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This thesis examines fictional and scholarly representations of historical changes in the 
Ottoman Empire during its final century, with an eye to understanding the dynamics 
that divided and united the empire across communities. In order better to understand the 
interplay between history and fiction, as well as the historical changes themselves, I 
have analysed, in the light of Ottoman history and historiography, a selection of 
contemporary Anglophone historical novels which have a strong component of social 
engagement and could be said to attempt to intervene in the representation of Ottoman 
history. These novels are The Janissary Tree (2006) and The Snake Stone (2007) by 
Jason Goodwin, The Abyssinian Proof (2008) and The Winter Thief (2010) by Jenny 
White, and Birds without Wings (2004) by Louis de Bernières.  
The nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire has been marked by technological, 
structural and social reforms, increased engagement with the European Powers, yet 
despite all such efforts, also by deteriorating economic status and increased divisions in 
the society. In their attempt to explore a past that best suits their vision of Ottoman 
society and the social conditions of the Ottoman Empire in its final century, these three 
authors have focused on three different moments of pronounced change, the Tanzimat, 
Sultan Abdülhamid II’s reign, and the First World War. All three novelists are 
interested in uncovering the dynamics and management strategies regarding cultural 
diversity within the empire. The concept of Ottoman ‘decline’ and the millet system 
emerge as crucial in Jason Goodwin’s work; Ottomanism and the heterogeneity of 
religious and national identifications and ideologies provide the critical focus in Jenny 
White’s novels. Through the analysis of Goodwin’s and White’s novels, I show that 
crime fiction, with the genre’s powerful ability to showcase social constituents and 
iii  
 
conditions, can present historical change as a matter of internal Ottoman dynamism, and 
project complex and sympathetic characters who help the authors produce a redemptive 
image of the Empire. De Bernières’s historical novel, by contrast, foregrounds the 
question of civilisation, and possible Ottoman difference from the West, while also 
exploring the challenges presented by intercultural coexistence in a small community 
that acts as a microcosm of the Ottoman Empire. Here the possibility of a common 
Ottoman identity, once perhaps a tacit condition, emerges as newly difficult to achieve 
because of the lack of any common definition of history, nationhood or patriotism as 
these concepts have emerged or been altered by the violent coming of modernity. 
Through close reading of both texts and contexts in this thesis, I have aimed to 
determine the projections of each author regarding the efficacy of historical novels as a 
point of entry to the past, and of Ottoman institutions and ideals as a modelfor 
promoting and managing the mutual coexistence of multifaith, multi-ethnic, and indeed 
multicultural identities. The parameters of each author’s investigation of Ottoman 
history are very much dependent on the kinds of past the writers envisage and are 
attempting to redeem. This vision in turn is informed by the authors’ subject positions 
vis-à-vis our contemporary existence in a modern multicultural world. That is to say, the 
authors do not only participate in, but attempt to intervene in, Ottoman history writing, 
both to redeem a past which they judge to have been most likely misunderstood by 
western readers, but also to project some alternative futures based upon a new 
understanding. This thesis argues that more balanced and nuanced representations of the 
Ottoman past, produced both as a result of the continuous efforts of writers of fiction as 
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What a strange city Constantinople is. Splendour 
and misery, joy and tears, a despotism greater than 
any that may be found elsewhere, yet, at the same 
time, a greater liberty. Here, four different peoples 
dwell together, and do not hate each other with 
more than a becoming hatred. Turks, Armenians, 
Greeks and Jews all live together in Constantinople 
as children of the same soil, and they seem to put 
up with one another better than men of different 
parties, or countrymen of different provinces, in 
our own land.1 
 
There has been a surge in the production of fictional works in recent decades which 
undertake the task of getting the reader or the viewer closer to Ottoman history. Being 
products of the twenty-first century imagination, the novels I undertook to examine in 
this research are aimed at heightening the susceptibility of the reader to a certain past 
that might just have been. In an attempt to fill the gaps between readers’ knowledge of 
Ottoman history and the heritage of the empire in the contemporary world, the authors 
use their informed imagination to alert readers to their own assumptions and potential 
biases. This way, they specifically allow themselves to recreate the controversial aspects 
of Ottoman imperial actions and policies by breaking silences which exist in history text 
books and expressing or challenging the implicit convictions of the readers. 
Unavoidably, like every individual who sees history from the perspective of their own 
personal background, these writers reflect their own projections of the significance of 
actual historical events and developments, but also specifically, of what being an 
Ottoman meant during the last century of the empire.  
                                                          
1 Gerard de Nerval, The Women of Cairo: Scenes of Life in the Orient, 2 Vols (New York: Harcourt, 




The works of literature studied in this research project, namely, The Janissary Tree 
(2006) and The Snake Stone (2007) by Jason Goodwin, The Abyssinian Proof (2008) 
and The Winter Thief (2010) by Jenny White, and Birds without Wings (2004) by Louis 
de Bernières, map some of the complexities of being a member of the last Muslim 
Empire during its waning years. The period covered by these novels stretches over a 
century from the early nineteenth century to shortly after the First World War (late 
1830s and early 1840s by Goodwin, 1880s by White and the early twentieth century by 
de Bernières), during which time the Empire showed resistance to further destruction 
and collapse by taking precautions, particularly by carrying out reformation movements 
or waging legitimacy battles. Following decades-long suffering of the empire’s subjects 
as the conflicts for independence were predominantly waged on its outskirts, the world 
eventually witnesses the transformation from an empire into a republic. In this project, 
on one hand, through the examination of the selected detective stories, the Ottoman 
Empire is observed from the point of view of the detectives, elite subjects of the empire, 
in an attempt to understand the struggles of the imperial core while the character of the 
region was prompted gradually to change through various nationalisms and Western 
imperialism. The specific use of detective characters with access to all strata of the 
society particularly provides the authors with the perfect vehicle to investigate both the 
crimes at hand and the complexities of the Ottoman society in the historical periods in 
question. On the other hand, in Birds without Wings, the concerns in the imperial core 
translate into the composition of a town. As it is, the alternative and fabricated histories 
narrated in the works under study here particularly correspond to and challenge the 
nationalist histories of post-Ottoman polities and identities.  
In this study, even if cultural diversity is examined as an important focal point, the 




dissolution. The works of fiction in question in this study, put together, examine the 
social tapestry of the empire when it was undergoing both a political deterioration and a 
rapid modernisation period in its final decades. It is witnessed in the novels that despite 
the efforts to confront the disintegration of the empire by state bureaucrats, 
dissatisfaction within the empire culminates in nationalist movements, and as illustrated 
by the characters in the contemporary works of fiction examined in this study, during 
such disturbances, historical subjects, as individuals, have had to find new ways to 
come to terms with their constantly shifting place within the empire. In its investigation 
of what being an Ottoman meant in the last century of the empire, this study examines 
not only the historical backdrop of the characters and events in the novels in question, 
but also the meaning and significance of the authors’ approach to historiography, 
choices of genre, and other literary conventions for the contemporary reader. 
On the whole, there are two main axes of this research project. On the one hand, I have 
tried to examine the representation of what it means to be an Ottoman and his 
(predominantly male subject) transformation throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The advance of ‘modernity’ in social sphere, material culture and 
technology as opposed to the continuing dominance of religion and superstition have 
been conducive to juxtapose and evaluate the transitional mileposts during the period in 
question. As the transformation of the Empire is explored through diverse primary 
considerations and viewpoints, despite setting their plots in different time periods, the 
writers of the works studied here were able to portray similar concerns regarding the 
representation of what being an Ottoman meant, including in terms of cultural diversity 
and modernity. The second consideration in this work has been the use of the historical 
novel and crime fiction to put the resources of literature to work in the interests of 




been put under an analytical lens to reveal each author’s perception of life, community, 
and government in the Ottoman Empire. These examples largely distinguish and 
pinpoint specific turning points that changed, and more often than not limited, the 
Ottomans’ place in world history. 
The Ottomans were an empire that, expanding from Asia Minor, stretched to territories 
in Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and Europe. As it spread across continents, it resettled 
some of its population in the newly acquired lands as its imperial policy and as far as 
assimilation was concerned, the empire itself evolved and changed as it interacted with 
new cultures, systems, technologies, administrative and military styles.2 Diversity was 
encouraged, as, with the annexation of largely Christian populated territories that had 
mostly constituted the Byzantine Empire, and particularly since the reign of Sultan 
Mehmed II, as is widely acknowledged, the empire made use of its religious diversity to 
create within its organisation a system of division through diverse legal and 
administrative structures within it. People that fall within these divisions, which were 
called millets, were allowed to practice their religion, and non-Muslims became exempt 
from the duties Muslims carried out, such as military service, but at the same time these 
non-Muslim groups were unable to attain high offices as rulers.  
The final century of the Ottoman Empire, before its collapse in the early twentieth 
century, is marked by the structural changes which had considerable impact on the 
makeup of the millets. By the early nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had already 
stagnated following the blow it had received to its expansionist policies as a result of its 
military defeats against the Habsburg Empire, which resulted in the Treaty of Carlowitz 
                                                          
2 Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, ‘Introduction’, in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: 
The Functioning of a Plural Society, ed. by Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, 2 vols (New York: 




(Karlowitz) in 1699, which betrays the onset of the empire’s military insecurities.3 With 
the advent of the nineteenth century, the balance of power had reversed against the 
Ottomans as European expansionism and scramble for territory now threatened the 
Ottomans’ very existence. During this period, cultural diversity of the Ottomans, which 
allowed the empire to prosper and thrive for at least four hundred years, now 
jeopardised its very existence as the idea of nationalism and national sovereignty that 
developed as a result of the American and French Revolutions, the Napoleonic wars, 
and what is generally called the Enlightenment, spread across the Balkans. The response 
of the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the nineteenth century to the threat coming 
from its own subject communities and European nations, including Russia, which 
supported such upheavals, was initially meagre, but played a fundamental role in 
shifting the political and social structure of the empire and the terms on which its 
subjects’ identifications were based. This period marks the Empire’s initial embarking 
upon reforms aimed at a virtually wholesale modernisation along European, and 
particularly French, lines. 
Since ‘it was nothing less than a public declaration by the sultan that he would respect 
the rule of law’, as Selim Deringil puts it, the reform edict of 1839 is principally 
accepted favourably as ‘the start of the Ottoman constitutional movement’.4 The edict 
promoted the burgeoning of increasingly nonreligious military and legal structures, and, 
according to the dominant historical narratives, gradually transformed the archaic 
palace-oriented organisation of power. However, these gradual reforms that were 
carried out in various areas of government, including bureaucratic structure, law, 
                                                          
3 Behlül Özkan, From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of a National Homeland in 
Turkey (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010), p. 15. 
4 Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman 
Empire 1876-1909 (London: I.B.Tauris, 2011), p. 45; Leonard A. Stone, Representations of Turkey: A 




military, education and finance, were also, to a great extent, conditioned by the strain of 
negotiating with and resisting British and Russian imperialist ambitions. The 
predominance of British interests over the Russians’ in Ottoman policies could already 
be discerned through the 1838 Treaty of Balta Limanı, which imposed a free-trade 
regime on the Ottoman Empire while the Ottomans did not possess the legitimacy to 
import goods using similar privileges. The treaty generated a rise in trades in the empire 
in the mid-nineteenth century; however, the system of free-trade and French 
capitulations (ahidnâmes), coupled with the Porte’s increased spending, precipitated an 
economic and political crisis that deepened further after the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russo 
War despite economic growth as a result of the loans the Empire received from the 
British (and investments by the French and Germans).5 In the meantime, the empowered 
status of Christians was starting to cause an upset among some Muslim circles ‘who 
increasingly felt their position of superiority under the Şeriat was being undermined’.6 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, especially mid-1870s onwards, the palace 
assumed a more reactionary stance to the increasing empowerment of the subjects, non-
Muslims or Muslims, by closing the newly formed parliament (which lasted just over a 
year), and repressing nationalist and liberal ideologies. Legal reforms in this period 
included ‘the Penal Code (1858), the institution of secular (nizami) courts in 1869, the 
empowering of the Ministry of Justice to control these courts, as well as the introduction 
of the principle of advocacy (1879)’.7 However, for some circles, the continuing 
evolution of education system and the new constituents of state bureaucracy were 
insufficient, so the slow progress in the face of increased financial hardship and the 
general mood of oppression led to the development of an internal resistance against the 
                                                          
5 Stone, Representations of Turkey, p. 17. 
6 Deringil, Well-Protected Domains, p. 48. 




monarchy, which found an outlet in the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.8 Bedross Der 
Matossian, in his Shattered Dreams of Revolution, explains the dynamics and the 
potential of this insurgence:  
There is no doubt that the Revolution of 1908 was affected by the regional and 
global waves of revolutions and constitutional movements that emerged in France 
(1789), Japan (1868), Russia (1905), and Iran (1905–1911). All of these revolutions 
had in common that they believed the predicaments of their states and societies 
should be solved through the kind of political reform that had transformed the West 
into a successful entity: constitutionalism and parliamentary rule vehicles to curb 
the power of the monarchy. The revolutionaries of this period saw these political 
mechanisms as the only sure way to guarantee the demise of older, absolutist 
political systems.9 
Despite the best intentions of this initiative, after the capture of Tripoli by the Italians in 
1912 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the standpoint of the Young Turks (Committee 
of Union and Progress) would assume a rather ‘defensive’ character.10 The onset of the 
World War One would prove that the Young Turks were failing to prevent the collapse 
of the Empire.  
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire has been a contentious topic in the body of both 
national and international historical literature of the subsequent generations, with many 
efforts, ranging in their focus and points of interest, channelled in understanding the 
circumstances which led to it. These developments have particularly, and rather 
predominantly, found their expressions in the experience of both the millet system, 
which played a direct role in the administration of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of 
religious differences for most of its existence, and Ottomanism, the project to create an 
egalitarian citizenry within the context of a reformed empire. The millet system was a 
method of administration which was introduced after the takeover of Constantinople by 
Sultan Mehmet II with the aim of governing the growing population of the empire with 
                                                          
8 Stone, Representations of Turkey, p.17. 
9 Bedross Der Matossian, Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman 
Empire, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2014), p. 2. 




diverse religious backgrounds. Ottomanism, on the other hand, was the project of 
transformation of Ottoman subjects into Ottoman citizens and, as a byproduct of the 
will and efforts in keeping the empire together, was marked by the Tanzimat reforms, 
1876-1878 Constitutional Era and the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. 
The increased interest in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the millet 
system and Ottomanism is an expression today of a move away from the modernist 
postulation of homogeneity and totalising concepts of nation and territoriality towards 
the acceptance and celebration of heterogeneity, multiplicity, and individuality. 
Particularly with the advent of globalised free-trade capitalism, taking hold of the 
national economic policies notably since the beginning of the 1980s and bringing with 
it, via more porous borders, an increase in the exchange of goods as well as labour 
forces, a renewed appreciation of pluralism has been cultivated around the world, 
paving the way for raised awareness about the past experiences of cultural diversity. 
The hailing of the Ottoman millet system in recent decades is not independent of such 
developments since the increased demand and appreciation for individual particularities 
and freedoms of the second half of the twentieth century eventually started also to 
include religious freedoms.  
Today, when social pluralism and individual identity have largely been accepted as the 
basis of modern democracy, the interest shown in the Ottoman Empire over the past few 
decades should not be seen independently of the worldwide interest in cultural diversity 
and the postmodern attraction to history. In an effort to be able to contribute to the 
scholarship on the relationship between imperial decline and social pluralism, at the 
outset of this project, I had confined the research problem of this thesis to the Western 
representations of multiculturalism in the Ottoman Empire during its years of decline. 




multiculturalism retrospectively to the nineteenth century, the research question of this 
thesis has had to evolve to include various perceptions on Ottoman identity, history and 
nationalism. Multiculturalism is a form of social coexistence of people with different 
values in terms of religion, cultural heritage, etc. The concept of cultural diversity or 
multiculturalism can have limited applicability retrospectively since the phenomenon 
presupposes the equal application of democratic political representation among social 
groups under one law, whether those groups are defined by race, religion or assigned 
ethnicity.  
The acceptance of the concept of toleration within the framework of cultural diversity is 
dependent on the choice of the individual or group to include or to exclude certain 
characteristics of the social group in question. In his review of Bhikhu Parekh’s 
Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Tariq Modood 
defines Parekh’s understanding of multiculturalism as ‘a form of (highly qualified) 
universalism’. According to Modood, multiculturalism’s fundamental ‘political’ tenet is 
the liberals’ obligation ‘to go beyond toleration and accommodation of other cultures to 
a dialogue with them’ in an ‘institutionalised’ way.11  
An early example of institutionalisation of multiculturalism is the regulated toleration of 
non-Islamic religions in the Ottoman Empire through the millet system. The interest in 
the millet system in recent academic studies and the cultural sphere can partially be 
explained through the efforts devoted to understanding the unavoidable experience of 
increase in the breadth of metropolitan cultural diversity in Western countries that 
occurred as a result of decolonisation, no border policies, and the lower costs and higher 
                                                          
11 Tariq Modood, ‘Their liberalism and our multiculturalism?’, British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, 3.2 (June 2001), 245–257 (p. 248); Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: 




benefits of relocation. Another reason for the general interest in cultural diversity is the 
desire of the culturally-liberal-minded to overcome the obstacles in building truly 
egalitarian societies by embracing differences. 
Examples of investigating and finding evidence of a just Ottoman society abound 
despite the vast variation of religious or ethnical affiliations within the empire. Gerald 
MacLean, for one, explains how ‘[i]n expressive and personal form, Evliya’s 
Seyahatname captures the Ottoman ideals of toleration, diversity and hospitality both as 
lived, conditional practice and – given his religious inclinations to the mystical 
traditions of Sufism – as the imaginary possibility of a joyous unconditionality’.12 
Despite all its appeal for a seventeenth century community, however, the millet system 
unquestionably lacked universalism, one of the main building blocks of contemporary 
understanding of multiculturalism, for the nineteenth-century communities in the post-
French Revolution era, until its final replacement with the official ideology of 
Ottomanism and its practical demonstration with the advent of a parliament. 
Ottomanism unreservedly represents ‘the possibility of a “convivial cosmopolitanism”’ 
in Evliya Çelebi’s vision of the Ottoman Empire, which  
is not a question simply of institutionalizing toleration but a founding principle and 
the future horizon of Ottoman civility, one that imagines and promotes the 
possibility of ‘a perpetual progressive movement’ that seeks to open hospitality to 
cultural and even religious differences, however radical they may be.13 
Here we can see within MacLean’s description of Evliya Çelebi’s model of Ottoman 
ideals an anticipation of the later movement of ‘Ottomanism’ in the nineteenth century 
investigated most fully by Michelle Campos, and to which we will return later.14 
                                                          
12 Gerald MacLean, ‘Remembering the Ottoman Past: Evliya Çelebi’s Book of Travels and Our Times’, in 
Literature and Cultural Memory, ed. by Mihaela Irimia, Dragoş Manea, and Andreea Paris (Leiden: Brill 
Rodopi, 2017), pp. 145-154 (p. 148). 
13 MacLean, ‘Remembering the Ottoman Past’, p. 150. 
14 Michelle U. Campos, Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century 




Addressing the very humanistic concerns regarding the cohabitation of people with 
different criteria for individual constraints and adaptability, Ottomanism in this broad 
sense, as a belated project that may still trouble the conscience of a post-Ottoman 
citizenry, has been one of the two main axes of this project alongside the representation 
of the struggles of the empire in its last century. 
Today, the last century of the Ottoman Empire is received with interest and a variety of 
genuine emotions, including bitterness, hostility, contentment and longing. The collapse 
of the empire is either celebrated by the many new proud nationalists of the nation-
states that replaced the Empire or mourned for what it could have offered to the war-
torn twentieth century if some things had gone differently. This leaves both the writer 
and the reader unavoidably obliged to see the history of the Ottoman Empire from a 
teleological perspective. Any little detail in the narratives of decline may carry a 
message for both the writer and reader as to the piled-up reasons that could have 
prevented the collapse. In this sense, the authors choose the time period, even the traits 
of their characters, based on a story they wish to tell about Ottoman social conditions. 
Helplessness in the face of an impending decline is not the only point under discussion; 
the ultimate result of the collapse is also latent. In this respect, both creative histories 
and their analyses are heavily contaminated by the contemporary politics in their focus 
on the ‘decline’ and fall of the Empire. There are multiple ways of reading history. 
After all, as Elif Batuman writes,  
Kemalism told Turks that they didn’t have to feel humiliated about the Treaty of 
Sèvres, because it was the Ottomans’ fault; neo-Ottomanism tells Turks that they 
don’t have to feel humiliated about the Ottomans, because if you go back far 
enough the Ottomans were the ones doing the humiliating.15  
                                                          
15 Elif Batuman, ‘Ottomania: A Hit TV Show Reimagines Turkey’s Imperial Past’, The New Yorker, (17-





This rift between the dejected, nostalgic and reactionary neo-Ottomanists and the 
secularising and westernising Kemalists has been pivotal in the representations of the 
Ottoman Empire. In general terms, the neo-Ottomanist ideology operates on the premise 
that after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, which might not have occurred 
save for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the nation has become an intellectual prisoner of the 
West. Atatürk’s Republic is criticised by neo-Ottomanists for destroying our culture, 
traditions, language, history, and religion following the footsteps of the imperialist 
forces. This throwback to the Ottoman Empire comes as a reaction to the dominant 
historical narratives of the republican period, which maintain that the Ottoman Empire 
had entered a period of decline in the nineteenth century due their detachment from 
scientific developments around the world based on their religious bigotry. Historians of 
the early republican period, in particular, saw the early nineteenth century reforms, 
including the Tanzimat reforms, as a reflection of the will to introduce a modern 
organisation of state, which eventually resulted in the foundation of modern Turkey in 
1923. The neo-Ottomanists reacting against the dominant republican historical narrative 
deem Mustafa Kemal Atatürk the authoritarian founder of amodern, secular and 
democratic state, which destructively and catastrophically broke away from the 
Islamically grounded Ottoman Empire. 
Fiction writers have contributed to this highly politicised subject with similarly varying 
foci and objectives in mind, from the investigation of Islamic traditions to the critique of 
nationalist ventures. The first novel examined in this thesis, Jason Goodwin’s The 
Janissary Tree, entertains the declinist perspective mentioned above, maintaining that 
the destruction of the Janissary corps offered a turning point in the history of the 




White’s novels, though, the protagonist of Goodwin’s novels does not exhibit a 
secularising mindset. On the contrary, despite the appreciation of legal changes that 
bring equality among the Ottoman subjects, he laments the eradication of old customs 
and celebrates the millet system. Jenny White’s novel, on the other hand, is rather more 
directly engaged with the ideology of Ottomanism. Louis de Bernières, differently from 
the former two, engages with the transition from multiculturalism to nationalism in a 
way that explores the limitations and the potential of state power and Ottomanism as its 
viable form of cohabitation among people from different religious backgrounds. 
The question of choosing a time period in history upon which to focus depends not only 
on what aspects of the history the historian and the historical novelist want to write 
about, but also on the history they prefer not to discuss. It is just enough to see the 
setting and actors of choice, such as the Janissaries, the Armenians or a town which has 
all but perished in contemporary times, to perceive that these are all conscious choices 
made to convey a legacy in the act of storytelling. After all, this is also in the nature of 
the novel form; as Agnes Heller suggests, ‘[a] novel is a novel. It needs to be 
teleologically constructed. Through all its contingencies, the story finds its way to its 
end. Whether the end is happy or unhappy, it is the end of a particular narrative’.16 
This aspect of the novel form, that the construction of a narrative requires active 
manipulation by way of being selective about the data and the input, has led some 
historians to see historical novels as spreading unhistorical truths. The author of The 
Historical Novel, Jerome de Groot, points to this fact:  
Much criticism of the historical novel concerns its ability to change fact, and indeed 
those who attack the form are often concerned with its innate ability to encourage 
an audience into being knowingly misinformed, misled and duped. [...] indeed this 
                                                          




fundamental strangeness is, it is argued, one the most important attributes of the 
historical novel.17  
Even though sometimes historical novels, like other works of fiction, have been 
criticised for being shaped by creative and commercial constraints because of the need 
for the author to write good books that sell, the viewpoint of the historical novel in this 
argument is rather that ‘academic history has tended to be too wary of emotions, too 
prone to treat historical knowledge as though it were a form of pure reason existing 
beyond the sullying realms of passion, fear, hope and sheer pleasure’.18  
De Bernières’s earlier novel, Captain Corelli’s Mandolin (1994) deals with the dilemma 
of involving emotions when writing history. The attempts of Dr Iannis, one of the main 
characters in the novel, to write the history of the island of Cephallonia fail because he 
sets the tone of his book based on the memory of his emotions; therefore, being 
premised upon his familiarity and relationship with the island, any attempt to create a 
historical text becomes doomed to be replete with ‘loaded adjectives’ and subjectivity.19 
The doctor’s inability to complete his book stems from his search for the authentic 
Cephallonian identity since there hardly seems to be one. Therefore, by adding the word 
‘the personal’ to the title of the  draft of his history book, the doctor frees himself from 
the burden of objectivity and finds that he can reflect ‘the ancient historical grudges’ 
and ‘be vitriolic about the Romans, the Normans, the Venetians, the Turks, the British, 
and even the islanders themselves’.20 In his effort to accept the history of Cephallonia in 
its entirety, he compares the previous Cephallonian rulers’ modus operandi with that of 
the Turks: 
[T]he Romans and the Normans were worse than the Turks, the Catholics were 
worse, the Turks themselves were probably not as bad as we like to imagine, and so 
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paradoxically, were not as bad as themselves. The Russians were infinitely better 
and the French were marginally better. The latter enjoyed constructing roads, but 
could not be trusted – the Turks never promised us anything, and therefore were by 
definition incapable of perfidy – and the British were worse than the Turks for 
some of the time, and the best of all of them for the rest.21 
The doctor is embittered about the centuries of invasions of the island, so builds his own 
reality and the reality of the island on this whirl of emotions: ‘Why could he not write 
like a writer of histories? Why could he not write without passion? Without anger? 
Without the sense of betrayal and oppression?’.22 Being too well aware of this 
conundrum, the doctor accepts the difficulty of writing history. In the narrator’s words: 
It was the same old problem; it was not so much a history as a lament. Or a tirade. 
Or a Philippic. He was struck by the illuminating idea that perhaps it was not that it 
was impossible for him to write a history, but that History Itself Was Impossible.23 
Doctor Iannis questions the possibility of a sentimental presentation of history. He then 
arrives at the conclusion that it is actually possible to write a sentimental history so long 
as the subjective nature of historiography is revealed.  
When the doctor’s daughter, Pelagia, decides to finish her father’s project, she gathers 
data from a variety of resources, including libraries and her correspondence with the 
learned, experts and the representatives of museums and libraries around the world.24 
The act of collation of history from various resources gives her the emotional 
detachment to the material that her father lacked; a detachment that also gives her the 
authority to write history. Unlike the doctor, Pelagia is able to complete the book, 
although in the end the publishing agencies declare that they are not interested in 
publishing it, because there is ‘no market’ for it.25 Regardless, the narrator describes 
Pelagia as ‘a substantial intellectual in the great Hellenic tradition’.26 The doctor’s 
                                                          
21 de Bernières, Captain Corelli’s Mandolin, p. 147. 
22 de Bernières, Captain Corelli’s Mandolin, p. 5. 
23 de Bernières, Captain Corelli’s Mandolin, p. 278. 
24 de Bernières, Captain Corelli’s Mandolin, pp. 395-6. 
25 de Bernières, Captain Corelli’s Mandolin, p. 396. 




search for identity is achieved when Pelagia finishes the book, and the direct connection 
to the Hellenic roots the doctor had been trying to create is finally established because 
of her intellectual connection to the island’s ancient inhabitants. The rejection by 
publishers to publish a book which lacked emotional, that is subjective, engagement 
demonstrates the demand among the common populace for emotional entanglement in 
order to appreciate history. Historical novels, with their unhistorical truths, bridge this 
gap between the historical knowledge of the reader and the reader’s unspoken emotions 
by granting them the room for experiencing sympathy, pain and an eventual acceptance 
of, or coming to terms with, one’s own experience of history.  
One of the functions of the historical novel, the act of stimulating the right kind of 
feelings for its consumer, is the key to the expansion of the reach of historical fiction as 
a genre. It is still widely accepted that the historical novel was born in the early 
nineteenth century as a result of the ‘transformation of men’s existence and 
consciousness throughout Europe’ after the French Revolution, which ‘form[ed] the 
economic and ideological basis for [Sir Walter] Scott’s historical novel’.27 The 
historical novel, which was sometimes called historical romance, remained popular 
throughout the nineteenth century; however, after a plunge of interest in it in the period 
between the two world wars, the historical novel has again reached a big market today 
with even more historical material in circulation. As Perry Anderson puts it ‘[t]oday, the 
historical novel has become, at the upper ranges of fiction, more widespread than it was 
even at the height of its classical period in the early 19th century’.28 The historical novel 
has emerged as ‘a product of romantic nationalism’, and today, it still acts as a medium 
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for readers in their search for their personal or national identities.29 This ability of 
historical fiction to represent the lived experience of its reader rests at the root of the 
popularity of the genre.  
In the same vein, the Turkish TV show Magnificent Century, geographically being the 
most widely consumed cultural product ever produced on the Ottoman Empire, sits at 
the centre of the debates on the ability of a work of historical fiction to stimulate 
fascination of audience from a large variety of national background, completely 
overlooking its implications for contemporary nationalisms. A BBC article grants that 
‘[t]hat it looks back 500 years to the era when Turkish Sultans ruled much of the 
Balkans and the Middle East is perhaps appropriate, as it has been seen in 47 countries 
mostly from this region’.30 The show’s success lies in its ability to unite the post-
Ottoman citizenry beyond their current nationalist persuasions, allowing them to 
reconnect with the history of their country as part of former Ottoman territories in a way 
that enables them to appreciate the struggles and complications of their personal and 
national histories. Gerald MacLean suggests that: 
The popularity of Muhtesem Yuzyil across widely differing audiences in Turkey 
testifies to different forms of cultural and nationalist nostalgia certainly, but the 
massive international take-up of the show indicates that there is more to it than 
Turks pondering their own past and debating its values.31 
The reproduction of history as cultural products can actually bring a slow change to the 
way national histories are written, as the single historical ‘truth’ and the desire to accept 
it as it is presented are being cast off. The homogeneity of historical narratives in 
predominantly homogenous societies, national, religious or gender constructions 
included, can be ruptured through alternative narratives. The diversification of the 
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imagery of the empire and the increase in its number and the diversity of medium used 
to create an Ottoman model mean that there can be more than one reality of the Ottoman 
Empire that the reader, or the viewer, can choose from.  
Cultural productions can change the ways the consumers of historical fiction look at 
history and help contemporary societies benefit from historical recreations in 
unconventional ways. Creation processes can also bring additional values to our 
understanding of history, which may be non-existing in the archives or artefacts, or 
ignored for lack of resources. Elif Batuman mentions in her New Yorker article how 
Leslie Peirce thinks that ‘the show has influenced her biography of Roxelana, drawing 
her attention to the central role of children, who are often neglected in the historical 
record’. In Peirce’s words, ‘[t]here are things you understand once you see them acted 
out in front of you’.32 This is an important example which allows the characters in 
history, especially the female characters, the possibility to speak out in Turkey’s largely 
male-dominant social architecture. After all, in societies with hegemonic structures, it is 
always possible to encounter ‘mistakes’ which are mostly caused by omissions. Reha 
Çamuroğlu also cautions against too much dependency on the imperial archives, in 
which, the writer believes, fabrications might have been possible, and documents may 
have been destroyed.33 The voice of the archives presents one of the challenges of 
objective representation. 
Apart from the ‘revisionist feminist’ side of Magnificent Century, which largely dwells 
on historical female characters, the series also acts as a postcolonial text which needs to 
be considered in terms of writing back to the imperialist West, the fight against whom 
has dominated the declinist narratives of the Empire. The powerful discourse of the film 
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shows that the East, with all its intricacies, complexities and power struggles, had once 
been the seat of rule of the world, thus challenging the contemporary rhetoric of 
dominant West versus weak and uncivilised East, which still occupies the consciousness 
of both Western and post-Ottoman societies.34 In the same vein, Magnificent Century 
can also be seen as a way of writing back to the early Republican official 
historiographies that have come to dominate much of Turkish public space, and find 
their counterparts in post-Ottoman nations in the Balkans and elsewhere. Such a wide 
frame of reference demonstrates the ways in which historical fiction subtly helps its 
consumers cope with the traumas of wars and their dissolved and forgotten past realities 
in the contemporaneity. Such reproductions of history change one’s map of realities and 
help them see alternative realities in past societies. The multiplicity of representations 
opens the ground for more eclectic and multi-faceted discussions and evolves our own 
conceptions of history, one sultan, one harem at a time. 
The novels in this research project initiate a renewed renegotiation of the ways in which 
the Ottoman Empire should be remembered today. By using the voice of the Ottomans, 
both real and imagined characters, they play a key role in the readjustment of the images 
of a perished Empire and its very real subjects to the social and political modes of our 
times. Through such representations of Ottoman lived experience, the reader can start to 
develop emphathy for those caught up in past struggles and better understand the 
conditions that left scars through successive generations. An example of such struggles 
is the growing nationalism of the nineteenth century which forced the Ottoman subjects 
to embrace the prospects of having to redefine their own loyalty to the empire and to the 
sultan, and their identity in relation to both. As a result, the Ottoman subjects of the 
nineteenth century experienced deep transformations in short spans of time, which led 
                                                          




to recognition of new identities for some of them and clashes between others. As 
religion started to lose its central position in the redistribution of power, Islam, which 
had been the core pillar of the empire for four centuries, started to lose its grip across 
the empire, slowly becoming one of the many means of reaching a social agreement 
across the empire.  
During this process, the definitions of Ottoman identity and the best ways of 
governance multiplied. As Ibrahim Kaya puts it,  
The rise of the West posed unforeseen questions to the Ottomans: should the West 
be recognized as a power? Were the Ottomans themselves no longer capable of 
governing the world? These questions could best be thought of as a search for a 
new definition of the Ottoman Empire. It is no surprise that Islamism and 
Westernism, as well as Turanism to an extent, came to be important paradigms in 
the nineteenth century.35  
Furthermore, every millet divided into various factions based on the relations of their 
membership with the imperial centre, and as a result, their financial status, religious 
representation, and territorial engagements redefined their loyalty to the seat of the 
Empire. In their descriptions of this period of transition to a more egalitarian and 
bureaucratic form of government and the emergence of new social formations around 
affinity-based identifications, a common point of reference in the novels in this study 
has been the renegotiation of the loyalty of the Sultan’s subjects to their Sultans. Many 
of the characters in the novels studied here negotiate the validity and potency of their 
loyalties to the Sultan; while some commit acts of violence to defame or dethrone the 
Sultan, some find ways of reiterating their allegiance to him. The historical and physical 
backgrounds in the novels, especially the additional complications of criminal activities 
in the novels of Goodwin and White, and the tension caused by the Great War in de 
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Berniéres, contribute to creating richly interesting settings that bring such confusions 
into the open. 
Another common trait among all of the novels studied here is the tests various 
characters are put through regarding Western modernity. Reactions to European 
modernisation (technological, institutional, etc.) in the novels vary from fighting, 
confrontation to acceptance and blindly following, all surfacing in relation to their 
professed Ottoman identities and positions within the society. The main characters are 
those who view the Ottoman sense of justice and compassion as the guiding principles 
of Ottoman modernity. In the first two chapters, we observe the detectives establish a 
balancing act vis-à-vis the sultans of their time against these sultans’ radical policies 
and actions. While Yashim, Jason Goodwin’s protagonist analysed in the first chapter, 
questions the benefits of the modernisation movement in the empire in the shadow of 
European powers, Kamil Pasha, the protagonist of the novels discussed in the second 
chapter, wields his own education in and understanding of law to keep the empire united 
rather than strictly working through the ordained methods of incredulity and violence.  
Chapter One, to a large extent, engages with Ottoman modernity: while the tradition-
modernity dichotomy of the Tanzimat period is discussed in relation to the ‘decline’ 
thesis in The Janissary Tree, sporadic examples are given from The Snake Stone on the 
topic of modernity in relation to multiculturalism. The plot of The Janissary Tree 
follows Yashim’s unravelling of a series of murder cases, which are connected to two 
simultaneous coup attempts against the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II in protest at his 
Tanzimat reforms. Against this background, and particularly in The Janissary Tree, the 
writer shares with the reader colourful imagery and historical details about the 
Janissaries, eunuchs, European-Ottoman relations and Istanbul as a city where 




Jason Goodwin initially studied Byzantine history at Cambridge University before 
developing an interest in Ottoman history in later years. His interest in the Ottoman 
Empire developed as a result of a journey he made on foot to Istanbul from Poland in 
1990, the outcome of which was his non-fiction book On Foot to the Golden Horn: A 
Walk to Istanbul (1993). This inspirational experience then becomes a point of entry for 
Goodwin into his long engagement with Ottoman history. In the ‘Introduction’ of his 
1998 book on the Ottoman Empire Lords of the Horizons, Goodwin suggests that this 
walk changed his perspective of the European map at a time when Soviet Russia was 
slowly fading away: ‘I think we caught Europe at a moment of clarity, and what we saw 
was a world that slanted towards Istanbul’.36 Still relatively influenced by his early 
experience in Poland, his crime fiction series largely take place in Istanbul with a 
general focus on topics such as the map of Europe, threats to the monarchy, the 
trafficking in antiquities, and modernisation versus tradition. After his fiction books 
gained popularity, Goodwin later published a cook book called Yashim Cooks Istanbul: 
Culinary Adventures in the Ottoman Kitchen (2016) based on the recipes his protagonist 
Yashim cooks in the novels.  
Jason Goodwin’s novels, even if they are set in and about the Ottoman Empire, 
essentially focus on Ottoman-European relations and the ways Europeans, in general, 
interacted with the Ottomans. Indeed, one novel, The Bellini Card (2008), is even set in 
Venice, establishing the Ottomans’ ties with Venetians through the painter Gentile 
Bellini’s (c.1429-1507) connection with Sultan Mehmed II (1432-1481). Jason 
Goodwin, like Jenny White, likes to blend nineteenth-century Ottoman history with pre-
Ottoman history, and with Ottoman history from before the period about which they 
                                                          





write. On the intricacy of the plots of his thrillers, Goodwin says that ‘plot, after all, is 
just the vehicle. What matters is the scenery, and who’s on board’.37 As it happens, his 
kaleidoscopic presentations of Istanbul have received enthusiastic reviews placing his 
writing within the exoticising category: ‘When you read a historical mystery by Jason 
Goodwin, you take a magic carpet ride to the most exotic place on earth’.38 This 
reception indicates the extent to which Goodwin’s novels can be read as Orientalist. 
Therefore, the question of rational reforms within the empire, or rational debates 
amongst Ottoman officials, does not play as strong a part in his representations as they 
do in the novels of Jenny White. While discussing choosing the time period for his 
fiction, Goodwin reflects on how he was hesitant about making a choice, or taking 
decisive action, or even choosing a side. He preferred to let things evolve, to remain 
open to possibilities as they unfolded: 
‘There were two periods with an obvious draw. One was 16th century, the Ottoman 
Empire at the peak of its powers, pushing up to Austria, pushing down to the Red 
Sea, Suleyman the Magnificent, and all that. The trouble with that is that 
triumphalism is a kind of dull mode. I think it’s much more fun to write about 
decay and decline, things growing a bit shabby. The 1830s was an interesting 
period when you’ve got two moods clashing. There’s the nostalgic one, you know, 
Where have we gone wrong? And there’s the fearful, Where are we going next? I 
suppose that just makes for an interesting milieu.’39 
The first chapter is particularly interested in looking at this ‘clashing’ of ‘moods’. In 
this chapter, Goodwin’s presentation of conflict as nonessential and the balancing role 
his characters play with this regard correspond to the author’s own modest expectations 
from history. 
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The historical context studied in the second chapter allows a more detailed analysis of 
Ottoman rationality. Jenny White’s Kamil Pasha series is different from Goodwin’s 
Yashim series in that the changes in the Ottoman world are more internalised than in 
Goodwin’s novels. There is a decisive position that has been taken through Kamil Pasha 
regarding a stress placed on the rule of law. Random chance in Goodwin’s novels 
regarding the investigation of crimes gives way to a more ordered, but at the same time 
more hierarchical worldview in the semi-procedural crime fiction of White. In White’s 
novels, ‘the actual methods and procedures of police work are central to the structure, 
themes, and action’. In the works of both authors, however, romance has an important 
role to play because of the way these works can be seen as the byproducts of what 
Scaggs calls ‘the hero detectives of bourgeois weakness’.40 Within this context, Kamil 
Pasha represents the ‘historical shift’ which witnesses ‘[t]he transition [...] from a 
judicial process centered on confession and torture to one centered in a trial by 
evidence’.41 In this modern experience of fiction, Kamil Pasha’s faith in law and 
Ottoman justice acts as the driving force in the novels.  
As contrasted with Kamil Pasha’s confidence in rationality, law, and order, Jenny White 
presents engrossing forces which take their power in the eyes of the general public from 
spirituality and the potency of immeasurability of authority. In The Abyssinian Proof, 
Kamil Pasha has to come to terms with his guilt over his father’s death by embracing 
his intricate family relations with the help of a Muslim cleric, and not allow his personal 
connections to get in the way of his search for justice. In The Winter Thief, he has to 
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come to terms with having to ignore the orders of his Sultan in order to protect the 
Ottoman subjects from the personal vendetta of Vahid, the secret police chief.  
Based on an understanding that Sultan Abdülhamid II’s reign is stamped by the 
monarch’s demand of loyalty, in Kamil Pasha novels, the author’s enactment of the use 
of the secret police to counter dissension in Sultan Abdülhamid’s re gn comes to the 
fore as a demarcator for Kamil Pasha’s loyalty to the monarch and as an indicator of his 
search for justice for all the sultan’s subjects in equal measure. The period of the 
author’s choice provides ample complications for crime fiction, and through Kamil 
Pasha’s belief in law, the weaknesses of Abdülhamid’s pan-Islamic policies also appear 
on display: ‘Kamil – the special prosecutor in The Winter Thief – is a modernist who 
believes in the intrinsic virtue of a multi-ethnic, multi-denominational empire ruled by a 
just and secular bureaucracy.  He tries to defend this principle against all odds’.42 
Jenny White has taught at Stockholm University's Institute for Turkish Studies after 
having taught social anthropology at Boston University until 2016. Her point of entry to 
interest in Turkey came through friends she made when she was studying abroad for a 
year in Germany. She then went on to Turkey to ge  a Master’s degree in psychology in 
Ankara. Her academic interest subsequently fell on Turkey; her academic biography on 
her personal website is self-explanatory about her choices of topic and focus in her 
novels: 
She has published three scholarly books on contemporary Turkey. Money Makes Us 
Relatives, a description of women’s labor in urban Turkey in the 1980s, was 
published in 1994. Islamist Mobilization in Turkey was published in 2002. It 
explains the rise of Islamic politics in Turkey in the 1990s and won the 2003 
Douglass Prize for best book in Europeanist anthropology. Her latest book (2012 
Princeton), Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks takes a look at the 
transformations that Turkish Islam and secularism -- and the idea of the nation -- 
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have undergone in the past decade. What is behind Turkey's leap to international 
prominence, and what should we make of it?43 
In her novels, female characters, lesbian relationships, religion, nationalism and 
socialism come to the fore as the most-addressed topics. In her approach to history, 
Jenny White blends popular and scholarly academic histories of such issues, including 
the story of the Ark of the Covenant, and adapts them to the conditions of an Ottoman 
setting, allowing the author to ask the questions she wants to ask and convey the kinds 
of feelings she wishes these speculative narratives to evoke. 
The subjectivity of history, artificiality of narratives, and the impossibility of acquiring 
complete knowledge about history form an important part of the discussions in the third 
chapter. The third chapter, in which Birds without Wings is examined, looks at the ways 
history is used and abused for the purpose of building nations, rebranding civilisations, 
and establishing loyalties. Louis de Bernières poses in the novel conjectural questions 
related to nationalism and irredentism that ravaged the accumulated customs, practices 
and experiences of transcultural actuality that had made up the Ottoman identity until 
the advent of the Great War. He is able to manifest the tensions of the early twentieth 
century in the shadow of an impending world war through the portrayal of everyday 
lives of the people of an idyllic, but by no means perfect or overly romanticised, town. 
In an interview, de Bernières tells how he came to write Birds without Wings:  
'I went to south-west Turkey and there's a ghost town there. It used to be a mixed 
community, as described in the book more or less, and they obviously had a 
wonderful way of life, quite sophisticated. The town was finally destroyed by an 
earthquake in the Fifties, but it really started to die when the Christian population 
was deported. It was walking around that very special place that gave me the 
idea.'44 
                                                          
43 ‘Biography of Jenny White’, <http://www.jennywhite.net/> [accessed 9 July 2018]. 
44 Geraldine Bedell, ‘I know I'm not Tolstoy, but I Try’, The Guardian 




Having already written a historical novel, Captain Corelli’s Mandolin, which 
investigates the impact of the destruction Second World War had on local people of a 
Mediterranean island, a visit to a coastal town in Turkey became Louis de Bernières’s 
point of entry in which he recognised a ‘quite’ sophisticated way of life, the Ottoman 
imperial multicultural model, which had been destroyed by the Turkish War of 
Independence and population exchange. In de Bernières’s novel, the increasing tension 
and hostility in the Empire among ethnic and religious groups have been approached 
with a rather nuanced manner than a more usual binary approach that is relatively more 
common in subjective historical narratives. De Bernières observes the opportunities 
presented within the Ottoman collective identity, but also demonstrates its limitations in 
the early twentieth century when commonalities become ruptured by Western 
imperialist and nationalist forces. 
The works of fiction which are the subject of study in this thesis have been examined 
through an interdisciplinary lens. Even though on the critique of the earlier 
representation of the Ottoman Empire, a much larger literature exists, a major limitation 
has been the scant number of readily available critical resources because of the 
recentness of thes  works of fiction.45 Based on the main points of interest of this 
research project, I have extensively benefitted from the writings of Niyazi Berkes, 
Michelle Campos and Selim Deringil to reach a general analysis of modernisation, 
multiculturalism and nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and of the ways the Ottomans 
chose to adapt to the changing world around them.  
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Goodwin, White and de Bernières tell similar stories about the destabilising 
relationships that emerged under the banner of liberty, equality and fraternity, 
ultimately leading to the homogenisation of identities. These stories, above all, involve 
the difficulties the Ottoman imperial centre encountered in managing populations from 
different faith groups, which at times challenged the imperial integrity. The uniquely 
complex social structure of the Ottomans was bounded, yet manageable and adaptable. 
Moreover, towards the end of its existence, the empire almost achieved a model which 
could permeate through the strict boundaries between faiths. Representations of lived 
experience of hardship as well as treasured commonalities open up to Western 
audiences this complex past, helping them grasp the disruptions and anxieties of the 
nineteenth century Ottoman Empire and offering hints about contemporary confusions 
and resentments. Representations of ashared past promote the possibility of a future 
based upon the notions of cultural hybridization, exchange and unity. In its most basic 
formulation, it has been the mission of this thesis to identify and analyse the nuances of 
such contemporary representations of historical changes and interpretations of Ottoman 







Palace Sleuthing and Tanzimat Problematics:  




‘We can be modern, Yashim: we must be 
modern. But do you really think modernity is 
something you can buy? Modernity isn’t a 
commodity. It’s a condition of the mind.’1  
 
In the history of the Ottoman Empire, the nineteenth century is registered as the century 
of economic deterioration, major territorial losses and empire-wide disintegration. It is 
also seen as the century of transformation, with the abolishing of the Janissaries in 1826 
regarded as the starting point of decisive and impactful reforms that, as interactions with 
the states of Western Europe increased, expanded by degrees. Jason Goodwin’s fictions 
shed light on the early development of the nineteenth-century reforms, reflecting a 
much different character from the later reformation efforts of most interest to Jenny 
White and Louis de Berniéres. The above passage from The Janissary Tree embodies a 
typical model within Ottoman historiography for grasping the confusions and anxieties 
of the nineteenth century that predominantly originated from the increasing encounters 
of the Ottoman Empire with Western European countries. Written in the twenty-first 
century, like the rest of the novels examined in this study, The Janissary Tree 
participates in both an ontological (such as ‘who the Ottomans were, and what and who 
they were becoming’) and epistemological (‘what they knew about the changes in their 
identity and how they articulated them’) investigation into the nature of nineteenth-
century Ottoman identity. By representing compelling aspects of Ottoman history 
                                                          




involving the critical premises of tradition, loyalty and modernity in his series of 
detective novels, Goodwin highlights the unique difficulties that the Ottomans 
encountered that distinguished them not only from their peers in other parts of the 
world, specifically in Europe, but also from the civilisations that preceded them. 
Through his synchronic and diachronic investigation, the author tackles the issue of 
modernity predominantly within the context of national, sexual and social identities, and 
informs the reader of the prevailing Ottoman imperial anxieties at the time, particularly 
in Istanbul, the imperial seat.  
Jason Goodwin is a historical novel writer with an academic background as a historian. 
He is the author of a popular history book on the Ottoman Empire, Lords of the 
Horizons.2 His historical crime fiction series, containing books titled The Janissary Tree 
(2006), The Snake Stone (2007), The Bellini Card (2008), The Evil Eye (2011) and The 
Baklava Club (2014), is centred on the adventures of the palace investigator, Yashim, 
the Eunuch, who solves murder mysteries that generally have intricate connection to the 
Palace or tragically to the future of the Empire itself. Chiefly set in Istanbul3 in the years 
between 1836 and 1842, the novels in this series shed light on the final years of Sultan 
Mahmud II's and the early years of Abdulmecid I’s reigns, which are, in the novels, 
associated with the early years of a series of social and economic reformations 
following the Tanzimat Edict of 1839. The Janissary Tree mainly undertakes to 
examine the domestic and international reactions to Western-style reform schemes, 
especially military ones, undertaken in the Ottoman Empire as it, arguably, finds itself 
in a new kind of relationship with post-revolutionary Europe in the background. The 
Snake Stone addresses itself more specifically to changes to the millet system, the 
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Ottoman system for enshrining in law religious toleration for Christians and Jews, 
‘People of the Book’, and managing a huge multicultural and multi-faith empire. Taken 
together, these first two novels serve to frame the governing preoccupations of the series 
as a whole. This chapter will focus primarily on these texts, while attending to others in 
the series along the way. 
1.1. The Janissary Tree 
The Janissary Tree, the first book in the Yashim, the Eunuch series, is the story of a 
clash between traditionalist and progressive forces that emerged as a reaction to a series 
of reforms in major legislative and civic areas, including the military, education and 
taxation, in the early nineteenth century. The novel takes place in the year 1836, when, 
ten years after the abolition of the Janissary corps, or Yeni Çeri (New Troops), in 1826, 
Sultan Mahmud II (1785-1839) is about to initiate a series of reforms with an imperial 
edict. Goodwin devises two groups of coup plotters in his novel who are not content 
with the sultan’s reforms and plan to end his reign. The first opposition to Sultan 
Mahmud’s reforms comes from the remaining members of the defunct military 
organisation, the Janissaries, who collaborate with a group of members of the imperial 
household, the eunuchs, with the intention of reversing the reforms. On the other side of 
the Janissary-Eunuch conspiracy, the Seraskier, the head of the new army, comprises a 
second camp of coup plotters, and finding reforms inefficient and insufficient and 
seeing the empire itself as a defunct system in the modern world, seeks to r place it with 
a republic. In other words, while one group fears the uncertainty of their future in a 
rapidly changing state structure and attempts to depose Sultan Mahmud II in order to 
protect their status quo, the opposite camp deems customs and traditions as ‘just grime 




government.4 The Janissary Tree, therefore, is an attempt to resituate the clash between 
traditionalists and modernists at the time of the Tanzimat (reorganisation or 
restructuring) reforms through the description of fictional coup attempts corresponding 
to some of the confusions of the time. 
The plot of The Janissary Tree follows the daily life of Yashim, the eunuch 
investigator, who is assigned to investigate two different cases of murder: a series of 
murders involving four Palace military officers, commissioned by the Seraskier, the 
commander of the New Guard, the new European-style army, and the murder of a 
favourite concubine of Sultan Mahmud II, which is commissioned by the Valide Sultan, 
the mother of the sovereign Sultan. The novel starts with Yashim being called for by the 
Seraskier, who then informs Yashim about the mysterious death of a promising young 
officer and the disappearance of three others. The first dead soldier is discovered in a 
large copper cauldron in the old Janissary barracks after having been boiled. Pondering 
on the incident, Yashim remembers the presence of a fire-tower on the edge of these 
barracks, which had been manned by the Janissaries.5 Apart from the significant 
location, the symbolic tool of murder also points to a possible Janissary connection as 
Yashim recalls that the Janissary ranks used to hold kitchen-related titles such as the 
Soup-men, the Cook, the Head Scullion, Barrack-room Chief, Quartermaster, 
Watercarrier and Black Scullion.6 
As Yashim continues his investigation following this lead, the bodies of the remaining 
three young officers, murdered with a cooking related tool or method, appear one by 
one at locations that had allegedly been symbolic for the Janissary corps. The murders 
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being linked with the Janissaries unsettles Yashim profoundly, since the Janissaries’ 
abolition in 1826 was followed by bloody fighting, with an estimated loss of 5,000 
Janissaries and 600 loyal troops, and Yashim predicts the possibility of the survivors’ 
vengeful return.7 The mission gets even more complicated as, in addition to these 
cadets’ murders, Yashim also has to investigate the mysterious death of a gözde 
(‘favourite’) concubine at the palace. Yashim, through these two murder investigations, 
gradually uncovers the connection linking these two sets of murders with the two coup 
plots designed to overthrow the sultan. At the end of the novel, Yashim’s mission to 
find the murderers of the missing officers turns into preventing a civil disturbance 
which could result in the regicide of Mahmud II, or even the demise of the Empire.  
In the novel, this commotion, forged as a result of the political agendas of the defunct 
Janissary Corps, the Palace Eunuchs and the Seraskier, is claimed to have been incited 
in consequence of the reforms set to be initiated by the Sultan Mahmud II. The reform 
edict that is expected to be proclaimed by the Sultan in 1836 in The Janissary Tree is a 
conjectural fictional experiment based on the Imperial Rescript of Gülhane of 1839, 
which is a document that concedes the presence of an imperial decline (of 150 years) 
and urges that the needed changes be carried out based on three foundational precepts: 
the protection of ‘life, honour and property’, a fairer tax system, and a reformed 
conscription system.8 Proclaimed on 3 November 1839, the document is an 
acknowledgement and a short evaluation of the failures of the empire, and a framework 
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for a vision of a more just future. In The Janissary Tree, the Sultan’s formulation of the 
Edict is explained within the context of the imperial throne’s commitments to restoring 
the frail reputation of the Empire by overhauling the systemic faults within its 
administration and by bolstering the Sultan’s sovereign rule in the face of the pressures 
stemming from ‘military weakness[es]’.9  
Introducing crimes and the means and techniques of solving them in fiction is a very 
efficient way of unveiling the complications and dysfunctions in a given society. As 
Heather Worthington puts it, ‘[w]e see clearly, in crime fiction, the anxieties, the morals 
and values of the contemporary society’.10 Goodwin, by having Yashim go sleuthing 
after the criminals, takes the reader on an inquisitive mental journey related to both the 
daily life in the Ottoman Empire, and its organisation, including the military system and 
palace life. In the meantime, through the pursuit of the crime, it becomes possible to 
witness the changes in society since ‘ rime is the deviant action of the marginalised 
individual that defines the normative centre of society’.11 This way, it becomes possible 
to see how the author delineates through his characters some of the domestic and 
international actors and conditions that are central to the organisation of the society. In 
The Janissary Tree, these actors and conditions are those that were part of the Ottoman 
political decision-making in the years right before the declaration of the Reform Edict in 
1839. Before moving on to the tradition-modernisation dichotomy of this period, the 
following sections of this chapter will explore the actors and the themes that have 
played an important role in Goodwin’s vision of the Ottoman Empire at this point in its 
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history when its ‘anachronistic political and socio-economic structures’ were being 
reformed extensively.12 
1.1.1. The Ottoman Decline, the Powers and the Eastern Question through the 
Edict 
Before the rise of the notorious Eastern Question, which was the political quandary 
among the Western Great Powers presenting a new opportunity from which to draw 
maximum benefit should the Ottoman Empire disappear, back in the classical period of 
the Empire, the Ottoman rulers took pride in their military achievements, and by 
incorporating religious multiplicity into their rule, they consolidated their power in a 
large geography. Philip Mansel shows how the Ottoman Empire is mentioned as a 
‘great power rather than as a Muslim enemy’ in the literature circulated in France from 
the late fifteenth century to the seventeenth.13 Headed by the long-lasting and powerful 
dynasty members with loyal subjects from a variety of backgrounds, their invincible 
military capabilities had allowed the Ottomans to perceive themselves as the rulers of 
the world. The consecutive military defeats, therefore, did not affect their self-
confidence in the years to follow even after the advance of the so-called age of 
decline.14 Moreover, as Niyazi Berkes argues in his The Development of Secularism in 
Turkey, their self-glorification even helped the Ottomans avoid confrontation with the 
unfavourable realities of their time: the fact that the Ottomans had such strong beliefs in 
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the ‘superiority of their own system’ had caused their detachment from the 
developments in the West where ‘a new civilization’ was rising.15 
Developments in their western neighbours did not alarm Ottoman officials nor inspire 
Ottoman intellectuals at a capacity that would encourage a grand-scale action; therefore, 
the Ottomans sustained their status in the world without sizeable exchange taking place 
with the West. A rare example mentioned by Berkes is İbrahim Müteferrika, who was 
an early eighteenth-century reformer. According to Berkes’s account, as early as 1731, 
Müteferrika discusses in his book 'Usûl ul-Hikam fî Nizâm ul-'Umam (Rational Bases 
for the Polities of Nations) the reasons for the rise of the West and the necessity for 
reforms in the Ottoman Empire. In the book, Müteferrika first details the achievements 
of the ‘Christian’ world, such as the colonisation of the American continent, the 
occupation of some territories in the Eastern and Western oceans, and the discovery of a 
new route to the Far East.16 Berkes explains how Ibrahim Müteferrika thought, as early 
as the early eighteenth century, that these recent developments in the West created a 
division in the world between the old world and the new. Contrary to the innovative 
world of Christianity, the world of Islam had remained stagnant and ignorant. It had 
neglected to study its neighbours, especially its European neighbours and Russia, which 
he anticipated would soon attack the Ottoman Empire. Müteferrika believed that the 
Europeans were transforming into world powers not only because of the new methods 
they were developing to protect their lands, but also because of the new principles, 
procedures and laws that they were introducing to improve their society. Ultimately, the 
Europeans were gradually becoming victorious over the Ottomans.17  
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A notion of nostalgia for the stronger days of the Empire and an anticipation of an 
Ottoman decline can be traced early in the novel The Janissary Tree, starting from the 
first few pages of the book when the conversation between Yashim and the Seraskier, 
the chief commander of the army, puts emphasis on the territorial losses to the Russians. 
A sense of longing for the old and strong days of the Empire is emphasized by means of 
the heavy presence of lament and resentment for the loss of control in the territories 
covering Crimea, Egypt and Greece. The Russian Empire is introduced as presenting a 
great danger to the Ottomans, particularly because of the Russian dominance in Crimea 
as of 1783, following the loss of the protectorate status of the Crimean Khanate in 1774, 
and the resultant continuing expulsion of the Tatars from Crimea in the nineteenth 
century. In Yashim’s reverie, ‘the ghosts of fearless riders’, ie. the Tatars, are in the 
vicinity of the ‘shattered palace in the Crimea’, reminding him of the ruination of the 
Khanate, and the lack of power of the Empire to defend them against Russia.18 In this 
anachronistic account, Yashim is represented as having been overcome by a sense of 
defeat and desolation that he witnessed in Crimea, which is no longer under the control 
of the Tatars, the ‘little brothers to the Ottoman states’, but of the Russian Cossacks.19 
Even if Yashim manages to run away from the bitter cold of the steppe to the safety of 
Istanbul, he is still being hunted by the ghosts of the Crimean past in the Ottoman 
present.20  
The Seraskier disdains the diplomatic failure in Crimea that Yashim was part of, 
although, speaking on behalf of the Ottomans, Yashim confesses that ‘[w]e failed there 
[in Crimea - or in their war against Russia] many years ago’, invoking early concerns, 
which were also shared by İbrahim Müteferrika, about the possibility of Russian threat 
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to the Empire.21 It is unclear what Yashim’s mission in Crimea was, and what the ‘little’ 
he did in Crimea refers to, although, considering that it is mentioned in the novel that 
‘[t]he khan himself fretted in exile’, the ‘little’ Yashim did may refer to the finalisation 
of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, which gave the Russians dominance over the 
territory as well as ‘the right to navigate the Black Sea, the Bosphorus and the 
Dardanelles’.22 By the end of the eighteenth century, Russia had already secured 
considerable influence in the Black Sea and the rule of the entire northern coast of the 
Black Sea. The diplomatic tensions between the Russians and the Ottomans arising 
from military conflicts are alluded to not only by means of the derisive comments of the 
Seraskier, but also through the complacent attitude of the Sultan regarding  case of the 
humiliation of the Russian diplomats that is brought to his attention later on in the novel 
during a concert at the Palace.23 Such examples of animosity between the Russians and 
the Ottomans in the novel result from the succession of recent wars between the 
Russians and the Ottomans, which generally ended with the Russians gaining control of 
formerly Ottoman territory. 
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The historical background presented in the novel is the period after which Mehmet Ali, 
the Albanian, sent his forces to help the Ottoman Empire with the Greek uprisings.24 
The Russians had already been backing Greek struggles of independence, which had 
indeed caused the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–29. This war was concluded by the 
Treaty of Edirne (14 September 1829), which recognized Russia’s dominance over the 
eastern shores of the Black Sea, Georgia and parts of present-day Armenia. However, 
when Mehmet Ali in the late 1830s secured influence in the region, and he and his son 
became a threat to the Ottomans, Mahmud II was obliged to ask for outside help to stop 
the advancement of Mehmet Ali’s troops. After the British declined the call for help, the 
Sultan asked for the help of the Russians, who were eager to intervene as it would mean 
that they could gain leverage against Western European powers over Constantinople.25 
Raphaela Lewis summarizes the ascent of the Russian power within the Ottoman 
borders giving clues as to resulting anxieties:  
The landing of a powerful Russian force in the Asian shores of the Bosphorus was 
concluded by the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi in July 1833 […]. This marked the 
breakdown of Turkish dominance in the Black Sea, and also over their Christian 
subjects, for it gave the Russians an excuse to claim to be protectors of all subjects 
of the Turkish Empire who were members of the Greek Church.26  
This instance of the Ottomans yielding to Russian military force is articulated in the 
novel by the narrator from the perspective of the Seraskier, whose inner reflections 
inform the reader that now ‘the Russians were closer to Istanbul than at any time in 
living memory’.27  
Expanding Russian influence within state affairs coupled with the economic and 
military failures of the Empire is a continuing source of anxiety in The Janissary Tree, 
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not only for the Ottomans, but also for the Western Powers. The author further makes 
use of this feud to institute a connection between the Russians and the pending fictional 
1836 Janissary-Eunuch uprising to register the determination of the Russians to weaken 
the Sublime Porte and the Palace. Yashim’s explanation to the Valide Sultan in the 
resolution of the novel betrays the writer’s attitude regarding the central role the 
Russians played in Ottoman consciousness, and possibly in the consciousness of the 
English, too:  
They’re poised for a takeover of Istanbul, [...] Ever since the days of the Byzantines 
they’ve dreamed of the city. It was the second Rome – and Moscow is the third. 
They wanted anarchy in Istanbul. They didn’t care how it happened – a Janissary 
coup, the seraskier going mad and proclaiming himself ruler, anything. If the House 
of Osman was extinguished, imagine the consequences! They’re camped a week or 
so away. They’d claim to be restoring order, or to be protecting the Orthodox, or to 
be being sucked into the vortex one way or another, it wouldn’t matter how. Just so 
long as they could occupy the city and provide themselves with a reasonable excuse 
afterwards, when the European Powers started kicking up a fuss. The French, the 
English, they’re terrified of letting the Russians in – but once they’re in, they’d be 
here to stay. Look at the Crimea.28 
The mention of Russian political ambitions by Valide Sultan within the context of 
Constantinople’s strategic importance helps the author not only to portray the extent of 
Russian menace, but also to situate the Western powers’ involvement in the domestic 
affairs of the Ottomans. 
The involvement of the Western Powers in the relations between the Ottoman and 
Russian Empires following the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi (1833) is an important 
moment in history, since the resulting London Straits Convention of 1841, which forced 
Russia to abandon its privileges regarding the closure of the straits to Western powers, 
allowed the Powers to be involved in Ottoman internal affairs and cast a policy shift 
woven around the Eastern Question.29 The Eastern Question was considered as a 
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diplomatic problem by the Western European countries that emerged as a response to 
uprisings and independence movements in the Balkans, prompting the Great Powers to 
institute their authority in these complications for the furtherance of their own interests. 
This not only became part of the expansionist imperial policies of the European Powers, 
especially due to the difficulties the Ottoman Empire was having managing its domestic 
issues, but also created tensions among the European states in their race of gaining more 
control in the world politics.  
Along with Russian ambitions, another condition that led to the formulation of the 
Eastern Question was the concern among the Western Powers regarding the status of 
the Greeks under Ottoman rule. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman 
lands with a majority Greek population had become a catalyst for the power struggles in 
Europe, which would eventually extend into the remaining territories of the Ottoman 
Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century. Şükrü Hanioğlu maintains that the 
extension of external support by the major powers, namely the French and the British, 
for the independence of a people under the Ottoman dominion, was specific to the 
Greek question, which had wider consequences for other Christian populations of the 
Empire.30 Before the Greek uprisings, the fact that Ottoman Christian subjects were 
ruled by a Muslim Empire had been typically acknowledged to be ‘an internal affair of 
the Ottoman state’. The ‘Serbian Question’, for example, had remained outside the 
Powers’ focus for being a ‘moral issue’ when Russia supported the rebels during the 
Russo-Ottoman War of 1806-12. The Greek case, however, had a different value in 
European consciousness, and unlike previous uprisings in the past, the Greek cause had 
international support. The situation, therefore, had become tricky for the Ottomans, 
since, when Greek independence was finally recognised by the Treaty of Constantinople 
                                                          




in 1832, it formed a precedent for other Christians of the Empire. The Christian world in 
Europe thereupon started to form strong opinions regarding the problems of the 
Christian populations in the Empire, and before long ‘internationalization of local 
grievances’ proved to be a powerful method for the non-Muslim Ottoman subjects to 
demand independence.31  
Correspondingly, from the viewpoint of the Sultan, the narrator explains that ‘growing 
spirit of rebellion’ of the Greeks had been ‘openly fostered by the Russians’, and that 
their independence ‘had been bought for them by European Powers’, which had 
established a ‘bad example’ for the rest of the Ottoman communities.32 Despite the 
attempt of the author to put the Russian and Western Powers on an equal footing, it can 
be said that the involvement of the Western Powers in the international affairs of the 
Ottomans is largely portrayed as an agreeable development, in contrast to the possibility 
of Russia’s claims over Ottoman territories. As noted by Niyazi Berkes, in this early 
period, ‘both Russia and France showed aspirations, conflicting but from the Ottoman 
viewpoint identical, of establishing themselves in the Balkans or the Levant’.33 
However, the description of the fairly oblivious and Romantic-nationalist 
representatives of the British embassy, who are purely interested in the cultural norms 
of the Ottomans, can be seen as an attempt to evaluate the British Empire as an 
impartial participant or arbitrator in Ottoman affairs. In the novel, the embassy officials’ 
coincidental presence at important times and places that result in events that could 
change the course of history for the Ottomans, such as the death of the Seraskier, when 
Compston and Fizerly, the two Embassy officials in disguise as traditional Ottoman 
men, walk onto the roof of the Great Mosque, perhaps a criticism of the ineptness of the 
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British officials, also acts as a display of the nonchalant attitude of the British 
government. The consequentiality of their effortless intervention and the caricature-like 
image of the British officials function as a projection of the antagonistic forces around 
the Ottomans and how even the casual involvement of the British nevertheless has the 
power to turn around the events.34  
It can be said that the general tendency in the novel is to flaunt the difference between 
the Russians and the Western European countries who support Greek independence 
with the knowledge that the Crimean War (1853-56) is lying in wait. While the Russian 
ambitions are employed as an important theme in the novel, the damage done by the 
remaining members of the Concert of Europe through their participation in Ottoman 
affairs is largely excused.35 In fact, it can even be said that the novelist is engaged in an 
act of partial acquittal of the Western powers of any vile political deeds, in opposition to 
his demonic descriptions of the Russians, which will be discussed at length in the next 
section.36  
1.1.2. The Edict and the Foreign Agents in the Empire 
In his formulation of the Ottoman decline in the novel, the author starts with the 
Empire’s inability to defend the Crimean Tatars against the Russian Empire, which 
indeed resulted in the delivery of hegemonic concessions to Russia in the Treaty of 
Küçük Kaynarca (1774), an outcome that became symbolic of the shifting power 
relations in the region in Ottoman historiography and considered as the point the 
Eastern Question was posed.37 The author also visits through the Seraskier’s bitterness 
the further losses Turkish-Egyptian navies suffered at the Battle of Navarino (1827), the 
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Russo-Turkish War of 1828–29 that was triggered by the Greek rebellion for 
Independence (1821-32), and the resulting acknowledgement of the independence of 
Greece (1832) by the Ottoman Empire, which were attestations to the increasing 
supremacy of Great Britain, France, and Russia, over the Ottoman Empire. The novel is 
framed throughout via the Ottomans’ relationship with the Western formulations of the 
Ottoman decline as it is also maintained throughout the novel that Sultan Mahmud II 
(1809-1838) was aware of the need for military and social reforms if the Ottomans were 
to regain their former strength and power in the region, and like his predecessor Selim 
III, he had enemies who attempted to prevent him from realising his reforms. 
As suggested by the novel’s title, a key function in the novel has been assigned to the 
Janissaries in regards to the military weakness and challenges the Ottoman Empire was 
facing before the onset of the reforms prior to the promulgation of the Edict of 1839. 
After the abolition of the Janissaries in 1826, Mahmud II actively began social and 
political reforms which would continue to be implemented after his death in 1839. 
Among his wide-ranging reforms were the rebuilding of the empire’s armed forces, 
limitation of the jurisdictions of pashas and high-ranking officials by means of 
expanding the subjects’ rights to trial; publication of the first fully Turkish-language 
newspaper, the Takvimi Vekayi; establishment of non-religious schools; and 
introduction of the first municipal administration in Istanbul which carried out regular 
police and firemen duties, which had previously been carried out by the Janissaries.38 
The Janissary Tree is presented as a contest between the institutions that take pride in 
their traditions and those that are determined to revamp them within the framework of 
the post-abolition history of the Janissaries, with additional factions in society other 
                                                          




than the military challenging Sultan Mahmud’s reforms, which constitutes the main line 
of historical inquiry by the author. 
Taking these two points into consideration, there are two main spheres of operation in 
the novel by means of which the rationale and the influence of the Edict are examined, 
and as such render the decree the backbone of the novel’s plot. While the reactions to 
the idea of change through the Edict produce a combination of responses within the 
Empire, the evolving relationship of the Empire with the European Powers similarly 
generates tensions as a result of the possibility of a power shift among Powers. The 
presence and the portrayal of the foreigners in Istanbul in the novel speak precisely to 
this point and to the formulation of the Eastern Question. Among the comments on the 
changes in the empire, Niyazi Berkes speaks of an American bishop who wrote that 
“[t]he destruction of the Janissaries overthrew the great barrier to the influence of 
foreigners upon Turkey [...] The doors to a free intercourse have been thrown wide 
open’.39 The presence of foreigners in the novel can profitably be read as a means of 
reflecting on both internal developments regarding the reforms and their international 
reception. 
Yashim’s friend Stanislaw Palewski, the Polish Ambassador, provides some insights for 
Yashim regarding the strategic position of the Sultan and the Porte in connection with 
their relations with the Power countries, while the ambassador himself illustrates the 
precarious situation of the Ottomans vis-à-vis the Western powers. He makes an 
important suggestion concerning the dependence of the Ottoman Empire on Western 
resources to achieve the goals of the sultan. In the novel, the sultan is portrayed as the 
patron and pioneer of this reform enterprise, through whose promulgation, the Palace is 
                                                          




described to have aimed to attract the financial sponsorship of the Powers. The 1839 
Gülhane Rescript is known to have been drafted by the then Foreign Minister, Mustafa 
Reşid Paşa (1800-1858), in order to generate fundamental changes within the Empire. 
In terms of its legislative foundation, while Berkes urges us not to presume ‘English or 
French political impact’ in the formulation of the document, Butrus Abu-Manneh 
explains how Stanford Jay Shaw finds in the document traces of the French Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789.40 Berkes, furthermore, asserts strongly the 
claim that:  
It is obvious that this is the earliest constitutional document in any Islamic country. 
While the Protocol and Charter did not form a constitution, there is no doubt that 
they contained the organic law by virtue of which a new political organization 
would exist. They designated the fundamentals to be incorporated in the 
organization of the state and its legal structure.41 
This is an important argument for the originary power of the Rescript as a sign of 
internal Ottoman dynamism and creative response to changing world circumstances. On 
the other hand, Halil İnalcık from a pragmatic angle argues that the document had been 
designed out of ‘the practical necessity of resuscitating the empire’.42 In a similar vein, 
Butrus Abu Manneh positions the document alongside the belligerence between Sultan 
Mahmud II and Muhammed Ali Pasha of Egypt, and argues that as the Sultan was not 
successful in consolidating his powers through a victory in Egypt, the document was the 
only option left for the Sultan to accomplish his centralisation efforts.43 Even more 
damagingly, in terms of the document’s putative status as an originary Islamic 
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constitutional founding gesture, it has been extensively acknowledged by historians that 
the main aim of the document was ‘to wheedle material assistance out of Britain’.44  
Conforming with this latter remark, the Polish Ambassador Palewski tells Yashim, who 
tries to apprehend the foreigners’ role in the Edict, that ‘foreign powers […] are the 
whole point: Foreign Powers, foreign loans’, essentially eliminating other perspectives 
mentioned above.45 Palewski informs Yashim that only ‘selected members of the 
diplomatic community in Istanbul’ had been informed of the pending Edict, which 
discloses to Yashim the ‘primary purpose’ of the Edict, which is ‘to make the Porte 
eligible for foreign loans’.46 The Ottomans, Palewski helps Yashim and the reader 
understand, now found themselves in a new arrangement of balance of power in Europe. 
Reforms are, therefore, principally necessary to form a new alliance with ‘Foreign 
Powers’ and to get ‘foreign loans’.47 Palewski keeps Yashim informed regarding the 
power structures in Europe and the disingenuous nature of the support the Porte receives 
from the nations in Europe for its reforms since it leaves questions as to the suitability 
of the reforms to the empire. Palewski, furthermore, confesses the Edict to be 
‘essentially, a Big Power arrangement’, detaching the Ottomans from the reforms, 
cultivating distrust about the ingenuity and sincerity of reforms.48 Conflictingly, it is 
also implied through the Sultan’s reflections that one of the motives behind the reforms 
of the Sultan is the prospect of ‘reclaim[ing] his sovereignty over Greece’.49 A sense of 
pragmatic conformity is invoked in the novel alongside a climate of increasing isolation 
as the political nature of the reforms is tied to the ambitions of the sultan to curb the 
dissemination of the ‘spirit of the rebellion’ by circumventing the external pressures 
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encouraging it.50 Palewski admittedly discloses to Yashim the breadth of challenges the 
Sultan faces in his quest for reform when he tells Yashim that he ‘get[s] the impression 
[...] that the sultan has sleepless nights over this Edict of his. It will make him a very 
lonely man. He makes a lot of enemies’.51 In some respects, the novel communicates the 
international significance of the Edict and the domestic threats evoked as though the 
edict is coming through as a result of the Sultan’s clutching the straw. 
Palewski’s conversations about the edict with Yashim and the Sultan carry the tinge of 
lack of faith regarding the involvement of the Western governments in reforms since 
Palewski himself, having been a casualty of the Polish Question, offers a cautionary tale 
for those who collaborate with Western Powers. A homology is drawn between the 
current weak state of the Empire and the dismemberment of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Empire, Palewski representing the remaining Polish/Ottoman strength. This very fact 
construes a mutual concern between the Sultan and the Ambassador regarding the 
Powers’ intentions, and at the same time unites them on the idea that, given the lack of 
options in the face of the economic and military decline, no other option is available 
other than trying to avoid an ultimate collapse of the Empire by carrying out the 
necessary reforms. Palewski’s precarious position as the Polish Ambassador in the 
Ottoman Empire is depicted as emblematic of the lingering concerns of the Porte 
regarding the intentions of the Powers as part of a broader Eastern Question, rather than 
evaluating the Ottoman monarchical order as a factor sui generis. Palewski keeps 
Yashim alert to the possibility that the reforms could be a step towards the carving up of 
the state as had happened to the Polish Empire.  
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Stanislaw Palewski has been received by critics in the image of Sherlock Holmes’s Dr 
Watson because of his role as a companion and an advisor to Yashim in solving his 
cases.52 Palewski’s role as an aide to Yashim in crime-solving in some of Yashim’s 
cases builds a secondary detective character for the Ambassador following that of 
Yashim. His knowledge of European history and politics, his resources at his 
ambassadorial outpost such as the ‘copies of Le Moniteur, the Ottoman court gazette’, 
and his eligibility as an ambassador to be present at important events such as a concert 
at the Palace provide Yashim with a very important source of information as well as a 
valuable capacity to maneuver in order to discover important information and 
evidence.53 It is more often than not through his conversations with Palewski that 
Yashim comes upon new perspectives that salvage his investigations from their clogged 
progressions. Alongside his assistance in solving crimes in the Yashim series, 
Palewski’s character revolves around Yashim’s cases not only because he provides 
Yashim with an auxiliary intellectual capacity and an elite social circle, but also by 
being a confidante to Yashim, Palewski poses as an audience and a companion to him, 
and thus informs the reader of the progress of Yashim’s cases.  
Both in The Janissary Tree, and also in The Baklava Club, Palewski’s character, by 
merit of his status as the ambassador of the partitioned Poland to the Ottoman Empire, 
illuminates the political concerns of early nineteenth-century Europe. An important 
insight into the changing map of Europe comes through the dismemberment of the 
Polish Empire. This development was against the political ambitions of the Ottoman 
Empire; therefore, the Ottoman Empire did not recognise the final partitioning of the 
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Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by Russia, Austria and Prussia in 1795, and it was 
the only state to do so. The study of the historical ties between the Polish and the 
Ottoman Empires has been one that has kept the readers of history of diplomacy 
intrigued when this period is considered, as the rejection by the Ottoman Empire of the 
partitioning of Poland has been deemed an important episode that left a positive 
sentiment in the Polish collective memory and historiography.54  
By bringing this issue up for a discussion, the author aims to reveal the complications 
regarding the perception of the Ottoman Empire nearer the inauguration of the Tanzimat 
Reforms. For instance, after the remarkable shift of regional power in favour of Russia 
as a result of the fall of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Sultan Mahmud II is 
portrayed as seeking to retain the symbolic historic power of his empire by maintaining 
the tradition of paying a stipend to the Ambassador and by providing protection for him 
as the representative of a foreign country: 
By a quirk of history, the Polish ambassador was maintained in Istanbul at the 
sultan’s expense. It was a throwback to the days when the Ottomans were too grand 
to submit to the ordinary laws of European diplomacy, and would not allow any 
king or emperor to claim to be the sultan’s equal. An ambassador, they reasoned, 
was a kind of plaintiff at the fount of world justice rather than a grandee vested with 
diplomatic immunity, and as such they had always insisted on paying his bills. 
Other nations had successfully challenged his conception of what an embassy was 
about; the Poles, latterly, could not afford to. Since 1830 their country had ceased to 
exist when the last parcel, around Cracow, was gobbled up by Austria.55  
The character of the Polish Ambassador is helpful in positioning the Ottoman Empire in 
its relatively inert moment in history vis-à-vis the Powers, including Russia, whose 
representatives deem Palewski a diplomatic nonperson.  
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The Ambassador’s indeterminate position carries a weight of warning against a similar 
outcome for the Ottomans. In The Janissary Tree, Yashim makes an observation about 
the Powers’ favouritism, which, he claims, has brought the Greeks their independence, 
and their discrimination against the Polish which brought the dissolution of their 
Commonwealth.56 This kind of bias, in the final analysis, makes Yashim question the 
integrity of the ‘Frankish laws’57 which ‘allowed the Greeks to have a country but 
denied the same convenience to the Poles’.58 Yashim’s apprehension about the Edict 
results from the adoption of mainly French legislative models that he fears may not be 
suited to the Ottoman social and administrative structure. He does not conceive how 
these laws can be exercised in the Ottoman nation with so much diversity within its 
territory and such a complex and conglomerate legal system. He questions if these laws 
could be applied throughout the whole empire on an egalitarian basis: ‘would it work as 
well in the highlands of Bulgaria as in the d serts of Tripolitana?’.59 By being wary of 
the policies which have led to the partition of Poland, Yashim would like to ward off 
any such important legal changes at the discretion of the Western Powers. 
In addition to providing an example of a hostile soluti n of the ‘Polish’ Question, the 
Polish Ambassador upholds a benevolent and tolerant image of the Empire as the last 
standing power against the dominance of the European powers in the region. Doing so, 
the Ambassador also complains about lack of consensus and compassion among 
European Christians:  
‘We talk of Christian justice,’ Palewski would explain, ‘but the only justice that 
Poland has ever received is at the hands of its old Muslim enemy. You Ottomans! 
You understand justice better than anyone in the world!’ Palewski would be careful 
not to complain that the stipend he received had not changed for the last two 
                                                          
56 J. Goodwin, Janissary Tree, pp. 105, 230. 
57 An evaluation of Franks, a general term to indicate Western European people, will b  made in the 
second part of this chapter.  
58 J. Goodwin, Janissary Tree, p. 150. 




hundred years. And Yashim would never say what both of them knew: that the 
Ottomans only continued to recognise the Poles to irritate the Russians.60  
While Goodwin investigates the Empire as a strong but benevolent Empire in the first 
book of the Yashim series, this particular image of the generous Ottomans housing 
outcasts of Europe is also maintained in The Baklava Club (2014), with differing 
attitude towards the Edict. 
Set in 1842, the fifth book in the series, The Baklava Club (2014), focuses on 
‘Istanbul’s role as a safe haven for European exiles and malcontents’ as the author 
stages in Istanbul a plot with revolutionaries in hideaway, pardon-seeking exiles and 
double-betrayers.61 Jason Goodwin revises the history of Europe through a range of 
characters, including papal conspirators, youngsters volunteering to work undercover 
for the unification of Italy, pardon-seeking daughter of a Decemberist exile, the Polish 
characters seeking Ottoman support to regain their country’s autonomy and Russians 
plotting against Polish ambitions. Among the exiles, the first group consists of three 
young men from Italy, namely Giancarlo, Rafael and Fabrizio, who live in Istanbul as 
expatriates absconding from an apostolic reprisal. These three young men form a 
clandestine cell taking directions from a secret organisation called La Piuma, which the 
youngsters trust because they received a warning from the organisation regarding the 
counter-revolutionary forces’ pursuit of them while the trio was in Rome, and asked 
them to go to Istanbul. Introduced to the reader first as the acquaintances of Palewski in 
Istanbul, the three revolutionaries find a note through which La Piuma assigns them to 
their first secret mission, which, they discover, is the assassination of a person with 
Papal connections. Disclosed to the youngsters to be an important anti-revolutionary, 
the target is actually the Polish Ambassador’s special guest Prince Czartoryski, who is 
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in the city to visit the Sultan to campaign in order to receive the support of the Empire 
in their cause of national revival of Poland and the re-establishment of a Polish nation. 
The group of the youngsters, the Baklava Club (named after the fact that, during their 
visits to the Ambassador at his residence, they bring baklava with them as a gift), and 
the Prince, who is in exile in Paris, are against the Vatican and the Church assuming the 
powers of a state, yet both the man and the small revolutionary group are convinced that 
the other is actually against the unification of Italy. This mistrust ends with the tragic 
and fatal realisation that it is a Russian agent that is actually pitting the revolutionaries 
against each other.  
The Russian agent and the third person belonging to the series of exiles in Istanbul is 
Natasha, the pardon-seeking daughter of a Russian Decemberist exiled in Siberia. Until 
the very end of the novel, it is assumed by the reader that, similarly to Prince 
Czartoryski, who seeks the Sultan’s support for a national cause, Natasha is also after 
Ottoman support for her personal appeal that she and her father be admitted back to St 
Petersburg. She stays at the Palace as a guest of the Valide Sultan, who instructs 
Yashim to entertain her guest by showing her Istanbul. During the time they spend 
together, Natasha tells Yashim about her life in Siberia, which includes unpleasant 
details about the physical abuse she endured at the hands of her Russian guardians and 
caretakers. At the end of the novel, it is revealed that Natasha had indeed been sent to 
Istanbul by the Russian czardom on a mission as a punishment after she had killed her 
caretaker. In Istanbul, she is to set up the killing of the Polish Prince, which she carries 
out by using the alias Piuma. Natasha, in her act as a Russian agent, tricks the 
revolutionary youngsters into thinking that the Polish liberator prince is a Catholic agent 
aiming to extend the influence of Rome in Europe. In order to promote hostility 




Russian plot aims both to prevent the rekindling of a Polish state through the murder of 
the Polish prince, and to supress a minor opposition of young people to a Holy Alliance 
headed by Rome. In The Baklava Club, Russia is once again represented as a disruptive 
and manipulative force as it was in The Janissary Tree.  
The Prince’s visit to the Sultan in The Baklava Club is a display of trust not only in the 
Ottoman Empire’s power and support for the Polish cause, but also of the strong 
relationship Palewski has with the Porte. Having been an important point in the first 
novel, this element in the plot of the later book reinforces the image of the Ottomans as 
a welcoming host to dissenters in Europe. Indeed, in both The Janissary Tree and The 
Baklava Club, the Ottoman Empire is seen as an active agent in international politics 
and a place of refuge for dissenters, in contrast to the repressive actions of powerful 
state alliances across Western Europe. The Valide’s question to Yashim intends to 
accentuate this point: ‘What are all these Franks doing in Istanbul, Yashim? It didn’t use 
to be like this’.62 An important reason for this change is viewed in the novel as 
stemming from the changing power relations in Europe as much as from the internal 
dynamics of the Ottoman Empire.63 In Yashim’s words, the reason for this is that 
‘[m]any people in Europe [...] want change. Their own governments resist it. People 
look to the sultan to help them [...] Natasha. Palewski. Even those Italians feel more free 
here than at home’.64  
In a similar manner, Niyazi Berkes mentions that many outcasts in Europe were arriving 
in Istanbul to take refuge in the eighteenth century: ‘Hungarians […] had taken refuge 
in the course of their struggles with the Habsburg emperors, the leading adversaries of 
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the Turks, for their Catholic persecutions’, or ‘[t]he Huguenots, persecuted by Catholic 
governments, looked hopefully to the reputedly tolerant Turks for succour and an 
opportunity to live and worship freely’.65 The instances of the conflicts involving 
various Christian denominations demonstrate not only the ongoing intolerance within 
Christian Europe for other religions and Christian denominations, but also the tolerance 
demonstrated for various faiths in the Ottoman Empire. The growth in the number of 
foreigners in the Empire is, however, mainly explained by the Reform Edict in the 
novel. The number of population movement towards the East had increased, because, as 
Yashim ponders, ‘[t]he sultan’s decree placing all his subjects, Muslim or otherwise, on 
the same legal footing, had emboldened the merchants and the bankers, and stimulated 
trade’.66  
In both Janissary and Baklava, the inclusiveness of the reform legislation is a 
fundamental point of interest, and this is seen as a favourable development for the 
economy and for the narrative of interaction with the West in the latter novel. These 
changes can be observed principally through the Polish example. Yashim’s suspicions 
of the Edict in Janissary, likewise, turn into approval in Baklava. This shift can be 
attributed to the shift in the author’s approach in his formulation of the main themes of 
his novels, and it can be observed through Yashim. Yashim’s concerns regarding the 
applicability of the Edict in Janissary because of his relativist attitude are eradicated in 
Baklava as he perceives the enforcement of the Edict across the empire as 
‘inclusiveness’ in the latter novel. This shift in attitude towards the edict arises from the 
author’s attempt to formulate the question of the Ottoman decline in his first novel and 
his focus on the comparative study of the Ottomans with the political landscape in 
                                                          
65 Berkes, Development of Secularism, p. 32. 




Europe in the latter. The frames of reference of Goodwin’s Yashim series are to a great 
extent informed by the historical developments in Europe. The Janissary Tree, as a first 
instalment preoccupied with the question of Ottoman decline, formulates Ottoman 
history around the Eastern Question and Western perceptions and influences; hence the 
prominence given to foreign characters. The Ottomans are therefore seen as weakened 
and in need of Western European aid to gain financial strength. Moreover, the reforms 
are introduced to represent a crossroads regarding increased interactions with the West, 
on one hand, and as lacking any insight into the needs of the Ottoman people, on the 
other. In his attempt to show the unsuitability of the reforms, the framework of The 
Janissary Tree is predicated on rigid negative bifurcated reaction to the reform 
movement. The next section examines these two representations of the dissatisfied 
groups with a view to evaluating the contribution of Goodwin’s historical novels to 
understanding the historical context of the landmark document in Ottoman history, the 
1839 Imperial Rescript of Gülhane. 
1.1.3. Interactions with Modernity: Traditionalists, Revolutionaries and the 
Middle Way 
In The Janissary Tree, the destruction of the Janissaries is observed through the lens of 
mainstream historiography, which presents the claims that the Janissaries were holding 
the Ottomans back from introducing innovations and new techniques in the military, 
resulting in the decline of the empire. The massacre of the Janissaries is therefore seen 
as an ‘auspicious’ event that finally allowed the Ottomans to pursue their efforts of 
modernisation. The Seraskier, for example, m ntions how ‘everything has changed 
because the Janissaries are gone’ and that ‘[t]hey were all that stood in the way of – 
what? The sultan riding on a European saddle’.67 This is a different reading from that of 
                                                          




revisionist historiographers of the likes of Baki Tezcan or Reha Çamuroğlu, which will 
be examined in the following sections. Similarly, in the novel, the reforms of Mahmud 
II are not amply scrutinised through the perspectives of today’s contemporary 
revisionist historiography. In this chapter, a frequently used resource is Niyazi Berkes’s 
The Development of Secularism in Turkey since it reads the history of the late Ottoman 
Empire as one of conflict between the institutions of tradition and modernity, which, 
according to Berkes, paved the way for the secularisation of the state when the Republic 
of Turkey was established. This dichotomy, and Berkes’s analysis, apart from the 
argument about Mahmud II’s reign being a moment of the start of secularisation, which 
is of no interest to Goodwin, resonates well with Goodwin’s intellectual and narrative 
frameworks.  
The main concern of The Janissary Tree is to shed light upon the conditions leading up 
to the proclamation of the Gülhane Rescript by dwelling on two possible cases of 
radical reactions to Sultan Mahmud’s reforms -- i.e. what some interest groups see as 
the eradication of traditional customs and institutions, others conceive as slow-paced 
reforms -- and to debate these through a spectrum of receptive and critical 
interpretations. This particular way of reading of the Ottoman history tell us a possible 
way of understanding how the Ottomans saw themselves at this critical point in 
Ottoman history, within the framework of the reformation efforts in the early nineteenth 
century. In the novel, while traditional elements are represented through the alliance of 
the defunct military organisation Janissaries and the palace eunuchs as those clinging to 
their ‘medieval’ identities, reformism is illustrated through the Seraskier, the military 
chief of the modern army, who defends a ‘totalitarian ideology’ of reforms.68 A third 
bloc represented in Goodwin’s novel is the reconciliatory approach, what can loosely be 
                                                          




associated with the theories of ‘alternative modernity’. This mid-way approach is 
materialised in the main character Yashim, who, as a modern eunuch, epitomises the 
conflict between modernity and tradition in an unobtrusive way. Below, these three 
approaches will be examined at length with a view to analyse Goodwin’s presentation 
of the complexities of this period through an investigative eye for clashing forces of this 
time.  
1.1.3.1. Traditionalists and Anti-Reformists: Against the Edict  
The collaboration between the Janissaries and the Eunuchs, who are viewed in the novel 
as the upholders of tradition in the Ottoman Empire and therefore in opposition to the 
Edict, is significant since both are part of the system of slavery, one of military and the 
other of harem slavery. While the Janissaries are emblematic of the military strength of 
the most powerful days of the Empire, the Eunuchs are evocative of the sumptuous and 
competitive Harem setting, which is seen as the symbol for the patriarchal influence and 
power of sultans. After the abolition of the Janissaries in 1826, harem-slavery, which is 
the royal (and high-class) expression of ‘household slavery’, remains not only the major 
extant form of slavery, but also an important stronghold of the model of imperial 
strength conveying the notion of reliance of the Empire on customs and traditional 
forms.69 Hence the reforms carried out by the Porte are predominantly depicted by the 
author as an attack on perennial hierarchies and traditions. In The Janissary Tree, the 
class of Islamic ruling elite as a strong bulwark of Islamic traditions on which the 
Empire thrives does not receive tenable attention. The following section will only 
showcase the traditional institutions discussed in the novel in relation to the 
modernisation movement in the early nineteenth century.  
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1.1.3.1.1. Eunuchs  
The eunuch characters in the novel, namely Yashim, the Kislar Agha and Ibo, the palace 
librarian, maintain a key role in understanding one of the most ancient institutions of the 
Ottoman Empire. Yashim’s role in the novel, as a manumitted Eunuch, is different from 
that of the Palace Eunuchs, and will be dealt with later in this chapter in more detail. On 
the other hand, Kislar Aga, and partially Ibo represent the innermost opposition against 
the Sultan’s Edict. Being a borrowed institution from the Byzantines, some of the tasks 
and responsibilities of the Eunuch slavery system in the Ottoman Court were altered in 
order to tailor the Eunuchs’ position and function in the Palace to the requirements of 
Islamic traditions.70 Classified as ‘Black’ or ‘White’ eunuchs, depending on their 
geographical origin and skin colour, the Palace eunuchs were, first and foremost, 
harem-slaves, who were responsible for overseeing and protecting female slaves in the 
Palace. They had a privileged status in the court as they acted as a conduit between the 
male and female occupants of the Palace, as well as the outside world.71  
John Freely explains that ‘[e]unuchs played an important role in Byzantium, and many 
of them rose to leading positions in the civil, military and religious hierarchies, several 
becoming patriarch and one becoming magister militum, the commander-in-chief of the 
army’.72 Among such roles, the grand chamberlain (praepositus sacri cubiculi), which 
is the equivalent of the Kislar Aga, was also a position held by a eunuch in 
Byzantium.73 In the Ottoman Empire, apart from being ‘in charge of the Harem’, the 
Chief Black Eunuch, of African origin, ‘also supervised the primary education of the 
sultan’s sons’; therefore, those in this position had considerable power and a critical role 
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to play in the future of the Empire.74 The ‘political influence’ of the eunuchs had largely 
depended on the Chief Black Eunuch, and correspondingly, Eunuchs underwent periods 
of increasing prominence during some of the critical moments of the Empire’s history. 
Ehud Toledano, recounting from M. Çağatay Uluçay’s Harem, published in Turkish, 
points out that the eunuchs had become more influential in the period between the 
second half of the sixteenth century and the eighteenth century, which Uluçay calls 
Kızlar Ağaları Saltanatı (the ‘Sultanate of the African Eunuchs’).75  
During their service, eunuchs developed ‘an especially close relationship’ with their 
masters and mistresses.76 As a result, as Toledano puts it, ‘the more powerful the ladies 
of the Court were, the more influential the eunuchs became’.77 The eunuchs enjoyed a 
‘dual structure’ whereby they had to pledge ‘allegiance both to their royal master or 
mistress and to the senior officers of the [eunuch] Corps’.78 Since they were ‘a foreign 
element in society’, as they were acquired either by purchase or as presents, and they 
could not establish ‘alternative family ties by marriage’, they retained their ‘loyalties’ 
on both sides.79 Especially the Chief Black Eunuch, or the Kislar Agha as he is called in 
the novel, was at the confluence of powerful forces, holding a uniquely strategic status 
in the Palace -- forces which had to be kept in a delicate balance or they might 
otherwise lead to corruption and damaging intrigue. Uluçay relates the decline and fall 
of the Empire to the exploitation of the power and influence established by the African 
eunuchs in the Court.80 In the novel, this theory is largely upheld due to the involvement 
of the Kislar Agha in the coup plot, which can be explained by eunuchs’ pivotal and 
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established position in the palace. Ibou’s case, on the other hand, presents a different 
challenge since the Kislar Agha is the uncle and protector of Ibou; therefore, the 
implications of Ibou’s involvement in the coup plot are ameliorated by the suffering and 
pain Ibou had to endure in order to cross the desert, undergo an operation and finally 
take up the job offered by his uncle.81  
Since the unique position of eunuchs in the palace is rooted in their powerful 
connections and the uniqueness of the services they provide, the Kislar Agha shows 
‘contempt’ for those who want eunuchs to be modern. ‘How can I be modern?’ he asks 
Yashim, ‘I’m a fucking eunuch’.82 He is presented as adamant in his belief that eunuchs 
are out of touch with the outside world and therefore they cannot ‘modernise’. Even if 
Yashim tries to convince the Head Eunuch that he can learn western social etiquette 
such as ‘sit[ting] in a chair’ or ‘eat[ing] with a knife and fork’, the Kislar Agha points 
out that the Tanzimat will require more of him.83 The head eunuch associates the 
Tanzimat, not only with Western modes of behaviour and appearance, but also with the 
Enlightenment and letters, which can be marked in his assertion that ‘modern people are 
supposed to know stuff. They all read, don’t they?’.84 His actions rest on the knowledge 
that reforms bring Western modes of life, which undermine royal customs, and 
therefore, the requirement to keep a harem. Despite the fact that Islam prevailed as 
‘[t]he core of the tradition’ in the Ottoman Empire, this point remains a moot point 
throughout in the novel despite the fact that in most cases it is the Ulema, ‘the corps of 
the learned men of religion or of the Ş riat’, that gets challenged ‘by the forces of 
modern civilization’.85 Without giving any reason, such as the secularising effect of 
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modernisation, but by only displaying hatred for the modernising Edict, the Kislar Agha 
expresses his concern that failure to defend such customs as his role in the Harem will 
mean a failure of survival, the end of his very xistence: ‘It may not be now, maybe not 
this year or the next [...] but the time will come when they’ll just turn us out into the 
street to die’.86 
The fear and concern of the palace eunuchs foreshadow the abolition of the royal house 
after the republic ame into being in 1923. Goodwin’s approach, in the main, highlights 
the emphasis given to tradition and empowerment gained through the privileges of 
proximity to the rulers. On the other hand, it was the case historically that the harem-
slavery system remained forceful and effective for a very long time because of the 
difficulty of amending ‘family laws’ and the influence the Ottoman Royal House had in 
keeping certain traditions intact for this purpose despite the prohibition of the 
trafficking of the Africans in 1857 and anti-slave trade conventions signed between 
Britain and the Ottomans in 1880.87 As a result, the practice of harem slavery survived 
into the early twentieth century despite the enactment of laws prohibiting the trafficking 
and trade of African slaves. By merit of being at the core of the empire, the household 
of the sultan prevailed as the last bastion of this system in the Ottoman Empire. 
Therefore, as Toledano claims, being ‘one of the most central and traditionally sensitive 
institutions in Ottoman society’, harem-slavery, like military-slavery, resisted 
modernising change.88 Toledano defends these lasting harem-slavery practices as 
‘culture-bound practices’, and argues that, as they were part of the private realm of 
society, namely, of ‘family structure’ and ‘relations between the sexes’, they resisted 
formal legal and political change. Therefore, this aspect of slavery escaped the notice of 
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many Ottoman Westernisers who adjusted their traditional outlook along Western lines, 
as ‘the prestige of the Ottoman House kept its social structure and patterns of conduct 
out of public criticism and preserved them as a source of emulation for the wealthy and 
powerful’.89 
In the novel, as a reaction to the Westernisation process carried out by Mahmud II, 
Goodwin’s Kislar Agha not only conspires with the defunct Janissary Corps to organise 
a coup against the Sultan, but also steals the Validé Sultan’s ‘Napoleon jewels’ to equip 
himself with symbolic powers during his coup.90 His effeminate outlook embodied 
through his stealing of the jewellery for his own use is overshadowed by the Head 
Eunuch’s concern about the literate people of the West and the Westernisers. 
Napoleon’s ‘N’ jewellery not only represents the Head Eunuch’s hatred of the West, but 
also uncloaks his inadequacy and helplessness in the face of Western modernity, which 
he tries to compensate with material symbols.91 The question of modernity, in which 
there would be no need for eunuchs, is a notion the head eunuch cannot comprehend, 
and his actions cannot go beyond symbolic connotations and the repetition of the 
experiences of his co-conspirators, the Janissaries – such as uprising, and even regicide, 
in the Court.  
Kislar Agha associates the jewels with power presumably because of his jealousy of the 
Valide, although the reason is not very clear. Before they became eunuchs, the Palace 
slaves would undergo a difficult process of transition, which would include enduring the 
health and life implications of their surgery and the experience of hormonal and 
psychological difficulties after their operation, which is believed to have led to ‘peculiar 
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characteristics’ and ‘eccentric social behaviour’.92 Ehud Toledano suggests that their 
condition may have had an impact on their actions when eunuchs exercised their 
strategical power in court politics.93 Toledano further suggests that their actions may 
also have been determined by ‘a deep sense of bitterness’ and they may have ‘sought to 
avenge the “unnatural crime” perpetrated on their person’.94 The narrator in The 
Janissary Tree describes idiosyncrasies and eccentricities of eunuchs in a rather 
emasculating manner: 
The service of barren men, like their desires, began and ended with their death; but 
in life they watched over the churning anthills of humankind, inured from its 
preoccupation with lust, longevity and descent. Prey, at worst, to a fondness for 
trinkets and trivia, to a fascination with their own decline, a tendency to hysteria 
and petty jealousies. Yashim knew them well.95 
The effeminate description of the Kislar Agha, with him wearing the Valide Sultan’s 
jewels, also participates in a stereotypically Orientalist discourse, with its images of 
harems and eunuchs as alienating and effeminising. This type of character, reified in the 
Kislar Agha’s imitation of the Valide Sultan, can be identified as the ‘effeminate 
tyrant’, which, as Joseph A. Boone establishes, is one of the dominant ‘patterns’ of 
homoerotic tropes in Middle Eastern depictions by Western writers and artists.96 The 
Kislar Agha assumes the most basic characteristic of a tyrant when he kills a concubine 
for witnessing him stealing the Valide’s jewellery in order not to put his coup at risk. 
This type of effeminising classification of Eunuchs actually tramps on Goodwin’s clear 
intention to undermine Orientalist discourses that sexualise the Harem:  
That was how the system worked, Yashim knew. Everyone knew. Everyone had 
their own ideas about the imperial harem, but essentially it was like a machine. The 
sultan, pumping a new recruit in the cohort of imperial concubines, was simply a 
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major piston of an engine designed to guarantee the continuous production of 
Ottoman sultans. All the rest – the eunuchs, the women – were cogs.97  
The correction by the narrator of Western Orientalist discourses about life in the harem 
contributes to Goodwin’s historiographical intervention to rectify earlier Western 
misrepresentations. However, Goodwin himself does not refrain from sharing in 
imagery that carries the tinge of Orientalist discourses at times, including the scene of 
the cariyes, the harem maids, showing their bare breasts to Yashim while waxing.98 On 
the other hand, the fact that Yashim is described as able to have sex with women, or the 
fact that the Sultan is, in a way, forced to spend a night with the gözde, the slave girl, so 
that she would not be disappointed, show harem life from a speculative lens, especially 
since the author feeds the curiosity of some of his readers by posing and answering 
some of the questions they may have regarding eroticism in the palace, including the 
possibility of a sexual life for eunuchs.99 This approach possibly presents a commercial 
compromise on the part of the author, which is based on the profitability of sexual 
descriptions in a market-driven publishing industry.  
Lastly, in addition to the attempts to introduce the system of eunuchs with attributes 
specific to the Ottomans, the narrator also assigns significance to Ottoman eunuchs 
through the ties of the system of eunuch-slavery to other civilisations in different ages. 
The characteristics of eunuchs are described through the institutional history of eunuch-
slavery in Janissary Tree as below:  
Yet men had been gelded for service in the time of Darius and Alexander, too. Ever 
since the idea of dynasties arose, there had been eunuchs who commanded fleets, 
who generalled armies, who subtly set out the policies of states. Sometimes Yashim 
dimly saw himself enrolled into a strange fraternity, the shadow-world of the 
guardians: men who since time immemorial had held themselves apart, the better to 
watch and serve. It included the eunuchs of the ancient world, and of the Chinese 
emperor in Beijing, and the whole Catholic hierarchy in Europe, too, which had 
                                                          
97 J. Goodwin, Janissary Tree, p. 108. 
98 J. Goodwin, Janissary Tree, pp. 59-60. 




supplied the celibate priests who served the kings of Christendom. Didn’t the Pope 
in Rome himself serve man and God?100 
Goodwin employs this informative discussion to highlight continuity and the cross-
cultural transference of imperial institutions and traditions. He attempts to connect 
Istanbul to the rest of the world not only through the practices of eunuch-slavery in the 
Byzantine Empire, predecessors of the Ottoman Empire, but also through the institution 
of eunuch-slavery itself in its perennial and universal context. By doing so, he connects 
and relates Ottoman customs to their ancient precedents beyond and outside their 
Islamic context. The perennial aspect of this institution makes it more difficult to make 
a distinction between the Islamic and earlier inherited aspects of these practices; 
therefore, the practice itself becomes part of Goodwin’s overall strategy regarding his 
tradition versus modernity argument, which side-steps any focus on religion and the 
complications Islam would introduce into formulating this dichotomy in relation to 
Ottoman structures of governance. 
1.1.3.1.2. The Janissaries 
In The Janissary Tree, the Janissaries are introduced as the chief suspects for the 
murders of the four military academy students. The book takes its title from the 
janissary tree at Etmeydanı (Sultanahmet), notorious as the location where the 
Janissaries revolted. Attached to the tree, Yashim discovers poems that the Janissaries 
use to communicate with the Eunuchs at the palace. Like Palace eunuchs, the Janissaries 
were also the subjects and the slaves of the Sultan. The origins of the Janissaries are 
believed to go back to as early as the fourteenth century when non-Muslim captives 
began to be employed as members of the army within the feudal cavalry where they 
were also taught Turkish.101 As Godfrey Goodwin explains in his work The Janissaries 
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(2006), a new army may have been born out of these converts which came to be called 
Yeniçeriler [Janissaries], the New Army.102 When these men emerged as soldiers in 
1416, during the reign of Mehmet I (1413-421), they also became the Sultan’s kul 
(slave), which meant that they had become ‘members of the imperial family’, whose 
head, the Sultan, was ‘the Shadow of God on Earth’. It was during the reign of Murat II 
(1421-1444) that the Christian children were first mentioned in a document as the new 
recruits of this standing army, who were commonly known as Christian Levy or 
Devşirme.103 As Godfrey Goodwin describes, the Janissaries wre ‘a newly recruited 
caste, educated at the palace or its subsidiary colleges, [were] hardened and then bound 
to a loyalist brotherhood proud of a growing tradition. It presented a potent force which 
was eventually to win civil as well as military authority’.104 The Janissaries were known 
to have been avid fighters and conquerors for the Ottoman Empire, and so they were 
respected during the Empire’s most successful times for their accomplishments. Due to 
these qualities, there are quite a few official historiographies of janissaries in which it is 
suggested that being a Janissary, far from a mishap, had been a prospect looked 
favourably upon. The fact that these fighters were ‘fed by a levy [had] set them apart 
from the commonalty’.105  
The widely accepted reason for the Janissaries’ abolition is their centuries of 
degeneracy, which had economically and militarily held the Empire back, behind their 
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peers in the West. The commonly-discussed reasons for their degeneracy, which are 
also employed in his novel by Jason Goodwin, include the changing structure of the 
corps such as their involvement in trades; the recruitment of Turkish people by birth 
instead of recruiting through devshirme; the introduction of new practices of marriage 
and having children; and lower payments and gains caused by the slowdown of the 
conquests of new lands and the gradual decline of imperial power which had become 
tiring for the Janissary fighters and caused their unwillingness to defend the Empire.106 
In Jason Goodwin’s words, ‘loaded with privilege, they lorded it over the common 
people of the city’, which, according to the narrator of the novel, made the Janissaries 
‘dangerous’.107 The out-of-control demeanour of the Janissaries finds expression in 
Lady Mary’s letters, in which the Janissaries outside Istanbul are criticised for 
displaying tyranny:  
the oppression of the peasants is so great, they are forced to abandon their houses 
and neglect their tillage, all they have being a prey to the janissaries whenever they 
please to seize upon it. We had a guard of five hundred of them, and I was almost in 
tears every day to see their insolences in the poor villages through which we 
passed.108  
The new order of the Janissaries, or their lack of discipline as many would say, often 
produced major revolts during the eighteenth century, including those led by Patrona 
Halil Isyani and Kara Ali Isyani.109 Because of their changing structure, the Janissaries 
are generally described as amounting to getting so much out of hand that they had even 
become a threat to the continuation of monarchical rule when they rebelled or scorched 
the city once their demands were not met, which could even culminate in the deposition 
of the sultans. In the novel, the Seraskier takes advantage of the Janissary rebellion and 
                                                          
106 J. Goodwin, Janissary Tree, pp. 24, 85. 
107 J. Goodwin, Janissary Tree, pp. 23-4. 
108 Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, The Turkish Embassy Letters, ed. by Teresa Heffernan and Daniel 
O’Quinn (Toronto, Ontario: Broadview Editions, 2013), p. 99. 




the fires started by the castaway members of the Janissary corps to carry out his own 
coup against the Monarchy. Jason Goodwin writes: ‘it was typical of their degeneration 
that they had combined their fire-duty with the more profitable occupation of fire-
raising, demanding bribes to put out fires they themselves had started’.110 Godfrey 
Goodwin suggests that their passion for money was stronger than their will to protect 
the Empire’s interests, and mutiny occurred when long fights tired them.111 Jason 
Goodwin’s humorous depiction of this situation reads as ‘[t]he men who had been sent 
to terrify Europe made a simple discovery: it was easier – and far less dangerous to 
terrorise at home’.112  
Godfrey Goodwin stresses that ‘[t]he often repeated tragedy lay in their inability to 
think ahead constructively or to plot more than a coup or a mutiny’.113 He suggests that 
the history of the Janissaries mirrors the Ottomans’ history as a whole, giving clues to 
the ‘struggles beneath the surface of Ottoman politics, the struggles of the tumultuous 
majority’.114 This view, therefore, also helps to elaborate the conclusion that the 
Janissaries remained at the root of the administrative instability as they were infamous 
for dethroning and even regicide of sultans whenever their demands were not met. 
Godfrey Goodwin maintains that the professionalisation of the army, had it happened, 
could have acted as ‘a challenge to the structure of the state’; as it was, there was a 
strong link between the welfare of the Empire and the interest of the Janissaries.115Th  
imperial history can therefore be depicted as one of transformation whereby the 
demeanour of the Janissaries altered by and large in conjunction with the empire from 
bright to shadowy days. The fact that the empire’s rise and decline went hand in hand 
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with the rise and decline of the Janissaries is considered a sufficient rationale by 
‘declinist’ scholars to conclude that the loss of the territories and corruption in the 
Empire were the result of the degeneracy in the janissary military corps.  
Correspondingly, in The Janissary Tree, the demise of the Janissaries is discussed in 
relation to the downfall of the Empire, which is then displayed as the reason for their 
desire to protect their self-interest, combined with their attachment to their tradition and 
brotherhood. The narrator is unambiguous in his assertion that, by clinging to tradition 
and by reclaiming their old power, the Janissaries had caused immense damage to the 
Empire: 
Once the Ottoman Empire’s crack troops, the Janissaries had degenerated – or 
evolved, if you liked – into an armed mafia, terrorising sultans, swaggering through 
the streets of Istanbul, rioting, fire-raising, thieving and extorting with impunity. 
Outgunned and outdrilled by the armies of the west, stubbornly they had clung to 
the traditions of their forefathers, contemptuous of innovation, despising the 
common soldiers of the enemy and rejecting every lesson the battlefield could 
teach, for fear of their grip loosening. For decades they had held the empire to 
ransom.116 
The Janissaries saw reforms as a threat to their traditional structures and the New Guard 
as their competitor. The story of the end of the Janissaries can hardly be told without its 
dramatic overtones, and Goodwin’s fiction bears no exception to this tendency. Even 
the symbolic power of overturning cauldrons had a grandiose effect, signifying a 
janissary uprising, and as for the narrator, ‘[i]t meant that they wanted blood’.117 The 
narrator further explains that the very last time the Janissaries overturned their cauldrons 
was because the Sultan had wanted them to ‘adopt the western style of the New Guard, 
knowing that they would be provoked and affronted’, and so they were. Goodwin’s 
narrator explains what happens in 1826: 
The sultan issued orders that the Janissaries should adopt the western style of the 
New Guard, knowing that they would be provoked and affronted. And the 
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Janissaries had rebelled on cue. Caring only for their own privileges, they turned on 
the palace and the fledgling New Guards. But they had grown stupid, as well as 
lazy. They were loathed by the people. The sultan had made ready. When the 
Janissaries overturned their cauldrons on the night of Thursday, 15 June, it took a 
day to accomplish by modern means what no one had managed to achieve in three 
hundred years. By the night of the sixteenth, efficient modern gunnery had reduced 
their mutinous barracks to a smouldering ruin.118 
Subsequently as the narrator chronicles, ‘on the night of Thursday, 15 June, it took a 
day to accomplish by modern means what no one had managed to achieve in three 
hundred years’ – the Janissaries had been dissolved.119 The Janissaries’ rebellion was 
also the means of their final destruction. Yashim speculates how the incident had been 
‘a trauma […] from which the empire still waited to recover’.120 From this, as the 
narrator states, ‘[c]ertain people might never recover at all’.121 It is therefore symbolic 
that the murders Yashim investigates are committed and displayed by using the symbols 
of Janissary traditions from their ranking system to their spiritual meeting houses.  
Jason Goodwin’s novel, to a great extent, follows the mainstream argument of Ottoman 
historiography in terms of the stress placed on the narrative that the Janissaries became 
corrupt and did not accept the use of modern military techniques within the corps. They 
are seen as the albatross around the neck of the Ottomans, holding back the progress of 
the empire. A recent generation of observers who don’t agree with this thesis, such as 
Baki Tezcan and Reha Çamuroğlu, argue that the Janissaries actually had an important 
role to play in the broader democratic corpus within the religious (Sunni sectarian) 
monarchical absolutist rule. These perspectives tend to see the developments concerning 
the Janissaries, especially around the year 1826, in terms of internal power struggles 
rather than as an extension of the East-West, or in other words, traditionalism-
modernity dichotomy. Reha Çamuroğlu’s criticism falls on the palace’s mechanisms of 
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self-preservation and policies of exclusion while Baki Tezcan offers a criticism which 
sees a stabilising quality in the Janissaries.  
Reha Çamuroğlu’s interpretation of the events that led to 1826 focuses on the vast 
power the Janissaries had acquired rather than on how degenerate and dangerous they 
had started to become. Çamuroğlu does not see the issue of Janissaries’ getting married 
and having children as signs of deterioration and corruption; for him, these practices 
should be regarded merely as the humanization of the sultan’s slaves.122 According to 
this viewpoint, the changes in the nature of the Janissary corps started to occur when the 
Janissaries realized that they had become influential against sultans, an important 
example of which was the dethronement campaign Selim I (1512-1520) waged against 
his father Bayezid II (1481-1512).123  
As noted by Reha Çamuroğlu, an important power struggle the Janissaries staged was 
the one with the Ulema, who would have been their superiors if the Janissaries had 
remained in the faith of Sunni Islam and would have caused the limitation of their 
powers to some extent. The Janissaries’ increasing association with the Bektashi sect, a 
dervish order that follows the spiritual teachings of Hacı Bektaş Veli, which Jason 
Goodwin calls Karagozi in the novel, might therefore be explained by their power 
struggles with the Ulema. Many critics point to the late sixteenth century as the early 
formative years of the Bektashi-Janissary association, although there is no agreement on 
when this connection actually started to ferment.124 During the subsequent two 
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centuries, the Janissaries gained strength by being present in the palace as armed 
functionaries and statesmen, as well as in public as craftsmen and tradesmen, enabling 
them to hold strong positions in both public and state functions.125 Çamuroğlu 
establishes that ‘as this union [of Janissaries and Bektashis] progressed, it would grow 
into a more civilized disobedience that would incrementally reproduce itself against the 
state’.126 Therefore, although it is generally acknowledged that the formal change the 
Janissaries underwent was induced by their own success in gaining power within state, 
in Çamuroğlu’s view, this change, or corruption as some say, would still have taken 
place, even without the imperial defeats. According to this reasoning, the change in the 
Janissaries did not depend on the West developing new military technologies and tactics 
or the diminishing resources of the Ottoman Empire so much as it depended on the 
lessening loyalty of the Palace to the Janissaries. Çamuroğlu thus sees this corruption to 
be internal rather than external, and their uprisings not as efforts to stop Westernisation, 
but to maintain their own power within the administrative bodies.127 
Berkes points out that by the end of the eighteenth century, the Sultan did not have 
unfettered influence within his administrative cadre anymore, and correspondingly, ‘the 
struggle for power’ had surfaced within the bureaucratic groups who were attached to 
tradition and isolated from society.128 There are three main factors according to Berkes 
that explain the atmosphere and the various types of mindset when the Janissary revolts 
developed. First of all, the Ulema and military leaders were enjoying self-acquired 
prosperity in a corrupt bureaucracy and they had become insensitive to the problems 
causing instability to the welfare of the state. Secondly, the new techniques in the 
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military were seen as against tradition (Şeriat) and were taken to be signs of further 
decline. In addition to that, new technological developments were also seen as a threat 
to the worsening economic conditions among the craftsmen, who served the military, 
and were in danger of being uprooted if the traditional structure were to be upset.129 All 
these developments comprised sufficient excuse for the Janissaries to revolt against the 
reforms made along European lines. When compared to Berkes’s analysis, Çamuroğlu’s 
defence of Janissaries omits Berkes’s structural economic perspective on the period, and 
instead focuses on the microeconomic and status benefits of interest groups, and on 
their opposition against the bureaucratic Islamic elite. 
Baki Tezcan provides another structural perspective to approach the question of the 
Janissaries’ relationship with Western modernity. While Çamuroğlu argues for the 
Janissaries’ power domination from the perspective of their religious sectarian 
affiliations and institutional intolerance to heterodoxy in the empire, Tezcan analyses 
the issue from the vantage point of the form of government itself, which is the 
unquestioned legitimacy of monarchical absolutism. Baki Tezcan presents his research 
question as it had been asked by Andrews and Kalpaklı in their earlier study and asks 
‘[w]hy movements towards limitations on monarchical absolutism are seen as an 
advance in the one case and as a decline in the other’.130 Tezcan argues that, until very 
recently, the mainstream historiography has tended to see the regicide of sultans in 
terms of imperial decline discourse in which each deposition hampered the Empire’s 
progress vis-à-vis its counterparts.131 Although the Ottomans did not have a parliament 
that compares with the English system, Tezcan argues that the depositions and regicides 
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should not simply mean that they were carried out by ‘some soldier-turned-bandits’. By 
arguing thus, he asserts that it shouldn’t be considered that the Janissaries’ perceived 
out-of-order actions ‘lacked any formal constitutional components’.132 He justifies his 
argument by supporting his perspective with that of a Frenchman, Victor Fontanier, 
who claimed that the Janissaries were standing in defence of the population in the face 
of the devastation caused by ‘absolute power’.133 Seen this way, the Janissaries can be 
understood in terms of their limited democratic contributions.  
Baki Tezcan proposes that this period of transition, in which the Janissaries gained a 
voice against the absolute power to the extent that they safeguarded the economic 
interests of the people, providing an unfettered environment for competition, 
corresponds to the post-medieval and post-patrimonial period of the Ottoman Empire, 
which he calls the Second Empire (1580-1826) in direct opposition to Berkes’s and 
Goodwin’s notions of what constitutes Medieval and early modern polities: 
Although modernity came to be closely associated with capitalism and colonialism 
and this came to be seen as a European phenomenon imposed on the rest of the 
world, I suggest that early modernity can be defined much more globally and has to 
do with the relative democratization of political privileges as a result of the political 
empowerment of economically affluent commoners. If one were to define early 
modernity using these parameters, the Second Empire would definitely be an early 
modern polity. That does not mean, however, that it did not fall into decline. The 
Second Empire’s future was determined by the interaction of its present with its 
past. The institutions it inherited from the past were truly transformed by the 
developments of early modernity. Yet at the end of this transformation, these 
institutions were no longer able to fulfil their original functions properly, which left 
the Ottomans vulnerable in the face of European imperialism.134 
Focusing, on the one hand, on the mechanisms of a gradually emerging market 
economy in this ‘early modern polity’ of the empire, and the transformation of land 
politics on the other, in his The Second Empire, Tezcan proposes that the absolute rights 
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of the monarch in this period were, at any rate, being confronted by the court, the 
viziers, the Ulema and the Janissary order, although the latter had particularly gained an 
important capacity for creating social and economic transformation in the Second 
Empire. In the post-Janissary period, when the New Order had established itself in the 
Ottoman and Turkish consciousness, the Janissaries eventually became the symbol of 
the Ottoman ‘ancien regime’ and were regarded as the chief culprits of the Ottoman 
decline.135 For Tezcan, the New Order represented the revenge of the state on pre-1826 
structures and forces, and its historians denounced the Ottoman ancien regime as 
accountable for the decline of the Ottoman Empire.136  
In The Janissary Tree, neither the economy-polity related focus, like Baki Tezcan’s, nor 
the sectarian focus, like Reha Ç muroğlu’s, is examined in depth in relation to the 
‘decline’ of the Empire. The transformation of the Empire is investigated in terms of 
reformations in the military and the cultural transformations along Western lines, which 
take precedence over other developments in the Empire related to the Gülhane Rescript, 
such as the farm tax reform. The Seraskier’s New Army corresponds the New Order 
mentioned above, even if in the novel the Janissaries are not seen as having democratic 
significance. Through the Seraskier, who advocates the Edict when he talks to Yashim 
about it, the premises of the reforms are associated with structural and executive 
changes: ‘Changes will be made in many areas. Equality of the people under a single 
law. Administration. Ministers instead of pashas, that sort of thing. It will follow the 
way the army has been reformed in western lines, and it will not be enough. 
Naturally’.137 The Seraskier’s prospective administration of the Ottoman Empire as 
republic forms a precedent for the later leadership of the Young Turks, especially that of 
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Enver Pasha, who led the Empire to the Balkan Wars and the Great War, which caused 
the suffering and displacement of a big portion of the Ottoman population, Muslim and 
non-Muslim alike. Tezcan’s thesis of the New Order describes the Young Turks, who 
were responsible for the:  
modernizing autocratic government that developed in the New Order, both in 
response to and hand in hand with European imperialism, [and] fostered the 
development of new political elites whose members eventually took over the 
leadership of the empire and oversaw its dismemberment.138 
This short description of the direction of the Empire in the nineteenth century, in which 
the rise of the modernising elites is criticised for taking the modernising project to an 
extreme, is a prospective backdrop for the modernising Seraskier of The Janissary Tree, 
who offers a solution of intense remodelling of the stumbling empire along military 
lines. He is, therefore, a precursor of a group of intellectuals, who, by incorporating the 
European Enlightenment into the Ottoman intellectual framework, paved the way later 
on for the empowerment of a group of military decision-makers, namely Enver Pasha 
and his associates, who came to rule the empire through the rise of the Committee of 
Union and Progress in the early twentieth century.  
Until recent years, the abolition of the Janissaries had generally been accepted as a cut-
off point for a new era as a general rule-of-thumb in Ottoman studies. Even if views 
differ on the categorization of the life span of the Ottoman Empire into epochs, it is 
possible simply to categorise the lifetime of the Empire into the stages of rise, 
stagnation, decline and collapse. After the increase in new perspectives in the study of 
the empire in recent years, Christine Woodhead argues that the revisionist ‘Ottomanist 
historians have largely jettisoned the notion of a post-1600 “decline”’.139 Baki Tezcan 
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also explains that the decline period of the mainstream declinist historiography has now 
been replaced by new revisionist approaches: 
Ottomanist historians have produced several works in the last decades, revising the 
traditional understanding of this period from various angles, some of which were 
not even considered as topics of historical inquiry in the mid-twentieth century. 
Thanks to these works, the conventional narrative of Ottoman history – hat in the 
late sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire entered a prolonged period of decline 
marked by steadily increasing military decay and institutional corruption – has been 
discarded.140 
As the declinist view has been predominantly positioned around the failure of the 
Janissaries, the study of the Janissary corps has been an important part of the 
mainstream historiography for a generation of writers. As has also been demonstrated 
by Çamuroğlu and Tezcan, there have emerged different ways of understanding the 
Janissary rebellions, with narratives that see them acting as safeguards against religious 
sectarian monopoly, and acting as pioneers for a more democratic administration by 
limiting the purview of the autarkical rule of the Sultan. These approaches provide 
supplementary examples to Jane Hathaway’s claim that ‘historians of the Ottoman 
Empire have rejected the narrative of decline in favour of one of crisis and 
adaptation’.141 In light of these works, Goodwin’s fiction remains within the framework 
of declinist historiographical narratives, which see the Janissaries as the force that 
prevented the modernisation of the Empire.  
1.1.3.2. Against the Edict: Revolution and the Seraskier 
Through the character of the Seraskier, Jason Goodwin situates the Edict within the 
context of the Ottomans’ military defeats against technologically more advanced 
opponents. Feeling humiliated by the military losses, the chief of the army is portrayed 
to be eager to start his own project of modernisation by instituting a Republic along 
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military lines after the fashion of French revolutionaries. The continuing success of the 
Russians in warfare is explained by their being ‘formidable opponents with up-to-date 
equipment and modern armies’, while in Egypt, Mehmet Ali Pasha, the Albanian, had 
used ‘the experience of the Napoleonic invasion to train the fellahin as soldiers, 
western-style’, as a result of which ‘[t]hey had drill, and discipline; they had tactics and 
modern guns’.142 The Seraskier’s resentment at the lack of a competent Ottoman army 
is witnessed in his train of thought: ‘No more than peasants in pantaloons, led by 
quarrelsome windbags, even the Greeks had proved to be more than a match for the 
New Guard’.143 The Seraskier’s army is seen in competition against these armies since 
it had been introduced as a countermeasure against further territorial losses: ‘The sultan 
read the message and began to train his own, Egyptian-style force: the seraskier’s New 
Guard’.144  
The position of the chief of the army is a rather precarious one as he is presented 
throughout the novel as a military commander preoccupied with the Review of his army 
by the Sultan despite the fact that it is discovered, towards the end of the novel, that 
behind the scenes he has been preparing a military coup against the Sultan and the 
Empire itself. As a result of lack of confidence in the Sultan’s reforms, the project of 
modernisation takes an extreme character in the Seraskier’s vagary of following the 
image and fashion of Napoleon. On the surface, the Seraskier attracts Yashim’s 
sympathy for his tentative situation, between wanting to be modern and lacking the 
education and manners to be able to become so. On this account, Yashim feels sorry for 
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the Seraskier for believing too much in the symbolic power of his French military kit, 
the ‘Ferenghi magic’ as Yashim calls it in his reflection:145 
Yashim felt a wave of pity for the seraskier, in his western kit, his efficient boots, 
his buttoned tunic. These were symbols he endured, not knowing exactly why, like 
one of those simpletons in the bazaar who feel that no medicine is good unless it 
causes them some pain. Magic boots, magic buttons.146  
Yashim is critical of the fact that by wearing the French military kit, the Seraskier 
thinks he and his soldiers can look and be modern, which is expressed in the Seraskier’s 
words as modernity being ‘a condition of the mind’.147 The fact that the Seraskier takes 
modernisation at face value is juxtaposed with the scepticism displayed by Yashim 
regarding so-called Western modernity, and his sense that the Ottomans will never 
really be accepted in the league of Powers: 
A dangerous party: always a guest, never a player. Only obliged to stand by, 
confused and helpless, as the old, grand battle raged, a battle that would never be 
won between the old and the new, reaction and renovation, memory and hope. 
Coming in too late, when last night’s manti were already curling at the edges.148  
This feeling of missing-out seems to be a weighty emotional burden for the commander 
of the army, who bemoans the absence of the French dictionary until a couple of 
decades ago even if he appreciates its novelty.149  
From the viewpoint of the Seraskier, Ottoman losses are assessed with a view to the 
Ottomans’ belated dialogue with European modernisation. The sultan, the narrator tells 
us from Yashim’s point of view, ‘was a born moderniser. He’d taken to the European 
saddle faster than anyone. The change that had come over the city went beyond the 
gradual but continuous disappearance of turbans and slippers, and their replacement by 
the fez, and leather shoes’.150 The Seraskier’s concern about the delay in military 
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modernisation and Yashim’s criticism of the rapid adoption of Western fashions in daily 
social practices are viewed in manifest contrast regarding the Ottomans’ place among 
their peers and neighbours. While for Yashim a total cultural transformation is not 
necessary for military achievements, for the Seraskier, the feeling of academic and 
cultural inadequacy vis-à-vis the French and the Russians is an extension of their 
military supremacy: 
‘I could pretend that none of that matters. There was a time when we met our 
enemies on the field, and crushed them underfoot. We were very good. But times 
have changed. We are not as fast as we were, and the enemy has become faster. [...] 
We can’t afford to ignore them – Russians, Frenchmen. Yes, even those Egyptians 
can teach us something, but not if we suck on narghiles here, in Istanbul, trying to 
imagine what they are like. It’s for us to go out and learn how they think’.151  
In order to be active in this learning process, the Seraskier admits to having set up a 
meeting between his young officers and the Russians, which, even though no detail is 
offered in the book regarding how it came off, presumably abets the Janissary coup by 
hiding the kidnapping of the young men from Yashim.152 
Despite being a product of the most recent military reforms carried out by Mahmud II, 
the Seraskier is portrayed as sceptical of the upcoming reforms as he finds the Edict to 
be ‘just another worthless piece of paper’.153 He confesses to Yashim his belief that 
reforms are not enough, and that the sultans and eunuchs aren’t ‘important’ as the core 
of the Ottoman Empire.154 Instead, he wants to form an Ottoman republic, since in order 
to be modern and strong, it is simply required to change the old system, the ancien 
regime, for a new Republic.155 The Seraskier is presented by Goodwin as an example of 
the revolutionary mindset which was protested in Edmund Burke’s influential criticism 
of the French Revolution in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). In this 
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work, Burke’s criticism targets the idealist republicans and revolutionaries of France 
who carried the French nation from anticipations of liberty to dictatorship.  
In his Introduction to Burke’s Reflections, Leslie George Mitchell mentions that, for 
Burke, ‘[a]ny practice that had shown itself capable of binding men together in political 
communion for any length of time was entitled to respect’.156 Contrary to Edmund 
Burke’s convictions, ‘the French had shown a complete contempt for all the 
accumulated wisdom and evidence in their political history’.157 In other words, based on 
his belief in the unpredictability of humanity’s nature, in his defence of the ancien 
regime, Burke maintains that, as noted by Mitchell, ‘given the diversity of man’s 
political character, any existing institution should be approached with reverence’.158 
Burke believes that, in Mitchell’s words, ‘[e]mancipated from the constraints of 
historical prescription […], the French had become wreckers’.159 In the novel, similar to 
Burke’s depictions, the Seraskier attempts to destroy the Palace through his violent plan 
and build a republican state to replace the empire using imported European methods. 
Europe is seen by the Seraskier as the source of reason, which Thomas Paine (1737-
1809) sees as the foundation of ‘good government’ in his The Rights of Man (1791-2). 
Duncan Wu summarises Paine’s defence of the republic through his conviction that 
‘democracy – a society in which all men have equal rights and in which leadership 
depends on talent and wisdom – is better than aristocracy’.160 Goodwin’s interpretation 
of the unfolding historical events echoes Burke’s Reflections in his scepticism about any 
new republic’s capacity to protect individual liberties. Yashim’s position is one of 
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trying to preserve certain customs, and protect his fellow subjects in their multiplicity, 
according to certain measures that are part of the existing system. His questioning of, 
and growing antagonism towards, the Seraskier’s republican idealism can be seen as a 
reflection of this nuanced position, which we could call an ‘alternative modernity’.  
Since modernity is only ‘an arrangement of power’ for the Seraskier, he looks up to 
Napoleon and the Russians for their military strength to achieve modernity. He also 
believes that equality will be achieved through a military regime, by being ‘shoulder to 
shoulder with the men beside you, taking orders’.161 The Seraskier, in other words, is an 
enlightened dictator. Goodwin’s fiction provides us with an opportunity to think about 
the Napoleonic scare and the new arrangement of power in Europe by means of 
situating the Ottomans’ military and structural reorganisation attempts in the early 
nineteenth century within this context:162  
Most of the foreign instructors in the New Guard, Yashim knew, were Frenchmen, 
or others – Italians, Poles – who had been swept into the enormous armies the 
Emperor Napoleon had raised to carry out his dreams of universal conquest. 
Fifteen, ten years ago, with the Napoleonic Wars finally at an end, some of the 
modern indigent remnants of the Grande Armée had found their way to Istanbul, to 
take the sultan’s sequin. But learning French was a business for the young, and the 
seraskier was pushing fifty.163 
According to general consent, the Ottomans have generally been seen as unresponsive 
to the French Revolution until the conquest of Egypt by Bonaparte’s forces in 1798 
when the revolution directly influenced them. Until then, the Ottomans have been 
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regarded to have stayed outside the influence of the ‘mass experience’ of their European 
counterparts with respect to the French Revolution.164  
Niyazi Berkes remains tentative regarding the way the Western Enlightenment was 
translated into Ottoman experience. He does not find in the historical accounts of 
Ottoman historians Cevdet or Asım substantial reference to the rational philosophy and 
ideology of the French Revolution, Napoleonic campaigns, or intellectual and scientific 
movement of ‘Enlightenment’. Even of ‘the French penetration’, he finds unclear 
expresions of opinion regarding ‘the appearance of the Frankish manners and ideas’.165 
In particular, the vague nature of the wording of Cevdet Paşa’s observations in his Tarih 
regarding the new influence of the countries of Western Europe doesn’t escape Berkes’s 
notice: 
In Istanbul appeared many French affairs and several European things which were 
necessities of civilization. The grandees of the sultanate and too-eager government 
officials exceeded reasonable limits and initiated French ways in everything. They 
began to follow European ways, necessarily or unnecessarily.166  
Berkes sees this vague expression as to the cause of the adoption of French innovations 
as insinuating that it results from undiluted appropriation and imitation by the reforming 
elite, which could lead to an unnecessary shift from Sharia ways and customs.167 So, for 
Berkes, Enlightenment and revolutionary ideas, both by means of their dissemination 
and in terms of their after-effects, primarily influenced only the Ottoman elite in their 
intellectual and cultural interactions with the French and other Europeans, who now 
appeared in greater numbers. These new styles of encounter with Western European 
visitors and residents accelerated the acceptance of the idea of Western superiority in 
the areas of ‘knowledge, technology, industry and economic power’, which is what the 
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Seraskier and the narrator from the viewpoint of the jewellery thief, that is Kislar Agha, 
repeatedly refers to when they say ‘new ways’.168 Janissary brings criticism to the 
understanding of Western civilisation as an unattainable entity through the character of 
Kislar Agha while the Seraskier and his ambitious westernisation project is used as a 
means to criticise the idealisation of the Western civilisation. Another approach that 
advocates an exclusively Ottoman modernity is presented through the protagonist 
Yashim, who embraces a model of intellectual engagement, which will now be 
examined.  
1.1.3.3. Middle Way: Yashim  
Between the extreme models of dependency in the security of tradition as well as the 
belief in the corrupt nature of the Western modernisation (Occidentosis), and the 
extreme belief in the potentiality of a wholesale modernisation, Yashim presents as a 
mid-way character, by both illustrating the aspects of the Empire that indeed cannot be 
transformed and the changes that can be adopted. Having been freed from his duties at 
the palace by Sultan Mahmud II, Yashim lives outside the Palace, but he still keeps his 
organic connection to the Palace as he tends to the requests coming from the Sultan or 
the Valide (mother of the) Sultan.169 Acting as a conduit between the immured world of 
the Palace harem and his liberated world outside it, Yashim could still carry out many 
of the responsibilities of a eunuch, since:  
Apart from the sultan himself, and the palace eunuchs, he was the only man who 
could take up an invitation to enter the women’s quarters. The only man in the 
whole empire who could come and go at will. And when the palace turned to him 
for help it was his duty to oblige.170  
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It has been noted that the manumission of eunuchs did not actually make much change 
in terms of the eunuchs’ employment status, because, as Ehud Toledano observes, ‘the 
wealth and prestige which attached to the position of Palace eunuchs required no 
coercion on the part of their masters’, so they would willingly work for their masters.171 
In view of this point, it is possible to argue that, like many other eunuchs, Yashim too is 
‘advantageously positioned at the crossroads of sensitive information, privy to the 
innermost secrets of many Court figures’, and this helps him in his duties as the Palace 
investigator, as does having a friendly and trustworthy relationship with the Valide 
Sultan.172 Having been manumitted, Yashim can also conveniently avoid the 
complications of delicate 'balance of loyalties' that existed in such a highly competitive 
environment as a harem; and this allows him to act as an independent agent.173  
We learn in Jason Goodwin’s later novel An Evil Eye (2011) that Yashim’s castration 
was carried out by some unknown people who also raped and killed his Greek 
mother.174 Yashim’s father being a governor, Yashim’s status in the Palace as a white 
eunuch, unlike that of other, African, slaves, is less clear-cut. His job as an investigator 
in the service of the Sultan as a non-black eunuch aptly betrays a different background, 
despite the fact that his freedom remains considerably limited even after his 
manumission, as Ehud Toledano points out: ‘The physical damage inflicted upon them 
[the eunuchs] could not be remedied by a mere certificate of manumission; their 
employment and prosperity were practically guaranteed by their handicap’.175 The 
narrator talks about Yashim’s coping strategy with his out-of-place position in the 
changing world with a solemn tone. Yashim chooses to remain invisible in his brown 
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cloak, finding shelter in detachment, since if he wore European clothes he would no 
longer have a real place in the emerging world: ‘Perhaps detachment was a mannerism 
he had adopted because the agony was too biting and too strong to bear without it. A 
very fragile kind of make-believe’.176 Despite the fact that he enjoys his liberation being 
in the company of his friends outside the palace, shopping and cooking, and enjoying 
the products of modernity outside of the palace, such as reading French books he 
borrows from the (French) Valide Sultan, Yashim has reservations about the ways 
modernity has been transformed in the Turkish experience.  
Yashim’s position in The Janissary Tree, overall, resembles that of the ‘middling’ hero 
type character of Georg Lukacs in his The Historical Novel. Hamish Dalley details two 
types of character in Lukács’s analysis of the historical novel. The first character type, 
‘historical-social types’, are the typical figures that can be found in Sir Walter Scott’s 
novels as representatives of ‘social trends and historical forces’. Hamish Dalley 
suggests that ‘this mode of characterization enables the depiction of large-scale 
processes of change via narratives of fictional individuals’, which means that they 
manifest some kind of political and historical significance.177 In Janissary, the main 
‘extreme opposing social forces’ are represented by the traditionalists (the eunuchs and 
the Janissaries) and a revolutionist (the seraskier).178  
The second type of Lukács’s classification, the ‘middle-of-the-road’ or the ‘middling’ 
hero type, on the other hand, ‘is defined by the relative absence of positive qualities’.179 
This hero of the historical novel is given a neutral character, which provides him/her the 
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flexibility to operate between clashing ‘historical-social types’ with contrasting 
expectations.180 Yashim, with his flexibility to move between the court and the public 
spaces (between the seraskier of the New Guard, the Bektashi tekkes, the harem and the 
köçek dancers) is able to interlace different layers of the society. It is the heroes’ 
task to bring the extremes whose struggle fills the novel, whose clash expresses 
artistically a great crisis in society, into contact with one another. Through the plo, 
at whose centre stands the hero, a neutral ground is sought and found upon which 
the extreme opposing social forces can be brought into a human relationship with 
one another.181 
In addition to bringing together the contenders of a given society, the middling hero also 
operates between the past and the present. Jerome de Groot describes some of the 
characteristics of Sir Walter Scott’s Waverly as representing history as a 
bildungsroman, as a personal history:  
In the same way that Lukacs talks of the masses achieving historical consciousness 
the hero of the Bildungsroman achieves a sense of ‘then’ and ‘now’ in relation to 
his personal identity. Yet Waverly himself is, as Lukacs points out, entirely 
middling as a character. This is key for Lukacs in that it allows Scott to explore the 
‘reality’ of history through a figure who is without prejudice.182 
Yashim’s is the voice raised to refuse the choice between the two extremes and the 
limited view of the world that is trapped between this dichotomy. By giving Yashim the 
characteristics of a middling protagonist, Jason Goodwin is able to produce ‘a narrative 
that posits society as a totality of contradictory forces’.183  
The theme of contradictory traditional and progressive forces in The Janissary Tree, 
namely the surge of contradictions created by political and social changes in a closed 
society that functions based on a deeply traditional system, had been an important topic 
for Ottoman intellectuals in previous centuries but coalesced with a new urgency in the 
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early nineteenth century.184 By consolidating characteristics of this turbulent political 
climate by means of characters and social groups in the novel, the author translates 
historical circumstances into deeply felt expectations and disillusionments. 
1.1.4. The Crisis of Modernity in The Janissary Tree: A Condition of the Mind 
As opposed to the staunch traditionalist perspective of the Janissaries, both Yashim and 
the Seraskier are portrayed in favour of the Sultan’s modernisation even though they 
don’t receive the importation of the French laws, expertise and culture with equal 
confidence and eagerness. Despite the difference in their attitudes in this matter, 
however, they both identify their relation to modernity as ‘a condition of the mind’. 
Yashim’s brown cloak as his choice of attire is explained by his wish to remain 
inscrutable, which is defined as a ‘talent [...] [m]ore likely [...] a condition of mind’.185 
His avoidance of European clothes gives him a degree of anonymity and an appearance 
of neutrality. The Seraskier, on the other hand, sees the French military kit he wears as a 
symbol of modernity, and defines modernity as ‘a condition of the mind’.186 The 
concept, therefore, is associated with the acts of both welcoming and disregarding 
change.  
Even if he does not follow European forms in his appearance and attire, Yashim 
appreciates French culture and literature. One of the books Yashim reads in French is 
Choderlos de Laclos’s Les Liaisons Dangereuses, which describes the plans of two ex-
lovers to manipulate and seduce an innocent aristocratic girl. In the epistolary novel, the 
seduction of the girl is carried out in the name of giving her an education. In Yashim’s 
dream, Marquise de Merteuil tells Yashim ‘depravity is not a word we recognise in the 
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Academie […] It is a condition of mind’.187 The Marquise achieves liberation from 
social forces around her by redefining morality and social norms; therefore, it can be 
said that de Laclos’s book is essentially about liberation from social constraints. 
Nonetheless, this book is also about the decadence of the French aristocracy nearing the 
French Revolution, and Merteuil is characterised as a corrupt person who abuses 
‘entrusted power’, that is her discretion, ‘for private gain’.188 In this sense, the 
decadency of French society is demonstrated in juxtaposition to ‘depravity’ being ‘a 
condition of mind’. The comparison Goodwin conveys between depravity and 
modernity is carried through when Yashim gets surprised upon hearing from the 
Seraskier these same words he hears from the Marquise. This may mean that, from the 
viewpoint of Yashim, the Seraskier is at the root of the decadence in society, proving 
that being corrupt is a feature that does not solely apply to corrupt elements within 
status-quo defenders. The Seraskier is viewed in this vein as guilty as the traditionalists, 
who are rebellious against the Sultan’s reform edict. 
Another pattern of corruption in the Seraskier’s representation can be found in the 
alliance of the Seraskier with the Russians. A definition of ‘corruption’ that speaks to 
this arrangement can be found in Mark Philp’s work on the same topic: ‘A public 
official (A), acting for personal gain, violates the norms of public office and harms the 
interests of the public (B) to benefit a third party (C) who rewards A for access to goods 
or services which C would not otherwise obtain’.189 One of the key features of this 
definition is ‘[t]he idea that three actors are normally involved or affected by corrupt 
activity: the occupant of the public office (A), the intended beneficiary of that office 
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(B), and the actual beneficiary of the particular exercise of that office (C)’.190 The act 
that is described as corrupt is defended in the novel by the Seraskier as being in a 
certain state of mind. This plot structure is a strong reminder of a Cold War-style 
treachery story pattern. The Seraskier (A), who wants to gain power like that of 
Bonaparte in order to impose modernity, instead of serving the Sultan and his subjects 
(B), collaborates with Russians and hides information regarding their culpability from 
the investigator (C), who would exploit and benefit from the chaos created in Istanbul 
from the murder of the officers by the Janissaries. In order to conceal his coup plans, the 
Seraskier tries to hide his knowledge of the French language, although Yashim learns 
from Palewski that the Seraskier can speak French fluently, and interestingly, this gives 
Yashim a clue regarding the Seraskier’s intention of dethroning the Sultan. For the 
Seraskier, the change is unavoidable and the Janissaries are just a hurdle: ‘We’ve seen 
those weak old fools for the last time. Blathering about tradition! Padding round in their 
own nest, like silly chickens. Defying history’.191 His idea of the Ottoman Empire is that 
it is sunken and corrupt, like a disease, whereas modernity and his revolutionist coup 
bring cure: ‘Think of it as . . . surgery. It hurts, of course. The surgeon’s knife is 
ruthless, but it cuts out the disease. […] For the patient the agony brings relief’.192 The 
Seraskier sees a noble future in transitioning to republic by removing the sultan; 
therefore, he doesn’t deem himself as corrupt for causing the death of the officers and a 
commotion in Istanbul.  
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In The Janissary Tree, the concept of ‘modernity’ in the period leading to the Tanzimat 
is entertained as fraught with conflict and crisis. The standard for modernity in the 
contest between radical forces is the anticipated reform edict, which, in line with the 
author’s conventional declinist approach in his historical analysis, provides a definitive 
point for embarking on grand-scale of reforms following the abolition of the Janissaries. 
Jason Goodwin brings forth his scepticism concerning the way reforms were 
implemented through his main character, Yashim, who can be perceived as one of the 
oddities of the Ottoman Empire from the perspective of a Western European observer. 
In his attempt to demonstrate the unique character of the Ottomans at this crossroad of 
changes, Jason Goodwin has created and employed other exceptional characters, 
including the Valide Sultan with French origin, Preen, a köçek, transvestite dancer, and 
Palewski, an ambassador with no country. These characters, partially representing the 
Ottoman social tapestry, constitute the groundwork examples for Goodwin’s 
formulation of cultural diversity in the Empire. These characters and the presentation of 
their daily lives attest to the author’s formulation of a model for alternative modernity. 
On the other hand, the Ottomans’ struggles at the time are formulated only in 
connection with the developments in Europe and the involvement of the Western 
European countries in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire, allowing the author 
to fall into the quagmire of the Eastern Question vis-a-vis Ottoman weakness. This 
results in a clash between the approaches of the obsolete Ottoman decline rhetoric and 
the alternative modernity approach.  
Any attempt at providing a comprehensive analysis of The Janissary Tree gets even 
more challenging because of the contradictory presentation of cultural exchange, as 
observed in the exchange of cultural attire. While the author’s suspicion of the 




Seraskier, Yashim, the vegetable-seller George and the Valide Hanım, this attitude 
becomes an issue of a masquerade when the two officials from the British embassy, 
Fizerly and Compston, are clad in Ottoman attire and disguise themselves as Turks. 
Yashim, presumably in order to appease the Seraskier, tells the chief of the army that 
the duo who appear on the roof of the Great Mosque, are ‘[m]uch more modern than 
they look, I imagine. And efficient, as you say’.193 The complexity of the question of 
modernity and cultural relativist perspective will be further discussed at length in the 
following section, which treats The Snake Stone principally in relation to the writer’s 
viewpoint on the millet system. Here we can begin to see more clearly the limitations of 
Goodwin’s attempts at intervening in Ottoman historiography by means of historical 
detective fiction. 
 
1.2. The Snake Stone 
1.2.1. The Millet System 
An important aspect of Mahmud II’s reforms was that they laid the basis for the 
secularization of the government kicking off the Tanzimat (Reorganisation, or 
Reordering) period and planted the seeds of a political and social movement called 
Ottomanism, which is an ideology that flourished at the turn of the twentieth century 
and saw democracy and equality among the people of the Empire as the most viable 
alternative to the millet system in order to prevent the nationalist and separatist 
movements.194 Stretched over three continents, the Ottoman Empire accommodated 
people from a variety of religious and ethnic groups called millets. These conglomerate 
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non-Muslim communities were simply divided into communities according to their 
major religious variation, such as the Greek-Orthodox millet, the Armenian-Catholic 
millet and the Jewish millet. Millets were administered by their own religious leaders in 
legal matters which were resolved within their individual judiciary system unless they 
were criminal cases or cases where the involvement of a Muslim was in question. This 
is why millets can be said to have held a partially self-governing entity. Non-Muslims 
were also liable to pay taxes called cizye which secured them exemption from military 
duties. Ottoman society was divided into two classes: The ruling (askeri) class were 
Muslims who carried out the governmental tasks and this category included the officers 
of the court and the army, civil servants, and ulema, the learned people of Islamic 
law.195 The rest of the population were called the reaya and were composed of both 
Muslim and non-Muslim individuals.196  
The Muslims in the Ottoman Empire were considered to have privileged status because 
Islam was the official religion in the administration of the Empire and this was the 
determining factor of social class. This prerogative underscored a model that has most 
often been called ‘tolerant’ since it functioned even in the most hostile conditions in 
Europe since the system of Islamic core permitted the pre-Islamic Abrahamic religions 
to be recognised as ‘people of the book’.197 Karen Barkey explains the function and the 
use of this system by indicating that ‘[t]he Ottoman state, like the Russian, throughout 
its history tried to use a policy of containment rather than letting religious rivalries get 
out of control’.198 Gerald Maclean discerns the Ottoman system from that of their peers 
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in Europe through the concept of ‘imperial envy’, which he uses to describe a ‘structure 
of feeling’ that developed in Europe at the height of the Ottomans’ beneficial 
engagement with an exuberant cosmopolitanism.199 MacLean maintains that the English 
began ‘to develop a new sense of their own place in the world’ through their cultural 
encounter with the Ottoman Empire, which gave way to ‘imperial envy’.200 Laila Abdel-
Rahman El-Sayed outlines envy as the feeling that constitutes a person’s view of ‘his 
equal as a rival in politics or in any arena’.201 According to her, MacLean’s use of the 
concept denotes to a ‘language of fascination’ which can be detected ‘in the writings of 
early modern English visitors to the Ottoman empire’, and which was actually used as 
‘the facade for imperial envy, which entails rivalry besides fascination’.202 MacLean 
describes the attitude of the English towards the Ottomans as ‘an explicit declaration of 
the malicious hatred of Ottoman imperial success’, and in El-Sayed’s words, also as ‘a 
negotiation between fear and fascination’ resulting from the tolerant image of Muslim 
rulers.203  
In addition to resuming the structural reorganisation of the military that had been 
initiated during Selim III’s reign, Mahmud II also launched some modifications in the 
traditional customs and practices in daily life. When Mehmet II conquered 
Constantinople in 1453, he had declared that each community would dress the way that 
was ascribed to them. Jason Goodwin describes the specifics of these garments in his 
Lords of the Horizons: ‘Greeks wore black trousers and slippers; the Armenians violet 
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slippers and purple trousers; and the Jews sky-blue trousers and slippers, and certain 
very privileged non-believers were allowed to wear yellow slippers and red trousers, 
like a Turk’.204 In Mahmud’s time, the imperial subjects were encouraged with a decree 
issued in 1829 to change their robes and turbans that symbolised the historical and 
religious affiliations. In the decree it was demanded that everyone in the Empire, 
including the sultan himself, wear red fezzes, western boots and the stambouline, a 
cutaway coat, although it did not involve the clergy, who were allowed to wear their 
robes and turbans.205 This was the new modern outlook of an Ottoman man. 
Jason Goodwin in his novel The Snake Stone (2007) frequently addresses the issue of 
the decree on clothing. The narrator voices Yashim’s reflections on these changes:  
It seemed to Yashim that he had once been able to glance at people’s feet to tell 
who they were, and where they belonged. In Fener, or Sultanahmet, perhaps; but in 
Pera, no longer. The distinctions blurred; the categories no longer held. That lanky 
figure in a Frankish suit – was he Russian? Belgian? Or an Ottoman, indeed – a 
Bosnian schoolmaster, perhaps, or a Russified Moldavian shipping agent?206  
In this passage, Yashim seems to lament that the distinctly Ottoman cosmopolitanism is 
vanishing and the Ottoman man is no longer distinguishable by his appearance. For him, 
the ‘origins’ of the Ottomans now seem to be ‘so clouded and confused’.207 Goodwin 
portrays the difficulty of leaving one’s habits and customs in the multi-faith society 
Ottomans lived in in the scene in The Snake Stone in which the narrator introduces the 
conversation between the investigator Yashim and the Greek Ottoman grocer George as 
below:  
Almost ten years after the sultan had told his people to dress alike, George stuck to 
the traditional blue, brimless cap and black slippers which defined him as a Greek. 
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Once, when Yashim asked him if he was going to adopt the fez, George had drawn 
himself up quite stiffly:  
‘What! You thinks I dresses for sultans and pashas all of my life? Pah! Like these 
courgette flowers, I wears what I wears because I ams what I ams!’ 
Yashim had not asked him about it again; nor did George ever remark on Yashim’s 
turban. It had become like a secret sign between them, a source of silent 
satisfaction and mutual recognition; as between them and the others who ignored 
the fez, and went on dressing as before.208 
On this topic, Goodwin agrees with Niyazi Berkes who notes that ‘[c]onfusion and even 
anarchy threatened when the elaborate traditional system of attire became severely 
damaged. People did not know what to put on; the streets assumed a carnival 
appearance [...] in the absence of a new uniform ty’.209 According to Berkes, it was 
during the time of Mahmud II that the ‘gradual-separation between state and religion’ 
was initiated as it was in his time that ‘Western attire, and certain social practices 
relating to etiquette, taste, and the like’ were beginning to be accepted. These changes 
were slowly rendering everyday religious symbols and distinctions irrelevant, and 
concerning this, Goodwin’s narrator points out that, with these changes, Mahmut II ‘had 
meant all men to receive equal treatment’.210 In Niyazi Berkes’s account of the 
development of secularism in Turkey, the reactions of Western observers to such 
changes had in the majority been negative. Berkes argues that these observers 
‘bemoaned the disappearance of what they believed to be peculiarly oriental. The great 
champions of equality between the Rayahs and the Turks complained of their new-
found difficulty in distinguishing one from the other’, an example of which we can see 
in the conversation between Yashim and the Greek grocer above.211  
The fact that the disappearance of the outfits with Oriental character should receive any 
criticism might well be understood as deriving from orientalism, with its exoticising and 
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essentialising tendencies. In her critique of postmodernist discourses on Black identity 
politics, Bell Hooks calls for an ‘African-American resistance struggle’ which is ‘rooted 
in a process of decolonization that continually opposes re-inscribing notions of 
“authentic” Black identity’.212 Such a demand can also shed light on the various 
interpretations of authenticity in both historical and contemporary accounts of Ottoman 
identity. Even though Goodwin’s novels have been written in the twenty-first century, 
under the influence of postmodern discourses which celebrate otherness and difference, 
applying such ideas within an early nineteenth-century context can, nevertheless, be 
considered anachronistic. In terms of the postmodern critique of homogeneous, uniform, 
and universal modern identities, which in the Turkish case has acquired an utmost form 
in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s early republic due to population exchanges following the 
Treaty of Lausanne (1923), as well as homogenising reforms during this period, the idea 
of rejecting an erstwhile eventual uniformity before the advent of the postmodern 
celebration of heterogeneity would be an unrealistic expectation, considering, in 
Anthony Giddens’s words, the ‘inherently globalising’ characteristic of modernity.213 
After all, as Berkes puts it, ‘[t]he traditional costumes of a changing society were bound 
to disappear under the force of actual conditions’.214 In the Ottoman case, changes to the 
appearance of its people came as a consequence of the rise of national insurgencies, 
which forced the concept of toleration to evolve into a consensus amounting to equal 
opportunities and obligations from the viewpoint of the ideal of Ottomanism.  
The author displays a somewhat Romantic and exotic view of Ottoman culture, which 
fails to promote the assessment of the new Ottoman outfit in its social and political 
                                                          
212 Bell Hooks, Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics (New York and Lo on: Routledge, 2015), 
p. 28. 
213 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Gateshead: Polity, 2004) p. 63. 




context, i.e. as an attempt to centralise Sultan Mahmud’s government by blurring the 
boundaries of the classes that are rooted in the millet system, and which aims to 
consolidate the loyalty of his subjects. The millet system unavoidably produced a 
‘closed group’ structure in the administration of the state even though it continued to 
mutually benefit the society and the Palace by ensuring that each group carried out their 
function in the society within their religious and professional capacity, securing the 
continuation of the empire.215 During the times of religious strife throughout the 
Europe, this system guaranteed the safety of all people in the empire; however, as such 
closed class-based systems proved to be limited in the face of nationalist movements, 
the reformations that commenced within military organisations exceeded their original 
intentions in time. On this issue, Niyazi Berkes argues that the outlook of people 
significantly followed Sultan Mahmud’s reforms: 
Headgear was a mark of religious, vocational, and national identity as well as an 
insignia of one's rank and status. […] The disappearance of the old orders, or the 
changes in their status, and the rise of new classes necessitated the adoption of new 
dress. The appearance of the horse-drawn carriage, the decline in certain trades, 
changes in the structure and in functions within the government, business, industry, 
and even education, and the appropriation of certain new amenities in home 
furnishings imposed upon the people the search for a new appearance.216 
This craving for new patterns and variety is criticised in Goodwin’s fiction 
predominantly from the Valide’s eyes as ‘a planter’s daughter on the French island of 
Martinique’ who preferred ‘the comforts of oriental tradition’.217 Her scepticism of the 
adoption of the French modes of living and fashion is given as purely limiting, without 
style and ‘fashion-plates’.218 
The accounts that have an essentialised view of the Ottomans and strive to keep them 
situated within an unchanging identity disregard the mutual exclusivity of establishing 
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universal equality and keeping traditions originating from the millet system intact. The 
project of Ottomanism ultimately intended to overcome this contradiction. At the 
beginning of the following century, as writers such as Michelle Campos and Raja 
Shehadeh show, this ideal of ‘peaceful coexistence’ in a highly nationalistic setting was 
almost accomplished, but shortly this dynamism backslid into nationalist fervour.219 
Berkes refers to Mahmud II as ‘the founder of a new Ottoman state’ which presents an 
understanding of ‘Ottoman sovereignty’ that is based on ‘the people’.220 He is seen by 
Berkes as a seculariser of the state: 
He threw away his cloak of sacred power with all its trappings and made himself 
not the defender of the faithful but the enlightener of the Ottoman citizenry. He 
founded an absolute monarchy supported by a centralized bureaucracy and a state 
army recruited from among commoners and formed with a new, secular, and 
progressive orientation.  
It was during Mahmud's time of greatest weakness that the idea of an Ottoman 
nationality composed of all the subjects of the Empire irrespective of their origin, 
language, and religious affiliation, and the idea of the Padişah as the temporal ruler 
of the Ottomans began to form.221 
 
An important aspect of the millet system was that the rule of the empire was based on 
the Islamic organisation of the state. The Ulema, ‘the corps of the learned men of 
religion or of the Şeriat’, were charged with assuring that ‘the ruler's legislation, 
administration, and justice agreed with the Şeriat’, which meant ‘the preservation of the 
traditional order’, i.e. nizam.222 In 1826, after the abolition of the Janissaries, 
şeyhülislam, the head of Islam, was offered Ağa Kapısı Palace, the defunct office of the 
master of the Janissaries, which was later turned into a ministry during the Tanzimat 
period (1839-1856), the result of which was the hampering of the şey ulislam’s direct 
                                                          
219 Campos, Ottoman Brothers; Raja Shehadeh, A Rift in Time: Travels with My Ottoman Uncle (London: 
Profile, 2010); Landry, ‘Said before Said’, p. 66. 
220 Berkes, Development of Secularism, p. 92. 
221 Berkes, Development of Secularism, p. 92. 




influence in political matters.223 With the establishment of rüşdiye schools (military 
middle schools) alongside the old religious schools called medreses, the education 
system was also being relatively secularised during the reign of Mahmut II. Moreover, 
the establishment of Mekteb-i Tıbbiye (Medicine School) (1827) and Mekteb-i Harbiye 
(Military School) (1834) marked the reformation attempts of the imperial army. All 
these new schools in which positivist education system was exercised contributed to the 
rise of future secular and Westernised bureaucrats.  
Such transition, whose effects will be further examined in the following chapter in 
relation to Jenny White’s novels, came as a result of the centralisation efforts that made 
it possible to end the distribution of power among interest groups such as the Janissaries 
and the Ulema after the eradication of the former in 1826. Treating each group within 
the empire impartially would put the state and the sultan in the centre and above all 
religious and ethnic differences. Mahmud II’s efforts to centralise power and then to 
redistribute it in this vein constituted milestones towards a more ‘civil’ised, secularised 
and centralised government in which the sultan held the absolute power and allowed a 
new kind of loyalty to the throne. The sultan undermined the religious class for the sake 
of installing a civil bureaucracy, which would give him more power and eliminate to an 
extent the religious intrusion in state policies, and in doing that, he favoured the 
supporters of reform and westernisation for the government posts.224 In Goodwin’s 
novel, it is possible to find descriptions of this moment of transition in Ottoman history, 
albeit with a taste of cynicism and repulsive imagery:  
It was several years since the sultan had begun to encourage his subjects to adopt 
western dress; the results were mixed. Many men had swapped their turbans for the 
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scarlet fez, and their loose robes for trousers and the stambouline, a curiously high-
necked, swallow-tailed jacket, but few of them wore European lace-up boots. Some 
of Yashim’s neighbours on the divan resembled black beetles, in bare feet; all 
elbows and pointy knees.225  
In the final analysis, the lack of mention of the socio-political significance of religious 
symbols in the daily lives of the Ottomans whose lives are rather segregated by 
religious boundaries gives a sense of incompleteness in the author’s description of the 
Ottomans. 
1.2.2. The Ottoman Cavalry and Horsemanship 
In Jason Goodwin’s crime fiction series, the detective Yashim presents both eagerness 
and suspicion towards the reform movement at the same time, raising questions 
regarding what modernity means. To begin with, it is possible to contend that Yashim’s 
cynicism towards Westernisation every so often serves as a means for Goodwin to 
display the kinds of attitude prevalent in nineteenth-century Western accounts that 
showcase the ways in which the Ottomans sought to reconcile themselves with and to 
Western lifestyles in their daily lives. In one of these accounts, in his book titled 
Cavalry; Its History and Tactics, dated 1853, Captain Louis Edward Nolan, an officer 
in the Light Cavalry of Britain, emphasises the forceful and artificial nature of reforms:  
The late Sultan Mahmoud must needs have his cavalry disciplined alIa Franca, or 
in Christian fashion; and he imported a number of French, Italian, and German 
non-commissioned officers to teach his men to ride with long stirrups, and to form, 
dress, and look like Europeans. To the disgust and even dismay of his Moslems, he 
buttoned them up in close jackets and put them into tight pantaloons. With a most 
perverse determination the system has been continued and extended these last 
twelve years, under his son and successor, the present Sultan Abdul Medjid, and it 
may now safely be said that the Turkish cavalry is no longer the best in the world. 
The men, always accustomed to sit cross-legged, and to keep their knees near the 
abdomen, cannot be taught to ride with the long stirrup, à la française. They are 
always rolling off, and are frequently ruptured.226 
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Captain Nolan’s tone carries a measure of empathy mixed with disdain and 
complacency. The word ‘safely’ denotes the fact that the Ottoman cavalry no longer 
posed a threat to the Christian West as it notoriously did in the past. The new modern 
and westernised army, Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye (The Victorious Soldiers of 
Muhammad), was formed following the abolition of the Janissaries in 1826, 
approximately two decades after Sultan Selim III’s Nizam-ı Cedid (New Order) was 
abolished after the Janissary coup of 1807. Captain Nolan writes about the Ottoman 
army in the above passage with an unconcealed sense of derision since the Ottoman 
army had been a source of admiration in the early modern period in Europe, which was 
amply proven in Western military and diplomatic histories and travel writings. 
Especially in the mid-16th century, ‘the discipline of Süleyman’s army’ was being 
praised by dignitaries such as the French King's commissioner Jacques Gassot and the 
Austrian ambassador Baron de Busbecq.227 The military training and discipline of the 
Janissaries had been a source of fear in Eastern Europe from the 15th to 17th centuries. 
This being the case, Captain Nolan’s caricatured description of the cavalry makes a 
telling point about the unwieldy transition to a desired level of technical expertise. 
As opposed to Captain Nolan’s descriptions, the new military force also attracted 
comments praising it from the perspective of functionality: 
The dress of the modern Turkish soldier has partaken of the general change which 
has occurred within the last ten years [from about 1820], and whatever it may have 
lost in picturesque effect, it has certainly gained in effectiveness for military duty. 
Instead of loose, slipshod slippers, he now wears stout serviceable shoes securely 
fastened by leather strings. The huge baloon chaksheers [trousers], which impeded 
his every movement have given place to woollen trowsers, still rather ample about 
the nether man, but not so large as to prevent him from making a rapid charge upon 
the enemy, or from running away. The glittering and flowing jubbee [gown] and 
bayneesh [robe] are well exchanged for a smart tight-bodied blue jacket, closely 
hooded in front, and allowing perfect freedom to the limbs; while the turban, 
infinitely varied in shape and colour, often ragged, and frequently dirty, suggesting 
the idea of walking toadstools, has forever disappeared. In its place the soldier 
                                                          




sports a tidy red cap, with a blue tassel gracefully depending from its crown. With 
the exception of the cap, and the still lingering amplitude of the trowsers, the 
Turkish soldiers could scarcely be distinguished from the regulars of any European 
nation.228 
The reason for the general disappointment in the new army among Western travellers 
can be explained by the nostalgia felt for the unique contribution the Ottoman army 
brought to the literature and history of military art and science.  
The travellers’ appreciation of the discipline of the Ottoman army as the source of 
Ottoman power in earlier times was also expressed in their admiration for the Oriental 
horses. Therefore, the disappointment in the Ottomans for their lack of mastery of that 
for which they were once most greatly admired extends to their horses as well. Arabian, 
Turkish and Barb horses were in demand by notable and royal figures because of these 
‘imported horses’ quality – their beauty and chiselled fineness of limb, but also their 
power and speed’.229 Donna Landry notes that  
Between 1650 and 1750 more than 200 stallions and mares were imported into the 
British Isles from the Middle East from ports in the Ottoman Empire or its regency 
spheres of influence on the North African coast. [...] Yet all these horses were so 
remarkably different from the northern European types with which English people 
were familiar, that a cultural shift occurred, beginning with horsemanship and 
equestrian culture but soon permeating the culture at large.230  
The reason for this cultural shift is the fact that the Ottomans, or Islamic culture more 
broadly, helped the Europeans substantially transform their treatment of the equine. In 
the early modern period, the European horses were being exploited and brutally handled 
by their grooms and masters in order to get the most out of their capabilities because of 
a belief in brutality as the best way to communicate with ‘brutes’, non-human 
animals.231 Busbecq claimed that the excessive use of the voice and club or horse-whip 
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‘makes some Horses even to tremble when their keepers come into the Stable, so that 
they hate and fear them too’.232 On the other hand, Busbecq found that ‘the Turks love 
to have their Horses very gentle, that, at a word of Command, they may fall down on 
their Knees, and in this Posture receive their Riders’.233 Busbecq praises these horses 
but also their masters’ humane treatment of them: ‘There is no Creature so gentle as a 
Turkish Horse; nor more respectful to his master, or the Groom that dresses him. The 
reason is, because they treat their Horses with great lenity’.234 From the late sixteenth 
century through the eighteenth century, such travellers’ accounts created awareness in 
Western societies of Ottoman and Islamic difference in attitudes towards animals as 
fellow creatures, and the ‘lenient’ treatment of the Turks of their horses started to 
receive appreciation in time. 
It can be said that, alongside the shifting understanding towards the human-like traits 
and ‘mental capabilities’ of horses, both the breeding of the English Thoroughbred 
horse and the distinctive riding fashion of the English gentlemen – which had been 
known in the sixteenth century as the ‘Turkey fashion’ and which was meant to 
proclaim ‘their mercantile and cultural superiority to the rest of the world’ – have 
Ottoman origins.235 Essentially, Donna Landry calls such fashions adjusted from the 
Ottoman Empire ‘the Ottoman origins of modernity’; professes the Ottomans’ 
contribution to the European Enlightenment; and also asserts that ‘[t]he superiority of 
Eastern horses was seen as representative of the potential superiority of the great 
Eastern empires and of Islamic culture’.236 It is within this context of ideas that Captain 
                                                          
232 Donna Landry, ‘Anglo-Ottoman Enlightenment?: Thoroughbreds and the Public Sphere’, in Britain 
and the Muslim World: Historical Perspectives, ed. by Gerald MacLean (Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), pp. 69-84 (pp. 72-3). 
233 Landry, ‘Anglo-Ottoman Enlightenment?’, p. 73. 
234 Landry, ‘Anglo-Ottoman Enlightenment?’, p. 73. 
235 Landry, ‘Anglo-Ottoman Enlightenment?’, pp. 69-70, 72. 
236 Donna Landry, ‘English Brutes, Eastern Enlightenment’, The Eighteenth Century, 52.1 (2011), 11-30 




Nolan is able to show in the mid-nineteenth century how easily the regression of the 
Ottoman cavalry can be recognised and traced by means of observing even the Eastern 
horses themselves when he says: 
Their [the Ottomans’] horses are now wretched rosses. The good breeds have died 
out; and the Imperial, centralizing tyranny — masked under the names of reform 
and civilization — which has been raging with more or less intensity these last fifty 
years, has not left on the surface of the empire a man of hereditary rank and wealth, 
or any private country gentleman, with the means of restoring the lost breeds, or of 
supplying such good light cavalry horses as existed in abundance at the 
commencement of the present century.237 
Captain Louis Edward Nolan saw that the French training had a negative effect on the 
Ottoman cavalry because ‘the Turks had lost the benefit of their old ways without 
mastering the advantages of the new’, and as a result, ‘this effective and really brilliant 
cavalry [was] reduced, by the spirit of imitation and ill-understood reform, to a 
condition beneath contempt’.238 The criticism of the misappropriation of French culture 
has been a common theme in Western literature about Ottoman reforms, and it can be 
observed in other material developments as well, which will be discussed below. 
1.2.3. The Franks  
Westernization practices of the Ottomans d these ‘ill-understood’ reforms, in a way, 
resemble the French mission civilisatrice. In this practice, the European colonizer 
justified its invasions and presence in the colonized countries and its exploitation of 
local people and resources by means of the concept of ‘civilizing mission’, which 
involved the imposition of the culture of the colonizer on the colonized.239 The Ottoman 
Empire had been an ally of France for three centuries but never its colony, yet the 
French culture permeated the Ottoman Empire, especially in its imperial seat, Istanbul. 
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It had all started with the end of ‘French crusading tradition’ when François I, 
surrounded on all sides by the Habsburg House of Austria, resorted to Süleyman the 
Magnificent in the hope that a protracted defense against the Turks would weaken 
Austria.240 The unlikely Franco-Ottoman alliance was subsequently consolidated with 
the arrival of the first French ambassador, Jean de La Forest, in Istanbul in 1535. The 
embassy ‘functioned as Europe’s window on the Islamic world’ and because of the 
large number of visits by French travel writers to the empire, both France and Europe in 
general became well informed about the Ottoman culture. As a result of this long 
political and literary interest, Philip Mansel observes that Paris had been ‘the centre of 
Arabic and Turkish studies’ and was also the site of ‘Europe’s first school of oriental 
languages’, as a result of which ‘Paris received the first students from the Muslim 
Middle East’.241  
Most importantly, the alliance between Sultan Süleyman and François I resulted in the 
expansion of Capitulations to France. This trade agreement composed one third of the 
total maritime trade of France, which, owing to the struggle of power in Europe, caused 
the Levant to be regarded as ‘our Indies’ as early as 1660s by the Chevalier d’Arvieux, 
French consul in Saida.242 Surprisingly, as Philip Mansel notes, ‘with the exception of 
the interlude 1798-1806 following Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt’, the French-Ottoman 
relationship remained stable until 1914.243 Capitulations, however, also expanded in 
time to include many other European states and began to be exploited by Ottoman 
subjects who were indiscriminately awarded citizenship or protégé status. Capitulations 
granted foreign citizens and protégés noninclusion in the Ottoman legal system and 
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gave them the opportunity to turn to the ‘consular courts’. These foreign residents were 
also exempted from Ottoman taxes, which attracted local Christians and Jews to become 
foreign citizens or protégés. The narrator of The Snake Stone draws attention to the 
blurred boundary between the foreign citizens resident in the Ottoman Empire and 
Ottoman subjects:  
Centuries ago the Ottomans had allowed foreign ambassadors to judge and 
sentence their own nationals – an errant sailor, a thieving valet – in the intelligent 
belief that the foreigners understood one another better than they could hope to do; 
they didn’t want foreign miscreants clogging the wheels of Ottoman justice, either. 
Now that there were so many foreigners in the city the situation had grown out of 
hand. Many of the people claiming extraterritorial rights were scarcely foreigners 
at all – Greek-born Englishmen, for instance, whose papers were in order but who 
had never been closer to England than the Istanbul docks; Corfiotes who could 
claim protection from the French ambassador without speaking a word of French; 
island Greeks who flew the colours of the Netherlands on ships which never sailed 
beyond the Adriatic. Half the native shipping in Ottoman waters was formally 
beyond Ottoman jurisdiction.244  
The Capitulations and ‘bilateral treaties between the Ottoman Empire and various 
European countries that were originally intended to give foreign merchants resident in 
the empire extraterritorial privileges’ resulted in the exploitation of these privileges.245 
This situation administered injustices between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, and as
a result, tensions between the ‘protected’ and ‘regular’ Ottoman subjects surged. 
Although far fewer in number, there had been cases where even Muslim subjects 
benefitted from these privileges since the dependency of the Muslim beneficiaries on 
these countries would help the latter to expand their influence in the empire.246  
Thanks to their increased presence in the Empire, mainly as a result of Capitulations, 
the French inadvertently came to represent the rest of Western Europe in cultural terms: 
all Westerners were generally called by the Ottomans the ‘Frankish millet’ or 
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‘Franks’.247 Capitulations made sure that the material developments were indeed part of 
the beginnings of informal imperialism instead of an honest attempt to gain from the 
knowledge of Europe. With time, cultural adjustment of the Ottomans to become more 
like Franks accompanied material developments. French culture started to permeate 
Istanbul, not only because of the high number of French citizens living in Istanbul at the 
time, but also because the French language and culture had been adopted by many of the 
elite residents of Istanbul. The Ottomans had long been aware of the importance of the 
French presence throughout the centuries during which the two had been allies, but the 
nineteenth century brought a new susceptibility or receptivity to French customs, 
French fashions and the consumer culture of Paris among the upper classes. Even the 
new palace in Beşiktaş had been notably influenced by European styles and standards. 
In The Snake Stone, even Mahmut II's French mother, the Validé Sultan, complains 
about her son being influenced by Western traditions:  
‘C’est bizarre, Yashim. As he gets older, my son grows more and more infatuated 
by the European style – yet I, who was born to it, find the comforts of oriental 
tradition. He hardly comes here any more, only to see me. His new palace delights 
him. I find it looks like a manufactory.’248  
The narrator of The Snake Stone makes certain that the reader is aware of the fact that 
the Validé Sultan, having been born French, but then having fallen ‘captive of Algerian 
corsairs, [...] been delivered here, to the harem quarters of the aged sultan Abdül 
Hamit’, knew the European style very well, yet preferred ‘the comforts of oriental 
tradition’.249 The Validé Sultan is portrayed as keen to protect her identity and culture as 
the mother of the monarch in the old Topkapı Palace. The new Beşiktaş palace, on the 
other hand, is introduced as the place where a certain vanity associated with European 
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culture, but also a certain vulgarity associated with mass-production of consumer goods, 
permeates:  
The ladies bobbed politely as she began climbing the stairs. How very trivial they 
looked, the validé reflected in their French gowns and corsets, their shawls and silk 
pumps: no more consequential than a tray of Belgian chocolates. A manufactory: 
yes. In her day, at Topkapi, how she and the others had prided themselves on their 
style – the way they wore colour, the arrangement of their hair, the artful collage of 
shawls and pelisses, silks and furs. Then they had paraded like a pride of she-tigers, 
jewels ablaze, loose-limbed and glorying in their fine skin and perfect teeth! Not 
like these girls, these fashion-plates, these trained canaries in their cage.250  
Jason Goodwin’s fiction projects modernisation, for the most part, as being imposed 
upon the Ottomans by themselves, confining them in their self-constructed Western 
colonialism. Goodwin’s work of nonfiction mentions how the alienating effect of 
reforms was observed in a controversial way in an account of ‘Count Helmuth von 
Moltke, who in 1835 was brought from Prussia to train the army’:251  
A Turk will concede without hesitation that the Europeans are superior to his 
nation in science, skill, wealth, daring and strength, without it ever occurring to 
him that a Frank might therefore put himself on a par with a Muslim.252  
In Goodwin's The Snake Stone, Alexander Mavrogordato, the son of a Greek banker, 
represents Moltke's idea of the submissiveness of the Ottomans to Western practices. In 
a similarly critical tone regarding Mahmut II’s reforms to that of the Seraskier in The 
Janissary Tree, Mavrogordato tells Yashim:  
‘You wouldn’t understand. The Fener. The Bosphorus. The Bazaar – you think it’s 
the world, don’t you? You all do. And just because the sultan makes a few changes 
here and there, you think you’re living in the most modern place on earth. Rubbish. 
Constantinople’s a backwater. You’d be surprised, efendi. The rest of the world – 
they laugh at us. Paris. St Petersburg. Why, in Athens they even have gas lighting 
in the streets! A lot of the streets. They have – politics, philosophy, everything. 
Concert halls. Newspapers. You can buy a newspaper and sit and read it in a café, 
and nobody looks twice. Just like the rest of Europe. People have opinions 
there.’253  
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Yashim is portrayed to be disheartened by such disparagement of the unique Ottoman 
identity as opposed to the wholesale cultural appropriation of exportations from the 
West. He answers Mavrogordato’s comment by saying, ‘[a]nd they read newspapers 
which have the same opinions?’.254 However, Mavrogordato, convinced, goes on to say: 
‘We’ll be completely free. You wouldn’t understand.’ For Yashim, Mavrogordato’s 
ideas about European freedom do not seem to be sufficiently nuanced by any awareness 
of their totalising affect. Yashim believes that there is no room for diversity in the 
concept of freedom Mavrogordato offers: ‘if freedom meant taking your opinions out of 
newspapers and dressing up like everyone else then it was certainly something he would 
never understand. A pleasure, perhaps, he would never be entitled to enjoy’.255  
In this section of the novel, the author discusses the politics of Ottoman cultural 
dissolution entailed by Western cultural influence through Yashim. The criticism he 
presents here is not only about the fear of the globalising effect of modernisation, but 
also of cultural imperialism. Yashim’s fear is that the Ottoman society is transforming 
towards a system which destroys the ability of the Ottomans to exist regardless of their 
belief or appearance, including people like himself. The direction towards singularity in 
cultural sphere, especially in the shadow of the Western cultural hegemony, is a road 
Yashim wants to avoid since it doesn’t possess a vision for inclusionary social 
structures. Aware of the fine balance of alliances in the West, Yashim cautions 
Mavrogordato against western colonialism and a complete submission to Western 
cultural influences. He urges Mavrogordato to be a better judge of the historical forces 
that attempt to influence and turn the youthful minds of the Ottomans. By doing so, 
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Goodwin offers a cultural reading of the Ottomans within the context of their cultural 
exchanges with the Western powers.  
1.3. In Defense of Early Ottoman Cosmopolitanism 
The examination of Jason Goodwin’s novels in this chapter has primarily centred on the 
analysis of the Ottoman Empire’s attempts at adopting European modernity as a way to 
cope with its military failures, and on the effects the changes carried out for this purpose 
had, or could have had, on its cultural diversity. The author frames his first historical 
detective fiction particularly around the way the Ottomans negotiated the project of 
reformation of Tanzimat that substantially transformed the Empire’s long-established 
traditional values. The primary framework of The Janissary Tree is positioned in 
relation to the readiness of the Ottomans to welcome social engineering projects that 
aim to pursue large-scale westernisation. In this regard, the two extreme positions taken 
against the reform edict are the forces of tradition, on one hand, which are formed of the 
alliance of the Janissaries, a defunct military organisation, and the palace eunuchs, 
representing those clinging to their ‘medieval’ identities, and on the other hand, the 
progressives, exemplified by the Seraskier, the military chief of the modern army, who 
is representative of a ‘totalitarian ideology’ of reforms.256 A third bloc in the novel is 
the reconciliatory vision of an ‘alternative modernity’, which materialises in the main 
character Yashim, who as a eunuch, embodies many possibilities of the complexities 
and idiosyncrasies of being a modern Ottoman man, and therefore epitomises the 
conflict between modernity and tradition.  
In his exploration of Ottoman reactions to the early to mid-nineteenth century reforms, 
the author significantly draws on the shifting balance of power in post-Revolutionary 
                                                          




Europe as a key problem. This comparative aspect in his formulation of the setting for 
his characters allows the author to speculate about the after-effects of the Napoleonic 
wars, both on the Russians, who, in the aftermath of the war initiated a rapid 
modernisation project, and on the Ottomans, who thus became vulnerable again to the 
conflicting ambitions of the Powers. The author’s frame of reference primarily pertains 
to the Western formulation of the Eastern Question, which is interpreted in relation to 
the emergence of Russia as a regional power and the nationalist insurgencies of the 
Greeks. The threat to the Ottomans coming from the Powers, therefore, is primarily 
conceived as the result of the empowerment of Russia and its rise as a hostile force 
following the Napoleonic Wars, from which it emerged as victorious. The characters 
created by Goodwin, and specifically the Polish Ambassador Stanislaw Palewski, are 
particularly devised in order to situate the Ottomans within this complex Eastern 
Question paradigm in The Janissary Tree. 
Palewski’s position in the Empire as the ambassador of partitioned Poland is highly 
instrumental in illustrating the Ottomans’ status vis-à-vis the Western Powers. The 
ambassador, by virtue of a diplomatic gesture of the Ottomans, who support Polish 
interests against the European Powers that have devoured Poland, or remained silent 
about this carving up, epitomises the remaining strength of the Ottomans as an 
international actors. Based on the Polish experience of reformation which proved to be 
inadequate in the face of a lengthy military and economic decline, the author also aims 
to foster a climate of cynicism regarding a total Ottoman capitulation to Western 
modernisation, especially evident through the dialogues between his main characters 
Yashim and Palewski. Alongside this scepticism, the two characters display a cautious 




claimed that these reforms are carried out to appease the Western European countries in 
order to be able to receive their financial support.  
This point about Sultan Mahmud’s intention to attract financial support presents one of 
the major landmark assertions as well as the contradictions in The Janissary Tree 
regarding the position of the author in his analysis of the Ottoman dialogue with 
Western modernity. In the novel, the Sultan is portrayed favourably for being resolute at 
the crossroads of his reforms and his increased interactions with the West. However, the 
author doesn’t seem to ascribe goodwill, insight or sincerity to Mahmud II regarding his 
adoption of Western style modernisation as the Sultan is suggested to be carrying out 
the reforms in order to be eligible to receive financial aid. The author’s lack of belief in 
the sincerity of reforms is also discernible through his selective mention of the cultural 
shift, including the drinking habits of the Sultan and the change in traditional outfits of 
individuals.257 The Ottomans are therefore predominantly portrayed as being a party in a 
tumult of naïve cultural appropriation. Through the Seraskier, the author criticises the 
early modernisers for erratically trying really hard, adapting new costumes and ending 
traditions. Through the exposure of the Enlightenment, which has transformed Europe, 
as being naively appropriated by the Ottomans in such a way that it becomes a hollow 
concept, the author essentially limits the benefits of ‘enlightenment’ for the Ottomans. 
Goodwin also questions the elite’s will to change and adapt to the new demands of the 
world in fundamental ways. He essentially denies some of the participants of the 
modernisation movement the sincerity and understanding required by fundamental 
cultural change, thereby questioning the very nature of the reforms that were initiated 
during the Tanzimat period. Such disavowal undermines the actually existing project of 
                                                          




Tanzimat reform, or even the possibility of any viable, sensible, gradual strategy for 
positive change. 
The Janissary Tree criticises the idealising of Western civilisation through the character 
of the Seraskier, who has an ambitious westernisation project, as well as criticising, 
through the Kislar Agha, the complete dismissal of the West and the possibility of 
mutual influence (he disregards Western knowledge as being unattainable or 
inconsequential). Because of the emphasis on the representation of these extreme 
responses in the wake of the modernisation project, Goodwin’s arguments remain 
within the well-worn dichotomy of tradition and modernity. Because of the author’s 
choice to present the Tanzimat reforms in a blanket or monolithic manner, only 
resistance to change seem validated. This approach gives rise to an oversimplification of 
the debates on modernity and tradition while some other crucial elements in this debate 
are ignored, including the practical role of religion in Ottomanisation and other 
strategies for greater cohesiveness and equality in the empire. Niyazi Berkes suggests 
that ‘[t]he core of the tradition which we find being challenged in Islamic countries by 
the forces of modern civilization (by no means unrelated to the rise and development of 
Western secularism) was Islam’.258 Goodwin’s fiction rejects Berkes’s analysis, which 
grounds the modernity-tradition dichotomy in increasing religious attachments, as there 
is little mention in the novel of Islam or the Ulema in the early reformation 
movement.259 By particularly focusing on this issue, the novels by Jenny White and de 
Berniéres provide a more comprehensive and detailed reading of the issue of cultural 
diversity in the Ottoman Empire thanks to their focus on religion, which proved 
essential to the administered social consensus in the Ottoman Empire. In Goodwin’s 
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novels, particularly in contrast to White’s, religion is viewed in its cultural context, but 
not as a political institution or structural force. It can therefore be said that the enduring 
representation of the empire promoted by early Republican authors such as Berkes did 
not register with Goodwin or even seem to him to require his attention. 
On a related note, through his examination of the legislative and social changes in the 
Empire in the early nineteenth century, Goodwin also presents the reader with the 
unique and rich qualities of a cosmopolitan Ottoman culture and history, including the 
rich history of the Janissary and Eunuch institutions. The author gives an international 
context to the anxieties of the Ottomans of this period, and also gives a historical 
account of Istanbul’s connection to the rest of the world and the layers of civilisations 
beneath it. Through his protagonist Yashim, the author also shows the possibility of an 
alternative modernity, unphased by the developments applied from above, from the 
Palace, while remaining protective of certain Ottoman social practices. Overall, in this 
chapter, I have intended to provide a framework for understanding this English writer’s 
assumptions as to how the Ottomans viewed themselves and also his projections as to 
their potential in the early nineteenth century, amidst the staggering socio-political 












Syncretism, Socialism and Abdülhamid II’s Reign of Terror: 
The Well-Protected Domains of Kamil Pasha in Jenny White’s Detective Fiction 
 
In her Kamil Pasha novels, Jenny White aims to create a platform that can bring into 
discussion some of the most significant historical controversies of the much-debated 
reign of Abdülhamid II which has left a mixed and contested legacy in our times. Set in 
the late 1880s, the Kamil Pasha novels manifest the Ottoman idealism and optimism 
that aspired to bring justice and compassion to the conflict-ridden domains of the 
Empire. The series so far consists of three books, namely Th  Sultan’s Seal (2006), The 
Abyssinian Proof (2008) and The Winter Thief (2010). The majority of the action of all 
three takes place in Istanbul, bringing together the genres of detective fiction and the 
urban historical novel.1 Kamil Pasha is a magistrate at the new court in Beyoğlu district, 
the increasingly commercialised, fashionable and europeanised part of Istanbul. He is a 
prosecutor who represents the unbiased justice of the empire, even if he finds himself in 
situations he is cynical about and others in which he nearly succumbs to despair, but 
rises to the occasion with desperate action, performing some erratic heroic acts in his 
role as a magistrate.  
In the first section below in which The Abyssinian Proof is examined, an analysis of 
proselytistic practices of religion and the desire for syncretism in the Empire will be the 
focal point while Macedonian insurgence and Muslim refugees pouring into the capital 
seeking protection from religious and ethnic clashes emerge as the background theme. 
The analysis of The Winter Thief will similarly focus on ethnic clashes, specifically the 
Armenian and Kurdish struggles, this time placing Sultan Abdülhamid II’s firm regime 
                                                          




under the spotlight. The primary mission of Kamil Pasha in both novels is to ensure that 
the empire remains strong and safeguards its subjects despite the increasing contention 
at the turn of the century. I have focused on The Abyssinian Proof and The Winter Thief, 
and not The Sultan’s Seal, which deals primarily with English embassy and imperial 
palace intrigues and the possibility of an Anglo-Ottoman romance. White’s project has 
developed dramatically since that first, rather conventional novel, with its focus on 
‘foreign’ characters and tensions they arouse in Istanbul. The latter two books are far 
more interesting for my investigation here, given their explicit engagements with the 
central issues of most lively debate within Ottoman history and historiography, 
especially the question of multiculturalism. 
2.1. The Abyssinian Proof: An Investigation into the Possibility of Religious 
Reconciliation 
The Abyssinian Proof (2008) is set amidst and against religious and ethnic dissension 
across the empire. Kamil Pasha’s mission is to prevent civil unrest by solving a case of 
thefts from sacred places of sacred objects, and to stop the ferment of increased mistrust 
among various religious groups. The narrator gives a preliminary view of the worsening 
climate in the empire between the Muslims and other religious groups by noting that 
‘[t]hese days, the mood in the city was as brittle as tinder. Muslim refugees from the 
embattled Balkan provinces had been teeming into the city, thousands of them’.2 The 
first case to which Kamil Pasha attends involves a Macedonian assassin who had killed 
‘an aide to the Ottoman governor of Macedonia’, from where Muslim refugees flood 
into Istanbul.3 This tense atmosphere, in which the declining economy and rising 
nationalisms in the empire cause increased mistrust among various millet groups, is 
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further provoked by the lootings of artefacts from churches, synagogues and mosques. 
Moreover, these artefacts are later found in European markets. Amidst the increasing 
mistrust among the various groups of believers towards the Muslim state officials, the 
Ottoman government is blamed for organising the thefts, despite the fact that mosques 
are also being burglarised.  
Kamil Pasha is commissioned by Nizam Pasha, the Minister of Justice, to stop the 
lootings and to break the organised crime gangs of antiquity smugglers before a 
commotion erupts in the empire. Nizam Pasha expresses the urgency of the situation to 
Kamil Pasha by saying that ‘[t]he minorities have tasted blood in the provinces and now 
they’re rioting in the capital. These thefts pour oil on the fire’.4 During his investigation 
of the thefts, the magistrate discovers the link of the thefts to an Abyssinian communal 
sect, as a result of a murder that takes place in a mosque. Kamil Pasha not only solves 
the mystery of the antiquity thefts and the murder, but also unearths the secret of the 
religious sect, the relic Proof the sect is protecting, the significance of which will be 
explained later in this chapter. The Proof presents an opportunity to bring a solution to 
the worsening split of the empire into religious factions, but such an expectation falls 
short as its protector is murdered. In the following section, the ethnic conflict, as the 
background story to the novel, will be the primary focus of the analysis, followed by a 
description of the significance of the Proof, and an evaluation of the author’s inquiry 
into the possibility of establishing an interfaith dialogue. 
2.1.1. Ethnic Conflict in the Empire: The Macedonian Case 
Before moving on to the investigation of the thefts that revolve around the Abyssinian 
story, Jenny White starts her novel by giving a picture of interfaith and interethnic 
                                                          




conflicts in the Empire through a case of assassination of a government official. The 
narrator informs the reader that ‘the news of the assassination’ had caused Muslims, 
whose ‘numbers [were] swelled by desperate refugees’, and Christians to clash at the 
site of the Aya Sofya Mosque, still venerated as ‘the Byzantine cathedral’ by Christians, 
resulting in the death of ten people.5 The murder of an Ottoman official is evidentially 
perceived by the Muslim populace as a religious blasphemy that deserves retribution. 
Amidst this chaos, Kamil Pasha is assigned to oversee an operation in which the 
assassin is to be taken into custody without further stirring-up the Christian 
communities in the vicinity. The sensitivity of this mission is emphasised by the 
narrator with the assertion that ‘[t]he last thing the government wanted was to arrest 
Christians in broad daylight’ -- in order to prevent the rise of further enraged reactions 
from non-Muslim communities.6 The narrator points out that ‘Kamil preferred not to 
think about what would happen to him’ after the assassin was captured – he would 
simply disappear –, since justice, the narrator remarks, would have to be violently but 
secretly enacted for killing a government official.7 
Jenny White illustrates the failure of the Ottoman legal system to protect all its subjects 
indiscriminately through a conversation between Kamil Pasha and Marko, the assassin, 
when Kamil Pasha goes into the assassin’s house in an attempt to negotiate with him. 
Here, the author gives voice to Marko, who explains that the assassination of the 
government official was a revenge for his sister’s defilement. Marko couldn’t accuse the 
perpetrator in court, since, as the narrator, speaking of Kamil Pasha’s thoughts, 
explains, ‘[t]he Balkan provinces were in such chaos that the rule of law had ceased to 
be applied, and judging by the tales of refugees, rape was probably a daily occurrence, 
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one of many unspeakable crimes committed by each side against the other’.8 Marko 
justifies the crime he committed by assassinating the government official as well as his 
membership of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation by suggestin  that the 
Empire is ruled by corrupt and arbitrary people: ‘You must imagine thousands upon 
thousands of hands, each cleansing the space before them. We will win because each 
man’s ambition is the same. You will lose, pasha, because your empire is driven by the 
greed of a few men’.9  
The control of the Balkans had been a major subject of hostility between the Russian 
and Ottoman Empires by the end of the nineteenth century, with this tension eventually 
spreading to new territories after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, including the 
Macedonian region, igniting new regional rebellions.10 By the early twentieth century, 
‘the Macedonian Question’ had emerged in the Empire as a result of contesting interests 
among Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs who wanted to subdue the Christians in 
Macedonia. Marko’s assertion that ‘We Macedonians won our liberty from your empire, 
but now it has pulled us back like an abused wife who has run away and must be 
punished’ speaks to the process of the rise of the Macedonian national revolutionary 
struggle that emerged as a result of the scramble for gaining control of the Ottoman 
territories with largely Christian Macedon populations in the Treaty of San Stefano 
(1878), which had concluded the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War, largely incorporating 
Macedonia into the new Bulgaria.11 The Ottoman Empire later on took back the control 
of Macedonia with the Congress of Berlin (1878), which amended the Treaty of San 
Stefano. This instability and fragmentation during this process elicited the formation of 
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the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in Salonica in 1893 and 
the External Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (EMRO) in 1895.12 Marko’s 
attitude that asserts that the Ottoman governor ‘is simply the greatest of the bandits 
pillaging our land’ illustrates the author’s intention to establish that the legitimacy of the 
Ottoman Empire as the ruler of these territories is coming to an end.13 Even though he 
respects Kamil Pasha’s loyalty to the empire, Marko’s admission that ‘one people’s just 
cause is another people’s lost territory’ addresses shifting loyalties within the empire.14  
In the Empire, the spread of movements of liberation to new regions ‘posed greater 
difficulties than ever before’ since it also caused the expulsion of Muslims from the 
Balkans to Istanbul and beyond.15 By introducing Marko, who kills himself defending 
Macedon liberty at the start of the novel, White actually brings the underlying problems 
within the multi-ethnic society of the Empire at this time up for a revision. The tensions 
are not only resulting from the conflict between the followers of Islam and Christianity, 
but also from a mistrust between the rulers and the ruled. Since the Ottoman 
administration is perceived by the non-Muslim community as representing the interests 
of the Muslims only, the Islamic core of the Ottoman Empire is contested in the Balkans 
through nationalist uprisings. In the novel, Marko considers himself as serving his 
people instead of betraying the Ottoman government while the government intends the 
issue to fade away by making the assassin disappear at night in order not to attract the 
rage of the Christian community. It is frequently Ottoman scholars’ contention that the 
increase in the perception of the imperial identity as being a singularly Muslim one in 
the late nineteenth century was the result of foreign intervention in the matters that 
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concerned the Christian populations. From slavery to conversion, the European powers, 
the British first and foremost, interfered with the internal affairs of the Ottomans 
whenever they could throughout the nineteenth century under the pretext of protecting 
Christian populations, which, in some cases, resulted in the exertion of more pressure 
on the non-Muslim communities to convert.16 
Muslim refugees being an uncommon phenomenon in Western European historiography 
of the late nineteenth century -- and a subject about which less is known than is known 
about their non-Muslim counterparts generally -- Jenny White, by focusing on the 
stories of refugees and the stories of the people those refugees are escaping from, 
discloses the extent and the complication of the ethnic troubles towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. The reader is encouraged to reflect upon the consequences of the 
support of the Europeans through Kamil Pasha’s mental representation in which the 
narrator conveys that incoming refugees from the Balkans 
bore the scars of massacres, neighbour killing neighbour without mercy. European 
countries were quietly supporting Christian populations that wished for 
independence from the empire, fanning the flames of nationalist movements that 
devoured everything in their way, friend and foe alike. Istanbul was a tinderbox of 
enraged Muslim refugees who had lost everything and angry minorities who were 
afraid of losing as much.17  
The increase in intolerance and schism between the Muslim and the Christian subjects 
of the empire is explicitly stated in this passage to have fomented under pro-nationalist, 
divisive European influence. In relation to foreign support, the author places Kamil 
Pasha’s mission to investigate the thefts of the artefacts within the framework of the 
clashes among various faith groups across the empire. Nizam Pasha, the minister of 
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justice, explaining the case of the thefts to Kamil Pasha, accentuates the sensitivity of 
the situation: 
‘The entire situation is out of hand. Yesterday the Greek Orthodox Patriarch 
suggested that the government is involved in the thefts [...] he actually accuses us of 
ransacking their churches to pay for the wars. And now the Jews are starting to 
complain that heir places of worship are being looted as well. They’ve lost sight of 
the fact that mosques are being stripped too’.18  
The author bases ethnic or religious clashes on a binary Muslim centre and non-Muslim 
population as the narrator, conveying Kamil Pasha’s point of view, points out that the 
theft of an icon from the Patriarchate ‘had raised the level of tension more than any 
other as, he [Kamil] supposed, the Christians believed their divine protection had 
thereby been revoked’.19  
For the Porte, the priority is to prevent a new national uprising and commotion from 
taking place. The Ottoman Empire’s ability to protect the non-Muslim population is 
important in terms of keeping its sovereignty and preventing foreign countries’ 
involvement in its internal affairs using the excuse of protecting Christians. Up to this 
point in history, the Ottoman Empire’s ability to protect its Christian populations had 
been challenged not only by Western European countries, but also by the expanding 
Russian empire. The Ottoman Empire had been confronted throughout the century 
about how it handled the problems related to its populations, including slavery and 
conversion.20 The antiquity thefts from religious sanctuaries reveal the fears in the 
administrative cadre as to the consequences of its inability to provide assurance to its 
subjects. Therefore, Nizam Pasha’s strict bidding of Kamil Pasha to solve the mystery 
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of the thefts is the result of his desire and obligation to protect the identity and the 
sovereignty of the Empire21: ‘It’s not enough that the Europeans are taking our 
provinces and emptying our treasury [...] They’re stealing our culture too. There’s a 
long pipe sucking the treasures of the empire into Europe and I want you to find it and 
shut it down’.22 Kamil Pasha’s mission is, therefore, no less than to save the Empire not 
only from the fetters of the Europeans, but also from the destruction that the clashes of 
religion are causing.  
2.1.2. Protectors of the Proof 
Kamil Pasha starts his investigation of the antiquity thefts with the incident of a theft of 
a silver reliquary and a prayer rug from the Kariye Mosque in Balat, Istanbul, whose 
caretaker is his friend, Malik.23 Malik is a learned man with whom Kamil Pasha is 
portrayed to have good relations alongside a shared love of orchids.24 Aside from being 
an Abyssinian, Malik is also presented as a descendent of the Byzantine patron of the 
Kariye Mosque. The author receives her inspiration to use the Kariye Mosque for such a 
setting from the fact that the Kariye Mosque was originally a church in Byzantine times, 
which was later converted into a mosque after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople 
in 1453. In the early fourteenth century Byzantine Empire, the patron of the Chora 
monastery was Theodore Metochites (Theodoros in Greek), an important statesman, 
who made ‘extensive restorations and new tectonic additions to the monastery’ during 
his patronage.25 In the novel, Theodore Metochites is deemed to have been entrusted by 
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the Byzantine emperor with the protection of the Proof and other valuables.26 The 
statesman then hands down this mission to his descendants, who maintain this role for 
generations until the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, when some new measures for 
the protection of the Proof have to be taken. 
In the novel, during the battle in the city at the time of the conquest, Isaak Metochites, 
supposedly a descendant of Theodore Metochites and the caretaker of the relic at the 
time of the invasion of Constantinople, entrusts the sacred treasure to Michael, his son, 
and Melisane, his illegitimate daughter from an Abyssinian slave, as he bids them to 
seek refuge with Melisane’s Abyssinian relatives, because ‘[i]f the Turks took the city, 
Isaak believed, the Abyssinians were less likely to be put to the sword than the noble 
families of Byzantium’.27 The most important relic of the treasure, ‘the Proof of God’, 
having been moved for its safekeep after the conquest to the protection of the Ethiopian 
relatives of Melisane because of its connection to Metochites, is kept in the Chora 
Church, which later becomes the Kariye Mosque (in Chora28). The Abyssinians 
henceforth become a secret sect, the Melisites, named after Melisane, protecting the 
relic, hence the title of The Abyssinian Proof, referring to the special relationship 
between the relic and its protectors. Therefore, at the centre of the novel is the story of a 
Habesh (Ethiopian or Abyssinian) family, who now live as the leaders of a closed 
community ‘in the Sunken Village, next to Sultan Selim Mosque’.29  
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2.1.3. Slavery in the Ottoman Context: A Story of a Foregone Conclusion 
An introduction to the Sunken Village involves a scene with three young boys looking 
down to the village of Abyssinians and chattering about its villagers: ‘They’re slaves,’ 
tells one of the children and he adds, ‘[y]ou know what they do in Africa? They cut off 
their yaraks.’30 The fact that White chooses to place an Abyssinian family at the centre 
of her novel and assign to them the protection of the Proof of God results from a 
practical consideration for a number of reasons. This primarily helps the author to 
connect Istanbul with its layers of history through the institution of slavery. She 
constructs this relationship through the characters’ connection to the Metochites family; 
more specifically, through the question about the history of slavery posed by Kamil 
Pasha, who ‘wondered about the history of Malik’s family. Had there been Abyssinians 
in Istanbul during Byzantine times? Perhaps they had been desired as slaves even 
then’.31 Another factor in White’s choice is related to the brother-sister pair of next-
generation potential protectors, especially in terms of Amida’s articulation of his place 
as an Abyssinian in the Ottoman Empire. Amida’s confusion in juxtaposition to his 
sister Saba’s espousal of the Abyssinian cult’s traditions, representing a dichotomy 
between modernity and tradition, offers a conducive axis for the novel’s plot. The third, 
and most important, reason is the significance of Ethiopia within the theories upon 
which the history of the Ark of the Covenant is based, which shall be explored at length 
in later sections of this chapter. In this section, the first two causes mentioned above 
will be briefly examined. 
Slavery in the Ottoman Empire has been a contested issue although the efforts to 
understand the structure and the types of slavery have only started in the last part of the 
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twentieth century.32 One reason for the lack of involvement in studying this issue was 
that the Western notion of slavery had been rigid and ‘closed’ in the nineteenth century, 
as the abolitionist view ‘tend[ed] to universalize the condition of plantation slaves in the 
United States South and le[ft] no room for alternative, milder manifestations of 
slavery’.33 The concept of slavery in the Ottoman Empire, however, was multi-layered, 
and not as rigid as in the case of African chattel slavery in the Americas. There were 
four types of slavery in the empire which were inherited up to the mid-nineteenth 
century: ‘military-administrative slavery, harem slavery, domestic slavery, and 
agricultural slavery’.34 In line with this advanced structure, a rich vocabulary developed 
to denote these types of slaves, but not all of these words in essence meant servility or 
enslavement; moreover, some even had undertones of ‘power and dominance’.35 This 
latter kind of slavery was used for individuals employed in administrative or military 
positions, which were known as kul, that is, the sultan’s slaves.36 The typical examples 
of slaves in the Western sense were the domestic and the agricultural slaves while, as 
Ehud Toledano suggests, kul/harem slaves were virtually ‘indistinguishable’ from their 
free peers. However, since the Western vocabulary did not boast an equal amount of 
terminology for kinds of servitude or ‘slavery’, a ‘uniform, undifferentiated view [...] of 
that rather complex Ottoman institution’ was accepted in Western scholarship.37 
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The Ottomans’ first attempts to abolish slavery were part of the Tanzimat reforms. 
Although some of these reforms relating to the abolition of slavery ‘evolved 
independently and out of Ottoman internal needs and considerations’, they were, like 
many other reform movements in the Empire, also partly carried out as a result of 
European engagement with the issue and the increasing susceptibility of the Ottoman 
Empire to European intervention in their internal affairs, especially with regard to 
matters relating to the position of non-Muslims in the Empire.38 In the case of slavery, 
Britain was specifically acting as a moral compass, with a certain ‘civilising mission’ on 
her agenda. Britain’s banishment of its own slave trade took place in 1807, with slavery 
in her Caribbean possessions being terminated by 1833. Following this, by mid-century 
many other slave-holding states of Europe entered ‘a treaty network’ under the initiative 
of Britain in order to stop slavery traffic in Africa and to keep the market forces in 
balance.39 The suppression of slavery in the Ottoman Empire, however, took longer, and 
the British were actively involved in this process, beginning in the 1840s.40 
According to Ehud Toledano, the pressure coming from the British Empire led the 
Ottomans to issue and enforce decrees that forbade the slave trade of both Africans and 
Caucasians as part of the Tanzimat reforms.41 As a result of these decrees, the slave 
trade was prohibited in the Persian Gulf in 1847 and in Africa in 1857. Finally, an 
Anglo-Ottoman convention to suppress the slave trade was signed in 1880 and the anti-
slavery Brussels Conference Act was signed in 1890.42 However, despite the positive 
outcomes of these long term joint efforts, Toledano criticises the way the suppression of 
slavery was handled and the way it progressed. He holds the view that there had been a 
                                                          
38 Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression, pp. 9, 12. 
39 Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression, p. 9. 
40 Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression, p. 11. 
41 Ehud R. Toledano, ‘Late Ottoman Concepts of Slavery (1830s-1880s)’, Poetics Today, 14.3 (Autumn, 
1993), 477-506 (p. 484). 




lack of dialogue between the British and Ottoman Empires throughout the process. 
According to him:       
Ottoman slavery and the Ottoman slave trade were never seriously debated, on 
either the political or the intellectual plane. It was as if one party barged in, fully 
armed with moral, economic, social, and political arguments and imbued with a 
strong sense of justice, while the other timidly turned its back, refusing to engage in 
a dialogue and claiming that there was basically no common ground, no common 
language, no frame of reference through which a true discussion could take place.43
As explained earlier, this lack of dialogue results from the difference between the rigid 
definitions of slavery made by the Western Europe at the time as well as the Ottomans’ 
unwillingness to classify the Sultan’s household using the vocabulary of serfdom. 
Toledano argues that ‘it was the defense of the kul and harem types of slavery that 
delayed full adoption of a clear abolitionist stance by the Ottoman governing elite’.44 
Policy makers at the time and those who theorised these relationships afterwards may 
have been unwilling to accept these classifications because of their long-established 
affinity with their respective institutions, both in the West and in the Ottoman Empire. 
Toledano’s criticism in this paragraph, however, is actually aimed at Britain, which, on 
the one hand, developed monolithic concepts solely based on its own experience and 
then imposed the same experience on others; and on the other hand, in reality, ignored 
much bigger injustices and ‘various forms of abuse and violation of human rights’ that 
they may have actually been tolerating or even paving the way for.45 Slavery remains an 
underrepresented issue, and although the institution has been recognised in many cases 
to have an important role in the Ottoman Empire, slaves imported from outside the 
empire receive little attention in terms of the formulation of their status from their own 
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perspective; therefore, the language used in such representations and analyses still 
remains that of the Empire. 
The Abyssinian Proof, in its description of the Ethiopian community, marks an attempt 
to overcome the limitation of representations that focus solely on palace life. White’s 
story takes place in 1887, when slaveholding was not only still legal, but also ‘socially 
acceptable’, although by that time the slave trade had already been prohibited by law.46 
In line with this, the Abyssinian village is described by the police chief Omar as 
composed of free subjects who ‘have been there for generations’ and those ‘new ones 
[who] join all the time – retired and escaped slaves’.47 By means of such references, the 
narrator makes mention of both eunuchs and those in domestic service. While Omar 
mentions the eunuchs by saying ‘Allah knows where they all come from. The village 
reminds them of home, I guess. Although you’d think the eunuchs wouldn’t be so eager 
to remember their homeland’, Kamil Pasha remembers ‘the Habesh slave in his father’s 
household when he was growing up’. In this reminiscence, he remembers that ‘[h]er 
skin had the burnished glow of early chestnuts. He had been in love with her’.48 There is 
no suggestion in the novel that the elite contemporaries of Kamil Pasha still keep slaves. 
On the other hand, Avi’s condition as an orphaned child labourer from the Jewish 
community is left ambiguous in the novel, in terms of whether such a condition might in 
fact have been widespread. The case of Avi presents an example of not only the lack of 
tools for the protection of children from abuse in the legal system at the time, but also 
the extent to which slavery could be exploited. While slaveholding was ‘legal and 
socially acceptable’ until late in the nineteenth century, ‘cases of cruelty and ill-usage’ 
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raised moral reactions.49 Kamil Pasha’s defence of Avi against the tanner as ‘[y]ou can’t 
purchase a free subject of the empire. The boy isn’t a slave. And as far as I know, both 
his parents are deceased’ can be seen in this light.50 This could mean that either Kamil 
Pasha is trying to save Avi from falling into the hands of the still rampant slavery 
mechanisms or he is giving a lesson to the tanner (and to the reader) that slavery is now 
an outmoded system that people once upon a time used to exploit others; or possibly 
both.  
2.1.4. Exchange Systems 
When Amida, the son of the priestess Balkis and the nephew of Malik, tells his mother 
about the changes he wants to see in the Abyssinian community, his mention of slavery 
touches the broad assumptions regarding Ethiopians, the general outlines of which are 
made clear through the exchange that takes place among the three young boys, 
mentioned above. Amida tells his mother, ‘if you let me, I could modernise things. We 
could make decent money and build proper houses, instead of these shacks. Make 
Habesh a term people respect, instead of assuming we’re all slaves’.51 Amida’s desire 
for change is derived from his past experiences. Firstly, the confines of being former-
slaves is a force that drives him to question the class system many Ottoman subjects 
with Ethiopian background had been an unwilling part of. Secondly, he opposes his 
family obligations since they are tied in with the religious traditions, customs and the 
creed of the Melisite society, which he deems outmoded and baseless. Not only does he 
protest against the prospect of his being the safe-keeper of the Proof, as opposed to the 
leader of Melisites, like his sister Saba, but he also voices his objection to his mother 
based on other villagers’ views: ‘Nobody believes that Melisite crap anymore. The 
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young men in the village are Muslims. They don’t plan on raising their kids in the old 
way’.52  
‘The old way’ Amida is referring to is the dual belief system and practice of Islam and 
Christianity, which the Abyssinian community embarked on in an attempt to protect 
their Christian unity around the Proof, while to the outside world they were Muslims. 
The dynamics of this change will be discussed in more depth in the following sections. 
Amida’s remark pertains to the lessening degree of commitment to the values and the 
traditions of the Melisite sect. According to Bainbridge and Stark, religions can be 
thought of as exchange systems, whereby the exchange of rewards and costs establishes 
the main pattern, and on this account:  
Faced with rewards that are very scarce, or not available at all, humans create and 
exchange compensators – ets of beliefs and prescriptions for action that substitute 
for the immediate achievement of the desired reward. Compensators postulate the 
attainment of the desired reward in the distant future or in some other unverifiable 
context. Compensators are treated by humans as if they were rewards.53 
On this account, Bainbridge and Stark argue that the formation of a cult54 requires an 
active involvement of creation and social acceptance.55 The cult of the Melisites offers 
to its adherents a special kind of empowerment as a compensator through the sense of 
importance assumed from the mission of the safekeeping of the Proof in secrecy. 
Moreover, the tradition goes back four hundred years to their Byzantine relatives, as 
well as to their Ethiopian roots via Melisane (the connection of Ethiopia to the Proof 
will be studied in the following sections).56 The decreasing level of attachment to the 
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Proof and commitment to its protection can be seen as a sign of estrangement from their 
roots.  
An important factor for Amida’s wish for change is caused by his lack of belief in the 
existence of the Proof. Amida’s rejection of his family traditions and values is primarily 
driven by his traumatic experience at the monastery in Ethiopia where he was sent to 
receive education about Ethiopian Christianity and culture. There, he was sexually 
abused by the monks and seemingly lost his faith in the power of the Proof as a result of 
this experience.57 Amida struggles to defend the traditions of the Melisite sect, despite 
his being in a leadership position in this cult, because he does not believe the Proof 
exists since he is not allowed to see it. He voices his disbelief by saying: ‘You can’t 
draw milk from a dead sheep [...] Anyway, I told you I don’t want to be caretaker of a 
mosque where nothing ever happens. It’s a waste of time’.58 By selling the valuables of 
his family which give the Abyssinian cult its legitimacy, Amida aims to gain respect for 
the Habesh community in the modern world outside the village, but more importantly, 
to have access to European goods for himself, including the piano, being his passion. As 
he looks out for his personal gain, however, he becomes part of an international 
organised crime gang by providing antiques to European smugglers.  
2.1.5. Protecting the Empire’s Antiquities 
By the late nineteenth century, the theft and smuggling of archaeological artefacts had 
become a real problem in the Ottoman Empire. As a reaction to the thefts from the 
Ottoman territories and in order to protect the empire’s sovereignty from European 
domination, a series of laws were introduced in the Ottoman Empire towards the end of 
the nineteenth century in order to protect the cultural material of the empire from being 
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ransacked by the imperial and national ambitions of the western powers. The European 
curiosity regarding artefacts, especially those from ancient civilizations, had its point of 
origin in the national struggle among European countries since artefacts had come to 
translate into ‘national symbols, and the subsequent French and British competition for 
such loot served the useful national function of filling up both the Louvre and the 
British Museum’.59 Philip L. Kohl, in his article on ‘Nationalism and Archaeology’, 
suggests that ‘[a]rchaeologists, employed as colonial officers in imperialist settings, 
were engaged in a form of nationalist archaeology in the sense that their work was used 
to puff up the glory and sense of self of their employer’. According to him, this kind of 
understanding of the past can be characterised as ‘simultaneously imperialist, 
colonialist, and nationalist’.60 
As a result of this archaeological obsession, the concurring advancement of Western 
influence and Ottoman indebtedness, both economic and cultural, which was causing 
the Empire to be stripped off of its archaeological artefacts, the principle of national 
ownership was introduced in the Ottoman Empire through the antiquities laws of 1874 
and 1884.61 The aim of these laws was simply to prevent the lootings of artefacts, 
exportation of antiquities and arbitrary excavations by foreigners. While the 1874 Act 
regulated ‘the movement of antiquities uncovered during archaeological excavations’ 
and entrusted ‘the ownership of the cultural heritage’ to the Ottoman Empire, the 1884 
Law ascribed the property of all the artefacts excavated within its territory to the 
Imperial Museum in Constantinople. These laws were indeed an indication of the 
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contention among the parties who claimed the ‘ownership of the past’.62 In the novel, 
the futility of such attempts is pointed out through a conversation between Kamil Pasha 
and Omar, the police chief, in which Kamil Pasha expresses his expectation that the 
antiquities ‘be put in the Imperial Museum for safekeeping’ and to avoid such thefts to 
which Omar replies ‘like throwing chickens to the foxes when all the museum directors 
were European’.63 Indeed, with a view to the difficulty of providing local excavation 
teams, the antiquity laws authorised the director of the Imperial Museum to carry out 
the primary assessment of the artefacts and then to place the foreign excavators under 
the supervision of an imperial authority.64 After Kamil Pasha’s reference to this rule in 
the new antiquities law and his mention of Osman Hamdi Bey as the new manager, 
Omar replies to him, saying ‘[s]o we have teeth but nothing to bite.’65 
This remark by Omar speaks to Morag M. Kersel’s observation that in practice ‘the 
Ottoman government did not have enough officials to oversee and implement the 
various regulations of the 1884 law’ simply because the range of Ottoman territories 
was too wide.66 Therefore, in the Istanbul of 1887 in The Abyssinian Proof, three years 
after the second piece of legislation on antiquities had been decreed, the frustration of 
Kamil Pasha and Police Chief Omar at the fact that the artefacts are kept at the 
churches, mosques and synagogues without protection, instead of under lock and key in 
the imperial museum, comes as a result of the fact that the capacity of the empire to 
handle and protect its cultural heritage was indeed limited.67 As the Director of the 
Museum, Osman Hamdi Bey’s words in this fiction offer a testimony to this fact:  
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‘Think of the empire as a plump piece of baklava. Each layer is studded with 
artefacts, entire civilisations, […] ancient cities, temples, enormous stone 
sarcophagi, friezes, mosaics, statues, an endless array of objects. […] There aren’t 
enough museums in the world to house our treasures. […] We are embarrassingly 
rich’.68  
As a real-life personage, the presence of Osman Hamdi Bey in the novel can give 
authenticity to both the wealth of the empire and the actions the Empire is undertaking 
in order to develop better protection and management of this wealth, despite limited 
capacity and resources. Despite Osman Hamdi Bey’s efforts, in the novel, it is made 
clear that because of this richness and the limited capacity to oversee the operations, 
‘[a]n intricate smuggling network developed through the region’.69  
The novel introduces the Charshamba district as famous for its thief and smuggler 
inhabitants, while the Abyssinians living there are depicted as involved in the 
smuggling business as middle men, providing goods to the bazaar.70 When new 
smugglers appear in the city, Amida would like to do business with Kubalou, the 
foreign ringleader of the new international smuggling gang which runs the latest 
antiquity thefts. Kubalou’s crew includes an English member named Ben and some 
local men from the Charshamba district. As the reader finds out, Kubalou turns out to be 
Magnus Owen, the cultural attaché at the British Embassy in Istanbul, who has access to 
resources that allow him to make the necessary arrangements for the dispatch of the 
stolen items to Britain without either customs checks or any other official scrutiny. The 
reader is instructed by the narrator that ‘Ottoman customs agents had few rights to 
search British citizens, leaving huge loopholes in the antiquities laws’; and because of 
this, Kamil, in his first meeting with Owen at the Embassy, where he asks the attaché 
for his cooperation, asks for ‘permission to search the cargo of any vessel leaving for 
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England’.71 The Embassy official shows a ‘lack of enthusiasm’ to collaborate to meet 
Kamil Pasha’s expectations.72  
As shall be examined in the next section, taking foreign loans comes at a hidden price of 
allowing the subjects of the Sultan to be treated as second class citizens, also upsetting 
the legitimacy of the Sultan. The example of Magnus Owen as an embassy official who 
is also capable of running a smuggling chain because of his official position shows how 
the unequal arrangement of power between two states can be exploited. This abuse 
comes as an extension of the ‘informal imperialism’ exercised by Victorian Britain, 
which, in John Darwin’s definition, ‘relied upon the links created by trade, investment 
or diplomacy, often supplemented by unequal treaties and periodic armed intervention, 
to draw new regions into the world-system of an imperial power’.73 As Darwin claims, 
‘[n]o other power developed more varied and far-reaching imperial relationships than 
Victorian Britain’; and therefore, the arrogance of Magnus Owen can be justified 
through his country’s position vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire’s. In any case, the 
narrator’s statement that ‘Kamil knew the British wanted a strong Ottoman Empire to 
stand between themselves and the Russians. The empire was the prey that kept the bear 
occupied’ speaks to John Darwin’s conclusion that the British Empire’s ambition was 
not limited with its interventionist policies, but the power of the British Empire was 
indeed limited against its rivals74: 
Informal imperialism was thus not a policy nor even a recognized formula for the 
assertion of influence. It represented a pragmatic acceptance of limited power. Far 
from being the best of all possible imperial worlds, informal empire could be a 
tense and unstable relationship whose purpose was the often painful and sometimes 
violent transformation of an 'undeveloped' economy and its socio-political 
institutions. It is easy to exaggerate the smoothness of collaboration: the instinct of 
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private British interests was to force the pace towards political and economic 
change where they could, where they dared and where they commanded the support 
of the imperial centre.75 
In White’s novels, Kamil Pasha’s well-meaning endeavours to prevent crime also have 
strong implications concerning the sovereignty of the empire. White, therefore, 
frequently employs a pattern in which Western European corrupt agents like Magnus 
Owen exploit lenient Ottoman jurisdiction and control.  
2.1.6. Hunger for the Proof: Profiling Interest Groups 
Morag Kersel explains that the enactment of the 1884 law legislating the requirement to 
obtain permission from the Imperial Museum in order to be able to export artefacts met 
with rigorous disapproval by many ‘foreign archaeological missions’. Kersel suggests 
that ‘[a]n intricate smuggling network developed through the region’ while ‘[p]ublic 
awareness of artifacts as commodities and consumer demand played integral roles in the 
legal and illegal movement of artifacts’.76 Kamil Pasha knows that the demand for the 
antiquities comes from London, because the London Metropolitan Police Force has 
provided Kamil Pasha with a list of oriental objects that have recently been sold by 
Rettingate and Sons, Oriental antiques dealers in London.77 Although Magnus Owen, 
a.k.a. Kubalou, cannot appreciate the value and significance of the Proof and tells Kamil 
Pasha that the Proof is ‘only a packet of old papers. It’s beyond me, really, why anyone 
should care’, he also confesses to Kamil Pasha that ‘[t]he buyer in London belongs to 
some kind of group that reveres – I’m not exaggerating, reveres – this thing. It’s utterly 
ridiculous’.78 The identity of this group remains unclear; however, the buyer of the 
artefacts is said to be ready to spend enough money ‘to finance a small kingdom’.79 
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White leaves a breadcrumb trail to help the reader speculate about the reach of this 
group’s influence and power as her strong character Ismail Hodja, Kamil Pasha’s friend 
and ‘a learned Sufi sheikh and leader of the Nakshibendi order’, warns Kamil Pasha 
about the groups who are interested in the Proof in England.80 He tells Kamil that  
‘[i]t’s not the dealers you should worry about. There are groups whose hunger for 
the Proof of God goes back hundreds of years, just like the Melisites. People who 
believe the Proof is the Ark of the Covenant or a rich treasure, or any number of 
ignorant legends. If their members heard it had been found, they’d stop at nothing 
to get it. They’d never sell it. It would simply disappear’.81  
It seems to Kamil Pasha that ‘the whole world wants it’. He reasons that ‘[i]t would be 
worth a fortune in Europe, not just to antiquities dealers, but to people who believe it’s a 
sacred object’.82  
The groups Ismail Hodja refers to here can be located within the scope of the 
confluence of informal imperialism and the plunder of antiquities that particularly 
characterised the later nineteenth century. This development is to some extent 
blueprinted in Margarita Diaz-Andreu’s A World History of Nineteenth-Century 
Archaeology: Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past, in which the author gives some 
insights into the institutionalisation of archaeology in the nineteenth century. Diaz-
Andreu argues that the interest in the past, particularly throughout the nineteenth 
century, evolved concurrently with nationalism and interest in forging a civilizational 
lineage from Ancient Greece, and was also bolstered by the ideas of colonialism and 
imperialism. Antiquities, as has already been explained above and shall be further 
explained in the next chapter, had become associated with national pride, and had 
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emerged as a token of civilisation as Ancient Greece and Rome were acknowledged ‘as 
the prototypes of the great nations and the ancestors of modern civilization’.83 
Another important factor during the nineteenth century that led archaeologists and 
antiquarians to carry out excavations in the territories under Ottoman rule was the 
increasing interest among the Europeans and Americans in establishing their biblical 
roots in the areas which were alluded to in the Bible, including modern Egypt, 
Mesopotamia (modern Iraq and parts of Iran), Palestine, Lebanon and Turkey.84 As a 
result, ‘[t]he value of the ancient remains was firmly connected to their role in the 
history of Judeo-Christian religions’.85 As religion became a separate area of aspiration 
for archaeological expeditions across the predominantly European Christian world, 
aside from the imagined civilizational supremacy acquired from the Greek and Latin 
Classics, Biblical archaeology also developed into a means and an end for imperial 
supremacy and control of the East while excavating parties searched for the roots of 
religion. In other words, Biblical archaeology became an extension of ‘informal 
imperialism’.  
Although the State Interventionist model was not employed in Britain in the field of 
archaeology until the 1870s, the Ottomans still remained a target of foreign groups who 
were not only after self-acclamation of their nation or religion, but also their own 
individual group identities.86 The Utilitarian model adopted by the state in Britain 
before the 1870s ensured that the sense of belonging generally gained in societies 
through either nationalism or religion was also likely to be formed through individual 
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groups who recognised a common self-interest.87 After all, religion still occupied an 
important place in the post-Enlightenment period in the formation of groups aimed at 
education and sociability, despite the limitations on the role of the Church and increased 
civil power.88 Missionary societies were among these new groups. Besides, a certain 
kind of sociability inherited from the eighteenth century consisted of new clubs and 
learned societies, which helped the formation of group identity for antiquarians, the 
predecessors of archaeologists. Diaz-Andreu explains the importance of sociability in 
terms of rationalism:89  
The growth of associations during the eighteenth century can be linked with 
rationality and its connection with sociability. As Porter explains, ‘to be a rational 
gentleman a fellow had to be sociable, or [...] clubbable. Clubs [...] , masonic 
lodges, tavern meetings, coffee houses and friendly societies flourished in the name 
of company, fellowship and credit, free republics of rational society’.90  
Among these groups religious symbols had a particularly important role. The Ark of the 
Covenant is one of these symbols that had an important role in archaeological ventures, 
to the extent that it has become an important part of popular fiction, movies and video 
games. Its significance in The Abyssinian Proof will be explained in the following 
section. 
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2.1.7. Abyssinian Connection  
2.1.7.1. The Background Story of the Ark of the Covenant 
The Ark of the Covenant as a Biblical story takes place in the Old Testament, in which 
the Ark is traceable only ‘up until the time of Solomon (970-931 BC)’, and after which 
point no reference is made to the ark.91 Whereas its disappearance is regarded as one of 
the great unresolved puzzles of the Bible, according to Graham Hancock, this makes the 
Ark ‘conspicuous only by its absence’.92 Graham Hancock in his popular history book 
The Sign and The Seal: Quest for the Lost Ark of the Covenant (1992) tells the story of 
his quest for the Ark and investigates the veracity of the legend of the Ark’s abduction 
from King Solomon’s Temple in Jerusalem to Ethiopia by Menelik, the alleged son of 
the Queen Sheba and the King Solomon.93  
As opposed to the Ethiopian Christian belief that the Ark of the Covenant was brought 
to Ethiopia by Menelik, Graham Hancock proposes that it was removed from 
Solomon’s Temple during the reign of the King Manasseh (687-642 BC) because of the 
king’s idolatrous paganism.94 The Ark was then brought to a temple on Elephantine, an 
island in upper Egypt, for about two centuries before it was taken to Ethiopia.95 In 
Graham Hancock’s book, it is claimed that after the Ark was brought to Ethiopia, it was 
removed from its hiding place only when there was threat to its safety, one of which is 
told to be the coup d’état by the Jewish tribal chieftainess Gudit around AD 980.96 At 
the time Jerusalem was seized by the Crusaders in 1099, the Zagwe dynasty (c.1030-
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c.1270) was still in power in Ethiopia. When the Templar order arrived in Jerusalem in 
1119, they settled ‘on the site of the original Temple of Solomon’.97 According to 
Hancock’s theory, the Templars must have been looking for the Ark there, and when 
they couldn’t locate it in Jerusalem, they were led to Ethiopia by the Ethiopian Prince 
Lalibela, who was in exile in Jerusalem until 1185 for a quarter of a century, and 
supposedly with the help of the Templars, he gained the throne by deposing his half-
brother, the King Harbay.98  
According to Hancock’s book, around a century later, Wedem Ara’ad, the third-
generation king in the House of Solomon that followed the rule of the Zagwes, sent a 
large delegation to Pope Clement V at Avignon in 1306.99 One year later, the Templar 
order was hunted down by the French King Philip and other European heads of state. 
Hancock speculates that the embassy from Ethiopia might have given ‘the Pope and the 
French king (Philip IV) an urgent motive to destroy the order’, such as the menace the 
Templars could present if they had the Ark with them.100 Hancock continues his theory: 
After all, it was a period when deep superstitions ruled the popular 
imagination. With so sacred and so powerful a relic in their hands the 
Templars would have been in a unique position to challenge both the secular 
and religious authorities of the land – and those authorities would certainly 
have taken any steps they could to prevent such an eventuality.101  
The rest of this narrative in The Sign and the Seal gives an account of the destruction of 
the Templar order by the French King Philip, and the probable resurrection of their 
quest for the Ark among the ranks of the Freemasons.102 
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2.1.7.2. The Journey of the Proof: The Proof of Authenticity by the Historian 
The story of the Proof, as recounted by Ismail Hodja, the Sufi sheikh from the 
Nakshibendi order, whom Kamil Pasha respects and consults, remarkably agrees with 
Hancock’s Ethiopian story of the Ark and the Templars. Indeed, the traces of the ark 
legend can be detected in the names of the characters in the novel, which resonate with 
the Biblical, historical and literary personae involved in the story of the Ark. Balkis, the 
priestess of the Abyssinian sect, the mother of Saba and Amida, takes her name from 
the name given to the Queen of Sheba in Muslim tradition, that is, Bilquis or Bilqis.103 
Saba, the daughter of Balkis, also possibly takes her name from the Queen herself as the 
famous queen is also associated with ‘the pre-Islamic south Arabian kingdom of 
Saba’104, which is now Yemen.105 The author has most likely chosen different versions 
of the Queen’s name for the mother and the daughter because, in the novel, the title of 
the Melisite priestesses is hereditary via females. The name of the caretaker of the 
Kariye Mosque, Malik, also echoes Menelik’s name, the son of the Queen of Sheba and 
King Solomon. Amida’s name, on the other hand, echoes the Axumite King, Ella 
Amida, who had freed Syrian Frumentius106 from slavery.107 Lastly, the midwife 
Gudit’s name is derived from the supposedly Jewish tribal chieftainess who attacked 
Axum and took over the ancient city, killing its Solomonic emperor.108  
As told by Ismail Hodja, the relic gets ‘stolen’ from Jerusalem in the early twelfth 
century by Christian crusaders, namely the Templars. The armies were looting articles 
that they thought were ‘powerful’ the Hodja suggests, and ‘[w]hatever it was that the 
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Crusaders found allowed them to become wealthy and strong’, and accordingly, the 
Proof was among these items.109 Then one step ahead of the Ottoman armies, according 
to the Sheikh110, the Proof, among other valuables, is taken to Acre and Antioch, and 
finally in 1291 to Aksum in Abyssinia.111 Not long after, when the Abyssinian king gets 
suspicious that the Templars would steal the Ark, he sends a mission to Pope in 1306 to 
warn them, who, then, in turn, persuades the king of France and other European leaders 
to root out the Templars and usurp their riches.112 Here, the Templars’ story is given a 
twist in The Abyssinian Proof  with the addition of a certain Philip of Stark, the Templar 
deputy who brought the treasure containing the Proof to Abyssinia in the first place. He 
takes the treasure with him to France, but gets executed, and Sophia, his daughter from 
a local woman, seeks refuge in Constantinople with her treasure as ‘the Byzantine 
Church wasn’t on friendly terms with the Roman Pope’.113  
In the novel, when Philip of Stark took the treasure to Europe in 1306, Metochites in 
reality would have been the controller of the general treasury (1305-06).114 It will be 
remembered that Theodore Metochites was the patron of the Chora monastery in 
Constantinople.115 He became the prime minister (Grand Logothete) under the 
leadership of the Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos, who, just like Theodore 
Methochites, was an admirer of Greek learning and had embraced the Empire’s ancient 
Greek legacy116. As a reaction to the Latin rule (1204-61) following the Fourth Crusade 
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(1202-04), the duo denounced the union with the Roman Catholic Church that their 
respective fathers had supported.117 
The Fourth Crusade (1202-04) was an important factor in escalating the divide between 
the Eastern Orthodox Church and Roman Catholic Church, and by ‘weakening 
Constantinople over the centuries’, the Latin Crusaders paved the way for the ultimate 
collapse of the Byzantine Empire.118 Ismail Hodja reprimands the Crusaders saying 
‘[t]hese were all supposedly religious men, yet they were scheming against each other. 
It’s remarkable that the Christians have thrived for so long’.119 He criticises the 
Crusaders, calling their acts ‘shameful’, and adds that ‘acting in the name of 
Christianity [they] sacked some of the greatest Christian cities of the time. When they 
were finished, there was almost nothing left of Byzantium’.120 In the novel, this is the 
reason the valuables belonging to Christianity were entrusted to the Byzantines, and ‘the 
Byzantine emperor put the Proof of God under the protection of the statesman Theodore 
Metochites’.121 The estrangement between Roman and Byzantine churches is criticised 
by Ismail Hodja, who, as a Muslim cleric, bemoans this division even if he also adds ‘I 
suppose the Turks can thank the Templars for weakening Constantinople over the 
centuries’.122 
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Ismail Hodja acts as the historian in the novel who speaks about the history of religions 
at length, and as a scholar of Islam and Abrahamic religions, his testimony gives the 
Abyssinian hybrid story credence. Furthermore, the way the story of the Ark blends 
with that of the Chora Monastery is rendered credible through the details about the 
Proof’s journey to Constantinople. When Ismail Hodja tells Kamil Pasha of the 
existence of ‘[p]eople who believe the Proof is the Ark of the Covenant or a rich 
treasure, or any number of ignorant legends’, this is very likely a hint at the historical 
pursuers of the ark, namely the Crusaders, i.e. the Templars, who allegedly tracked the 
traces of the Ark and many other antique ‘sources of wisdom’ for centuries, possibly 
believing in their potency.123 Ismail Hodja tells Kamil Pasha that ‘[t]he Templars used 
the object [The Proof] to advertise their own importance’, and as explained earlier, this 
is why Ismail Hodja warns Kamil Pasha that, in a passage quoted earlier:124  
‘It’s not the dealers you should worry about. There are groups whose hunger for the 
Proof of God goes back hundreds of years, just like the Melisites. People who 
believe the Proof is the Ark of the Covenant or a rich treasure, or any number of 
ignorant legends. If their members heard it had been found, they’d stop at nothing 
to get it. They’d never sell it. It would simply disappear’.125 
The groups Ismail Hodja refers to are groups such as the Freemasons, whose 
secretiveness, as a group whose members recognise each other through the use of 
special words and symbols that are based on the fraternity of medieval stonemasons, 
provokes conspiracy theories about their quest for power. As it has been mentioned 
above, the Templars’ quest for the Ark of the Covenant was later revived by the 
Freemasons, whose upper ranks paid many visits to lower Nile to investigate the 
Ancient Egypt, which they saw as ‘the source of wisdom’.126 Masonic authors generally 
identify Templars as ‘the “missing link” between the masons of antiquity and modern 
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Freemasonry’.127 In his quest for the Ark, Graham Hancock also pursues the elite ranks 
of Scottish Freemasonry in order to find clues to the history of the lodge’s interest in the 
Ark in Ethiopia and provides some evidence regarding the Masonic search for the Ark 
of the Covenant. 
Based on Ismail Hodja’s brief, Kamil Pasha starts to associate the reliquary thieves with 
the resurrection of the Crusaders: ‘What did a member of a secret religious society look 
like? He imagined them to be rough, gullible, and ignorant, but then remembered that 
the Crusader orders had been made up of knights and educated men’.128 Ismail Hodja 
advises Kamil Pasha to maintain his guard against any kinds of thieves, even against the 
scholars, despite Kamil Pasha’s confidence in them.129 Kamil Pasha himself, as a 
rationalist, recognises the power of religious belief to overcome reason and civil order, 
especially when sacred objects that promise power are at stake: 
Kamil didn’t believe the reliquary had any miraculous properties. Reason was more 
likely to be duped by faith than by logic. The world was peopled with believers 
whose faith caused them to act against all reason, to steal, to wage war, to kill and 
maim their neighbours. If they believed the reliquary or its contents was sacred, 
then they could cause great harm. The icon stolen from the Patriarchate had already 
demonstrated that.130 
It is made clear in the novel that the potency of the Proof is secured because of the 
feelings it may stir in people: being in power and control or having a respectable status 
are some of the aims pursued by various characters in relation to the Proof. Ismail 
Hodja, thus, simply cautions Kamil Pasha against the people who can abuse religion to 
gain power: ‘It’s a powerful relic, Kamil. Although I know you don’t believe in such 
things, others do’.131 He adds: ‘I’m afraid if one person knows, then others will hear of 
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it and be drawn to Istanbul like scaveng rs to blood. I’m afraid it’ll fall into the hands of 
men who will either destroy it or use it to incite hatred among the religions’.132  
The hodja, while informing the Pasha about the history of the Proof, also discourses on 
the damage the ambition of men can do to society, very disappointing for the hodja 
because it means that religion can at times be used as a tool for destruction rather than 
reconciliation. With the murder of his friend Malik, who was killed trying to protect the 
Proof, taking down the smuggling ring becomes a personal undertaking for Kamil 
Pasha. John Scaggs mentions in his Crime Fiction how drawing ‘parallels between the 
detective and the historian’ is a common practice in the critique of works of crime 
fiction, whether the crime in question is related to history or not, since, as Worthington 
explains, historical crime fiction as a genre is indeed ‘based on the investigation of past 
events; the crime in crime fiction necessarily takes place before the investigation’.133 
Therefore, as Worthington puts it, ‘ he detective has often been likened to the historian 
in their common endeavour to construct a coherent narrative from the relics (evidence) 
of a previous time’.134 However, the fact that the crime itself in The Abyssinian Proof is 
linked to history, finding the relic, the Proof, now also depends on the detective’s ability 
to think like a historian. Kamil Pasha, based on his new knowledge on the history of the 
relic, discovers the hiding place of the Proof before the thieves can find it, which turns 
out to be hidden inside the wall in the Kariye Mosque. The hiding place provides a 
metaphor for religion’s power to create both division and union, as examined below.  
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2.1.8. Religion that Divides, Religion that Unites 
It is generally maintained that as the Ottomans replaced the civilizations that were in 
place before them, the Empire emerged as their heirs, and as a result, the Ottomans took 
up the ‘practices’ of their antecedents and subsumed them.135 In The Abyssininan Proof, 
Jenny White features this adjustment through the dual religious practices of the 
Abyssinian villagers as well as the Kariye Mosque itself. The Proof is initially protected 
by the Byzantines; however, the reliquary disappears136 shortly after the Conquest of 
Istanbul and it remains so until it is recovered by Malik, the caretaker of the Kariye 
Mosque, at the end of the nineteenth century. The loss of the Proof, like the ‘lost 
manuscript’ theme within the crime fiction genre that presents writers a mystery around 
which to base their stories, is posited as the backstory of The Abyssinian Proof, also 
motivating the murder mystery plot. As to the disappearance of the Proof, Malik 
explains to Kamil Pasha that as a result of ‘a battle between the caretaker of the 
reliquary and a false prophet’, the reliquary disappeared as the caretaker at the time was 
able to hide it before he got killed. Following the disappearance of the relic shortly after 
it is entrusted to the Abyssinians, the community leaders hide the absence of the relic 
from their community, believing it was still in the church and would be found one 
day.137 The building, however, gets converted into a mosque after being kept as a 
church for another hundred years following the Conquest. Its mosaics remain intact as 
they are kept ‘plastered over’ for hundreds of years, and a recent renovation in the 
mosque reveals the mosaics ‘again for the first time in three hundred years’, which 
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allows Malik finally to be able to locate the Proof towards the end of the nineteenth 
century.138 When the word of the discovery of the Proof gets out to smugglers through 
the caretaker´s money-seeking nephew, Amida, the smugglers murder Malik to learn the 
location of the Proof. Malik gets killed trying to protect it before he is able to tell 
anyone its location or is able to make a copy of it.139 
The time frame between the death of two people trying to protect the Proof and the 
hidden location of the relic act as a reminder of how powerful and enduring religious 
symbols can be. Within this framework, the choice of a hidden location for the Proof 
helps the author to raise the matter of the endurance of religious symbols while pointing 
to the material transformation of the Chora monastery over the centuries. The 
transformation of the Byzantine Empire into the Ottoman was realised gradually as the 
Ottomans ‘coopted their enemies; instead of pursuing a policy of de-Byzantification’.140 
Therefore, some social structures as well as edifices were (and are) left in forms that 
expose their syncretic and symbiotic nature: things remained solid, but were modified. 
The discovery of the Proof of God by Kamil Pasha, the magistrate, beneath the surface 
of the ancient walls of the mosque, which have gained a hybrid character over the 
centuries, is therefore symptomatic of this symbiosis. The transformation of the building 
throughout history is exemplary of the transformation the Ottomans generated in 
Istanbul. The narrator of The Abyssinian Proof says:  
Byzantine walls, arches, cisterns, and artefacts came to light every time someone 
stuck a spade in the ground. The old city was encrusted with the new, but no matter 
how many palaces and mosques the sultans and their families built, the Christian 
city always found a way to remind the newcomers that it had been there first.141
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Talking about the early Ottoman regimen, Karen Barkey mentions how the boundaries 
between Christians and Muslims eroded because of Islamization that was promoted by 
‘dervish-based proselytism’ whose aim was not to divide people but to unify them 
around common goals. Other contributing factors to gradual Islamisation at this period 
were the ‘heterodox understanding of Islam’ and ‘the prevalence of Islamo-Christian 
sanctuaries’ which came about as a result of this unifying attitude towards religion. The 
use of ‘the same sacred space’ had brought ‘the faithful closer together’; moreover, 
transformation of monasteries into tekkes, but at the same time preserving their 
religious symbols, had become a pattern in the early Ottoman Empire.142  
In this regard, while both the famous Hagia Sophia Mosque and Kariye Mosque had 
once been churches, their Christian features were kept intact as they were buried under 
Islamic features. In The Abyssinian Proof, this detail is used as a plot twist which allows 
Malik and Kamil Pasha to discover the location of the hidden relic, and at the same time 
it gives the reader a glimpse of religious and political history materialised in a single 
holy premises. This change, the material Islamisation, denotes the fact that ‘religious 
boundaries’ had appeared following the initial phase of unifying religious practices, and 
the reason for this was that, by the fifteenth century, the Ottomans had gained 
confidence in their newly conquered territories and ‘local networks’, and in ‘their ability 
to dominate’.143 As a result, this later period witnesses the transition of the Ottomans 
from a heterodox understanding of Islam to an orthodox one. By mid-fifteenth century 
(by the time of the reign of Murad II (1421-1444)), ‘interfaith constructions’ of 
Christian buildings were deserted, and after the conquest of Constantinople, ‘the 
comfortable multi-confessional space’ transformed into a ‘dominant Sunni Islamic 
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state’. The consequence of this in terms of shared conventions was ‘a gradual move 
away from a comfortable multi-religiosity’ and ‘the construction of “the other”’.144 
In The Abyssinian Proof, the Habesh people of the Sunken Village, by seemingly 
becoming Muslims, attempt to avoid this space of the ‘other’. As a result, they live a 
double life because this space of multi-religiosity is abandoned. In the later period of the 
Empire, beginning in the late sixteenth century, interfaith practices increasingly lost 
popularity. Instead, clearer boundaries were established as conversion to Islam became 
more important with its evidential advantages for the Muslim populations, such as 
‘better economic and social status, less taxation, and the privilege of belonging to the 
victorious class’.145 Under the Islamic rule, it was allowed to become a Muslim; 
however, Muslims were rigorously forbidden to convert to Judaism and Christianity. 
The punishment for the latter kind of apostasy ‘was even harsher [including the death 
penalty at times] when converted Muslims tried to go back to their orig nal faith’.146 
However, the severe repercussions of apostasy based on Sharia law were ameliorated by 
the early nineteenth century with ‘the last case of a formal, official, execution of an 
apostate in Istanbul’ taking place in 1843, and it became a state policy to ignore the 
crypto-Christians’ return to their old faith ‘in the years leading up to and immediately 
after the Reform Edict of 1856’.147 Indeed, to the contrary, Selim Deringil makes it clear 
that, different from the Tanzimat (Reorganisation), in the Islahat (Reform) Edict, there 
was a clear emphasis on the forbidding of the compulsion to convert to Islam, which 
can be explained by the somewhat reprehensible pressure on the non-Muslims to 
convert to Islam.148 Deringil explains the relative ‘freedom of religion’ which was 
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provided by the reform movement rather as ‘freedom to defend their religion’, which is 
significant for the discussions on the role of Islam in Ottoman society during the 
nineteenth century.149 
2.1.9. Philosophical Debates in Religion 
Interfaith practices of the Melisites, the combination of their covert Christian rites and 
overt Muslim rituals, correspond to the transformation of the Kariye Church. Malik 
explains to Kamil Pasha that ‘[t]he Melisites converted so they could continue to 
worship at the church after it became a mosque’.150 As a result, instead of practicing at a 
mosque near the village, after their ceremony in the village, the Habesh community pray 
at the old mongrel Kariye Mosque on Fridays. The author’s depiction of the Melisites’ 
secretly maintaining their double religious identities indicates the fact that the 
boundaries that had reappeared after the erosion of the ‘heterodox understanding of 
Islam’ in the fifteenth century had indeed endured even after the Tanzimat period.151 
The Abyssinian Proof is a platform through which the various issues of religious 
freedom, cohesion and unity can be examined. Ismail Hodja’s comments prove this 
point:  
‘Some believe that the Melisites are really Christians living as Muslims, although 
who’s to say what that means. But ordinary people aren’t interested in philosophical 
debates, and they tend to be quite unforgiving about that sort of thing. They say that 
he who prays at two altars is without religion’.152  
The ‘philosophical debates’ Ismail Hodja mentions here hint at topics that encompass 
intermediacy in religions, including syncretism, proselytization, and oneness of 
religions. Ismail Hodja is a Sufi sheikh who belongs to the Nakshibendi order. Although 
Sufism represents mystical heterodox Islam, Nakshibendis’ teachings were strictly 
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rooted in orthodox Islam and the exercise of Sharia rules.153 After the dispersion of the 
Janissaries in 1826, the Bektashis were dislodged as they had also been ‘accused of 
paying no homage to Islamic orthodoxy or to shari'a obligations, and therefore being a 
source of moral degeneration for good Muslims’.154 Following this development, many 
Bektashi shaikhs became affiliated with the Nakshibendis, and resultantly, the foothold 
of the Bektashis was replaced by the Nakshibendis. Especially after the death of Sultan 
Mahmud II, the order (tarikat) became more powerful under the rule of Abdülmecid I 
(1839-1861), who had been educated as a child by Mehmed Emin Şehri Hafiz Efendi, 
an adherent of the Nakshibendi-Khalili suborder.155  
Itzchak Weismann suggests that the Tanzimat period was a continuum of centralisation 
efforts in the Empire that also ran parallel to the Sharia-based rule of the ulema and the 
pursuit of modernisation.156 Abu-Manneh also agrees that Mahmud II’s sole aim was to 
restore his sultanic power while it was Abdülmecid who put emphasis on eradicating the 
misconducts of the imperial officials.157 In an Imperial edict (Hatt-ı Humayun) which he 
had addressed to the Grand Vizier and in an irade where he addressed his ministers, 
Sultan Abdülmecid was calling for the implementation of the Sharia in all the affairs of 
the sultanate and urging all authorities under his rule to uphold integrity and fairness, 
and calling them to maintain tranquillity and repose among all the inhabitants of the 
Empire.158 During the reign of Sultan Abdülmecid the main impetus was the precepts of 
Orthodox Islam; however, there existed a schism between the state-ordained religion 
and Islam’s philosophical variations that continued to mark the nineteenth century 
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Ottoman rule.159 Deringil describes the ‘centralized or centralizing state’ apparatus as 
represented by ‘the member of the cerebral high ulema, who sat in his medrese (Muslim 
seminary) in urban centres’.160 However, divergently, especially after the Greek 
uprising of 1821, reactions to this centralist position of the Empire as well as ‘the  
increasing oppression and violence’ of local rulers loomed throughout the empire, 
causing a sense of insecurity, transformed some groups into radicalised religious 
formations, specifically Islamic orthodox factions.161 Having mainly expanded ‘among 
the upper and the more educated ranks of society’, the Nakshibendis seeped into the 
administrative ranks of the Ottomans and functioned mainly as ‘an urban order’.162 
Unlike other branches of Sufism, the Nakshibendi teaching was only for the spiritual 
elite, who were drawn to divinity by nature, and it was seen as ‘the mother of all 
mystical paths and the source of all their secrets and truths’.163 As ‘the demand to 
observe the law against the arbitrariness of the governors’ increased, the order gained 
sympathy in the provinces, which in turn even seeped into the capital.164  
It is within this context, within the context of the interreligious dimension of the empire, 
that the complex structure of Jenny White’s crime novel makes a clearer argument than 
might otherwise be visible. Jenny White’s representation of the late nineteenth-century 
religious fanaticism of the sultan’s subjects, as in the Macedonian case, and their 
evolving devotional tendencies, as in the Abyssinian case, sets up the quandary of 
multicultural representation: there is an increasing tension between people with 
differing religious affiliations. Moreover, the tone of the novel is generally not a hopeful 
one when the accounts of Macedonian rebel Marko and the inflowing Muslim refugees 
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from the Balkans are taken into consideration. The tension resulting from the empire’s 
dissolution is communicated throughout and this lack of hope is sustained until the point 
where the contents of the Proof are revealed.  
Ismail Hodja, as a scholar of Islam, shows a particular interest in the discovery and the 
contents of the Proof. When he reads from the Aramaic text of the manuscript, he 
discovers it to be the opening verse of the al-Anbiya Sura in the Chapter of the Prophets 
of the Quran: ‘In the name of the merciful and compassionate God, [. . .] their reckoning 
comes even closer to men, yet they turn aside heedlessly’.165 If the contents of the Proof 
are considered genuine, Ismail Hodja acknowledges, the text ‘was written six hundred 
years before the Quran was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad’.166 The text of the 
Proof continues with the following:  
‘We have revealed for you a Book in which is a Message for you.  [...] He has 
ordained you the religion that He commanded to Noah, Abraham, and Moses, and 
revealed also to the servant of God, Jesus of Nazareth, whose testament lies 
revealed before you.’167  
This would mean that Jesus was the bearer of the words Ismail Hodja was translating 
from Aramaic, ‘a distant ancestor of the Arabic alphabet’ and ‘spoken in the time of 
Jesus’.168 Given the fact that it would have been impossible for the prophet Muhammad 
to have seen this text when he recited the Quran, it also attests to the fact that Islam and 
Christianity are indeed one and the same in essence. This, moreover, essentially proves 
the existence of God. Ismail Hodja explains its reasoning to Kamil Pasha:  
‘Think about it rationally, Kamil, as you always like to do. How else would Jesus 
have been able to produce such an exact copy of the text? Allah dictated it to him, 
but he was killed and unable to deliver the message, so another Messenger had to 
be found. That was the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. Allah revealed the 
same message to him and he was able to deliver it’.169 
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Although it acknowledges uniformity among religions, this passage has an underlying 
implication with regard to the Nakhsibendi leader’s position in the face of the Proof. 
The novel harbours a diversity of characters that represent religious practices to varying 
degrees. As a figure within the Nakshibendi order, Ismail Hodja’s position is a blurry 
one in certain ways. He is called a Sufi leader, although, as explained earlier, the 
Nakshibendi order grounded its enterprise on the application of Sharia only.170 Unlike 
the pantheist Bektashi order, which is credited with bringing about the ‘dervish-based 
proselytism’ of the early expansion period of the Ottomans, the Nakshibendi strictly 
abided by the Sharia and had the tendency to profess superiority vis-à-vis other religions 
and heterodox communities.171 
Ismail Hodja is given further credence in the novel through his personal contribution to 
the compilation of the history of the Proof, collected at al-Azhar in Egypt, known as 
‘Sunni Islam’s most prestigious university’ in the contemporary world of Islam.172 This 
detail aims to demonstrate the sophisticated and advanced status of Islamic scholarship 
to the Western reader; however, it also shows the Islamic world’s possible interest in 
(and concern with) the Proof’s legacy. The power of the Proof is interpreted by Ismail 
Hodja in an explicitly Islamic light: as a legitimising source of power for the superiority 
of Islam. Further assurance of this orientation is imparted by the Hodja’s following 
sentence: ‘I think either this text [the Proof] disappeared soon after Jesus died or it was 
hidden by his followers who replaced it with their own gospels’.173  
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In Islamic belief, when ‘God’s earlier revelations had become distorted at the willful 
and perverse hands of the Jews and Christians’, God’s words were revealed to 
Mohammad, ‘no less than to Moses and Jesus’:174 
There is nothing but God’s own Word in the Quran, as Muhammad himself could 
assure the community of believers. In Jewish and Christian circles, however, there 
were assuredly circulating other writings that had some claim to being God’s Word 
but are not found in the Bible or the New Testament. Both these Scriptures 
represent, then, a deliberate decision by someone to designate certain works as 
authentic or canonical Scripture and to exclude others from the authoritative list 
that is called the canon.175  
Ismail Hodja’s comments reinforce his belief that the prophets before Muhammad were 
not able to accomplish their mission and their followers manipulated God’s words, 
giving the Prophet Muhammad the upper hand in this. For the Hodja, the Proof of God 
is indeed proof of Islam, because almost two millennia after the words of God were 
relayed to Jesus, the text which contains the approximate words of the Quran and which 
was meant to constitute the Covenant with Jesus, re-emerges in Constantinople, 
testifying to the truthfulness of Muhammad. This source of power that has the capacity 
to dictate over religious divisions is sketched against the background of the tension that 
was caused by the increasing fragmentation of the empire along religious lines. The 
implication of the Proof in terms of the Ottomanism that was prescribed in the early 
years of the Young Turk period can be read below.176 
2.1.10. Ecumenical Council, Ottomanism, Yesterday, Today 
As mentioned above, when Ismail Hodja reads the Proof, he discovers that it contains a 
similar text to that of the al-Anbiya Sura in the Quran and justifies this concomitance to 
credit Islam with a higher authority than its precedents: ‘In the al-Anbiya Sura, Allah 
tells us that there were many other prophets before Muhammad, praise be upon him, 
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including Jesus, and that they were all given the same message by Allah, but that they 
were ignored or worse by the unbelievers’.177 In another discussion, Ismail Hodja also 
states that ‘[a]ll of our religions flourish from the same trunk, a single vast tree 
inhabited by the spirit of Allah. Nevertheless every branch and leaf believes itself 
distinct’.178 Despite Islam’s recognition of the Judaic and Christian prophets, Islam had 
not ordinarily been counted as part of the family of monotheist religions in the Judaic 
and Christian world until recent times, although it had been common to accept the 
interrelatedness between Jewish and Christian faiths.179 Today, it is widely accepted that 
all these three religions have common roots in the Prophet Abraham, whose Covenant 
with ‘the One True God’ is considered to symbolise the start of monotheism.180  
Aaron W. Hughes claims that the term ‘Abrahamic religions’ is ‘a theological 
neologism’ and that the recognition of similarities between religions that creates 
trialogue in the contemporary world does not appear any earlier than the 1990s. In other 
words, it is only in the modern world that Abraham has been melded into a model as a 
precedent for the originators of each religion as a result of a willingness to promote 
‘interreligious reconciliation’ between what is perceived as the East and the West.181 
Especially, since the 9/11 attacks, Abraham, the common denominator of these 
monotheist religions, started to be taken as ‘the point of departure for interfaith 
conversation and understanding’.182 While providing a reference point to all three 
religions ‘to explain the myths, structures, and historical interactions among these three 
religions’, the concept of an Abrahamic root has also been used to denote an interfaith 
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ecumenical union in recent years.183 John L. Esposito, in his introduction to F. E. 
Peters’s The Children of Abraham, maintains that the issue of interreligious dialogue is 
more than a theological concern now, and that it has also become an issue of 
international and domestic politics.184 The promotion of the commonality versus 
differences of the Abrahamic religions is, therefore, not independent of its political 
implications, and has set the agenda in the early twenty-first century. 
John L. Esposito suggests that both differences and similarities of religions within a 
‘broader Abrahamic vision’ need to be recognised as an ‘interreligious and civilizational 
dialogue’.185 However, in line with Ismail Hodja’s tree metaphor above, Hughes claims 
that each of these religions has claimed to be ‘the true recipient of the Abrahamic 
covenant’, and in the process, each has urged its own perception of Abraham onto the 
others.186 Hughes observes that ‘what Judaism, Christianity, and Islam do is construct 
three rival versions of Abraham, claim that their construction is not only the most valid 
but the only valid one, and, in the process, discredit the constructions of their rivals’.187 
In the meantime, ‘an interfaith Abraham’ cannot be achieved, because each of these 
religions originally views Abraham from their own historical viewpoints which results 
in contrasting historical knowledge and a lack of shared understanding of Abraham.188 
On this point of historical commonality in reference to the contemporary attempts of 
historical reconciliation, Hughes asserts that 
many of the similarities that we perceive in these three religions are the result of 
real historical interactions. For example, that Paul would emphasize the Abrahamic 
roots of Jesus’s message or that Muhammad would perceive himself as the restorer 
of the original ‘religion of Abraham’ (millat Ibrahim) is not an essential property 
that clearly reveals their ‘Abrahamic roots,’ but an ideological move to legitimate 
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the new in light of the old. Or, when in the modern world these three religions are 
invoked in various military conflicts such as the Middle East, it is not helpful to say 
that this is a ‘family squabble’.189 
In other words, it is justifiable to assert that the imagined shared Abrahamic root is an 
invention of the contemporary world that is aimed at surpassing centuries’ long disputes 
based on differences that terrorised the world via individual or collective actions like 
crusades and jihads. This new perspective of religion is among many previous examples 
of constant rewriting of history and religion to fit the ideological and political goals of 
the day. 
It should be stressed once more that Hughes is not of the belief that faith in the 
Abrahamic origin can achieve an historical reconciliation and peace among religions, 
and neither can the ecumenical calls for union. Hughes criticises the promotion of an 
ecumenical union because he doesn’t see this possible new direction as the solution to 
the problems caused by religious strife in the world. According to him, advocating the 
ownership of ‘a set of “shared beliefs and values”’ would necessarily require the 
anticipation of a shared historical ancestry for Abraham that can only be used to 
legitimise each of these individual religions as the ‘true spiritual heir’. According to this 
reasoning, belief in union only recognises the uniqueness of each of the individual 
religions concerned, which eventually only contributes to more dissension based on 
these religious institutions’ perception of their own superiority.190 Moreover, this 
imagining not only creates essentialism and antagonism towards each other but also 
with regard to other so-called non-monotheistic religions. Additionally, the act of 
challenging secular notions of history by way of placing the events in the history of 
religions within the scope of such a history generates bias and essentialism by positing a 
subjective truth, which is indeed itself an ahistorical phenomenon. Therefore, Hughes’s 
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objection is aimed at the academic and historical analyses that simplify this puzzle and 
diminish the ‘complexity and the messiness that goes with it’ instead of creating ‘new 
taxonomic models to classify it adequately’, although he claims not to have any 
objections to non-academics whose aim is to create better communication between 
religions.191  
The implications of these arguments for Jenny White’s creation of a phenomenon 
represented by the Proof’s place within the scholarship of the history of religions, or 
within the context of a beleaguered if not declining Ottoman Empire, are manifold. The 
ultimate goal, however, is to show that the Proof evinces the fact that ecumenical 
discussion is not without the burden of a power struggle which is represented by various 
actors in the plot. Firstly, the whole plot is set within a series of antiquity smuggling 
schemes carried out by a local gang of thieves and ruffians with an English ringleader. 
The value of the Proof is not only measured by its theological value, but also by how 
much material value it may bring to its handlers and holders, and how much power it 
may render for any organisation that may possess it. The Proof is represented to be a 
mysterious and powerful object as Ismail Hodja makes it clear that ‘[w]hoever 
possesses the Proof will be immensely powerful. She [Saba] must understand it to wield 
it properly’.192 Ismail Hodja is afraid that whoever holds it may become a source of 
menace, because ‘with the actual Proof in his hands, he [Malik] would be much more of 
a threat. People might have left their own religions to follow him, like a prophet. It’s 
happened before. Very dangerous, indeed’.193  
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Secondly, despite his support for an ecumenical council, Ismail Hodja has been 
primarily represented in the text within the context of Islamic scholarship. His 
contribution to the history and legacy of the Proof is offered as a means of legitimating 
the privileges of Islam vis-à-vis Christianity. Also, in the case of non-believers, the 
Proof is said to prove the existence of God. After all, Ismail Hodja’s beliefs and 
knowledge are derived from the Quran: 
‘The important point is that all the prophets were given the same message. In the 
Consultation Sura, it is written, ‘He has established the same religion for you as that 
which he enjoined on Noah, on Abraham, Moses and Jesus. Namely, that you 
should remain steadfast in religion and make no division therein. […] Of course, 
it’s pointed out that the people did become divided, but the idea is that Allah will 
bring them together again. The Islamic, Jewish and Christian God is the same 
God’.194  
Despite his belief in God’s intentions to gather the people of the world together, this 
illumination does not have any impact on his sense of the contingency of the source of 
his own knowledge. The idea that Muhammad had not seen the Proof before the Quran 
was scripted turns what is considered by some an ‘ahistorical’ event into a ‘historical’ 
one, rendering religion indispensable for human history and progression. This whole 
argument can be seen as a legitimising factor for the rule of Islamic law in the Ottoman 
Empire. Although one may argue that, by means of the characters of Ismail Hodja and 
Malik, it is the intention of Jenny White to project, or rather put forward for discussion, 
the idea that an ecumenical council would eliminate all the struggles for primacy among 
religions and help bring the family together, I would support Hughes’s claims in contra-
argument to this thesis.  
If the thesis of Abrahamic roots, or an equivalent of it, the Proof, is applied to the 
Ottomans, the most commonly idealised version of the Ottoman Empire, with its 
Muslim and non-Muslim subjects living in harmony under the roof of the Islamic 
                                                          




administration, would receive further support. However, such a model is rendered 
particularly suspect given the failure of the attempts at Ottomanisation, which came 
about as a result of the failure of the Porte to shed its Islamic cloak as increasingly 
exclusivist. The Islamic core of the empire had a unique value in its earlier days of 
expansion when the Empire ‘tended toward toleration’ when ‘the communities […] and 
the leadership were concerned with this issue.’195 The empire had chosen ‘maintaining 
diversity and managing the resources of this diversity’ instead of supressing differences. 
Indeed, these differences of these ‘Peoples of the Book’ were protected and even 
encouraged under the banner of Islam ‘provided they recognized the superiority of 
Islam’. In this regard, Karen Barkey points out that ‘Islam was pervasive and the 
primary marker of inclusion in the political community. Its impact can be summoned up 
in three words that described Muslim and non-Muslim communities: separate, unequal, 
and protected’.196 
Jenny White’s Empire is different from Goodwin’s happy-to-have-strict-boundaries 
image of the Ottomans. In the novels of both authors, the continuity of the Ottomans is 
predominantly threatened by the forces outside of them, although some of the local 
characters’ plight or quest for a new social identity, or their fight to keep the existing 
order, is mostly represented within the main framework of their potential offenses 
against the law. The empire is observed in its moments of adaptation to upcoming 
changes. In White’s representation of the Ottoman Empire, the difference from 
Goodwin’s lies in the empire’s lessened ability to ‘manage’ the differences among its 
subjects, hence giving way to ethnic and religious clashes to which Goodwin’s novels 
only tactfully and generically refer. Ottomanism, which came about as a result of efforts 
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to have a shared identity, failed to blur or overcome certain strict and detrimental 
borders among religious, and increasingly ethnic, groups. Even if these boundaries are 
praised for being a sign of a tolerant society in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, by 
the nineteenth century they present an obstacle in the way of forming an egalitarian 
society, and a plural one in the contemporary sense. Promising this ideal, the Young 
Turk revolution, by consolidating into a Muslim-Turkish identity, eventually failed to 
achieve Ottomanism, and, therefore, was not able to prevent the full-blown coming into 
being of ethnic nationalisms in the twentieth century. It is therefore doubtful whether 
the Proof would provide a solution to the religious strife across the empire, considering 
the demands by each group for sovereignty or self-rule could not be met, given the 
position of an increasingly scriptural and exclusivist Islam as the religion of the imperial 
core. Since the Proof disappears again by the end of the novel, the author leaves the 
answer to this question open-ended. 
The third point that explains the challenges brought to the Proof and the world created 
around it can be observed in terms of the changing relations of power in the Ottoman 
society by the end of the nineteenth century. While the Imperial Museum, the new 
secular courts, the new antiquities law and modern medicine are part of the changing 
Ottoman identity, many traditions still persist and people usually cling on to their source 
of power derived from what is accepted as traditional. This contradiction can be 
observed in the example of the Abyssinians, who form a small community with 
enduring traditions such as the rite of ceremonial worship on Fridays, the ritual of 
circumcision of the Priestess, and the employment of a midwife, who performs the 
circumcision, upholds traditions, and acts as a healer.197 The story of the protectors of 
the Proof demonstrates both the flexibility and the durability of these practices. For 
                                                          




example, while the resilience of the Melisites is proven by the ability of the community 
to convert to Islam to be able to retain the Kariye Mosque, Gudit, the midwife, insists 
on continuing the acts required by archaic traditions, including purification which 
involves circumcision, and on refusing to make use of modern medicine at the risk of 
the death of Balkis, the priestess.  
Explaining to Kamil Pasha how the Proof got stolen from the museum, Hamdi Bey, the 
manager of the Imperial Museum, tells him that ‘they [the guards] thought they were 
guarding a prophecy revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by an angel’ and that ‘they 
think this is a newly revealed sura’, because ‘in the absence of real information, 
rumours are passed around’.198 The reader is led to guess that it was Saba who took the 
Proof using some of the drugs that belong to the young surgeon Constantine Courtidis, 
who is in love with Saba, to delude the guards into believing that an angel has visited 
them to take the Proof from the Imperial Museum; the ritualistic tattoos on her back 
would prove to the guards that she is an angel. Saba, as the new priestess after her 
mother Balkis’ death, believes that the Melisites are the rightful owners of the Proof, 
and as a passionate ruler of her community, Saba’s insistence to inherit the Proof’s 
legacy marks the durability of traditions.199 In this sense, the Proof fits in the tradition of 
magical items ruling over the willpower of humanity in popular fiction, including the 
One Ring in The Lord of the Rings by J.R.R. Tolkien.  
The Abyssinian Proof is a criticism of abuse of power, which has been explored at 
length by means of the Proof, a relic containing a manuscript proving the existence of 
God. In the novel, religion, as a source of power, is used as a double-edged sword. On 
the one hand, it can be used to exert dominance by insinuating hatred among people 
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(social unrest in Macedonia, Muslim refugees, the thefts are all signs that any former 
unity among people has been disrupted and the sacred values of people, such as home, 
religion and family, are now being disregarded). In the novel, the ‘ungodliness’ of 
people is on display through the mostly godly proof available: 
Yet everyone Kamil met seemed obsessed by the battered reliquary they believed 
contained the Proof of God. Despite Ismail Hodja’s enthusiasm, Kamil thought it 
unlikely that the Proof of God proved anything at all, but someone had been willing 
to kill Malik for it. To Kamil, that proved the ungodliness of man, nothing more.200 
On the other hand, it also proves that this source of power can unite people (the cleric 
Ismail Hodja and Osman Hamdi Bey watching an Abyssinian initiation rite at the end of 
the novel). In the final analysis, with the relic having disappeared from the Imperial 
Museum, the hopes for an ecumenical council are also abandoned. The lack of trust in 
humanity is extended even to the ecumenical council since Ismail Hodja keeps the 
knowledge of the Melisites to himself instead of sharing it with them. He confides this 
to Kamil Pasha by adding ‘[u]nfortunately, the world isn’t ready to become one nation 
[...] We need to plough the ground first before we plant the seed’.201 The author, 
through her invention of the Proof, opens a gateway for discussions on the role of 
religion in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire as well as in the contemporary 
world.  
2.1.11. The Creation of an Evidence-Based World of Crime Fiction  
We can see a distinction in The Abyssinian Proof, created via crime fiction, of the 
existence of a world which is ruled by religions, sects, rituals, traditional medicine; and 
on the other hand, the new modern world which offers evidence-based investigation, 
transformation of the justice system that involves higher degrees of cooperation with 
local and international institutions, such as Scotland Yard and the British Embassy. In 
                                                          
200 White, Abyssinian Proof, p. 242. 




the Ottoman case, the second part of the nineteenth century marks the years of 
centralisation and secularisation but also Muslimisation of imperial rule. A series of 
reformations in this period [the Tanzimat and the Islahat] ‘transformed the role of the 
religious communities: the non-Muslim laity gained influence at the expense of the 
[Muslim] clergy’. Also, ‘[e]thnic and secular affiliations and the use of the vernacular 
began to subvert the universalist ideas of the church’ as ethnic awareness began to take 
root.202 Secularisation of the justice system in the Ottoman Empire was a slow process 
that was introduced and reinforced by structural reforms such as the founding of the 
Police Force in 1845, a couple of decades after the foundation of Scotland Yard in 1829, 
and the introduction of the public prosecutors in 1864 and their temporary integration 
into the constitutional system in 1876. These are the developments that are not traceable 
in Jason Goodwin’s Yashim series. Jenny White’s Kamil Pasha, on the other hand, is a 
magistrate who received law and criminal procedure education in Cambridge and is 
therefore familiar with legal structures in another part of the world.203 
The world of Abyssinians, which is administered based on its religious and traditional 
foundations, offers a life of devotion to a spiritual cause which is false and delusory 
since the keepsake that is the raison d’etre of the sect is lost. In the novel, ‘the mystery’ 
presented by the Abyssinian community’s secret is ‘what keeps us reading’ and it is also 
what ‘opens out to interrogate the nature of society itself’.204 The hypocrisy on which 
the Abyssinians base their traditional values, the increasing clashes among religious 
groups across the empire, and the antiquity theft suggest lack of order, which is the 
detective’s mission to unveil even if he is unable to correct it. According to Sue Neale, 
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crime fiction is used ‘as a weapon to criticize social, political, and gender inequalities’, 
and therefore there is a ‘strong socio-political content’ in this genre.205 In its criticism of 
society, the detective fiction as a genre, according to Ed Christian, ‘often moves from 
the interrogation of suspects to the interrogation of society, where crime stems from 
flaws in the political, social, and industrial [or economic] systems’.206 The contradiction 
between archaic traditions and modernity presented in the example of Amida supports 
Jon Thompson’s claim that ‘fictions of crime offer myths of the experience of 
modernity’. In this sense, they offer the experience of ‘what it is like to live in a world 
dominated by the contradictory forces of renewal and disintegration, progress and 
destruction, possibility and impossibility’.207 Placed in a late nineteenth-century setting, 
both Jason Goodwin’s and Jenny White’s crime fiction provide a vehicle ‘to evaluate 
different historical moments in the experience of modernity’.208 
Through the journey provided by the Proof, The Abyssinian Proof draws attention to 
and mounts a critique of injustices across the Ottoman Empire. Kamil Pasha comes 
across many instances of abuse of power that surface in a range of cases, such as slavery 
(the tanner’s attempt to enslave Avi), religion (Muslim refugees in Istanbul), faith 
(‘blind faith that requires only obedience and discourages thought’), knowledge 
(Amida’s selling the secret of his sect) and national privileges (the embassy official’s 
abuse of his position).209 Alongside the many topics just listed, the novel also shows the 
cunning ways in which the forces of Western imperialism are exerted against the 
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Ottomans in the nineteenth century, a topic which is also central to The Winter Thief. In 
The Winter Thief, Western imperialism primarily takes the form of Great Game 
competition between Britain and Russia, and the struggle of emergent ethno-nationalist 




2.2. The Winter Thief: Shifting Loyalties and the Plight of Justice in a 
Multicultural Ottoman Polity 
If The Abyssinian Proof is the story of the failure of the dream of living in harmony, 
Jenny White presents The Winter Thief as the story of the failure of the ideal of living in 
equality. The Winter Thief is about an attempt to establish an Armenian socialist 
commune in Erzurum in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Throughout the novel, Jenny White explores the waning years of the Ottoman Empire in 
terms of imperial anxieties in the face of foreign interventions and the rising nationalist 
formations. The heavy-handed response of the Porte to the plans and actions of 
Armenians to set up a socialist commune is illustrated as an indication of the 
sensitivities and misgivings of the government regarding any collective action or 
formation within its territories. White, through her enaction of the emergence of state 
violence in The Winter Thief, engages with a number of historical incidents of the last 
few decades of the Empire that tarnished the relations between the Armenians, the 
Kurds and the Ottoman bureaucracy, which would eventually lead up to the most 
controversial incidents in both Armenian and Turkish national histories and the 
representation of those incidents in a contested historiography. In this section, I discuss 
the formation of nationalism among the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire in the 
second half of the century, the involvement of the Great Powers in ‘the Armenian 
Question’ and the dissension within the Armenian communities. The aim in this 
analysis is to study the contributions made by the alternative historical representation of 
Jenny White that provides a perspective outside the generic understanding of the binary 
formulations of victimhood versus perpetration, which becomes the method of 




2.2.1. Introduction to The Winter Thief  
2.2.1.1 Summary 
In The Winter Thief, a British-owned ship filled with armaments is discovered in the 
harbour of Istanbul in 1888, and Kamil Pasha, the magistrate of Beyoğlu, is 
commissioned to discover the agents behind this operation and who the guns were 
intended for. Despite the fact that New York is registered as the place of dispatch, 
Kamil Pasha suspects the British of supporting a nationalist group in the Ottoman 
Empire. A few days after the discovery of the guns, The Ottoman Bank is robbed and 
bombed, which causes the burning down of a nearby taverna. Unrelated to the events 
taking place at the Ottoman Bank, Vera Arti, the wife of Gabriel Arti, one of the robbers 
of the bank, is seized by the imperial intelligence unit Akrep (Scorpion) for her attempt 
to get The Communist Manifesto published in the Armenian language. In order to save 
his wife, Gabriel asks for the help of Yorg Pasha, a close friend of Kamil Pasha’s 
deceased father, who turns out to have arranged the smuggling of the guns through the 
customs.  
Vera escapes from detention at the base of Akrep, the imperial secret service, which is 
run by Vahid, its ferocious leader. Gabriel, giving up hope of finding Vera, sets out on a 
journey towards Erzurum, followed by his wife Vera and Apollo, their friend from 
Geneva. In the Kachkar Mountains near Erzurum, the plans to set up a socialist 
communion have begun to be implemented, with people from all around the world with 
socialist aspirations arrived and settled at an old monastery. At the monastery, the group 
not only has to fight the cold weather and contagious diseases but also to defend the 
monastery against the attacks by the Hamidiye troops under Vahid’s command, which 
are comprised of local Kurds. The clashes end with the shooting and wounding of 




the commune during the fight under the leadership of Kamil Pasha, finally leave for 
Trabzon for safety. Using the stolen money hidden in Trabzon by the now deceased 
Gabriel, Kamil Pasha pays for the expenses of the Armenian villagers in their final 
destination. Fearing the consequences of this action, he claims to have met the expenses 
from his ‘personal fortune’, and as a result, Kamil Pasha is declared a hero by the 
Western press, The Times of London, and the Sultan himself.210 Vahid, who survives his 
wounds, is declared unfit to serve as the head of the intelligence unit of the empire.  
2.2.1.2. Main Topics of Concern 
The Winter Thief employs as its guiding reference points the social and political 
incidents that took place at the end of the nineteenth century in relation to the Armenian 
case, such as the Ottoman Bank occupation and the clashes between the Kurds and the 
Armenians in the East; however, the author uses a modified and speculative version of 
these events. For example, the Imperial Ottoman Bank occupation by the Dashnak party 
in 1896 is utilised in the novel both as a robbery and an attack, which were carried out 
by a group with seemingly two different ideologies. The clashes in the east of the 
Empire between the Armenians and the Kurds are also depicted as events that could 
have been avoided were it not for the ambitious interventions of the likes of Vahid, who 
herald disaster for the Ottoman Empire. In this section of the chapter, my aim is not 
only to examine the ways in which the Armenian and Kurdish people are represented, 
but also to analyse the motivation and rationale behind such representation. The 
Armenian – Turkish – Kurdish relations have been a focus of dissidence throughout the 
modern national histories of both Armenia and Turkey. Therefore, representations 
involving these ethnic groups should be approached with more deliberation as they 
generally suggest a nationalist agenda that favours one kind of nationalism over another, 
                                                          




and as such, involves propaganda rather than a search for authorship, agency and 
alternative approaches within their historical complexities. On the other hand, such a 
sensitive issue is sometimes dealt with in a manner in which the stories or narratives 
that are locked in from a certain perspective may also leave ample room for speculation 
around philosophical, cultural and historical issues, opening up reflection and debate 
rather than closing down into one fixed position. Elif Shafak’s The Bastard of Istanbul, 
which surveys contemporary collective consciousness regarding the Armenian 
massacres, is an example of such an approach.211 
In this section of the second chapter, my analysis will mainly focus on how a work of 
historical fiction can establish a connection between the knowledge about and the 
legacy of past atrocities. The fictive versions of historical events, such as the 1863 
Armenian rebellion against the Kurds in Erzurum, the Sasun massacres of 1893-94, and 
1895-96 massacres in various parts of the empire, and finally the Ottoman Bank 
occupation (1896), shed light on the much debated questions of Turkish-Armenian-
Kurdish relationships by means of an alternative approach that centres discussions not 
only on the events that took place, but also on the ideological shifts, and economic and 
social challenges and changes that were dominating the political scene around the world 
towards the end of the nineteenth century. The Ottoman government too was not 
unexceptionally unaffected by these dynamics. Therefore, an alternative historical 
representation is fabricated in The Winter Thief, in which the actors and the ideologies 
of the late nineteenth century in the context of the Armenian question are reworked in 
order to shed light on the highly sensitive balance of political and economic power at 
the time. 
                                                          




In The Winter Thief, Jenny White stages the political and social complexities of the 
Armenian nationalist struggle at the turn of the nineteenth century in a Kamil Pasha 
novel setting, diffusely showing that ‘the Armenian question’ was shaped by no less 
than the tripartite structure of the limitations of Ottoman power, the widening influence 
of the European Great Powers on the Ottoman Empire, and the spread of nationalist and 
socialist thinking within the Armenian community. The plot twists in the novel, such as 
the Ottoman Bank robbery, the seizure of the armaments in a British-owned ship and 
the active incitement to take up arms of the Anatolian Armenian townspeople by the 
Western-educated youth for protection against Kurds, correlate very closely with the 
actual historical events that led up to the 1915 massacres. A subject that instigates 
nationalist feelings in both Armenia and Turkey today, the 1915 deportations of the 
Armenians are not directly examined since there is no mention of the events of this 
period in the novel. Therefore, the issue of genocide will be left out of the scope of the 
analysis carried out in this chapter, although an attempt will be made to elucidate the 
extent to which anachronisms and ingenuity in the novel are cultivated in relation to the 
Armenian massacres during Abdülhamid II’s reign.  
2.2.2. Dissension among Armenians  
Assigned to the investigation of the arms smuggling, Kamil tries to figure out which 
group the British are supporting by providing them with guns.212 Possible enemies of 
the Empire include ‘Armenians, Greeks, Russians, the British, the French, Young Turks 
sitting in the Porte, plotting to reinstate the parliament’, as musingly enumerated by 
Yorg Pasha in a conversation with Kamil Pasha.213 Enemies of the empire threaten not 
only its sovereignty (Westerners, Russians), but also its integrity (nationalist 
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revolutionaries, such as Armenians) and its absolutist monarchical form of government 
(demands of the Young Turks for reinstatement of the constitution). Kamil Pasha thinks 
it possible that something big has been planned against the empire, ‘something that 
could tear at the belly of the empire’. He takes a mental note of the vulnerability of the 
empire because of the ‘massive debt to European banks and loss of territory in decades 
of wars and revolts’.214 As the Empire’s perception of itself as a betrayed nation and an 
empire on the verge of collapse, its vulnerability translates into suspicion of each and 
every group in the Empire, Muslims or non-Muslims. Tensions between the Armenians 
and the Porte, and the Armenian resistance translated into a socialist movement, emerge 
at this juncture of weakness of the empire.  
The plot of The Winter Thief is a composite of various events, ideologies and policies 
that lingered within the universal political climate during the late nineteenth century. 
Vaguely based on the distinction between idealism and conformism, the chapters with 
Vera or Gabriel reveal some of the clashes between different ideologies among the 
Armenians of the period, including socialism, anarchism, nationalism and Ottomanism. 
The novel starts with the attempt of an Armenian girl, Vera Arti, to get The Communist 
Manifesto published in the Armenian language in the Istanbul of 1888. Vera has been a 
student in Geneva, of Armenian origin, and is represented as the daughter of a wealthy 
family in Moscow. Despite her Russian bourgeois background that enabled her to study 
in Geneva, Vera’s enthusiasm for socialism together with her affinity for her Armenian 
roots coalesces into her interest in promoting nationalist socialism. In her conversation 
with the publisher, Monsieur Agopian, Vera presents her reasons to want to get the 
                                                          




Manifesto published by saying, ‘It’s the duty of educated Armenians like us to protect 
those of our people who are vulnerable, the peasants and the workers’.215  
As a member of the Henchak, the Armenian socialist organisation, she defends the 
consolidation of Armenian nationalism with socialism as a method of defiance against 
the Ottoman autocracy: ‘The Armenian people will find the strength to resist oppression 
only by joining the International Movement, by standing shoulder to shoulder with other 
oppressed peoples around the world’.216 Despite her adherence to the Armenian cause, 
socialism is more pivotal for Vera than nationalism, because for her, 
‘[a]n Armenian landlord has more in common with a Turkish agha than with the 
peasants plowing his fields. The fact that landlord and peasant share the same 
nationality is irrelevant. It doesn’t mean the landlord will treat his workers any 
better. Peasants have to stand together, no matter if they’re Turk or Armenian. 
Nationality divides people; socialism unites them’.217   
Vera’s enthusiasm to get Marx and Engels’ work published is met with an unmitigated 
rejection by the publisher when he says:  
‘Madame Balian, I appreciate your sentiment, but from what I’ve heard, this is the 
stuff of sheer anarchy. If you remove the state altogether, do you really think men 
will support one another from the goodness of their hearts? […] If you remove the 
state, they’ll rush to tear out each other’s throats’.218  
The publisher doesn’t seem to symphatise with Vera’s concern about the hardships of 
the working class while Vera doesn’t discern the publisher’s concern about the 
complications lack of authority may evoke in such a system. For the publisher, it is 
important that there remains a state that holds its people together and protects them. 
Thus, the conversation between the two proves inconclusive; the publisher does not 
yield to Vera’s utopian ideology while Vera does not conform to the publisher’s 
deference. Agopian establishes their difference by saying, ‘Maybe in Moscow you have 
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the luxury of being Armenian however you choose – by going to church, or speaking 
the language, or just baking cheoreg. But here we Armenians have a common fate, 
peasant and landlord alike’.219 Vera finds this statement fatalist and ‘Oriental’, which 
demonstrates lack of knowledge or awareness concerning the internal dynamics in the 
Empire.220 
The nucleus of Armenians in Russia consisted of the Armenians of Persian Azerbaijan, 
who had immigrated to the Caucasus as per the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828). Their 
population was immediately augmented with the addition of the Armenians from the 
Eastern territories of the Ottoman Empire, who had joined the withdrawing Russian 
army after the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-9.221 Russian Armenians prospered after the 
1850s, acquiring influence in the region as merchants and bankers, and although ‘the 
separation of the bourgeoisie from peasantry became more pronounced’, they 
nevertheless maintained their solidarity as the rich made donations for the education of 
the Armenian community and to the Church.222 Besides, a new intelligentsia was 
produced among the educated bourgeoisie; some of them worried about the conditions 
of the peasantry and set out to fix their problems while others, influenced ‘by the waves 
of revolutionary and populist ideas tha swept through Russia from the 1850s’, instead 
of focusing on deposing the tsar, concerned themselves with the problems of the 
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.223 Jenny White is particularly interested in this point 
because of her concern about the damage a lack of understanding of the individual 
conditions of people, and a lack of recognition of the consequences of external 
interference, can create for the existent order. 
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The discrepancy between Vera’s heavily accented Armenian, which she learned from 
her grandmother because her parents spoke Russian in Moscow, and the publisher’s 
‘cultured and precise’ voice, reveals the difference between their Russified and 
Ottomanized background despite their common ground as members of the middle 
class.224 Agopian, the publisher, not being able to celebrate his Armenian culture and 
traditions, sees himself first and foremost as an Ottoman. Appalled by Vera’s disregard 
for the existing Ottoman state, he calls Marx and Engels’s socialism an anarchy and sets 
out to show her that the state is the only essence that keeps people together: ‘Something 
has to hold people together, madame. We’re Armenians. That’s enough. We don’t need 
someone else’s utopia’.225 His rejection of the socialist ideology may be read as 
conformism, or even treason, by Vera, because he can seemingly conduct his publishing 
business unmolested, but it rather means forbearance for Agopian, which, despite the 
hardships his fellow Armenians face at the time, rests on the Ottoman Armenian’s faith 
in the Ottoman system that it will protect all its subjects as long as they abide by the 
rules of the system.  
Agopian’s lack of interest in publishing The Communist Manifesto can be viewed as the 
manifestation of self-censorship that became a habit during the Abdülhamidian era.226 
The press is kept under strict scrutiny in this period since Abdülhamid II’s regime 
‘exploited the power of a modern press to cement loyalty to the state and stifle 
dissent’.227 During this time, the press was ‘entirely committed to the service of the 
regime’, which left political issues outside the interest of the publishing industry.228 
However, even in the face of such restrictions, Agopian’s rejection of Marx can also be 
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read as rejection of ideologies or idealism altogether. Agopian complains th t ‘Everyone 
wants to offer us a utopia […]. No one offers us peace’.229 Agopian stresses the fact that 
being acquiescent is the only wise way for the Armenians, because he is aware of the 
threat Russia is inflicting: ‘Russia is threatening the empire’s eastern provinces [...]. The 
sultan suspects us Armenians of collaborating with them’, and because of this, he 
believes that ‘[t]his is not the time to publish Marx’s work here’.230 After this opening, 
in the rest of the novel, the author examines the complexity of ‘the Armenian question’ 
from both the Armenian revolutionary viewpoint and the perspective of the Ottoman 
body politic through her representation of a turbulent, cold and merciless society. As the 
dimension of socialism brings more complication to the Armenian resistance, the 
complex web of relationships among Armenians and Ottoman officials are put to the 
test.  
2.2.3. Armenian National Awakening: Socialism Unfurled 
While Vera’s conversation with Agopian, the book publisher, exposes the divisions 
among Armenians, the conversations Kamil Pasha has, during his investigation, with 
other characters in the novel, such as the Police chief Omar, or Huseyin Pasha, Kamil 
Pasha’s sister’s husband, disclose conflicting views among the ranks of people in the 
service of the empire. The author draws attention in her novel to the differences in 
opinion not only among the Armenians, but also within the government, with people 
like the Sultan and Huseyin Pasha suspecting an Armenian plot behind the confiscated 
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arms while Kamil Pasha and his father’s friend Yorg Pasha believe that the guns were 
meant for a socialist commune in Choruh Valley.231 When he first discovers that the 
shipment is connected to Armenians, the unsuspecting Kamil Pasha does not consider 
an Armenian revolt a possibility even though the captain of the ship with illegal 
armaments that were brought from New York claims to have heard Armenian being 
spoken by the owners of the shipment, which is hidden as a ‘load of salted cod’ whose 
barrels are marked with an ax.232 Not linking socialism with nationalism, Kamil Pasha 
utters his first impression about the Henchak symbol on the confiscated barrels on the 
ship: ‘I thought socialists didn’t go in for nationalism. How can there be Armenian 
socialists? Isn’t their slogan something like “Workers of the world, unite,” not 
“Armenians, unite”?’.233 Jenny White marks a different intervention in the Armenian 
historical narratives with the dimension of socialism and foreign intervention receiving 
the spotlight rather than the more familiar, and ethnically teleological, Armenian 
national narratives.  
Teleological historical narratives of the Armenian national awakening paint a picture of 
a determined fight of the Armenian nationalists that woke up the Armenian people from 
their slavish slumber. In these narratives, tragic deaths and massacres during the early 
strife caused by the abuse of power by the state, are retrospectively seen as the examples 
of national struggle, or as steppingstones contributing towards the formation of 
Armenian national identity. Folk tales of such times, for example, emerge likewise as 
part of national social consciousness. While some of these historical narratives are 
harshly deterministic in their manner of blaming the Ottoman state, amounting in their 
blame-placing to accusing the Ottomans of being slaveholders, some of them also see 
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the Ottomans as being victims, as a minor power among the Great Powers of Europe – a 
sheep among the wolves. These explanations are further complicated by the distinctive 
role of Russia as an actor separate from its role as one of the Great Powers in that the 
Russians also had a contested relationship with the Great Powers as well as with their 
Armenian subjects, especially as the Armenians increasingly gained more power and 
influence in the Russian Empire.  
One thing that is commonly pointed out is that the Armenian demands for independence 
were presaged by demands for fair treatment. The rural Armenian populations in 
Anatolia were under heavy tax obligations; not only did the local authorities act 
arbitrarily when collecting taxes, but also Kurdish and other nomadic tribes demanded 
‘protection tax’ which sapped almost all the surplus of the farmers’ harvests and 
products, and so made life unbearable for the Armenian Christians. As extortions 
increased, at times conversion seemed to be the only safe avenue for the Anatolian 
Armenians.234 The rights of the Armenians as Ottoman subjects had been limited, and 
not inconsequential in relation to this condition, a certain political and national 
consciousness was flourishing among the Armenian peasantry. Other Christian ethnic 
communities gaining sovereignty from the Ottoman Empire had become a touchstone 
for Armenian national struggle. The complexity of the troubles of Armenians at the end 
of the nineteenth century, therefore, cannot be separated from the convoluted issues of 
the financial difficulties of the Ottomans, the involvement of the Great Powers in the 
internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the internal political, social and 
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economic dynamics and reactionary international movements that emerged as a result in 
this period. 
Armenian nationalist thinking emerged as a result of a two-step process. First, came the 
cultural renaissance (preparatory phase), then, supported by the high clergy and the 
liberal bourgeoisie, patriotic and socialist reform movements followed.235 The Zeytun 
Rebellion of 1862 and Erzurum Rebellion of 1863 are the first two of a series of 
insurrections against the Ottoman Empire and the Kurds in the region in this period. 
These uprisings are now considered to be the early ‘examples of popular resistance’ as 
they are also ingrained in the later Armenian identity as part of Armenian folklore.236 
Local Armenians’ hardships were also emphasised in the works of the nationalist 
writers of this period. The rising of national identity was therefore enmeshed with the 
sufferings of the Armenians under ‘the Ottoman yoke’.  
Armenians’ nationalist feelings were cemented in the imagery of Ottoman oppression. 
‘The Ottoman yoke’, as an ideological discourse, had been ever-present since its first 
use by Ivan Vazov in a play with the same title in 1888 to promote Bulgarian 
nationalism.237 In Andrew Petersen’s words,  
In order to understand the negative attitude towards the Ottoman past it is worth 
remembering that Bulgaria’s independence was chiefly championed by Russia from 
the start of the nineteenth century. The Russo-Turkish wars of the mid-nineteenth 
century followed by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 led to the creation of an 
independent Bulgarian state which regarded the Ottoman period as a time of decline 
and stagnation. As in many former Ottoman provinces the Bulgarian population 
was ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse. This was true even amongst 
the Christian population so that the development of a national identity was 
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predicated on an antipathy to the Ottomans in terms of politics, culture and 
language.238 
The economic stagnation and the Ottoman centre’s lack of dedication to responding to 
the demands of its people during the nineteenth century set the stage for ‘a multilocal 
awakening’, which, as time progressed, gave birth to a ‘consolidation and radicalisation 
of collective identity’ for Armenians as well as other Christian ethnic groups, and 
culminated in fiercer local uprisings, localised attacks and even assassination attempts 
on the person of Abdülhamid II.239 
Armenian American professor of history Richard G. Hovannisian uggests that ‘[a]s 
long as these peoples [minorities] performed their duties and as long as the central 
government could wield a system of checks over its provincial officials, there was no 
reason to upset the existing balance’.240 On account of this, according to Hovannisian, 
the harmony had actually started to be unsettled in the seventeenth century when the 
tendency of Muslim leaders to rebel repeatedly, the adverse effect of corrupt 
bureaucratic elements in administrative matters, and the European menace to the Empire 
prompted the early development of a climate of intolerance in the Empire. In the 
subsequent centuries, as the empire continued to lose territories and the uprisings in the 
Balkans paved the way for the creation of new nations with the help of European 
support, intolerance in the empire worsened.241 Eventually, persecutions started to take 
place in the Balkans as well as in the Eastern territories in a war-like manner to 
counterbalance the uprisings, which were habitually considered to be treacherous 
movements. In the second half of the nineteenth century indifference toward the 
destitute among the Armenian Christians was being rationalised due to fear of the 
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Russian aspiration to annex the Ottoman territories with Armenian populations and the 
possibility of further insurgencies among Armenians that could lead to a further loss of 
territory.  
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, rebellions assumed a more organised 
character under the guidance of the activists and the encouragements of nationalist 
intellectual writers. Initially, figures such as Father Khrimian (1820-1907) and 
Mekertich Portukalian (1848-1921) acted as the indigenous pioneers who encouraged 
the Armenian people and cultivated their sense of justice, which was later on translated 
into national sentiments and invested in the intellectual and armed mobilisation based 
on the possibility of national liberation.242 Father Khrimian was especially instrumental 
in terms of kindling the national feelings of the Armenians. At the Berlin Congress, 
through the representation of Father Khrimian, Armenians demanded reforms and civil 
rights alongside partial autonomy based on the model of the Maronites of Mount 
Lebanon that was established in 1861.  
The Berlin Congress convened after the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-8 to discuss the 
status of the Ottoman territories in the Balkans and in the Eastern provinces, the two 
fronts the war was fought on. Changing the Treaty of San Stefano signed between the 
two empires earlier that year, the Berlin Treaty was a limiting force of the Russian 
control over the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Largely due to British 
pressure that sought to limit the Russian influence over the Ottomans in order to protect 
its overland route to India, in the Berlin Treaty, the Russian Empire had to relinquish its 
claim to be the protector of all Orthodox Christians under Ottoman rule. Moreover, as 
per the Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty, the Ottoman Empire was compelled to guarantee 
                                                          




the security of Armenians against Kurds and Circassians, make ‘improvements and 
reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians’, and 
to ‘periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the powers’.243 In this 
treaty which replaced the Treaty of San Stefano, no genuine action by the Powers was 
guaranteed to be undertaken for the Armenians with the Berlin Treaty.  
Father Khrimian had come from Berlin empty-handed after the Congress concluded 
with the Ottoman lands in the Balkans being divided up into new territories creating the 
new independent states of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro while the Armenians were 
only promised in the famous Article 61 the chance to oversee promised reforms within 
the Ottoman Empire.244 Disappointed by the lack of interest of the West in the 
Armenian question, on his return from Berlin, Father Khrimian ‘gave a series of 
speeches which secured him a place in the radicalisation of Armenian thinking, and the 
clear and forceful articulation of demands based on nationalist principles’.245 Razmik 
Panossian relates the power of the ‘iron ladle’ metaphor Khrimian used in his speeches 
in Istanbul after the Congress, which was later on instrumental in aligning Armenian 
nationalism in the direction of revolution: 
Khrimian spoke metaphorically of the ‘dish of liberty’ from which Serbs and 
Bulgarians served themselves using ‘iron ladles’ (weapons and force). Armenians 
went to get their fill, but they only had ‘paper ladles’ (petitions and promises), 
which dissolved and were useless to serve liberty. They therefore remained hungry. 
The moral of the story was clear: in order to obtain freedom, arms had to be used.246 
Khrimian’s call to use ‘iron ladles’, which meant arms, was therefore a call to revolt as 
a result of the disillusionment about the lack of support for the Armenian question at 
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Berlin in 1878.247 Also, after the internationalisation of the Armenian suffering at the 
Berlin Congress in 1878, the calls to revolt became more vocal.248 
Another development that encouraged Armenians to take up arms was the changing 
structure of the organisations that were being set up in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century by the Armenian nationalists in the Ottoman Empire, Russian Empire (Tiflis) 
and those living in European cities. An important figure that inspired such organisations 
was Mekertich Portukalian (1848-1921), who inspired his fellow Armenians to project 
the future of the Armenians as a nation. Portukalian was a writer and an educator, who 
wrote for newspapers, and opened two schools in Van, one of which was shut down by 
Armenians in 1881 because of dissidence among them and the other by the Ottoman 
authorities in 1885.249 After his expulsion from the Empire in 1885, Portukalian settled 
in Marseilles and encouraged those Armenians who were abroad to financially help the 
oppressed Armenians and to spread the word on their status around the world.250 
Although he was an intellectual leader who believed in people’s right to defend their 
rights and be recognised through their nations, he didn’t become a revolutionary leader, 
seemingly due to his reservations regarding the need for armed struggle to achieve 
change; and therefore, not infrequently he favoured reforms rather than revolution.251 
Portukalian’s commitment to the national cause bore fruit when the future of the 
Armenian people started to be discussed under the guidance of the new political parties. 
The Armenakan Party was the first political party to be set up by Portukalian’s disciples 
in 1885.252 They wanted self-rule for the Armenians, which could be achieved through 
revolution. Although they refrained from ‘terror, agitation and militant demonstrations’, 
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they still favoured training people ‘with arms, as guerrilla fighters, but essentially for 
defensive purposes, against the terrorism of the Ottoman empire’. They hoped the Great 
Powers would get involved in the Armenian cause to help them achieve their aim.253  
Subsequent organisations were not as abstinent in their chosen methods to defend 
themselves against the violence executed by the Kurdish irregulars. Both Henchaks and 
Dashnaks used armed resistance in order to create the resonance that would draw the 
Powers’ attention to the Armenian suffering. Unlike the Armenakan Party, they did not 
emerge in the Ottoman Empire, but in Geneva, Switzerland, and Tiflis, in the Russian 
Empire, respectively. Their architects were heavily influenced by the flourishing ideals 
of socialism and Russian antimonarchism. Both of these groups’ focus fell on the 
emancipation of the Ottoman Armenians despite the pressure put on the Armenian 
Catholics by the Russian Empire after 1880s. An important reason for this was that they 
believed the Ottoman Armenians to be in imminent danger, while they also did not want 
to fall out with the Russian Empire. Thus, it can be said that, their campaign was not 
independent of their Russian background. As Christopher Walker explains, ‘the two 
main revolutionary organisations were founded by men from Russian Transcaucasia, 
and the imprint of Russian Populism is strong on them – so strong indeed that it can be 
argued that they frequently misunderstood political relationships within the Ottoman 
empire’.254 Such misunderstandings led to further oppression by the authorities after 
each action they took within the Ottoman Empire. Having glossed over some of the 
misunderstandings involving these political relationships above, in the sections below, 
the standpoint of these organisations and factions within the Ottoman Empire will be 
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investigated as they have been projected and novelised by Jenny White in The Winter 
Thief. 
2.2.4. Class System among Ottoman Armenians 
The Ottoman Armenians did not have strong ties as a community across the empire 
before the second half of the nineteenth century, which contributed to a marked urban 
and rural division among them. According to Christopher Walker, the Armenians in the 
Ottoman Empire were divided into four groups based on their geographical status and 
their relationship with the Ottoman state. The most affluent group among them were 
called amiras, the wealthy and influential people who had close ties with the Ottomans 
and were based in Istanbul and Izmir. In the second category were the traders and 
artisans who lived in towns in the inner parts of the Empire. The third and fourth groups 
of people were villagers and mountaineers. The most pronounced difference between 
these latter two was that the mountaineers led a reasonably unaffected life by the social 
changes around them in the sense that they were largely exempt from tax-payments, and 
unlike the villagers, they were allowed to carry armaments.  
After the Armenian question gained recognition as an international issue with the 1878 
Berlin Treaty, political awareness and solidarity spread among Armenians even though 
the split driven by ideological and economical differences persisted. This divided 
ideological landscape transformed with Sasun events of 1894 which left approximately 
900 to 3000 Armenians dead.255 In his observation of such division, Walker refers to the 
analysis of the British diplomat Sir Robert Windham Graves (1858-1934) on ‘the nature 
of the swing of opinion among Ottoman Armenians’.256 Graves initially sets out to 
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clarify that the ‘agricultural population’ is largely uneducated and that their political 
awareness goes as far as their understanding of their lack of security. Therefore, they 
welcome any means to be rid of the oppression they are subjected to, which among 
other reactionary tactics also includes conversion into Islam. Graves also notes that due 
to the lack of ‘freedom of discussion’ and of ‘local press’, the townspeople are 
incapable of forming unity among them, therefore, difference of opinion among them 
emerge in the form of political dissent, which, according to him, is an obstacle in the 
way of Armenian self-governance.257  
Graves mentions three categories of Armenians who were politically conscious. The 
first category involves the conservatives or Turcophiles, who enjoyed protection and 
wealth due to their relations with Muslims; and the Catholic Armenians, who ‘had little 
to suffer from Kurdish exactions’ and whose ‘current religious immunities’ would be 
imperilled in the case of ‘a Russian annexation’ as they would be a minority group 
among the Gregorian Christians. The second group included moderate liberals, who 
took part in businesses, educational and other professional activities. Graves suggests 
that despite this group’s alertness to the precariousness of the position of the Armenians 
in the Empire, they were also receptive of the futility of the attempts to gain 
independence as a nation, or of the threat a Russian rule would pose to their Armenian 
identity. This group: 
whose views although too liberal to allow them to be really contented with the 
present position of Christians under Turkish rule, could not be called actively 
disloyal. They were generally quite alive to the material impossibility of 
constituting an independent Armenia, as well as to the danger of ultimate 
denationalization that perhaps awaited them in case of annexation by Russia; it was 
therefore their aim to avoid precipitating any violent solution of the Armenian 
question, and to maintain the Armenian element as such, by strengthening and 
developing the national Church and schools, which enjoyed greater freedom under 
Ottoman than under Russian dominion; at the same time, they placed their hopes 
                                                          




for the future in the ultimate introduction of those administrative reforms which 
have been so often promised by the Porte. 
Finally, the third group consisted of the revolutionaries, ‘young Armenians who have 
studied abroad, and have fallen under the influence of Socialist or Nihilist propaganda’. 
Graves mentions the journal Hunchak as ‘the most prominent organ of this party’ and 
sees their resistance to the Ottoman maladministration as their sole design and ultimate 
goal:  
Their object has plainly been, by creating an appearance of widespread disaffection, 
quite out of proportion to their numbers and influence to provoke reprisals on the 
part of the Turkish Government and people, of a nature to draw the attention of the 
Powers to the manifest grievances of the Armenian nation, and the necessity for 
their redressal. In this, it must be admitted that they have been ably seconded by the 
action of the Turkish authorities themselves in the provinces chiefly concerned. 
Their policy appears to be merely destructive, and so long as they can upset the 
present regime, they seem indifferent as to what shall replace it; at least I am not 
aware of their having formulated any alternative scheme of government.258 
This classification of Armenians based on their political awareness prior to the Sasun 
crisis is explanatory for the variety of characters with conflicting types of Armenian 
self-identification in The Winter Thief. Accordingly, the Armenian publisher in the 
novel represents the second party, the liberals, evidently due to his choice of inaction 
because of the increasing tension between the authorities and the Armenians, especially 
in the face of threats coming from Russia, which means that he is willing to protect the 
sense of unity among Armenians as Ottoman subjects.  
Vera, on the other hand, is representative of the revolutionaries, the Henchaks, who, as 
Graves claims, aimed to stir political unrest in order to attract the attention of the 
Powers, with the expectation of invoking the Berlin Treaty. Unlike the liberals, the 
Henchaks desired ‘immediate radical change’ and they were explicit regarding their 
organisation’s socialist agenda. They stood firm in their belief that they needed to attract 
the Powers’ attention to end the Ottoman rule, and to that end, they used revolutionary 
                                                          




techniques, which included propaganda, education, agitation, mass protests as well as 
assassinations, terror and other extreme measures. The eventual aim was to institute 
socialism. They were especially active between 1890-6, during which time they 
organised rebellions in Sasun, Zeytun and Van, and took part in other oppositional 
activities.259 In the novel, Vera is introduced as a moderate Henchak member, who 
believes in an Armenian nationalism forged by the socialist cause, although the more 
avid revolutionary stereotype described by Graves is also represented in the subsequent 
chapters. The narrator gives the reason for Vera’s joining the Henchaks as ‘out of 
misplaced loyalty’ to her friend Apollo, who is introduced as a founding member of the 
Henchak.260  
The Armenian Hunchak Party was the first socialist party of the Ottoman Empire. 
According to International Communist Current, a still active group founded in 1975, 
the Hunchak party was established ‘under the influence of Russian Marxism’, and in 
their design of public actions they were aligned with Russian populism. International 
Communist Current in International Review xplains the Hunchaks’ national basis with 
the ‘stage-ist understanding of the Second International’.261 Vera first becomes aware of 
the discrepancy between the socialist and nationalist leanings of the Hunchaks when she 
takes refuge at the Armenian Church in Kurtulush.262 She comes to the realisation of 
and gets disappointed by the fact that Gabriel, her husband, is a member of Father 
Zadian’s league.263 Their friend Apollo’s involvement with Father Zadian turns out to 
be controversial as well, as they are heard by Vera to be arguing. Finally, Apollo takes 
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the confiscated arms out of Yorg Pasha’s storage, and Apollo, his men and Vera set out 
for Erzurum. Socialism, however, as Vera understands it, does not seem to be a purpose 
of this Armenian insurgent group:  
The men [the comrades that came to Trabzon with Vera and Apollo on a ship] 
claimed to be socialists, but Vera by now understood that they did not understand 
socialism as she did, as a universal ideal of justice. This, she had come to realize, 
was an Armenian movement, and it was her Armenian heritage, not her ideas, that 
caused them to accept her. The men had obsessively planned to trek into the 
mountains, going over every possible scenario and danger. They had quarrelled 
over each kurush of expenditure, since their means were limited by the money 
Father Zadian had collected.264 
The question of whether the Choruh Valley is a socialist commune, as Kamil Pasha and 
Yorg Pasha maintain, or an Armenian rebellious group, as the Sultan insists, remains 
vague until the nature of the population of the valley is made clear to the reader. The 
fifty pioneers to settle in the Concord Commune are part of ‘the socialist International’ 
from all over the world, including one girl, Alicia, from Ireland, and others from 
Europe, Russia, and the Unites States who made their way to the commune to try a new 
communist or maybe communal anarchist settlement.265 When starvation and cold take 
their toll and the population of not only the commune but also the Armenian local 
resistance is largely eliminated in great numbers as a result of the armed conflict 
between the Hamidiye troops and Kamil Pasha’s special investigation unit, the dreams 
for a socialist commune die. 
2.2.5. The Representation of Wrongdoings  
To be able to probe Jenny White’s chosen method of representation, that is, her use of 
fictional devices to stage intellectual positions and dialogue, I will first review Tessa 
Morris-Suzuki’s synoptic illustration of the ways politically sensitive historical issues 
are dealt with in their contemporary representations. According to Morris-Suzuki, 
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different narratives can be used to suggest different ways of confrontation with the past, 
which can appear as taking or denouncing responsibility for past wrongdoings. In her 
The Past within Us she mentions several ways of dealing with past atrocities, and 
especially in terms of dealing with their legacies.266 For example, while the liberal 
interpretation may acknowledge the responsibility of certain parties of a historical event 
or incident, the structuralist narrative explores the conditions that give rise to these 
incidents. So, while liberal focuses on the political and ideological aspects, structuralist 
focuses on the continuity of social structures that offer necessary conditions that prevail 
at the time of the increased tension.267 A third type of narrative draws parallels between 
the wrongdoers and the countries they are in contention with, putting symmetrical 
blame on each party. This kind of parallelism may, however, justify a differentiation in 
people as evildoers and victims depending on the harm done in any given society. This 
simplified classification acquits civilians and soldiers in any given country of any 
support they may have shown or any crimes they may have committed during the times 
of disturbance. Parallelism therefore makes it more difficult to use the term aggressor 
instead of victim when it is weighed on a comparative scale. The final component in 
Morris-Suzuki’s compilation of narrative models is the display of previous wrongdoings 
of some other faction or country as pre-dating which sets an example for the atrocities 
to follow, ‘shift[ing] the focus of responsibility away’ from generally accepted 
wrongdoers.268 
This analytical distinction serves both to broaden and narrow down the domain of 
influence and responsibility for any particular historical incident, which Morris-Suzuki 
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makes use of in her examination of Japanese historiography. In her corresponding 
analysis, the historical accounts by the Society for History Textbook Reform are not 
viewed as progressive outputs as they are claimed to be, but are indeed seen as 
intending ‘to relieve a contemporary generation of Japanese from any sense of 
responsibility for pre-1945 colonialism and military expansion in Asia’. In a similar 
way, but this time from an opposing position to the Textbook Reform, performing 
detailed archival research in order to ‘document Japanese military and state involvement 
in crimes such as institutionalized rape’ functions to place ‘greater emphasis on the 
specific guilt of particular individuals and institutions’. On the other hand, unlike these 
blame placing-blame acquittal exercises, in the Japanese example, the postcolonial 
narratives ‘explore both the complexities of Japanese colonialism and the structural and 
intellectual continuities linking prewar empire to the postwar Japanese state’ which, like 
the structuralist approach, recognises the entrenchment of historical responsibility in the 
‘enduring social structures’.269  
The two resulting conclusions from these examples are that, although they each have 
‘slightly different implications for our understanding of historical responsibility’, the 
first casts the spotlight chiefly in the direction of ‘the need for the punishment of 
wrongdoers and the payment of compensation’ while the second concentrates on ‘the 
need to think how we might undo the legacies of past violence and discrimination which 
survive in contemporary political and social institutions and modes of thought’.270 
Considering the sensitivity of the issue of representing Armenians of the late Ottoman 
Empire, Morris-Suzuki’s classification may shed helpful light on the representation of 
Ottoman society in Jenny White’s work. The representations that deny the Armenian 
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suffering as well as those that single-handedly vilify the Ottoman Empire can be 
considered within the liberal school. An aspect of Morris-Suzuki’s analysis, the fourth 
approach, sheds light on the emergence of the intertwining of Armenian and Kurdish 
stories that makes use of the stories of repression over the years. The violence Kurds in 
the southeast of Turkey have undergone in the past few decades, if not longer, has now 
begun to be viewed as something of the same violence perpetuated against the 
Armenians by the Ottomans in the nineteenth century, often using Kurdish forces. 
Today, this complex history is often used against the modern Turkish government to 
create a narrative that supports modern forms of ethno-nationalism and ignores aspects 
of the Ottoman model that had made for coexistence for some centuries. On the other 
hand, the fact that these communities had co-existed for centuries before the late 
nineteenth century and continued to do so in some areas after these outbreaks of inter-
ethnic violence, suggests the need for a structural investigation into how increased 
hostility among the peoples of the Ottoman Empire emerged along religious, and ethnic, 
lines in the late ninetenth century. This is what Jenny White’s fiction attempts to do.  
What is important for the purposes of this thesis, therefore, is to reach a conclusion as to 
whether, or how, historical fiction can help intervene in dominant historical narratives 
to overturn the stigmatising legacies of the past by reconnecting the present to the past 
in more nuanced ways.271 The multicultural model that was in place in the Ottoman 
empire before its last decades accommodated both Kurds as a relatively autonomous, 
largely Muslim people governing large swathes of territory within the Ottoman 
domains, and Armenians as one group amongst many non-Muslim subjects. Jenny 
White’s novel gives us glimpses of the ‘divide-and-rule’ violence that replaced earlier 
more peaceful formations as the Ottoman state struggled to maintain its territorial 
                                                          




integrity. We are not made privy to the Kurdish irregulars’ own view point in the text; 
they figure as ‘exorbitant’, in Jacques Derrida’s phrase, to the narrative substance of the 
novel.272 That is to say, the Kurds’ story would require a different narrative, perhaps 
even a different narrative form, from the Armenian community’s story, which is at the 
centre of this novel. The novel as it stands performs the important revisionist work of 
re-centring Armenians as Ottoman subjects during an important moment of the empire’s 
destabilisation, and indeed the beginning of its self-destruction through the perpetuation 
of ethnic violence. However, both this work and other historical works that do not 
incorporate all parties involved in the escalation of the events to wide-scale massacres, 
fall short of being comprehensive, and unless more effort is spent is on the construction 
of alternative narratives, blame-placing and blame-acquittal polemic will continue to be 
exercised in history and identity construction. Jenny White’s novel, by placing the 
Hamidian regime and bureaucracy at the centre of her investigation into the violence 
against Armenians, also usefully explores the difficulties the Ottoman Empire was 
having in keeping the Ottoman body politic intact. Below, the representation of the 
Ottoman Bank robbery will be discussed as one of many expressions of such 
difficulties, in which previous Ottoman models are shown to fail under new strains. 
2.2.6 The Ottoman Bank in view of Political and Financial Difficulties 
The Hamidian period represents the Ottoman Empire’s final attempts to protect its 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, which were being challenged due to the financial 
difficulties the empire had been undergoing and the aspirations for national liberation of 
ethnic groups of the late nineteenth century Empire.273 Despite the changing character 
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of the relations of the Ottomans with the Powers after the joining of the Ottomans in the 
Concert of Europe with the Treaty of Paris in 1856, the challenges the Empire was 
facing were rendered more precarious due to its worsening economic conditions. To 
start with, the system of capitulations, which had been granted to the foreigners in the 
Ottoman Empire since Süleyman I granted them for the first time to the French in 1535, 
had already been exploited both by the Europeans and the Ottoman non-Muslim 
subjects, who made unjust gains by naturalising into a foreign citizenship during the 
nineteenth century. This has been alluded to in the first chapter as constituting informal 
imperialism, a much softer form of formal imperialism. Apart from the economic strain 
the capitulations generated on the Empire’s economy, capitulations also influenced the 
psyche of the Ottoman subjects. Those non-Muslims and foreigners who obtained a 
more privileged status were increasingly received by the others with resentment causing 
the rise of xenophobia among Muslims. Those Ottomans who sought protection using 
the system of capitulations, including the Armenians, were also received with mistrust 
by the Ottoman government and public.274  
The second reason for the immense economic pressure the Ottoman Empire was under 
was related to the Powers’ economic interests in the Empire.275 The second half of the 
nineteenth century was a period of imperialist competition in Europe, particularly 
between the French, the British, the Germans and the Italians who were interested in 
new potential colonies, especially in Africa. Europe was, therefore, in a secure position 
for economic expansion and investment of its surplus capital abroad. As the British 
historian Christopher J. Walker suggests, it is possible that the European investment in 
the Ottoman Empire was part of a longer term plan ‘to keep the Muslim empire 
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backward and at the economic mercy of Europe’.276 Coincidentally, there was also 
economic hardship in the Ottoman Empire; when the sources of local bankers, sarrafs, 
were not sufficient anymore, especially in the face of the Crimean War ahead, the 
Ottoman government had to start borrowing large amounts of money from the Powers 
in the 1850s. Financed with Western capital, the Imperial Ottoman Bank opened in 
Istanbul in 1863.277 The loans coming from the British and the French continued to 
stream into the Empire for another twenty years after the Crimean War, which at that 
point amounted to a total of £191 million, most of which had been spent rather lavishly. 
A bankrupt empire was welcomed by the Powers because both the collapse of the 
Ottomans and the strengthening of it would pose a danger due to the competing interests 
among the Powers.278  
The narrator describes the makeup of the Bank in terms of its foreign capital and 
administration based on what Kamil Pasha remembers from social events: the bank was 
controlled by a French central cashier, a British comptroller and a third German 
official.279 Notably, Walker points out that ‘[t]he bank was about as Ottoman as a 
foreign embassy’.280 It is one of the sad occasions of the Ottoman history that the lack 
of autonomy of the Ottoman Bank was endorsed when the Porte was unable to pay the 
interest on the loans. With the declaration of bankruptcy, the empire was forced to 
‘accept a British and French-run Public Debt Administration [Düyun-u Umumiye] in 
1881’.281 Monopolies on tobacco and salt were established, revenues of which would be 
directly streamed into the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, ‘ensur[ing] that 
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Ottoman revenues went first and foremost to servicing its foreign creditors and only 
later (if at all) to paying for the military, government bureaucracy, public works, and 
education systems.’282 Walker suggests that ‘Turkey was thereafter reduced to a state of 
economic vassalage’.283 At that point in history, the Powers had already ‘extended their 
own privileges within Ottoman Turkey’ when the Porte realised it was ‘too weak to 
oppose the powers’.284 The police chief Omar uses humour to point at the fact that the 
Europeans held the keys to the finances of the Empire when he sees the plain wooden 
door to the bank’s vault, whose actual keys are held by the three European officials: 
‘This explains why the empire is bankrupt […] We don’t need a treaty to hand our 
wealth over to our European friends. They can just come here, jiggle the lock, and take 
what they want’.285  
The imperialist attitude of the British is conveyed by the narrator of The Winter Thief on 
a number of occasions. Swyndon, the British comptroller, is described as talking about 
‘the best way to hunt tigers’, possibly bragging about his previous colonial experiences 
in Europe’s now infamous venture, the scramble for Africa.286 On another occasion, the 
British ambassador’s denial of responsibility for the weaponry discovered in a British 
owned ship is perceived with scepticism by Kamil Pasha, as noted by the narrator:  
it was typical of the British to vow support for the Ottoman Empire while 
undermining it. British ships had delivered Martini rifles to the Iraqi Bedouin by 
way of Kuwait, ostensibly to protect them against tribal disputes. They had given 
gifts of guns to tribal sheikhs and the heads of dervish convents around the Arabian 
Gulf. Now those rifles were trained against the Ottoman Sixth Army.287  
In terms of their involvement in the banking system of the Ottomans, Omar does not 
find the European bank representatives’ attitude trustworthy either. Upon discovering 
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that Swyndon might have been a collaborator on the theft at the bank, he reflects that 
‘[w]e give the Franks salaries the size of Mount Ararat and still they rob us blind. 
Europeans are about as trustworthy as weasels in a larder’.288 With the representation of 
the increasing involvement of foreigners in the financial affairs of the Ottomans, the 
novel demonstrates that distrust towards ethnic groups also grow for fear of foreign 
backed ethnic rebellions.   
2.2.7. Forging Loyalties: Sharp Knife  
Michelle Campos suggests that as a result of the adverse financial developments, 
‘Ottomans of the late nineteenth century had every reason to literally fear for the 
continued existence and well-being of their empire.’289 This is because previous 
experience had demonstrated to the Ottomans how territorial integrity could be 
fractured by the Powers either ‘through direct military operation’ or due to unfair 
treaties imposed upon the empire by the Great Powers.290 Despite having him correctly 
surmise the British involvement in arms smuggling, Jenny White portrays Kamil Pasha 
as having reservations as to the likelihood of the involvement of the British in the 
trafficking of illegal weapons and in plotting against the empire by supporting an ethnic 
group, providing them with weaponry.291 The pasha doubts that the British would be 
involved in the arming of the insurgent group, because ‘[i]f the British wanted to arm 
the Armenians on the Russian border, it would be much easier to send the weapons 
through Syria’. He reasons that arming Armenians would mean helping the Russians, 
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which is what the British are trying to prevent, the Berlin Treaty being an example of 
this.292  
Kamil Pasha’s reservation concerning the possibility of English support for an 
Armenian insurrection grows as he finds the Henchak symbol on the confiscated crates. 
The possibility of foreign involvement in the arms smuggling, on the other hand, is 
firmly verified in the novel by a trusted source, Huseyin Pasha, the sultan’s minister for 
the east, who shares his knowledge with Kamil Pasha, remarking that the Palace is 
indeed aware of the fact that ‘the British are arming terrorists in the provinces’.293 But 
even so, believing that the British have a role in the arms smuggling, Huseyin Pasha 
expresses his surprise at the audacity of the act of sending the shipment to Istanbul, 
which can be considered a downright act of contravention of the sovereignty of the 
Empire. His fears are primarily concerning the possibility of an insurgency in the 
capital: ‘This is a city, not a desert sheikhdom. If you start shooting here, before you 
know it, you’ll have a pile of bodies so big it would fill the harbour’.294 He sees the 
arms smuggling as one of ‘British games’, as an intervention in internal affairs of the 
Ottomans. He adds, ‘They distribute fuel drop by drop, year after year, thinking no one 
notices, and then they hand out matches’.295 In view of the hidden political strategies of 
the British, Huseyin Pasha remarks that ‘the British lie in wait under the table for the 
scraps’ alluding to the Russians as one of the drops of fuel the British ‘distribute’.296  
According to Huseyin Pasha, the minister for the east, however, an immediate threat to 
the Empire comes from the Russians, because they ‘have been trying for centuries to 
grab a piece of the empire’. The minister says that ‘[t]hey took Artvin ten years ago, and 
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now we have the border right up to our ass’, referring to the war of 1877-78.297 Huseyin 
Pasha, who is painted as a vulgar character in that he swears and aspires to acquire 
European art-works participating in European-style ‘modernity’ (‘Kamil thought the 
ropes of gilded plaster and oil paintings of fruit and dead pheasants an abomination of 
taste’), believes that ‘the Russians are trying to extend their reach [...]. They think they 
can get another arm of the empire, and the Armenians will get a finger in return’.298 
Huseyin Pasha speaks for the Palace, disclosing its policies in reaction to the troubled 
situation in the east, and it is evident from the pasha’s contention that, alarmed by the 
immediate threat from Russians, the palace plans a reprisal. One of the measures taken 
by the Porte against the Russian threat is the employment of the Kurds to counteract the 
Armenian plot. In Huseyin’s words,  
‘Sultan Abdulhamid suspects the Armenians of colluding with Russia. There are 
rumors of something going on in the Kachkar Mountains. Foreigners have been 
seen there, agitating the locals. They’ll be arming the villagers next. The Kurdish 
irregulars will put an end to it, one way or another’.299  
Irregular corps, or the Hamidiye, as they were named after the Sultan himself when the 
corps was established in 1891, were recruits of Sunni Kurdish and Turkmen cavalries 
who have been armed and placed in the service of the Empire under the protective 
shield of pan-Islamic policies. Hamidiye troops served the purpose of supporting Pan-
Islamic policies under the leadership of the Sultan as Caliphate and promoted loyalty to 
the Ottoman sultan, acting in a combined effort to resist European influence, especially 
on non-Muslims who sought autonomy.300  
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Pan-Islamic policies of Abdülhamid II not only aimed at supressing Armenian revolts, 
but also preventing the recurrence of Kurdish revolts.301 In his book A Modern History 
of the Kurds, David McDowall explains that the origins of the Kurds have been 
obscured and mythologised for political reasons by Kurdish nation builders in order to 
profess an ancient nature and background to their community. Nation-building ethos 
includes ‘the mountain’ as a geographical denominator which, according to the legend, 
protected the Kurdish tribes from ‘Zahhak, a child-eating giant’, and the kinship of 
Kurds to the Prophets Solomon or Muhammad, placing the Kurdish people’s kinship 
within a religious foundation.302 In terms of population, McDowall also surmises that 
the Kurds were mostly Indo-European tribes who first arrived in the modern day Iran in 
the middle of the second millennium BCE and from there they were slowly scattered in 
the region, including in Mesopotamia and southeastern Anatolia.303 During the reign of 
Yavuz Sultan Selim (Selim the Grim as he is generally known in Western literature), 
Kurdish people in the Ottoman Empire were resettled alongside the frontiers with Persia 
in order to be employed as militia to defend the Ottoman Empire in return for an 
exemption from taxation.304 In the nineteenth century, Kurds began periodically to 
revolt against the Porte.305  
While by the nineteenth century, the Kurds and Armenians had completely mixed in 
Eastern Anatolia, by the end of the nineteenth century the Kurdish tribes had become a 
threat to both Armenians and non-tribal Kurds in the region.306 In line with the Pan-
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Islamist policies of the Sultan, the use of Kurds against Armenians also comes as a 
result of the desire of the Sultan to prevent the Kurds from revolting.307 The armed 
‘irregular Kurdish regiments’ are described by the narrator from Kamil Pasha’s 
viewpoint as ‘tribal militias given the distinction of official rank by the state in order to 
keep them from rebelling against it. But they were paid little and lived off plunder’.308 
Huseyin Pasha acknowledges the Porte’s plans to use the Kurdish tribes against 
Armenians with the metaphor of the knife, which can be understood as part of an overall 
pan-Islamist strategy: ‘We don’t want the Kurdish tribes civilized [...] [a]t least one of 
our knives has to remain sharp’.309 Kamil Pasha questions the sustainability of the 
policy of violence and ethnic favouritism. Huseyin Pasha’s comment, ‘[t]he Kurdish 
irregulars will put an end to it, one way or another’, receives reaction from both Kamil 
Pasha and his sister Feride.310  
Inferring from Huseyin Pasha’s reference that the Porte was indeed planning to deploy 
the Kurdish irregulars who were ‘known for their brutality’ to solve the problem of 
Armenian disloyalty, both Feride and Kamil explicitly argue that killing Armenians 
won’t make them ‘loyal’.311 They claim that the real reason for their revolt could indeed 
be because of ‘the sultan’s heavy-handedness’.312 While Huseyin Pasha thinks that only 
money can make them loyal, by way of referring to the bankruptcy of the empire, he 
says this is not an option, so the only alternative left to make them loyal is to use 
force.313 Kamil Pasha, on the other hand, believes that Armenians are loyal anyway, 
while Feride suggests that the only way to make them loyal is to show them that they 
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are ‘respected and safe and that their children have a future’.314 Through the dialogues 
in which Huseyin Pasha and Kamil Pasha contradict each other as to the Porte’s 
treatment of the ethnically diverse populations, Jenny White suggests a differentiation 
and division within the ranks of the Ottoman core – similar to the way differences in 
opinion and philosophy within the Armenian community as has been discussed earlier 
in this section. 
In addition to the use of Kurds against Armenian insurrection, the second measure taken 
by the palace against the Russian threat, according to Huseyin Pasha, is the extensive 
employment of the secret police for domestic matters. The mistrust of the Sultan for his 
subjects can be traced to the dissolution of the parliament in 1878. The war with Russia 
had been viewed as an excuse by Sultan Abdülhamid II to annul the 1876 Constitution 
two years after its promulgation, although it was more likely a measure he took in order 
to protect his sovereign status as the head of the state.315 The dissolution of the 
parliament, however, is likely to have caused mistrust among the supporters of the 
parliamentary monarchy. Feroz Ahmad points out that the parliament had already raised 
the issues of ‘identity and loyalty’ of the Ottoman subjects to the Empire even when the 
first constitution was in force. The Tabiiyet Kanunu (nationality or citizenship law) of 
1869 had failed to create a new Ottoman identity through the notions of citizenship by 
promoting a new culture of Ottomanism.316 According to Ahmad, ‘[m]ost non-Muslims 
continued to identify with their millets rather than with the dynasty’.317  
After the abolition of the constitution and as a result of further degeneration of 
infrastructure and failure to keep promises of progressive reform in the empire, 
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dissatisfaction with the absolutism of the sultan widened. As a result, an opposition was 
formed, which ‘argued that only by restoring the constitution, ending corruption, and 
introducing reform could the empire be saved’.318 A dissident group with the name of 
CUP, the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası in Turkish), also 
known as the Young Turks, was created in the aftermath of the dissolution of the 
Parliament in 1889, with the aim of implementing reforms and of saving the empire 
from further collapse. The political dissidence and discontent widened at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, and a consensus was achieved between CUP and the other 
nationally disposed organisations such as the Hunchaks (est. 1887) and the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation (ARF) (est. 1890), which had also been formed as part of a 
reactionary wave of anti-absolutism. They all aimed at curbing the powers of the sultan 
(in the case of Armenians also partially of the Czar in Russia).319 In his book in which 
he views the Russian Empire from a comparative perspective, Dominic Lieven argues 
that  
[o]nly in Abdulhamid's realm […] did senior officials in other realms conspire with 
émigré revolutionaries to depose their own sovereign. Every empire feared decline, 
the loss of territory, the inability to compete with foreign powers, and consequent 
loss of control over ethnic minorities within the empire. Nowhere had this process 
gone so far among European empires as in the Ottoman case.320 
Alongside the opposition from its own institutions to the autocratic rule of the Sultan, 
by the end of the nineteenth century, the Sultan also feared ‘continued European 
meddling in Ottoman affairs’ and subversive movements within his realm, both of 
which had become chronic.321 As a result, any suspicion of separatist action paved the 
way for reactionist practices and extreme force and action by the Sultan.322 The Sultan’s 
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tight grip on his domains and his efforts to forge loyalty came along in ways other than 
military intervention. In The Winter Thief, the seemingly unlimited resources of the 
secret police chief, the Akrep commander, Vahid, represents such an investment - in 
violent revenge upon people who are not loyal - that indeed holds the Porte hostage. 
Before moving onto the Sultan’s secret police, first, the image of the Sultan in The 
Winter Thief will be examined.  
2.2.8. The Sultan’s Gambit? 
The Sultan Abdülhamid’s employment of secret police as a result of his growing 
paranoia is a repeated theme in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century fiction. 
Barry Unsworth’s Pascali’s Island is an important example in this genre, presenting the 
extent of the web of spies by means of the main character seeking Sultan Abdülhamid’s 
attention through his use of an intimate tone in his letters -- because of the high number 
of spies just like him!323 Information gathering had been an Ottoman state apparatus for 
centuries, at the least as a practice which endured from the Seljuks. In the Ottoman 
Empire, Janissaries, whose ‘agents were sent out in plain clothes to patrol the markets, 
bazaars, coffeehouses, and taverns of Istanbul and other major cities’, were an important 
source of domestic intelligence alongside the informers employed by local Ottoman 
authorities.324 Even though secret police service was founded during Sultan Abdülmecid 
reign (r. 1839–61) based on the advice of the English ambassador Stratford Canning, it 
was in 1913 that the first professional Ottoman intelligence service, the Teşkilat-i 
Mahsusa (Special Organisation), was established by the members of the Committee of 
the Union and Progress.325  
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More than any other sultan, Sultan Abdülhamid II, in Gábor Ágoston’s words, ‘placed 
great emphasis on information and intelligence’.326 Huseyin Pasha in The Winter Thief, 
explaining ‘the reaction in the palace to the weapons’ and the Sultan’s infatuation with 
the secret service, tells Kamil Pasha: 
‘Our great padishah has been convinced by his advisers that other nations have 
riddled us with spies like mold in a loaf of bread and that he needs a secret service 
to counter their influence. For now, the sultan has set up a new security force called 
Akrep as a branch of the secret police, but mark my words, Akrep is the first step in 
establishing a Teshkilati Mahsusa, a vast secret service like the one the British 
have. […] Akrep is going to ferret out these revolutionary cells, unlike the secret 
police who just spy on everybody and write reports. Akrep is going to go after these 
people, the Armenians, the Greeks, the socialists, and all their foreign 
collaborators.’327 
The Sultan Abdülhamid’s lack of trust of both foreigners and his own subjects appears 
as a typical theme authors of fiction engage with. In The Winter Thief, the author 
conceives Akrep as a precedent to the notorious organisation Teshkilati Mahsusa, which 
has been accused, particularly by Armenians and Greeks, of ‘committing atrocities and 
mass killings’.328 The sultan is described in the novel as being ‘distrustful of his own 
countrymen’ as well as being afraid that the British and Russians would ‘send troops 
into the heart of the empire on the pretext of protecting the minorities’.329 Daniel Allen 
Butler explains how financial problems had been a particular problem throughout the 
Sultan’s reign, cascading into security concerns: 
Foreigners had become a particular problem, for they were in many ways 
unravelling the fabric of the empire. By the time Abdul-Hamid assumed the throne, 
the ‘concessions’ being made to the European powers were literally that: the Turks 
were conceding their rights and sovereignty to the Westerners.330  
In The Winter Thief, an attack at the Ottoman Bank shortly after the confiscation of 
weaponry at the port is regarded as substantially unsettling for the Sultan, enough to 
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have him take harsh measures.331 The narrator of The Winter Thief describes the sultan 
as ‘[a]n enlightened monarch’, who ‘nevertheless jealously guarded his fears and 
delusions and would visit them whenever the mood took him. This, all his subjects 
knew, made him unpredictable and even dangerous’.332  
Late nineteenth century anxieties across the empire, which were projected because of 
the financial and political stalemate, lead to the creation of the Sultan Abdülhamid’s 
image as waging a silent warfare among citizens and foreigners in popular fiction. Such 
an amalgam of political conflict and personal crisis finds voice in Barry Unsworth’s The 
Rage of the Vulture (1982), in which the protagonist Robert Markham confronts Miss 
Munro, an English visitor in Istanbul, who wants to form her own opinion about 
Ottomans rather than relying on other people’s observations, by saying that she won’t 
be able to find any Turks who would be willing to talk to a foreigner because of the 
widespread system of espionage and incrimination: 
‘None of them [Turks] would dare to come to the house of a foreigner. Once on the 
Sultan’s list you never get off it. Men disappear without trace in this city, this 
romantic city. Sometimes hours after being reported, sometimes years. This is a 
police state, Miss Munro, run by a man who has been insane for a long time’.333  
In Jenny White’s novels, the sultan has a rather different image from those in earlier 
novels of this genre, such as The Rage of the Vulture, which describe the sultan as 
‘insane’. In White’s work, the sultan is portrayed as yearning to make sensible decisions 
regarding his realm and his subjects – albeit he is also illustrated as sincerely concerned 
with forging loyalties of his subjects and maintaining a good image in the European 
press. The Sultan is, most importantly, represented as the protector of the empire and its 
citizens despite those who have their own separate agendas.  
                                                          
331 White, Winter Thief, p. 32. 
332 White, Winter Thief, p. 176.  




An instance in the novel specifically elucidates the Sultan’s well-disposed demeanour 
when Kamil Pasha appears in the presence of the sultan, which the pasha later on 
recounts to Yorg Pasha: ‘Through Vizier Köraslan, Vahid has convinced the sultan that 
the commune is a threat to the empire and that the Armenians are scheming with the 
Russians to take the Choruh Valley’.334 In this exchange Kamil Pasha refers to, the 
Sultan is portrayed by the narrator as relatively moderate and well-meaning regarding 
the Armenian settlement in Erzurum, which might even be called sympathetic, but for 
the manipulation of the head of the Sultan’s secret intelligence service, Akrep. Upon 
Kamil Pasha’s claim that the commune in Choruh Valley is not a revolutionarist group, 
but ‘a social experiment, a community where the members share the labor and profit 
equally’, the sultan assigns Kamil Pasha to investigate the situation before deciding 
whether to send his irregular troops to surpress a possible Armenian insurgency335:  
‘I had been under the impression that this was a revolutionary movement that 
required a military response, but if indeed this is a peaceful valley and the socialists 
are not pawns of the Russians, as my advisers have told me, then I would be 
committing an unforgivable crime. […] It is haram to spill innocent blood, and may 
Allah preserve me from it.’336 
Despite the unfavourableness of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s image in numerous accounts, 
which consider him ‘insane’ or ‘paranoid’, White’s approach is in favour of portraying 
the Sultan as reasonably moderate, in that, the Sultan as a patriarch is represented as 
able, by degrees, to ‘control’ the fate of the Empire.337  
In his observation of the methods of legitimation of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s rule in the 
absence of a parliament, Selim Deringil notes in his The Well-Protected Domains that  
A ruler like Abdülhamid II, who laboured under the stigma of the ‘Terrible Turk’ or 
the ‘Red Sultan’, while trying to pose as a modern monarch, suffered the self-
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imposed handicap of his virtually complete isolation from his own people and the 
outside world.338 
In the absence of a democratising and balancing element such as Parliament, Deringil 
observes the narrowness of the circle of people who fed into the Sultan’s perception of 
the world around him:  
Even as autocratic a sultan as Abdülhamid II, who was in effect the last real sultan 
of the empire, had to rely on a staff who fed him information, advised him, indeed 
influenced him. So the so-called ‘Red Sultan’ or ‘Oriental Despot’ of legend, who 
rarely left his palace, and never left his capital, depended on these men […].339 
An example that shows that the sultan is surrounded by manipulative staff members is 
observed through the Vizier Köraslan’s selectiveness of the foreign press he chooses to 
show to the Sultan. While The Times of London is said to have had a headline as 
‘Ottomans Slaughter Armenians in East’, Vizier Köraslan hides this news from the 
sultan by calling them ‘lies […] fabricated by foreigners’.340 However, Huseyin Pasha 
and Yorg Pasha, who know about the sensitivity of the Sultan regarding his image in 
foreign press, use this headline to plead for not dispatching the Sultan’s soldiers to the 
Choruh Valley. The pair’s presentation of the headlines to the Sultan exposes the fact 
that Vizier Köraslan witholds valuable and course-changing information from the 
Sultan. Another example of clear manipulation of the Sultan by his advisers is the 
moment Vizier Köraslan tells the Sultan about the connection of the Sultan’s failed 
assassin with the socialist Henchak organisation. The untrusting sultan, who questions 
the scanty evidence concerning the identity of the assassin and the unlikely alliance 
between imperial Russia and the Henchaks, since ‘the socialists are trying to undermine 
the czar’, is easily convinced by Vizier Köraslan despite the vizier’s weak conviction 
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about the reliability of Akrep and decides to send his soldiers to the Choruh Valley 
because of the so-called assault on his life.341  
The vizier is not entirely trustful of the intelligence gathered and provided by Vahid, yet 
he remains firm in his defence of Akrep’s operations because of his fear that Vahid 
‘could destroy his family’ with the evidence he has on the vizier’s son’s murder of his 
friend.342 Vahid as an antagonist, and nemesis of Kamil Pasha, is represented as a 
blackmailer, abuser of women, and general villain who achieves his privileged position 
by covering a murder committed by Vizier Köraslan’s son.343 In order to marry the girl 
he likes, Rhea, whom Vahid discovers to be at the tavern next to the Ottoman Bank 
when the explosion takes place, he uses methods of intimidation to feed into her father’s 
fear by burning down ‘[o]ne of the father’s warehouses’ and ‘ruining a season’s 
production’.344 At the basement of the Akrep headquarters, during his first encounter 
with Vera, he hits Vera in the face, and later on Vahid’s two men make Vera take her 
clothes off and touch her.345 In his comparative study of the Russian Empire, Dominic 
Lieven claims that ‘[o]nly in Abdulhamid's realm […] did the monarch set up a large 
semi-private secret police whose boss was a psychopath who used his home for 
purposes of torture and rape’.346 The Akrep commander Vahid is undoubtedly modelled 
on this and similar antagonistic descriptions of the secret service agents.  
2.2.9. Carte Blanche to the Sultan’s Agents 
In his article published in A Companion to Crime Fiction, David Seed remarks on the 
‘proximity of the spy and detective genres’ in the sense that both prioritize detection 
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and investigation, although detectives are hardly ever identified as spies.347 Even though 
spy novels were initially set to defend ‘the rightness of the agent’s cause and the 
security of the nation’, such blend of patriotism soon developed into anti-hero narratives 
that came as an alternative to the spies taking the centre stage. According to Seed, 
Somerset Maugham’s own professional experiences had an important role to play in 
creating a move away from the description of spies with enviable tenacity and appealing 
careers. As Seed remarks, the publication of Maugham’s Ashenden or, The British 
Agent (1928), with the first anti-hero character, Ashenden, came as a result of the 
author’s concern for the verisimilitude in the representation of ‘the nature of the agent’s 
daily experience’. With the secret service having emerged as an ‘institution’, the 
minimal access to information, or the lack of it, allowed more realist, or perhaps 
cynical, descriptions of spies as anti-heroes in the British scene of crime fiction.348 
David Seed agrees that spy stories, like detective fiction, involve ‘detection’, with the 
additional characteristic of ‘disguise’.349 Like detective fiction, Seed argues, the spy 
narrative customarily ‘progresses from apparently disparate fragments of information 
towards a more complete account of action’, allowing the reader to construct a narrative 
based on their acts of investigation.350  
In The Winter Thief, the detective work is carried out primarily by Kamil Pasha, the 
protagonist, and also by Vahid, the antagonist, and his organisation, although not very 
successfully. Through Vahid’s interrogation of Vera and the narrative of Vera’s stream 
of consciousness during and following these encounters, the reader gets an insight into 
the world of Vera – motivations, dreams, fears, doubts and disappointments of a 
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revolutionist. Vahid’s team also trace Huseyin Pasha because of his relationship with 
Rhea, the girl Vahid wanted to marry; however, unlike what Vahid assumes, Huseyin 
Pasha doesn’t turn out to have a romantic relationship with Rhea, the daughter of a 
wine-seller. The narrator remarks on Vahid’s concern regarding ‘what might happen if 
Vizier Köraslan or Sultan Abdülhamid discovered that he had been using Akrep 
resources in a personal vendetta against one of the empire’s most highly placed and 
respected citizens’, that is, his adversaries Huseyin and Kamil Pashas.351 Vahid also 
traces the commune to the Choruh Valley to prove to the Sultan the threat they pose for 
the Empire. Vahid represents what Campos describes as ‘the sultan’s spies, avaricious 
men seeking their own promotion rather than the national good’.352 As a public servant 
who appropriates public resources for personal use and punishes people for crimes they 
didn’t commit, Vahid clearly enacts the role of a villain in the novel. Yet as an 
antagonist for Kamil Pasha, he also symbolises the dark side of detection and detective 
work, and he does that in a more anti-patriotic manner than as an anti-hero type. Vera’s 
abduction by the secret police, the death of Gabriel’s driver Abel by torture, and the 
covering up of the murder of Gabriel’s sister Sosi are examples of the ambitious and 
dedicated, but also scrupulous detective at work. Additionally, these acts of detection 
are perverted for personal ends rather than social good.353 
Vahid appears as the adversary of Kamil Pasha, who is distrustful of the chief of secret 
police and is aware of his capacity for misconduct and torture.354 At every step in his 
investigation of the weaponry smuggling and the Ottoman Bank explosion, Kamil Pasha 
aims to prevent more wrongful accusations and bloodshed from taking place even at 
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risk to his own career and safety. When he appears in the presence of the Sultan, Vizier 
Köraslan nominates Kamil Pasha, who claims the formation in the Choruh Valley to be 
‘[a] group of young people [who] has begun an experimental farm’, to go to Choruh 
Valley and investigate the purpose of the people gathering near Ispir.355 After leaving 
the Palace, Kamil Pasha ‘wonder[s] at his own logic’ for undertaking the responsibility 
‘to produce proof of the commune’s innocence and preserve the valley from harm’.356 
Despite that, Kamil Pasha feels ‘satisfied that he had at least postponed an attack on the 
valley and the commune, even at the price of his having to make the journey east 
himself’.357 By the same token, Kamil Pasha finds himself ‘horrified and amazed at 
Vahid’s ambition and insensitivity to human life and honor’, as the narrator puts it.358 
The Pasha even considers killing Vahid at one of his encounters with him believing that 
‘by using the knife in his boot now, he would save countless lives’ because he would 
prevent him taking the Sultan’s irregular troops to Erzurum.359 Such details function to 
establish the moral superiority of Kamil Pasha to Vahid since in the end ‘[i]t took all his 
moral strength not to do it. No man’s death is unaccountable, he told himself firmly’.360  
This distinction between Kamil Pasha and Vahid is allegorised by Yorg Pasha through 
spiders and scorpions, that is akreps. Yorg Pasha first talks about spiders: ‘The male of 
a certain species of spider allows himself to be devoured by the female after they’ve 
mated […] It’s his final, magisterial investment in the success of his offspring’.361 The 
pasha finds this act ‘heroic’, since it demonstrates that ‘[t]he Cause is always greater 
than individual lives’.362 As opposed to the spider, akrep is represented as anti-heroic: 
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‘Unlike our selfless spider, the scorpion paralyzes its prey with venom’.363 Yorg Pasha 
describes Vahid, the commander of Akrep as ‘the sultan’s very own poisonous 
creature’, who ‘wants people to be in his power’.364 While Kamil Pasha fears that the 
Sultan may be giving Akrep carte blanche, Huseyin Pasha concurs in Kam l Pasha’s 
concerns involving the claim that Vahid ‘wants people to be in his power. His is the 
voice whispering in the sultan’s ear’.365 Unsatisfied by the unfettered powers of Akrep, 
Kamil Pasha is ‘alarmed’ by the possibility of ‘the formation of a new security network 
[Teshkilati Mahsusa] reporting directly to the sultan’.366  
Kamil Pasha’s reaction to the extensive powers of Akrep can be seen as a display of the 
author’s disapproval of Sultan Abdülhamid’s absolutism and can give a hint about the 
abuses created within a system based on consolidated power and unilateral decision-
making. Within this context, while in Jason Goodwin’s novels criticism falls upon 
Sultan Mahmud’s reliance on the sweeping mandatory modernisation project which 
aims to ward off the Empire’s vulnerabilities, Jenny White’s novel sheds light on Sultan 
Abdülhamid’s unilateral management of domestic and external threats and the violent 
containment of these threats. While in the former, the Sultan, Mahmud II, is observed to 
be actively involved in his efforts to reverse the disintegration of the Empire, the latter 
Sultan, Abdülhamid II, is observed as merely ‘managing’ situations that might be 
subversive. While Mahmud II attempts to make changes to avoid an international 
encroachment, Abdülhamid’s perspective is only related to continuing to maintain the 
status quo for the same end.  
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Within this context, the modernisation of the army during Mahmud’s time can be 
contrasted to Abdülhamid’s creation of the Hamidiye, illustrating the differences 
between the diverging perspectives of Goodwin and White on the dissolution of the 
empire. While Goodwin contests the pace and the suitability of Western modernisation 
through a story of premature advent of reforms, White similarly criticises the Sultan’s 
reign, but in her case, she suggests that, despite the adequacy of technical skills and the 
magnitude of the state’s resources, although not necessarily their sufficiency, these 
skills and resources are not mobilised in the most productive way. In other words, in 
White’s vision of the empire, the Sultan is criticised for being content with the 
reproduction and the redistribution of his empire’s resources at high costs rather than 
employing new and effective methods of negotiation in order to maximise their benefit. 
Essentially, in The Winter Thief, Sultan Abdülhamid is envisaged as merely managing 
adverse situations. 
Selim Deringil, by pinpointing the ‘management’ aspect in Sultan Abdülhamid’s reign, 
places stress on the Porte’s endeavour to survive the crises of the period: 
[J]ust as the state was permeating levels of society it had never reached before, 
making unprecedented demands on its people, it created new strains on society, 
leading to what Jürgen Habermas has called a ‘legitimacy crisis’ or ‘legitimation 
deficit’. Nor was this legitimacy crisis confined to the relationship of the Ottoman 
centre with its own society. In the international arena also, the Ottomans found 
themselves increasingly obliged to assert and reassert their legitimate right to
existence as a recognized member of the Concert of Europe, as recognized after the 
Treaty of Paris which ended the Crimean War in 1856. In a context of military 
weakness, diplomacy acquired vital importance, as did the process I shall call ‘fine 
tuning’ as regards to the population of the empire. Fine tuning involved the 
meticulous inculcation, indoctrination, enticing, frightening, flattering, forbidding, 
permitting, punishing or rewarding […]. I would even venture to say that fine 
tuning is more the characteristic of a state which is constantly on the defensive. Not 
necessarily humane and anodine, it can involve brute force and bloodshed, but only 
as a last resort.367 
                                                          




Jenny White’s The Winter Thief is an exquisite illustration f Selim Deringil’s thesis in 
The Well-Protected Domains as it pertains to the Sultan. Especially in terms of the 
Sultan’s use of ‘brute force’, White is particularly careful to portray Sultan 
Abdülhamid, in the beginning, as withholding his troops from intervening in the 
commune in the Kachkar Mountains and being reasonable about his judgement 
regarding the intentions of the commune until an attempt is made on his life, supposedly 
by a member of the Henchak organisation.368 Even if he questions the reliability of the 
information his vizier gives to him, the Sultan orders the Hamidiye corps to take control 
of the area. The administration does not deal with the problems themselves, but attempts 
to contain the consequences of them through image management. Kamil Pasha, on the 
other hand, gives an effectively different portrait of the Ottoman ‘management’ of 
crises, a topic discussed below. A majority of state officials, unlike Kamil Pasha, are 
viewed as taking shortcuts rather than dealing with the root causes of the problems. In 
demonstrating the troubles generated by such civil servants, Carter Vaughn Findley 
complains that  
[t]he interference of the palace secretaries and spies, coupled with the way the 
sultan sought to dominate and use new organizational and procedural systems, did 
a lot to project the traditional repression of bureaucratic initiative into a new era 
and, in general, to hamper efforts at more effective administration.’369  
This list includes the Vizier, the head of secret police and even Huseyin Pasha in The 
Winter Thief. 
Any voice of objection to a government on the defensive and any such movement may 
be viewed as a personal attack on the ruler, particularly if an existential crisis might be 
in question for the state or the office. Spy narratives of this period are especially popu ar 
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because they are seen as symptomatic of a whole system of rule living out its last days. 
Spies frequently figure in fictional narratives set during Sultan Abdülhamid’s reign 
because they signify such fear -- of imperilled systems, of dissolving monarchical 
power -- and in turn, they evoke the fear the Sultan’s agents inculcate in the Sultan’s 
subjects. In Ágoston’s formulation, this situation is particularly ‘legendary’ considering 
the rumours claiming that the Sultan Abdülhamid ‘paid one half of his people to spy on 
the other half’, which discloses a dark aspect of Sultan Abdülhamid’s network of 
spies.370 In view of this, early representations of spies also revealed the malicious side 
of the spy system, which is directly associated with the palace policy and protocols. For 
example, Robert Markham in The Rage of the Vulture ells his wife that ‘[a]n accredited 
agent of the Palace will always be believed, if it is his word against those he accuses. 
People will pay to avoid being accused. That’s why the spy system is so vicious’.371  
White employs the spy narrative in a more nuanced way than these other writers of 
Ottoman detective fiction who, in their stories, engage in a trenchant vilification of the 
sultan’s spies. Like most of these writers, in an effort to represent the systemic defects 
and weaknesses of the Ottoman administration, White offers an investigation into the 
fears of individuals from the secret police, such as the Armenian publisher’s rejection of 
publishing The Communist Manifesto. In addition to reinforcing the narrative of the 
climate of fear, White also ascribes very human emotions to her ill-disposed spy 
character. The head of Akrep feels contempt for the wealth of Yorg Pasha, for his 
having the privilege of having the drive to his house ‘somehow clean of snow when the 
city was suffocating in it’.372 Vahid also feels betrayed when he finds Rhea among the 
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victims after the fire at the taverna.373 The author offers a justification for these extreme 
emotions in Yorg Pasha’s voice, unveiling Vahid’s past to the reader. The pasha, in his 
confrontation with Vahid, tells him a story involving a child whose father loved his first 
son, born of his Greek mistress, and ‘cared nothing for’ his second son and his mother. 
The Pasha finishes his story by asking Vahid, ‘When he [the father] died he left no 
inheritance but bitterness and loss. What do you think happened to that boy, the second 
son? What could ever make him whole?’374 Not knowing how Yorg Pasha knows his 
story, Vahid gets angry.  
Antipathetic depictions of spies, such as that of Dennis Wheatley’s early Republican 
insubordinate spy, the Eunuch of Stamboul, generally don’t provide personalised 
accounts of the conditions that turn the chief of secret police into who he has become – 
apart from the political cause to restore the empire.375 In The Winter Thief, White sets 
out to account for the hatred Vahid feels towards the privileged, and the reader 
witnesses Vahid’s quest for vengeance turning into an over-extension of his duties. 
Through Vahid, White explores the correlation between the power given to a secret 
service under hostile conditions and its abuse. In the meantime, the supporters of this 
system, people like Huseyin Pasha and the Vizier Köraslan, who trust the unchecked 
powers of Akrep, i.e. scorpion, become prey to it. At the end of the novel, Vizier 
Köraslan confesses to Vahid his regret for ever trusting him: 
‘I should never have gone along with your stupid scheme. You told me the troops 
would wipe out a small group of socialists that no one cared about. Instead they ran 
loose and massacred entire villages that had nothing to do with the Henchak revolt 
you sold me. Now I know why you disappeared. You went to lead them yourself, 
and undoubtedly engage in more of your unpleasant digressions’.376 
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By pinpointing the internal politics and the systemic faults and by giving a personalised 
account of the vicious head of the secret police, the author essentially demystifies the 
Sultan’s web of spies and demonstrates the little ways the Sultan’s system of loyalty 
creates its own rifts.  
2.2.10. The Conscience of the Empire: Kamil Pasha’s Plight of Justice  
With the abolition of the first Ottoman parliament, Meclis-i Mebusan, in 1878, more 
than a little over a year after it had been inaugurated, the end of the nineteenth century 
witnesses Sultan Abdülhamid’s promotion of a culture of loyalty to his person. 
Hanioğlu explains that this spirit of absolute loyalty to the Sultan was irreconciable with 
the spirit of the Tanzimat era (1839-1876): 
The Hamidian regime reinstated an old Ottoman emphasis on personal loyalty. 
Whereas officialdom in the Tanzimat era had been bound by loyalty to the state, the 
bureaucrats of the Hamidian epoch owed their allegiance to their sovereign. The 
sultan viewed loyalty as an indispensable qualification for employment in the civil 
service.’377 
A system of personal loyalty can promote a practice of competition among bureaucrats 
to take their place among the sultan’s favoured officials. Such a practice would be 
unavoidably detrimental to the unity of the state because it undermines the chances of 
establishing equal and fair opportunities for its people. In view of this, White offers a 
reassuring ending in her novel, with Vahid punished for his schemes, intimidation and 
making secret deals in order to be promoted as the head of the secret police. At the end, 
the resentful Vahid accuses the Vizier of failing to help him get the promotion he 
expected: ‘You said you’d increase my influence with the sultan, and instead now he 
suspects me. You were going to sideline Kamil Pasha, and now he’s a hero’.378  
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In turn, Kamil Pasha wins the commendation of the Sultan, feeling ‘only a slight twinge 
of guilt at lying to the sultan’ about not being able to recover the stolen gold from the 
bank.379 When Kamil Pasha and a couple hundred refugees from the Kachkar 
Mountains arrive in Trabzon, the governor doesn’t want to use the resources of the city 
administration because the government won’t authorise him ‘to pay a kurush’ for 
‘rebels’.380 In order to recruit the governor’s help, Kamil has to use the stolen gold from 
the bank, and ‘[w]ith some shame, but seeing no other solution, he let[s] the town think 
it was his personal fortune’.381 Vizier Köraslan, being aware of the importance of the 
image of the Ottomans abroad, and despite his personal hostility towards Kamil Pasha, 
sends a photographer to Trabzon in order to administer the failure of Vahid’s operation 
in the Choruh Valley. The vizier tells Vahid that: 
‘The Franks are looking for any excuse to invade. By allowing such madness, you 
gave them the pretext to come in and help the embattled Armenians. If Kamil Pasha 
hadn’t stepped in to save the refugees and if I hadn’t sent reporters and 
photographers east to make sure the world knew about it, it could have been a 
disaster. I was a fool to trust you.’382 
The photos of the refugee relief unintentionally allow Kamil Pasha to gain fame after 
the news of his generosity makes the headlines of foreign newspapers with the titles of 
‘Pasha Pays for Armenian Relief’ and ‘Ottoman Lord Rescues Armenians’.383  
White delivers this detail in her novel, because in Ágoston’s words, ‘Abdülhamid was 
known for his keen interest in news regarding world affairs.’384 The fact that the 
photographer was sent to Trabzon by Vizier Köraslan and that the photos were used in 
headlines for stories of Kamil Pasha’s bravery in The Times of London and New York 
Tribune, points to the fact that it was through the Vizier’s efforts that the news of the 
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Pasha’s heroism was published in foreign newspapers. An important argument in 
Deringil’s The Well-Protected Domains is that in order to achieve a balance of power in 
their foreign affairs, the Ottomans had continuously to reassert their self-image:  
As their world shrank around them, the Ottomans realized that a vital aspect of 
survival was the projection of a positive image abroad. In a world where there was 
increasingly less space for the ‘unspeakable Turk’, in Gladstonian parlance, this 
was more often than not a question of damage control as Ottoman statesmen tried 
desperately to make the case that they were a Great Power recognized by the Treaty 
of Paris of 1856, with a legitimate right to exist. Their effort centred around two 
major areas. First was the attempt to contain the damage done by incessant 
pejorative publications in the international media, and in other forums such as the 
theatre, which sought to project the Ottoman state as a degenerate nest of blood-
thirsty tyrants at worst, or a decaying fleshpot of ‘Oriental’ vice at best. Second 
came the presentation of a positive image, in the course of which any opportunity to 
appear in the mainstream of world events was seized upon.385 
In Kamil Pasha’s case, the Sultan is extremely satisfied, because the publication of 
Kamil’s act of generosity allows him to hold onto his denial of the massacres in the 
Choruh Valley. The Sultan is convinced that the Armenian villagers were armed rebels 
while in Kamil Pasha’s defense, they were armed ‘only after the word spread of an 
impending attack on the villages’.386 As reward, Kamil Pasha receives both ‘the High 
Order of Honor’ and ‘a yali mansion in Sariyer’.387 Since Vahid’s reputation is now 
sullied, Kamil Pasha is now considered to become the chief of the new secret service, 
Teshkilati Mahsusa.388 The imperial order, promotion and the gift Kamil Pasha receives 
at the end of the novel, for having been declared a hero in the foreign press, is an 
expression and reassurance of the Sultan’s belief in his award system. In order to 
establish loyalty, Hanioğlu claims that Sultan Abdülhamid ‘granted extra ranks, 
decorations, and sometimes extravagant personal gifts, such as mansions, to high-
ranking bureaucrats who proved exceptionally faithful – often provoking storms of 
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protest within officialdom and the military’.389 These can be seen as attempts by the 
Sultan and his ‘service elite’ at ’fine tuning’ in order to overcome a ‘legitimacy crisis’, 
or ‘legitimation deficit’.390 
Despite his contentment about the consequences of the military mission to the Choruh 
Valley, the Sultan is dismissive about the factors that have paved the way for the news 
of Kamil Pasha’s heroism: ‘The empire has already come under attack by foreign 
journalists for supposedly attacking defenceless villagers. Whether or not they were 
defenceless is a question it seems we must disagree on’.391 The sultan is aware of the 
potential for an even bigger death toll than the one which has already occurred, had it 
not been for Kamil Pasha. In such a circumstance, according to the Sultan, ‘the 
consequences for the empire would undoubtedly have been severe. Britain and Russia 
might have felt called upon to intervene’.392 Despite the initial imprint of concern by the 
Sultan regarding unjust treatment of Armenians, at the end of the novel, the author 
ascribes a sense of denial and indifference to him, for when the Sultan first asks about 
the revolt, Kamil Pasha can ‘read nothing’ in ‘the black eyes of the sultan’, ‘neither 
concern nor interest’.393 The sense of denial can also be discerned from the word 
‘engagement’ the Sultan chooses to use to refer to the armed clash in the Choruh 
Valley.394 The publication of the story of heroism in an international newspaper, 
therefore, comes to the rescue of the Empire, saving it from the bad reputation that may 
have been produced by reports of massacres. Through his enigmatic demeanour, the 
Sultan denies having inflicted any intentional harm on Armenians; moreover, he admits 
to having greater concerns about the image of the empire in the international press than 
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about the news of the massacre itself by saying that ‘the newspapers took note of your 
[Kamil Pasha’s] admirable efforts and the world has already forgotten the Choruh 
Valley’.395 
After the publication of the news of Kamil Pasha’s heroism in the foreign press, the 
Sultan commends Kamil Pasha for his ‘humanity’ and for his ‘generosity’, and he says 
that he sees Kamil Pasha as ‘a true Ottoman’.396 Kamil Pasha’s loyalty as ‘a true 
Ottoman’, however, is not directed to the Sultan as he expects, but to the people of the 
Empire and their rightful causes. He doesn’t fear the Sultan, so when the governor 
refuses to help the refugees for fear of the Sultan’s retribution, the Pasha asks him to 
help the refugees ‘for humanity’s sake’,397  rather than fear, including fear of Russian or 
English invasion. Kamil Pasha defends the people of the empire against the 
vulnerabilities created by both the legitimate Ottoman systems of power and illegitimate 
formations, even though in such an unstable environment, Kamil Pasha’s plight – trying 
to serve the cause of justice -- at times presents a conundrum. He can become conflicted 
between what is right and what is legal. For example, Kamil Pasha comes to the 
realisation that, in order to get new information from the captain, who smuggled arms to 
Istanbul, he has to negotiate and come to agreeable terms with him, ‘letting a small fish 
off the hook in exchange for information leading to a bigger catch’. The narrator 
comments that ‘Kamil hadn’t reconciled himself to the slippery nature of the law when 
it was applied in the streets’, for according to him, ‘justice shouldn’t be bought and sold 
like grain at auction’.398  
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Another example of Kamil Pasha’s confrontation with the slipperiness of law is the 
moment when, having witnessed the poor treatment of Armenian villagers by irregulars 
enlisted in the service of the state, he learns from Omar that ‘a group of refugees and the 
surviving members of Gabriel’s commune’ were intending ‘to organize an armed 
resistance against the Ottomans, coordinating and arming all the small village-based 
groups like Levon’s’. The narrator explains that ‘[a]s an Ottoman official, Kamil knew 
he had a duty to stop them. As a representative of justice, he had no idea what the right 
thing to do was’.399 White establishes a ‘relativist’ understanding of justice in the novel 
with Kamil Pasha rationalising the fact that ‘what was right today might not be right 
tomorrow depending on the circumstances’.400 Kamil Pasha is not at ease with his 
relativist attitude, and sees it as contradictory to being a representative of the law, so 
constantly questions his principles and whether laws could be applied fairly with his 
having such a relativist attitude.401  
This is an important concern in the novel in terms of crime fiction’s ability to reveal the 
injustices within a government through the gaps in the legal system. As Worthington 
establishes:  
[…] it is the law that constructs, or at least classifies, what is criminal. A crime is, 
literally, an action carried out in defiance of the law which codifies the practices 
and deeds that society and culture deem to be deviant from or injurious to the norm. 
As such, the law is ideologically inflected and culturally and nationally specific, 
which might be seen potentially to raise complications when discussing the role of 
the law in crime fiction in the event, the law, or its letter, is curiously absent from 
much criminology.402 
In the case of Kamil Pasha White is able to stage exactly some of the tensions brought 
about by the complexities of Ottoman law, including the very ‘letter’ of the law.  
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Ed Christian, in an article in which he discusses postcolonial detective fiction, argues 
that ‘postcolonial detectives are not entirely free agents, they do have a degree of power 
denied most of their compatriots’. Considering this point, he suggests that, in fiction, the 
indigenous detective must ‘decide whether to act within the law […] or to circumvent 
it’, and make a choice between justice and mercy.403 While the surveillance carried out 
by the detective in this genre requires ‘observing the disparities, ironies, hybridities, and 
contradictions of both the empire and the indigenous culture’, the same claim could also 
be said to be true for Kamil Pasha’s investigation on the street as well as his pursuit of 
justice within ethnically or religiously diverse and conflicted communities, in which 
daily clashes and struggles may result from a mutual lack of awareness or 
misunderstanding, or even uneven power structures. Kamil Pasha, by siding with the 
Armenians and using the imperial army against the Sultan’s Kurdish irregular troops, 
makes such a conscious decision of conscience, as it were, to defend the Armenian 
villagers, who are at the mercy of the Sultan’s irregular armies. Kamil Pasha pleads to 
the Ottoman soldiers to make their own conscious and conscientious decision on this: 
‘You are Ottoman soldiers, […] You are representatives of the most civilized 
empire in the world, serving a sultan who cares for every peasant in his land as 
much as for every pasha. It is your duty to obey the orders given by your superiors, 
but it is also your duty to fight for civilization. The refugees that have arrived 
appear to have been driven here by the sultan’s irregular troops. These troops were 
given orders to keep the peace, and some have exceeded those orders by terrorizing 
the population. But I don’t want to hide from you that these troops were sent by our 
great padishah, just as you were. I see our mission as protecting the people in this 
compound. If these troops attack us, then our mission will conflict, and you must 
decide for yourself whether you are willing to remain here under my command. If 
we end up fighting them, that might be considered treason. As your commanding 
officer, I assure you that you are free to leave my command, and I will note it down 
as a transfer, not a desertion. You are free to go’.404 
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According to Kamil Pasha, ‘a good Ottoman officer’ should be ‘strong, educated, 
obedient, humane and civilized’.405 Based on his faith in their capacity to do the right 
thing, instead of asking them to carry out his orders to fight or accept the situation as an 
obligation or fate, he urges his soldiers to use reason and exercise free will even at the 
cost of circumventing laws.  
Kamil Pasha’s conflict with the agents sent by the same entity that sends him is a 
demonstration of ‘that the state [and a reliable one at that] is necessary for the creation 
and maintenance of public life and central to the reproduction of the socio-econonmic 
inequalities that lead to crime in the first place’.406 In the pursuit of stopping outlaws 
from offending against the Ottoman legal mandate, Kamil Pasha by ‘(unwillingly) 
reiterating the authority of the state’ is in a position to ‘rais[e] troubling questions about 
the adequacy and fairness of the justice system as a whole’.407 On the other hand, Kamil 
Pasha’s plight, in trying to serve justice, is essentially driven by his trust in the Ottoman 
justice system. When Kamil Pasha is wrongfully put in the prison by Vahid for 
allegedly murdering a young girl, Kamil Pasha reminisces about the day when he 
witnessed injustice unfold while he was in England to study law. He thinks of how the 
son of a lord ‘had destroyed the taproom of a pub on a drunken rampage with his 
friends’, and that ‘the rape of the pub owner’s daughter and her subsequent death were 
never investigated despite a roomful of witnesses to both events’. Remembering this 
experience, the narrator points out that, ‘Kamil had to believe that the Ottoman system 
was more just than that, that the murder of an ordinary girl would not go unpunished 
because she was poor’. Facing a conviction of a murder he didn’t commit, the narrator 
notes that Kamil Pasha ‘tried to believe that right would prevail, not because he too had 
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powerful friends but because the system itself was just. He would be released because 
the evidence would show that he was not guilty’.408 Likewise, at the beginning of the 
chapter, I argued that Kamil Pasha is presented in The Abyssinian Proof as a loyal 
Ottoman prosecutor who believes in the Ottoman legal system and tries to negotiate 
with Marko, an assassin, but upon hearing Marko’s reasons to assassinate the state 
official, he admits that the state fails to protect its subjects across all its domains as it is 
meant to do, because of the cracks in its justice system.409 Marko had said ‘We will win 
because each man’s ambition is the same. You will lose, pasha, because your empire is 
driven by the greed of a few men’.410 
In The Abyssinian Proof, the narrator stresses Kamil Pasha’s own scepticism regarding 
the state officials:  
Although he was a civil servant himself, he [Kamil Pasha] had an instinctive 
distrust of bureaucrats and what they might do with information about something as 
potentially inflammatory as the Melisites or the Proof of God. Be loyal to the state, 
he thought, but trust who you know.411  
Of all the Ottoman bureaucrats and elites Jenny White introduces in The Winter Thief, 
Kamil Pasha stands out as the most idealized and morally superior of the state officials. 
He is different from Huseyin Pasha, who relies on violence and money to make citizens 
loyal, Yorg Pasha, who is less patriotic than greedy, Vahid, who bristles with vengeance 
and doesn’t hesitate to kill innocent people, and the Vizier Köraslan, whose ethical 
calibration is impaired because of the favours he owes. D ringil establishes that ‘[s]ome 
[the Ottoman service elite] were more conservative, others more progressive, although 
hard and fast categories and facile labelling have led to much historically inaccurate 
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stereotyping’.412 Within Sultan Abdülhamid’s bureaucracy, the character of Kamil 
Pasha offers a refreshing addition to the hostility-loaded world of Anglophone fiction 
about this period. Through Kamil Pasha, as the protagonist, as well as through other 
generous characters such as the police chief Omer and Osman Hamdi Bey, White 
reinforces the idea that the empire was not merely staffed by corrupt or violence-prone 
elites and leaders, but that the domains of the empire were also protected by leaders and 
public representatives who sought to defend the life and wellbeing of every subject of 
the sultan, which is a theme revisited in Birds without Wings, as we will see in the next 
chapter.  
  
                                                          





History in the Making of History:  
Louis de Bernières and National Imagination 
 
The setting of Birds without Wings (2004) by Louis de Bernières is inspired by the 
ghost-town of Kayaköy, ‘Village of Rock’ in Turkish, which is located near 
contemporary Fethiye in Turkey. Throughout its history, this region has come under 
Lycian, Greek, Byzantine, Ottoman and finally republican Turkish rule before it was 
eventually destroyed by an earthquake in 1957. This historical novel is set in the early 
twentieth century in a bustling town composed of people from Greek, Turkish and 
Armenian communities, and recounts a story of the dying days of the Ottoman Empire, 
followed by the years of war and early years of the Republic of Turkey. In the book, the 
town is called Eskibahçe, Old Garden, which is described as being located close to ‘the 
vivid waters where the Aegean merges into the Mediterranean Sea’.1 When Leyla 
Hanım, the mistress of the town’s aga, enters the town after her journey from 
Constantinople, she thinks that ‘[s]he is back where she belongs, amid the softness of 
civilisation’.2 In the vicinity of Eskibahce, there is a leech gatherer catching leeches 
amidst ‘the ruins of a temple that once was sacred to Leto, Artemis and Apollo’3; a 
vagabond, whose half-dead look calls for a nickname ‘the Dog’, ‘tak[ing] up residence 
in the Lycian tombs’4; ‘townspeople still us[ing]’ ‘the almost intact ruins of a Roman 
theatre’ ‘for big meetings and celebrations’5; ‘the cries of the vendors and artisans’ at 
the forefront of ‘the white minarets of the mosque and the golden dome of the Church 
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of St Nicholas’.6 Expanding from this concurrence of history, this chapter looks at the 
ways Louis de Bernières represents coming-togetherness of various civilisations in an 
Aegean town, and happy moments as well as the struggles of the townspeople to 
continue to coexist despite and because of their differences – if any, especially during 
the increasingly hostile conditions of war. As the slippery nature of history turns the 
characters of the novel into agents of living history, their sense of belonging crumbles 
under the weight of the antagonistic forces that challenge and run counter to their ideals 
of Ottomanism.  
3.1. Civilisation 
Louis de Bernières, by setting his novel amidst the remains of great civilisations, invites 
the reader to visualise the townspeople both as outlanders, as if fitted with no concern 
about the archaeological rtefacts around them, and also as part of the town’s history, as 
having an intimate dialogue with their predecessors. These two ways of interpretation 
are rooted in the way civilisation came to be thought of. Before the word’s evolution 
into denoting ‘being civilized’ or ‘not being barbarian’ with the onset of the 
dissemination of Enlightenment ideas, civilisation had been mentioned in Western 
literature7 as a ‘term of jurisprudence, where civil law, instead of military law, was seen 
as the marker of the society.8 According to Bruce Mazlish, the earliest change in the 
meaning of the word is detected in Victor Riqueti’s L’Ami des Hommes which was 
published in 1756.9 The neologism of the word in Riqueti’s work harks back to the 
origins of civilisation in agriculture as opposed to its ‘roots in the city and its future in 
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increased industrialization’: In Ancient Greece, the polis, the city-state, was ‘based on 
an agricultural hinterland’ but ‘[i]t was only in the city that one spoke “in public,” in a 
civilized manner, rather than babbling in an uncouth and impolitic tongue’10 which is 
the language of the outsider.11 For Riqueti, Marquis de Mirabeau, then, the word came 
to refer to ‘a group of people who were polished, refined, and mannered, as well as 
virtuous in their social existence’.12 Following the publication of Riqueti’s book, the 
word regained popularity and, stripped of its original religious standards, it was 
embedded by European thinkers into their emerging Enlightenment thought. The 
concept, since then, has come to carry with it the notions of ‘increased population, 
liberty, and justice’ that are lodged in ‘a particular form of sociability’; and by way of 
its reification, civilisation has started to serve as an important component of the idea of 
progress that would become, in Mazlish’s words, ‘the third phase in conjectural history, 
signalling the last stage in the movement of humanity from savagery to barbarism and 
then to civilization’.13 The representation and characterisation of the Ottomans in Birds 
Without Wings extensively harbour undertones of the criticism of the concept 
civilisation and its development as a notion that denotes linear evolutionary stages, 
which is then, just like the Western use of the concept of progress, used as an excuse to 
act against less civilised peoples and their lands and possessions. 
In Birds without Wings, civilisation is not projected as commensurate with linear 
historical development, but envisaged by Leyla Hanım in a way seemingly analogous to 
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that of Victor Riqueti in its emphasis on community life in the rural; while, on the other 
hand, for Daskalos Leonidas, this is not a town inhabited by, in Mazlish’s words, ‘a 
group of people who [are] polished, refined, and mannered, as well as virtuous’, hence, 
not civilised.14 Leonidas is a Greek nationalist who comes to Eskibahçe from Smyrna 
(İzmir) as a teacher for the Rum school children of the town. He views the Muslim 
inhabitants as his nemesis while he himself is seen as a figure of discontentment and a 
source of mockery by the inhabitants of Eskibahçe. He is resentful of the rule of the 
Ottomans and disdains the Turkish language because he sees Greek as the ultimate 
language of humanity – by misguided righteousness he claims that ‘even the Romans 
spoke Greek’.15 He also complains about the Christian people’s inability to speak Greek 
at all since Turkish is spoken as the main language in the town. Leonidas is evidently a 
propagandist of the Megali Idea – the ideal of Greek irredentism. He is a member of 
Philiki Etaireia – a ‘secret societ[y] formed to bring about the reunification of 
[historical] Greece’.16 Explaining Leonidas’s irredentist dreams, the narrator of the 
novel shows that the teacher’s big dreams for the Greek nation go hand in hand with his 
feelings of Greek superiority, particularly defined as opposed to Turks. The narrator 
offers this stance as a specific kind of human weakness:  
He [Leonidas] was possessed by beautiful visions of Constantinople restored to its 
place as capital of the Greek world, and, like all who have such beautiful visions, 
his were predicated on the absolute belief that his own people and his own religion 
and his own way of life were superior to others, and should therefore have their 
own way. Such people, even those as insignificant as Leonidas, are the motor of 
history, which is finally nothing but a sorry edifice constructed from hacked flesh in 
the name of great ideas.17 
In this dramatic passage, the narrator reflects on three key components; feelings of 
national and racial superiority, the contorted and invalid source of this tendency (hacked 
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flesh) and the peculiarly feeble causes of revolutionary changes in history.18 Leonidas’s 
dream about a far-reaching Greek rule and his perception of Greek superiority signal 
and foreshadow the coming of a tragedy of one’s own making.  
Leonidas’s feeling of superiority to Ottoman Turks actually runs parallel to the 
European concept of civilisation, and it is used as a marker of identity that is defined 
and driven from an angle of exclusionism. Poignantly, Greece’s gaining a place and 
prominence in the ranks of Western civilisations was the result of European nations 
competing amongst themselves to be world actors if not powers. Especially following 
an upsurge of interest in antiquity owing to the accounts of French and British travellers 
who visited ancient sites during the eighteenth century, he image of ‘classical antiquity’ 
was increasingly embedded into the discourse of Western Enlightenment. In the 
eighteenth century, in pursuit of their newly found source of inspiration, French and 
British travellers toured the ruins of the ancient Greece while the Society of Dilettanti 
(founded in 1733–36 in London) financed such expeditions and works related to the 
antiquities of Rome and Greece. The publication of books such as Antiquities of Athens 
(1762-1816) by James Stuart and Nicholas Revett was the outcome of such enthusiasm. 
Such publications served the function to instil an inquisitive passion for the ancient 
Greece, and became the precursors of the Neoclassicist and Greek revival movements. 
Readings of history from this renewed light also helped Western thinkers to interpret 
history as the ‘unraveling of human progress’.19 As a result, the (discourse of) Western 
Enlightenment was construed alongside the image of ‘classical antiquity’, and it is 
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within this context that Europe saw the Hellenic20 as the source of its ‘originary topoi’ 
for the purposes of self-definition.21 
It is accepted by scholars in general that the power European states gained by looking at 
their own past through the achievements of ancient Greece gave the continent of Europe 
the tools for its own legitimisation as the universal authority: 
The concept of civilization, developed at the time of Enlightenment as part of the 
European imaginary, claimed to offer a universal measuring rod: a civilization had 
certain material characteristics and it behaved and thought in a certain spiritual 
manner. (Needless to say, one man’s civilization could be another’s barbarism.) 
Certainly this was the case in the past. Was there anything more substantial, 
however, to the European version of civilization, carrying with it a claim to 
universality? Or was it a simple expression of domination, to be overthrown in the 
name of relativism or multiculturalism?22 
Such limited universality, however, would espouse certain attributes which are assigned 
to Ancient Greek civilisations that llowed humans to consider them as ‘civilised’. 
These attributes the Greeks allocated to themselves as ‘civilized’ beings are explained in 
general to be widely ranging from ‘[r]eason, philosophy, and freedom to shape one’s 
personal destiny’ to ‘historical awareness, agriculture, the polis, a more refined 
treatment of women’.23 These qualities were meant to echo Europe’s vision of itself, 
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and also to pronounce a sense of superiority deriving from historical progress attributed 
to the West. Edward Said cites Paul Valéry’s work in his Orientalism to show how the 
East is seen by Europe in antagonistic terms with an intention to prove the superiority of 
European civilisation.24 In Valéry’s work, the ‘role’ of the West is seen as appropriating 
the sources it chooses to use in order to postulate its own standards, the result of which 
is the empowerment of the West, which is, needless to say, learnt from the Greeks and 
Romans. Further, the Mediterranean is perceived by some early scholars as the 
bottleneck that prevents threats from the East. As Paul Valéry suggests in his article 
Puissance de choix de l'Europe: 
From the cultural point of view, I do not think that we have much to fear now from 
the Oriental influence. It is not unknown to us. We owe to the Orient all the 
beginnings of our arts and of a great deal of our knowledge. We can very well 
welcome what now comes out of the Orient, if something new is coming out of 
there—which I very much doubt. This doubt is precisely our guarantee and our 
European weapon. 
Besides, the real question in such matters is to digest. But that has always been, just 
as precisely, the great specialty of the European mind through the ages. Our role is 
therefore to maintain this power of choice, of universal comprehension, of the 
transformation of everything into our own substance, powers which have made us 
what we are. The Greeks and Romans showed us how to deal with the monsters of 
Asia, how to treat them by analysis, how to extract from their quintessence [...]. The 
Mediterranean basin seems to me to be like a closed vessel where the essences of 
the vast Orient have always come in order to be condensed.25 
Early twentieth-century essayist Paul Valéry was a believer in the power of the intellect, 
a sceptic of civilisations but a determinist of European history. He was aware of the 
transient nature of civilisations, yet this did not cause him to forsake his belief in the 
future of Europe. Although he recognised the greatness of every civilisation in history 
and acknowledged their contributions in the progress of humankind, in the above 
passage from ‘Puissance de choix de l'Europe’ (Europe’s Power of Choice), he was 
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using a Eurocentric terminology when he described a dichotomy between ‘the monsters 
of Asia’ and ‘powers’ of ‘the Greeks and Romans’.26 
Through commensurate modes of literary works, the Ottoman Empire has been 
envisaged and represented as part of Europe’s Orientalist and Eurocentric imagination. 
As a reaction to such discourses, in later works, including that of Louis de Bernières, a 
counter-argument and demand has been made to acknowledge such essentialist and 
ahistorical arguments. Edward Said, for example, demanded, as Fatih Çalışır puts it, that 
historians ‘abandon the Eurocentric views that contributed essentially to the self-
identification of the West, and [...] make an effort to establish new paradigms to 
understand the historical developments regarding the Middle East’.27 In Jason 
Goodwin’s The Snake Stone, European admiration for Greek greatness is sketched 
through the character George Compston from the British Embassy in Istanbul, whose 
admiration for Lord Byron is so unlimited as to be arrogantly overbearing. Through this 
character, a stereotype has been established of a person who has the strong feelings 
Britain, France, and Russia had for the independence of Greece (1829), and who sees 
Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire as a triumph for [the] European 
civilisation.28 Such stereotypically Hellenophile characters as Compston prevail in 
contemporary fiction to remind readers of the need to question the bias of the founders 
of Greece as opposed to their comparative indifference to other new states. Arnold 
Toynbee admonishes, in his 1922 book The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, 
the tendency of Westerners to be drawn into the domestic politics of countries like 
Turkey or Greece: ‘The fact that I am neither a Greek nor a Turk perhaps creates little 
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presumption of my being fair-minded, for Western partisans of non-Western peoples are 
often more fanatical than their favourites’.29 As Toynbee suggests, Westerners, in his 
own term, can be more fervent and determined about the destiny of non-Western 
civilisations than the non-Westerners themselves. The recognition of Greeks by 
Europeans as ‘an oppressed people’ that need to be saved from their oppressors came 
about only as a result of the interest developed by the European travellers in the region 
inspired by Renaissance humanism, and inspired the forerunners of the Greek 
independence movement such as Adamantis Korais, who were educated abroad, and in 
whose nationalist thinking, the Greek people had been enslaved by the Ottomans for the 
better part of their existence.30 It shouldn’t be forgotten that no other millet that lived 
under the protection of the Ottoman Empire received such substantial support from the 
Western Powers as the Greeks did. 
3.2. Oppression 
The Greek national identity, just like the Bulgarian and Romanian national identities, as 
has been mentioned in the second chapter, is founded on the notion that the Greeks were 
oppressed under the ‘the Ottoman yoke’. The novel The Beggar (1982) by Andreas 
Karkavitsas propagates the idea of ‘oppression’, which is widely explored as a common 
theme by the Greek independence movement supporters.31 The novel takes place in 
Thessaly in the years following the annexation of the region by the Kingdom of Greece 
in 1881, and features the Nykteremi villagers, who are yearning to achieve a democratic 
rule in their village under the new Kingdom of Greece, and repeatedly failing to do so. 
The Greeks’ state of enslavement is represented in the villagers’ bestial character, which 
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is expressed through these following techniques: directly and openly (‘The bestial 
condition of the Karagounedes’32); by means of comparison (‘One opened and closed 
his eyes, another chewed constantly though he had nothing in his mouth, from habit 
merely, as the grazing animals do’33); and through the descriptions of the animals of the 
village living side by side with the villagers. The villagers’ bestial character is attributed 
to their slavish attitude, which is, according to Karkavitsas, the result of centuries’ long 
rule of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the fact that the Turks are not the rulers, and 
therefore the Turkish aga of the village is not the official administrator anymore, the 
villagers still demonstrate a spirit of servitude for the aga. Karkavitsas pointedly uses 
words related to servility such as ‘master’, ‘slavish attitude’, ‘obeisance’34 and ‘serfs’35 
to stress the villagers’ habitual disposition. When the aga comes to visit the village, the 
villagers cannot stop themselves from showing their homage even if they don’t want to 
and they know the aga is not their master anymore:  
the peasants involuntarily began to feel that uncontrollable ancestral dread rise 
within them. In their eyes that tiny company seemed like the procession of some 
great and feared pasha of olden days, one of those who terrified their grandfathers 
and great-grandfathers and left a legacy of horror to their descendants. The effect of 
that legacy and the terrified seeds of their ancestors which they carried unchanged 
in their blood caused the Karagounedes to feel the air about them grow oppressive 
with horror and menace. Killings, beatings, tortures, burnings – all those evils 
which their ancestors had suffered at the hands of their Turkish masters appeared 
clearly before them; plaints and wailings roared in their ears and drove them, dead 
from fear, to that slavish and indispensable obeisance.36 
This grotesquely polarized depiction shows the villagers as having internalised centuries 
of brutal treatment by foreign masters. There is no hint that Ottoman rule might ever 
have been just or fair, or brought prosperity. The prejudice against being governed by 
non-Greeks appears self-evidently justifiable. The slavishness of the peasants continues 
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even after the aga’s rule has ended – and the question of whether the aga had ever been 
a cruel, or perhaps a reasonable, governor is not entertained. 
As opposed to Karkavistas’s rather pessimistic and hostile image of Demis Aga of 
Nykteremi, de Bernières draws a fatherly and protective image of Rustem Aga of 
Eskibahce. When a hermit nicknamed the Dog comes to live amongst the ancient tombs 
near Eskibahce, Rustem Bey sends a sabre and a loaded pistol for him, so that, whether 
he is a new resident or a visitor, the man is ready to defend himself if he needs to.37 
Another incident that proves the good character of Rustem Bey takes place at the 
Christian cemetery. Word of mouth conveys that Polyxeni’s mother poisoned Muslim 
families in Eskibahce.38 In order to see whether Polyxeni’s mother is guilty or not, the 
townspeople gather at the cem tery and unearth the mother’s bones to see if the flesh 
dissolved in soil. Rustem Bey believes in the innocence of Polyxeni’s mother, and upon 
seeing her mother’s clean skull at the cemetery, he extends a purse of money to 
Polyxeni and her siblings and he asserts that he always knew that her mother was 
innocent and had brought money with him to give to Polyxeni and her siblings.39 He 
continues by saying:  
‘Wasn’t it enough that I should lose all my family in the plague? Wasn’t it enough 
that Polyxeni Hanım and her brothers and sisters should lose their mother? It’s a 
mean-spirited and ignorant people that rubs salt and sand in other people’s wounds 
with all these stories of poison and conspiracy! No more stories! No more bad 
blood!’.40  
Although contented, Polyxeni and her siblings wonder ‘why it was that an infidel pasha 
as important as Rustem Bey should have come to make a speech in their defence, and 
give them a purse of money’.41  
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The representation of an Ottoman Aga is a symptomatic indicator of how the writers 
view the society itself. Both novels take ‘the dead’ as their topic, exhibiting the 
involvement of the villagers and townspeople with similar superstitious issues, and 
disclosing, in turn, each of the agas’ reactions to the actions of the villagers. In The 
Beggar, believing that the vrykolakas, the undead, the vampires, in Greek folklore42, 
had taken possession of the house that stands right next to the Aga’s house, the villagers 
set it on fire, which results in the burning down of the Aga’s property as well. Upon the 
first confrontation with the perpetrators, Karkativsas writes, the aga ‘glowered fiercely 
at the peasants as if wanting to annihilate them with looks alone. The tyrant’s blood 
boiled within him at the sight of those humble slaves [...]. The conquering wild beast 
untamed and pitiless within him snorted and roared with blood-dripping rage’.43 Since 
the punitive rights of the aga have been taken from him after the independence of 
Greece, he is rendered powerless in theory. However, the aga uses his power to punish 
the villagers, while the beggar gets away even if it is him who convinces the villagers 
that the house contains a vrykolakas, and woos them to burn down the house. All the 
juridical bodies, including the attorney from the city, the commander, the governor and 
the captain, side with the aga in this matter to show that the Ottoman rule is not over for 
the villagers and that justice is not in view yet.  
Apart from the common theme of belief in superstitions in both novels, the characters’ 
search for justice, or their epiphany that there was none, serves as the main axis for the 
plot and provides a platform for instancing the historical backgrounds of the novels. 
Superstitious beliefs and traditions are typical traits of both the townspeople in 
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Eskibahce and in Nykteremi, but while the ‘mean-spirited and ignorant’44 townspeople 
of Eskibahce are disgraced by the act of goodness of the aga in Birds without Wings, the 
consequences of the villagers’ actions based on their superstitious beliefs become a 
reason for a harsh punishment for the tyrannical aga in Nykteremi: 
The Sultan, unloving father, has generously handed the land over to the infidels, 
and together with them has also handed over the beys and the agas to the discretion 
and the ridicule of hated slaves. And the infidels have no right to do anything with 
them! Take them to court! Seek satisfaction! What did Demis Aga want with 
satisfaction and law-courts since he couldn’t punish his slaves with his own 
hands?45  
From the perspective of justice, Kostavistas and de Bernières show potentially different 
qualities of an infidel ruler, and Kostavistas’s Demis Aga, even without any official 
authority in the village, is not portrayed as compassionate as Rustem Bey. That is to 
say, while Rustem Aga is depicted as a just and compassionate leader who treats the 
townspeople in a dignified and equal manner, and with respect and trust, Demis Aga is 
viewed as a narcissistic and despotic ruler who enjoys disempowering and petrifying the 
villagers. Through the portraiture of the hopes and confusions of the townspeople of 
Nykteremi, Karkavitsas demonstrates that establishing the rule of law is a tricky 
process. The villagers choose to side with those who can favour them, and since the 
elected usually end up being those who are close to the Turks, according to the narrator, 
they elect ‘foreigners’ in a dysfunctional democratic system. Having a master is almost 
seen like a feature of the Greek character46: ‘We go get rid of one master and up pops 
another’ says Paparrizos, the village priest.47 The villagers seem not be able to govern 
themselves, and the reason for this is seen as the Ottoman rule that lasted for centuries: 
‘They were no longer his slaves, and he was no longer master! But as soon as Demis 
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Aga appeared at the outskirts of the village, that slavish attitude buried within them 
through the centuries once again made them forget their oaths and their 
independence’.48  
3.3. Originary Topoi 
Andreas Karkavitsas’s novel is about the inability of Greek people to build a national 
character following the gaining of their sovereignty from the Ottoman Empire. Bearing 
no significant trace of their idealised Greek antecedents, the Greek inhabitants of 
Nykteremi struggle to define their Greekness. On the other hand, the investment of de 
Bernières’s novel in national ideology is more complex and multi-layered than that of 
The Beggar as it informs the reader of different forms of justice, historical 
consciousness and formulation of sense of belonging. In Birds without Wings, separatist 
nationalist people like Leonidas exemplify de Bernières’s idea of mental alienation 
experienced from historical authenticity during national insurgencies in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. 
According to Georg Lukacs, ‘[t]he appeal to national independence and national 
character is connected with a re-awakening of national history, with memories of the 
past, of past greatness, of moments of national dishonour, whether this results in a 
progressive or reactionary ideology’.49 In view of ideologies of nationalism, Louis De 
Bernières illustrates alternative attitudes to such a loaded idea of re-awakening, 
instancing various ways of reading history. For example, in a scene in which Leonidas’s 
attitude is juxtaposed with that of his father, unlike Leonidas’s rigid understanding, it is 
discovered that the idea of national identity can be rather fluid. Leonidas’s father cannot 
                                                          
48 Karkavitsas, Beggar, p. 8. 
49 Georg Lukacs, The Historical Novel, trans. by Hannah Mitchell and Stanley Mitchell (London: The 




relate to his obsession with the idea of originary topoi, his feelings of hostility, and his 
wish for vengeance of the Ottomans. Despite Leonidas’s dire opposition to the Ottoman 
rule, his father is a content Ottoman gentleman, who enjoys his privileges as a merchant 
in Smyrna under the Ottoman rule.  
One day at dinner in Smyrna, Leonidas tells his father that he’s become a member of 
Philiki Etairia, causing him to become enraged. According to the account of events told 
by Leonidas’s father’s friend Georgio Theodoru, the father exclaims in anger: 
‘You’re crazy! You want to be ruled from Athens? Have you ever been to Athens? 
It’s a shitty little village, that’s what! A shitty little provincial village with some 
ruins and no theatre worth going to, and the people with no education and no 
culture, and the houses with all the paint peeled off, and they can’t even speak 
Greek properly! Is that what you want? You’re a fool.’  
Leonidas tried to defend himself: ‘The new Greece would be ruled from 
Constantinople, Father, just as the old Greece was.’  
‘We are already ruled from Constantinople,’ replied his father.  
‘By Turks’.50 
Just as the idea of being ruled by Turks is repeatedly revisited in The Beggar, Leonidas 
is also often observed as opposing to Turkish rule at every turn. More importantly, 
Leonidas’s character gives an example of the nationalist and irredentist mind-set51 that, 
following the Great War, led Greece to wage war between 1919 and 1922 against the 
Ottoman Empire, in which they had coexisted for almost half a millennium. In his 
words, as a member of ‘the greatest race in the world’, Leonidas believes in the 
restoration of the Byzantium.52 The following lines from the novel demonstrate the 
narrator’s scepticism about the virtue of Leonidas’s undertaking:   
Britain no longer mourns the throne of France, Spain has no project to reclaim the 
Netherlands, and Portugal has no ambitions on Brazil, but there are those who are 
incapable of letting the past pass on, among them the Serbs who will always be 
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obsessed by the loss of Kosovo, and the Greeks who will always be obsessed by the 
fall of Byzantium.53 
The irony in the process of Greek nation-building is that before the conquest of 
Constantinople by the Ottomans, the pagan Hellenic was not directly followed by the 
Orthodox Greek establishment. Therefore, although the image of the Hellenic is always 
at the core of Greek nationalist thinking, during the Greek independence movements, 
under the intellectual leadership of the likes of Adamantis Korais, there came a point of 
realisation that ‘the linear past of the nation was invariably disrupted’ by the Christian 
Roman establishment in the city.54 As a result, ‘Korais and his disciples could not 
account for the severing of modern Greece’s link to classical antiquity’.55 Since the 
Ecumenical patriarchate of Constantinople being not only spiritual, but also the 
administrative and legal leader of Christians of Eastern Europe, including Bulgarian, 
Serbian, Albanian, and Greek communities, the Rum millet,56 of the Ottoman Empire 
had often claimed to be ‘unnational’ in terms of the ‘conduct of the Church, the clergy 
and other elites that dominated’.57 In other words, the narrative that leads to ‘the 
classicist hegemony over the Greek past’ had brought many inconsistencies with it.58 
In his 1964 inaugural lecture as the Koraes Professor at King’s College London, Cyril 
Mango mentions how the fluidity between the definitions of Hellenism and Greek 
identity resulted in the preclusion of an alternative understanding of Greek identity: 
Much of the claim of modern Greece upon the sympathy of western Europe has 
been based on the assumption of a direct historical continuity reaching back three 
thousand years: from modern Greece to Byzantium, from Byzantium to the 
Hellenistic world and thence to ancient Greece. Whoever asserts this continuity is 
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classed as a philhellene; whoever denies it runs the risk of being labelled a 
mishellene or hater of the Greeks.59 
This statement by Mango epitomises the unwillingness of historians and critics to admi 
the Ottoman heritage of Greeks. However, in contradictory evidence and to the dismay 
of the western world, as Özkırımlı and Sofos point out, Ancient Greece’s ‘most tangible 
and material remnants were the ruins scattered throughout the Ottoman territories’.60 In 
Birds, Louis de Bernières portrays Eskibahce as a location containing such ancient 
ruins, which are mentioned solely for the purpose of having the residents of the town 
neglect them. In Eskibahce, Leonidas’s philhellenism is received with cynicism and 
counterchallenged. What is seen as the disruption of linearity imposed by the Ottomans 
from the point of view of Leonidas is seen by Iskandar the potter, a sympathetic 
character in the novel, as the continuation of civilisation. According to Iskander:  
[Leonidas] stirred up resentment in them [the townsmen] with stories about how we 
Osmanlis had taken the land from the Greeks, and that the land was rightly theirs. I 
have heard it said that this place belonged once to a people called Lycians, and that 
the Greeks took it from them, so why did this teacher not tell the children that all 
land is originally stolen? Why did he not say ‘Let us find the Lycians, and give it 
back’?61  
Lycian tombs are one of the recurrent images in the novel used primarily to juxtapose 
and challenge the discourse of linear Greek civilisation. Leonidas Daskalos’s belief that 
the Greeks were the true owners of Anatolia and the feeling of superiority this notion 
gives to him make him oblivious to the contemporary reality of the life and diversity in 
the Ottoman town that came about as a result of centuries-long historical progression. 
The narrator remarks, ‘if one traced it back far enough, there was no one in that town 
who was not in some way a relation of everybody else’.62 What connects local people of 
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Eskibahce to one another is not their ancestral definition of who they are, but their 
shared experiences and customs. In this town, as in many other towns of the Empire, 
Muslims ask their Christian friends to burn candles for them in the church and to ask 
their Mary Mother of Jesus to do them favours. The Christians, on the other hand, ask 
their Muslim friends to tie rags to the tekke of their saint, or give them verses of the 
Qur’an to be written on slips of paper by the Imam of the town’s mosque.63 To the mind 
of an orthodox Muslim, not asking what the white meat is when sharing a meal with 
Christian neighbours and drinking wine with them either overtly or in secret, getting 
converted when married, and being buried with a silver cross wrapped in a scrap of the 
Qur’an enfolded in the hands of the deceased might be all outrageous acts, but these are 
the common modes of behaviour in Eskibahce.64 Sharing, and in Karen Barkey’s terms, 
mixing of the cross and the crescent, becomes a practice that’s produced over time.65 
The mongrel town, thereby, poses the unique character of the transcultural customs and 
practices that make up the Ottoman identity. 
3.4. Vatan: From Community to Nation 
As believers of the book, Ottoman subjects were all recognized as members of the 
empire, and regardless of their religious affiliations, they could see themselves as 
Ottomans even before the diffusion of Ottomanism as a state ideology starting from the 
early nineteenth century. However, after the declaration of independence of Greece, 
nationalism began to pose a new threat to the integrity of the Empire, and ‘[a]s a result 
of this staggering development’ suggests Michelle Campos,  
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the Ottoman government turned to create a state ideology known as Ottomanism 
(Osmanlicilik) which aimed at promoting universal loyalty to the dynasty and 
equality under the law for both non-Muslims and Muslims. The architects of state 
Ottomanism hoped to prevent the spread of new nationalist ideologies among non-
Muslim subject populations as well as to neutralize European interventions on their 
behalf.66  
Officially-led reformation movements of the nineteenth century to a great extent aimed 
at preventing further losses of territory in the empire by forestalling national movements 
and the possibility of a European intervention. Such countermeasures included the re-
adjustment of the rules of citizenship so as to provide all citizens of the Empire with 
equal rights and obligations. This period was what Campos defines as a process of 
transition ‘from community to nation’.67 Theories on modern nationalism emphasise the 
importance and primacy of collective popular elements such as language, race, shared 
customs, etc. in nation-building and its preservation. In a vast empire with subjects from 
multiple religious affiliations and complex administrative divisions, such methods 
would have to be appraised carefully to ensure the continuity of the empire. Therefore, a 
similar nationalism project had to be introduced in the empire. In Benedict Anderson’s 
words, in the Ottoman Empire, an ‘official nationalism’ would need to be implemented 
for ‘combining naturalization with retention of dynastic power’ as it did happen ‘in 
particular over the huge polyglot domains accumulated since the Middle Ages’ (‘willed 
merger of nation and dynastic power’) or in other words, ‘for stretching the short, tight, 
skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire’.68 That proved to be a difficult 
task.  
Like the late nineteenth century Russification, Ottomanisation was also a product of 
‘official nationalisms’ which ‘developed after, and in reaction to, the popular national 
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movements proliferating in Europe since the 1820s’.69 Russification of the tsarist 
regime initially sought to assimilate minority ethnic and religious groups into the 
Russian imperial body by means of either imperial strategies which underscored 
‘political integration based on loyalty to the Empire’ and which would pave the way for 
evolutionary assimilation; or by means of bureaucratic nationalism which ‘defined 
being Russian on ethnic and religious bases and sought to assimilate members of other 
ethnic groups linguistically and culturally’.70 Unlike the Russian case which mostly 
favoured the latter model, forced homogenisation, between 1863 and 1904, in the 
Ottoman Empire, the former method, assimilation respecting the pre-existing diversity, 
was administered up till and during the process of the 1908 Revolution.71 This marked a 
differentiation in attitude which inclined towards a unity in variety; altering the identity 
of the Empire towards a common ground for developing an understanding about shared 
accountability based on equal parliamentary representation; and undertaking equal civic 
responsibilities, instead of embracing rights and privileges that arise from the rule of 
absolute monarchy.72 
In order to foster a common identity in an empire with large-scale multitude and variety, 
where the risk is that the lowest common denominator of that variety was just not 
substantial enough to create an identity sufficiently compelling to drive people away 
from the promises of homogenous nationalism, the territoriality of a bordered land 
therefore had to come to the fore as the one common ground to connect these various 
groups. As a result, territoriality emerged as a strong element of nation-states in the 
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imperial context. According to Bernard Lewis, territory-based nationalism was tailored 
from European models in order to meet the needs of the Ottoman Empire. The word 
patriotism, which meant ‘the sentiments and beliefs of the patriot’ in the later period in 
Europe, is actually derived and evolved from its Greek and Latin origins, patriotes and 
patriota respectively, which meant ‘fellow countryman’.73 The corresponding word in 
Turkish, vatan, was borrowed from Arabic (‘watan’ in Arabic transliteration), and it 
basically meant place of residence. L wis explains that the word had ‘none of the 
paternal or ancestral connotations of patris or patria’, and in its simplest form it meant 
‘the love and devotion which people felt for their birthplace or homeland’ or even 
family in classical Arabic and Islamic texts.74 It was, accordingly, used as ‘a focus of 
sentiment, of affection, of nostalgia, but not of loyalty, and only to a limited extent of 
identity’.75 
In the Ottoman case, according to Bernard Lewis, the first instance of the official use of 
the word vatan is observed in a report prepared by the Board of Public Works76 in 
1838.77 This report, after giving various examples of how military and commerce are 
expected to develop thanks to scientific knowledge, views the need of the Empire to 
improve in science by means of restructuring education and primary school system, 
showing it as a necessity for being able to communicate ‘the meaning of love for the 
state and fatherland (vatan)’.78 Despite the failure of the report in achieving the desired 
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change in the schooling system, this example shows that love of homeland had already 
entered into the vocabulary of a state organisation. In addition to this report, the word 
also receives a similar substance in the 1839 Edict of Gülhane, in which it was noted 
that 'it is the inescapable duty of all the people to provide soldiers for the defence of the 
fatherland [vatan]'79. According to Campos, this proclamation, ‘injected the language of 
loyalty’ and devotion to state and homeland.80 Bernard Lewis shows that, by the mid-
century, devlet (state) and millet (nation) had already been identified with vatan 
(country), and vatan had become ‘something not only to be loved but also to be served 
and if necessary fought for’ in public consciousness.81 
In order to demonstrate the increase in the level of penetration of nationalist feelings 
among the Ottomans through the notions of love of land, Lewis further gives as an 
example a letter Şinasi, poet and journalist, wrote in 1851: 'I want to devote (or 
sacrifice) myself to the cause of my religion, state, country (vatan) and nation (millet)'.82 
In Şinasi’s letter, vatan and religion seem to be inseparable, and despite the increasing 
association of vatan with the ‘land’, nationalist feelings would remain strongly 
associated with religion up until the First World War and unavoidably beyond into the 
period of the Republic of Turkey. On the other hand, even after the notions of land 
became the official discourse, collective sense of belonging continued to be explained in 
relation to jihad. The Ottoman Empire’s expansionist wars since the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, apart from a number of sporadic exceptions, are seen by Lewis as part 
of the Empire’s warfare in the name of Islam, and as a result, ‘the Ottomans had become 
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accustomed to seeing each of these wars as a jihad’ throughout the years of fighting 
against Christian states.83  
The Crimean War (1853-56) became the turning point in international relations of the 
Ottoman Empire as in their fight against Russia, the British and French became 
Ottoman allies. According to Lewis, the emergence of vatan as a source of aspiration 
alongside religion in the military enterprise of the Ottomans was partially the result of 
the fact that they had observed ‘the lack of concern’ of the British and the French ‘at 
fighting with Muslim allies against a Christian enemy’ during the Crimean War.84 This 
model, however, wasn’t seen as suited by some Ottoman officials to the Ottoman case 
for the unique problems recruiting non-Muslims in the trenches would create. As 
described by Lewis, among the opposition to this idea was Cevdet Paşa who claimed 
that people from various non-Muslim faiths of the Empire would require among other 
necessary arrangements, their own religious leaders, so that these soldiers could practice 
their religions; but such adjustment would not be easy to administer. Cevdet Pasa was 
also suggesting that  
For Muslims, the most effective call [for ‘greater endurance and sacrifice’ in war] is 
to holy war or martyrdom in the cause of the true faith. These are words familiar to 
them from childhood, inculcated in them at school. The vigour and endurance of 
Muslim soldiers in battle, greater than that of other religions, are due to such 
religious sentiments.85  
According to Cevdet Paş , soldiers’ endurance, which is pivotal to military 
achievement, seems to be sustained with less effort if religion is placed at the centre of 
such sacrifice since children grew up with religious sentiments. So, on the battlefield, 
one had to provide soldiers with support that could keep their faith in martyrdom and 
justice upon death. Practice of religion therefore was crucial, but also very challenging 
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in such a mixed faith system. If one, however, replaced religion with vatan, as was done 
in Europe after ‘the decline of their feudal age’, and taught children the term vatan 
instead, ‘even then it would not be as potent as religious zeal, nor could it take its place. 
But even that would take a long time, and until that time our armies would be left 
without spirit’.86 Another important aspect in Cevdet Paşa’s report was the difference of 
the Ottoman army to multi-ethnic armies in other countries:  
In India the English may promote non-Christian soldiers to the level of sergeant but 
no higher, and no one interferes or objects. But among us, if we accept Christians as 
soldiers, it will be necessary to give them the ranks to which they are legally 
entitled in the same way as Muslims. If they are not given these ranks, the so-called 
friendly states will offer friendly advice by way of protecting them, and our military 
organization, hitherto exempt from interference by foreigners, will be exposed to 
foreign interventions.87 
In short, the multi-religious structure of the Ottomans had become a problem in military 
practice, and the introduction of the word vatan, it was feared, was not going to be a
sufficient answer to likely clashes as a result of its introduction. The fear of foreign 
intervention as discussed in previous chapters also offers an explanation regarding 
paradoxes of national Ottomanism and different forms of imperialisms around the 
world. 
3.5. ‘There is a Jehad Preparing’ 
As a result of an evolving sense of belonging and national identity, at the turn of the 
twentieth century, a common imperial identity and love of homeland were ultimately 
being promoted in the press not only in Ottoman Turkish, but also in Greek, Armenian, 
Arabic, Ladino (Judeo-Spanish), and other various imperial languages.88 In Michelle 
Campos’ introduction to Ottoman Brothers, a Jewish lawyer Shlomo Yellin’s address in 
one of the CUP meetings in Beirut after the Ottoman revolution in 1909, encouraged the 
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unity of the Ottoman nation as he frequently spoke of the ‘sacred homeland’. According 
to Campos, at this stage, martyrdom, the need to sacrifice oneself for the sake of his 
Vatan, was ‘stripped of [its] traditional Islamic context and reinvested within an 
Ottoman national framework’.89 However, in de Bernières’s novel it can be observed 
that such a popular common nationalist sentiment was not felt on the same wavelength 
across the empire. Ottomanism was not flourishing in the new parliament of 1908 
because, as, he notes, the deputies ‘prove[d] themselves incapable of any ideal higher 
than ethnic self-interest’.90 An important reason for that was the fact that the Ottomanist 
project had been shaped too slowly and too late.  
The process of centralizing and nationalising the empire required equal rights for non-
Muslims, but it also entailed some obligations on them that only the Muslims were 
subject to before. For the non-Muslims of the Empire, having the same political rights 
as their Muslim brothers required accepting the end of exemption from military service. 
Actually, ‘universal military service was seen as the means of bringing all the 
communities under the umbrella of Ottomanism’.91 On the other hand, conscription was 
something non-Muslims were not accustomed to and it became even more challenging 
as the Empire went into war after war despite the best efforts of the Unionists.92 At any 
rate, nationalism’s unstoppable rise had become undeniable during the Balkan Wars. 
Both during the Balkan Wars, and at the Eastern front during the onset of the First 
World War, Christians were started to be seen as a fifth column enabling the defeat of 
the empire to Greece and Russia. In Michelle Campos’s words, ‘Ottomanism as a union 
of Muslims and Christians was proven to be a delusion’ now.93 Therefore, although 
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non-Muslims were not exempt from military service anymore, in order not to risk losses 
caused by possible betrayal by its Christian population, the Ottoman government left 
them out in labour battalions, outside of the immediate influence of other forces during 
the war. 
In Eskibahce, the impact of such empire-wide developments regarding a rising sense of 
nationalism and the continuing changes in the practices of conscription can be 
monitored through the daily lives of the inhabitants. The population of the town gets 
tested by the impending wars, especially as the First World War breaks out and the able 
men of the town are conscripted. Karatavuk and Mehmetçik, two of the main characters 
in the novel, are among those who are trying to sign up for the Great War despite being 
underage. Karatavuk tries to serve in place of his father Iskander the potter, for without
the father the family would starve during the war. The story of the friendship of 
Mehmetçik and Karatavuk is one of the important axes of the plot. When these two 
characters are still boys of young age, Iskander, the potter, makes bird whistles from 
clay for his son Abdul and his friend Nico. They blow the whistles so much and for so 
long that the two children are named after the sound of the birds that these whistles 
make. Abdul becomes Karatavuk (blackbird); Nico becomes Mehmetçik (red robin). 
When the conscription sergeant accepts Karatavuk’s demand to conscript in place of his 
father, Mehmetçik, the son of Charitos wants to go and fight for the empire and the 
sultan padishah as well, as long as he can stay with Karatavuk, but since he is the son of 
a Christian father, the sergeant doesn’t accept him. He says that the war is against 
Franks, and Franks are Christians. But Mehmetçik, Nico, insists that he is an Ottoman 
and that the Germans, also a Frank nation, are allies. Th  sergeant says ‘Yes, the 




in the army in case they turn against us. It’s only natural common sense’.94 In the end, 
Mehmetçik is not able to fight for his own country as an Ottoman, and the labour 
battalion remains the only option for him.95 
In the narrator’s words, the war minister Enver Pasha of the Young Turk government ‘is 
convinced that he can get the entire Muslim world behind him by playing the Islamic 
card, thus disabling much of the Russian, British and French empires’.96 Martyrdom is a 
powerful topic in nationalist and war narratives, and is also deployed as the central 
theme within the context of the First World War in Greenmantle (1916) by John 
Buchan. In the novel, Richard Hannay, a secret agent for the British government, is 
commissioned to find out what Greenmantle is and what makes it so vital for the 
Germans to retain it as the tension of the Great War escalates. The Eastern Front is of 
crucial importance for the British to win the war, and Germany is trying to achieve it by 
using the element of religion, Islam, to control the masses in the Ottoman Empire. 
When Greenmantle, a prominent Muslim figure, a prophet, who can ‘madden the 
remotest Moslem peasant with dreams of Paradise’ is found out to be dying, the 
Germans attempt to replace him with someone else, and a German intelligence officer, 
Hilda von Einem, is sent to ensure that the mission is completed.97 The underlying idea 
of this German mission is to convince the Turkish people to declare Jihad against the 
British, because in Hannay’s words, ‘religion is the only thing to knit up such a 
scattered empire’98, and for that reason, Sir Walter, Hannay’s handler, believes that 
‘[t]here is a Jehad preparing’.99 By making a religious analogy with the Ark of the 
Covenant, Sir Walter suggests that Greenmantle is expected to create a miracle, 
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although he doesn’t know how yet – which is left to Hannay to find out. Hannay’s 
mission is to find out what the awaited revelation is in order to be able to plot against it 
so as to weaken the Central Powers and keep the Indian Muslims loyal to the British, 
which is crucial to the integrity of the British Empire.100 
A similar notion of the role of jihad and martyrdom during the war is employed by 
Louis de Bernières in his Birds. Karatavuk at the beginning seems to be enthusiastic 
about jihad, and like other Muslim believers, is looking forward to ‘meeting the Prophet 
in his own garden in paradise’ and ‘spend[ing] eternity in the arms of a vast number of 
houris’.101 He believes that the martyrs ‘would be carried there by the green birds of 
paradise that come only for martyrs’, and that they ‘were being given a chance to go 
straight to Heaven with no questions asked’.102 The confusion starts to dawn on him 
after he has ‘seen too many evil things’ and has ‘done too many evil things even when 
[he] believed in Him’.103 After the war, nearer the end of the novel, Karatavuk reflects 
on the pointlessness of jihad in a war with so many actors to take part in too many 
possible scenarios:  
Here are the things that I would like to tell Mehmetçik if I knew where he was. I am 
sorry that you were not allowed to fight for the empire like an honourable soldier, 
and although it was a jihad I think that those who wanted to fight for the Sultan 
should have been trusted. There were Arabs at Çanakkale who were Muslims but 
did not fight, and were traitors to the empire, and ran away. Also the Franks had 
Muslim soldiers from India who fought very fiercely for them, and did not believe 
it was a jihad. Therefore this proves that to exclude Christians from the army was 
beside the point.104  
Ironically, Nico’s nickname, Mehmetçik, in contemporary Turkey, refers to the bravery 
of Turkish privates. In a painful contrast to Karatavuk’s despondency, earlier in the 
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novel, Mehmetçik doesn’t complain about the labour camp as long as he can serve the 
Sultan. Karatavuk, during his years in the military, ‘come[s] to understand why they 
would not let Christians come and fight, because the Christians would have doubted that 
it was a holy war and they might have dampened our enthusiasm, because doubt, when 
it is split, spreads like water’.105 After all, political jihadism not only resulted in the 
exclusion of non-Muslims from fighting alongside their Muslim countrymen, but it also 
aimed at demoralising the Arabs who fought against the Ottomans. However, de 
Bernières has his character, Iskander, Karatavuk’s father, criticise this rationale, for 
Iskandar finds it conniving that ‘the Arabs had sided with the British, as had the 
Muslims from other side of Persia’. He says: ‘It seemed that only Turks took the Jihad 
seriously.106 
In his The Politics of Nation-Building, Harris Mylonas attempts to explain the formation 
of primacy in decision making regarding nation-building, including the selection 
processes of one type of nationalism over another.107 In his analysis, Mylonas outlines 
the types of strategy the state employs to deal with non-core groups under its 
administration. Mylonas, in his argument regarding the shifts and variations in state 
policies towards non-core groups and nation-building processes, concludes that 
‘international and geostrategic concerns’ justify the importance of ‘the interaction 
between host states and external powers rather than non-core groups and host states’.108 
According to this logic, it can be said that it was partially the loss of ‘Christian-
populated territories’ in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 that warranted ‘the return 
of Islam’ in the following political decisions of the state, but not the Muslims’ 
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relationship with the non-core groups.109 This trend, although intermittent as stability in 
the country could be secured considerably, continued throughout the nineteenth and the 
early twentieth centuries. The increase in Islam’s role in defining the Ottoman identity 
in its final years, as Hanioğlu explains, came in relation to the fear that ‘strengthening of 
the common denominator of citizenship would lead to dangerous demands for 
representation and would ultimately accelerate separatist processes’. As a result, as 
Hanioğlu puts it, Sultan Abdülhamid II’s regime unmistakably ‘reintroduced a 
determining role for Islam in imperial identity’.110 To make things worse, Islam-
oriented policies thrived alongside other ‘various forms of Turkism’ by Ottoman 
Muslims, which is not inconsistent with the articulation of other nationalist formations 
in this highly divided society.111 As a result, as suggested in the novel, the Arabs’ 
resistance to fighting on the same side as the Turks points to the failure of 
Abdülhamid’s policies of Islamization. Below, the Muslim and non-Muslim divide, the 
inter-ethnic animosity and the failure of the Islamisation of citizenship will be explored 
further. 
3.6. Treason 
As the Muslims experienced a change in their status as opposed to their non-Muslim co-
citizens, and as this helped the recognition of their Turkish identities, the non-core 
groups, to use Mylonas’s terminology, were experiencing a different level of confusion 
of identity. Harris Mylonas in his The Politics of Nation-Building asks why Armenians, 
the most loyal millet in the Ottoman Empire, which did not rebel until the last decade of 
the nineteenth century, while many other millets had already rebelled, were subject to 
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the cruellest treatment.112 In Birds without Wings, this assertion has a rather contrasting 
quality with no notable victimisation of any group and self-explanatory in terms of the 
confusions of identity of the non-core groups. Instead, the increasing tension and 
hostility in the Empire among ethnic and religious groups are mentioned 
indiscriminately: 
For many decades there had been troubles in the east of Anatolia. Living separate 
lives in separate villages, Armenians and other tribesmen had been assiduously at 
each other’s throats, committing against each other the banal but vile atrocities so 
frequently rehearsed by those who are deeply addicted to the orgasmic pleasures of 
extreme hatred. Relations were particularly bad between Kurds and Armenians, 
both convinced of the superiority of their own race and religion [...]. Many 
Armenians desired an autonomous land for themselves, aspiring to situate it even in 
places where they were not in the majority. The Kurds were at that time still more 
or less loyal to the state, and the state itself was too chaotic to impose tolerance or 
order on these far-flung and undeveloped places, where life had become equally 
perilous and abject for all races. To this day the Kurds of that region and the 
descendants of the Armenians will tell identical stories against each other, perhaps 
the most common being that one had to disguise one’s little girls as boys, and 
women as men. Armenian guerrillas were armed through the charitable efforts of 
Russian Armenians, and encouraged by Great Britain, whose politicians calculated 
that an independent Armenian state would constitute an excellent buffer to keep out 
the Russians.113 
Shortly after this paragraph, de Bernières also brings up the fact that, when the subjects 
of the empire were declared equal under the new laws of 1908, the conscription of non-
Muslims resulted in the Ottoman army being ‘filled with reluctant [Armenian] 
conscripts [...] whose natural aspiration was towards an independent Armenian state’.114 
As a result, the precautions taken by the government consisted of the removal of ‘all 
remaining Armenian officers and men from the 3rd Army, and put them to work in 
labour battalions’, which was later followed by Enver Pasa’s proposal ‘to remove all 
Armenians from behind Ottoman lines, and replace them with Muslim refugees from 
                                                          
112 Mylonas, Politics of Nation-Building, p. 1. 
113 de Bernières, Birds without Wings, p. 303. 




elsewhere’, ending catastrophically with the death of many of those who were removed 
from their homes.115  
The narrator in Birds without Wings argues that ‘the first step that led the Armenian 
people into their great tragedy’ had been the treason of Garo Pastermadjian (aka 
Karakin Pastirmaciyan, or Armen Garo), a former member of the Ottoman Parliament 
from Erzurum and also one of the attackers of the Ottoman Bank in 1896.116 According 
to the narrator, ‘Garo Pastermadjian led most of the Armenian officers and men of the 
3rd Army over to the Russian side, returning with them in their campaign of pillage and 
rapine through the Muslim villages in their path’, which unavoidably shuttered the trust 
of the Ottomans.117 Such instances are placed under the spotlight as examples of 
destabilising relationships between the central government and the non-core groups, 
although a rather more nuanced appraisal offered in the novel than this more usual 
binary approach. In the novel, the increase in the suspicion and reactions towards 
Armenians across the country following the Russian-Armenian rapprochement is 
represented through the example of the Armenian apothecary, Levon Krikorian, in 
Eskibahçe: 
Ever since it had become known that bands of Armenians had effectively started a 
civil war behind the lines on the Russian front, Levon Krikorian and his family had 
had to put up with small insults. He sometimes heard the words ‘vatan haini’ 
[‘traitor’] muttered as he passed by, and once there had been stones thrown against 
his shutters at night.118 
When the Hamidiye119 arrives in the town to take the Armenians away, the narrator tells 
that the Hamidiye were essentially looking for ‘the traitors’, which baffles the 
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gendarmes of the town, who later on understand that what the Hamidiye sergeant means 
by ‘the traitors’ is the Armenians.120  
The choice of word ‘the traitor’ to describe what is considered as a group tied to the 
society in an organic way, the lack of any common notion of who the traitors could be, 
as well as the villainous description of the Hamidiye members, is made by the narrator 
both to criticise the governmental practices of removing Armenians and to challenge the 
narratives which level the responsibility of the mistreatment of the Armenians on the 
Ottoman Turks in equal measures. In the same vein, the blaming and beating of Levon 
by Greek Constantinos while no one else tries to stop the beating, for the mere fact that 
Levon is an Armenian, shows that de Bernières’s narrative hinges on the idea that the 
townspeople, in other words the Ottomans, did not act based on hatred of Turks for 
Armenians for racial or religious reasons, but because of the inculcation of the idea that 
the Armenians have now come to be seen as a threat to the community.121 Levon avoids 
being beaten to death when he pledges loyalty to the Sultan Padishah and the Empire 
and announces that he is ‘a loyal Ottoman’.122  
Siniša Malešević in his Identity as Ideology (2006) examines the popular concept 
‘identity’ from the lens of ‘ideology’, another popular concept which, according to the 
author, has lost its appeal among scholars in recent decades. In his book, Malešević 
explores the principles of Anthony Smith’s nationalism, which will be discussed further 
below, based on Durkheim’s theories on society in an attempt to discover the scope and 
the potential of the conjectural understandings of any given social order that are shaped 
by the ideologies that lay claim to wield the authority of ‘moral norms or superior 
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knowledge’.123 In doing so, he offers an insight into the motivations of nationalists that 
animate disparities among cultural forms, branding them as ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’. 
According to Malešević, the ‘specific moral principle’ that draws people towards such 
binary conclusions is to do with ‘remain[ing] true to oneself’. Since morality is 
measured by loyalty to any such group, being true to oneself would refer to what is 
morally required in terms of the group’s distinctive norms, including ‘loyalty towards 
the ancestry’.124 In this light, while the rise of nationalism and the resultant 
disintegration of the Empire caused the Porte to take precautions to prevent any further 
breakaways by adhering to Ottomanisation policies, these responses from the central 
government gave way to the confusions of the subjects regarding their loyalty, hence 
identity. While, as in the example of Armenian Levon’s case, such confusions of 
identity and galvanising inputs provoke a sense of betrayal within the community, this 
moral inclination, at the same time, facilitates the transition to nationalism, both 
Ottomanism and other nationalist ideologies. 
Émile Durkheim views society as an entity with ‘a superior form of collective character’ 
which ‘overpowers individual will’ for the merit of constituting the foundation where 
‘rules of ethical behaviour’ emerge.125 The disposition of the members of society to 
such morals shows their ‘attachment’ to any such group, thus distinguishing it as a 
society with its own unique characteristics.126 In other words, ‘morality begins where 
there begins an attachment to a group of any kind’.127 In de Bernières’s novel, the issue 
of group attachment based on morality is exemplified by two specific occasions of 
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public display in the town’s meydan, the plaza. Both during the stoning of Rustem 
Bey’s wife by the townspeople of all religions for committing adultery, and during the 
second public incident, in which the apothecary Levon gets beaten by Constantinos as 
the onlookers cheer him, the role of group attachment determining people’s interactions 
with each other becomes visible.128 In the first case, with men stoning the adulteress 
regardless of their religion, the common norms of the public are established primarily 
based on the loyalty of townspeople to the aga and to the patriarchal social system, but 
not to a particular religion or ethnicity. As opposed to Levon’s Armenian identity, 
Leonidas’s Greek propaganda does not attract as much attention, because Levon is now 
susceptible to being branded as betraying the Ottomans. This difference emerges as a 
result of the empire-wide experience with the Armenian insurgency and the war against 
the Russian Empire.  
Some of the divisions among the Armenian population have been examined in the 
second chapter. De Bernières centres his focus on the Ottoman collective identity and its 
rupture, rather than on contradictions among various types of Armenian national-
belonging, as Jenny White does. In the matter of Levon, even the modern aga Rustem 
Bey is driven to feeling betrayed by and becoming resentful about the Armenians 
because of ‘the treachery and perfidy of these citizens who had turned against the 
Sultan, deserted the army and then attacked it from behind’. Therefore, he is depicted to 
be ‘not at all sympathetic to the victims’, and ‘scowling at every Armenian he passed in 
the street, resenting them suddenly for the first time in his life’.129 ‘However’, tells the 
narrator, Rustem Bey ‘was intelligent enough to know that none of these particular 
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Armenians had ever been near the front, and none of them had ever attacked anyone, 
from behind or otherwise’.130  
Malešević, writing about contemporary notions of nationalism, holds that ‘if one looks 
only inwardly for the psychological or even biological basis of “identity claims” one 
may miss the outward structural, historical and ideological underpinnings of how, when 
and why such claims exist at the particular moment in time’.131 Accordingly, when 
nationalism is considered, the thesis of group belonging and the notion of betrayal can 
only exist in the presence of other historical and ideological preconditions. Especially in 
the case of the Ottoman Empire, the fact that a major clash emerged among different 
religious and ethnic groups under the sweep of modern nationalism, according to Smith, 
was due to the lack of ethnie-oriented polity since the state polity was based on the 
religion-based millet system, and because of the fact that the divergent ethnies did not 
necessarily live on ‘clearly demarcated territories’.132 In other words, ‘[i]n the Ottoman 
empire’, says Smith, it was ‘difficult for Ottoman elites to envisage a “Turkish” nation’ 
because in Anatolia ‘Arabs, Armenians, Greek Orthodox and other ethnie’ lived with 
the ‘Turkic-speaking, Islamic core’.133 
During the transition from millet-and-religion-based understanding of community to 
ethnicity-based nationhood, as Paraskevas Konortas argues, nationalism did not have 
the same effect it did in urban locations; in other words, nationalism was predominantly 
an urban progression because its spread in the countryside was slower due to the lack of 
organisation, networks of education and press, and other related reasons; therefore, the 
                                                          
130 de Bernières, Birds without Wings, p. 310. 
131 Malešević, Identity as Ideology, p. 5. 
132 Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Cornwall: Blackwell Publishing, 1986; repr. 1988), p. 
143. 




effect of nationalism could not be discerned forthwith throughout the empire.134 
Furthermore, in rural areas, the role of loyalty and identification have an even more 
personal value during such transitions. For instance, in certain groups, especially in 
closed, rural communities, while identifying oneself with the core or a non-core group 
may mean exerting a strict restraint to breaking away from certain established ethical 
norms, those who do not comply with the practices of such groups may thence carry the 
risk of being declared immoral. An example of social aggravation that is analogical with 
the beating of the Armenian apothecary by his fellow townspeople in Birds Without 
Wings can be found in The Stone Woman by Tariq Ali. The death of Dmitri, the Greek 
school inspector in The Stone Woman who is indeed married to a Muslim woman, 
comes as a result of a commotion which was precipitated by ‘the Young Turks, who 
saw all Greeks as the agents of Britain, Russia and France. These were the people who 
wanted to create a pure and modern empire’.135 These two examples, alongside the fear 
of Kamil Pasha in The Winter Thief that his loyalty would be questioned if the truth 
about his role in the rescue of the socialist Armenian group came out, tell similar stories 
of the bumpy process of transition from communities that primarily function based on a 
consensus of a variety of religious and traditional values to nations with unified 
homogenous ‘national’ values.136 
3.7. In Defence of Ottoman Citizenship 
The gradual transition from millet-religion based understanding of community to 
secular nation came not only as a result of rising nationalism, but also as a result of a 
series of reforms and the evolution of the relevance and significance assigned to religion 
                                                          
134 Paraskevas Konortas, “Epilogue”, State Nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey: 
Orthodox and Muslims, 1830-1945. ed. by Fortna, Benjamin C., Stefanos Katsikas, Dimitris Kamouzis, 
and Paraskevas Konortas (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 221-225 (p. 4). 
135 Tariq Ali, The Stone Woman (London: Verso, 2000; repr. in paperback 2001), p. 109. 




in the administration of the Empire. Within this context, as Benjamin Fortna points out, 
the reforms in the nineteenth century had also the ‘unintended’ consequence of 
alienating the millet groups from each other.137 For instance, with the Islahat Fermani 
of 1856, the Ottoman government attempted to reify the official resolution of the first 
half of the nineteenth century for the centralisation of power; and, in line with this 
resolution, it was also stressed in the decree that no subject of the Empire would be 
‘inferior to another class, on account of their religion, language, or race’. According to 
Fortna, this latter decision came ‘at the expense of “millet” or national sub-identities’, 
since originally the intention was to uphold ‘the still somewhat’ immature ‘sense of 
Ottomanism (i.e., the collective allegiance of all subjects, regardless of religion, 
language or ethnicity to Istanbul)’.138 By enforcing such rules, the Porte also intended 
‘to assuage the growing insistence of the Great Powers for “reforms” that would in 
practice improve the condition of the non-Muslim subjects of the empire.’139 As Fortna 
argues, this was ‘an internally contradictory’ act, and wound up ‘reinforcing the very 
particular national (‘millet’) identifications that it had set out to soften and to weaken 
the imperial institutions such as the Ecumenical Patriarchate on which it depended’.140 
The edict, according to Fortna, ultimately, evoked ‘a heightened awareness of the very 
communitarian boundaries that it had sought to blur.’141 
Michelle Campos, in her Ottoman Brothers, in which she explores ‘the meaning of 
liberty, citizenship, and public life in the last Islamic empire’, proposes an alternative 
perspective to the ethnicity-centred and ‘Islamic core’-oriented definitions of Ottoman 
                                                          
137 Benjamin C. Fortna, ‘The Ottoman Empire and after: From a state of “nations” to “nation-states”’, 
State Nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey: Orthodox and Muslims, 1830-1945, ed. 
by Benjamin C. Fortna, Stefanos Katsikas, Dimitris Kamouzis and Paraskevas Konortas (Oxon and New 
York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 1-12 (p. 9). 
138 Fortna, ‘The Ottoman Empire and after’, p. 9. 
139 Fortna, ‘The Ottoman Empire and after’, p. 9. 
140 Fortna, ‘The Ottoman Empire and after’, p. 9. 




identity.142 She challenges the idea that ethnic identities in the Empire were strictly 
demarcated. In her book, she also questions the generic belief that the inevitability of 
ethnic nationalism was the reason for the Ottoman Empire’s dispersal.143 Campos points 
out that empires like the Ottoman Empire were seen by nineteenth-century Western 
travellers and diplomats as the ‘prisons of nations’ as it was believed that empires could 
no longer meet the demands of the time.144 She criticises the claims that in a period in 
which the ‘homogenous nation-state’ was so ‘idealized and normalized’, the Ottoman 
Empire, with its ‘dozens of religious sects, languages, and ethnic groups’ proved to be 
an ‘anachronism’ for Europe.145 The perspective of nineteenth-century Western 
nationalism essentially challenges the applicability of the notions of liberty, equality 
and fraternity to the heterogeneity of an empire, assuming that these ideals could only 
be accomplished in less diverse conditions. 
As opposed to the various currents of national consolidation, Campos claims that, after 
the Young Turk Revolution, the change of regime to democratic monarchy reinforced 
the definition and actions of the Ottoman Empire as a united nation with members with 
a common historical past. The Ottoman nation could be in the league of modern nations 
since subsisting as an ‘imperial collective’ required the collective effort that involved 
the building up of the language and the cultural association which gave a state the form 
of a ‘traditional’ nation and its people the notion of nationalism.146 In her criticism of 
nationalist narratives, Campos highlights that such an intrinsic imperial change was 
ignored in most of the discourses of nationalism of the late Ottoman Empire.147 Campos 
calls such nationalism ‘civic Ottomanism’, and defines it as ‘the premise that all 
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citizens, irrespective of religion or ethnicity, were partners in the imperial project’.148 
Hence, the delimiting attitude regarding the ‘Islamic core’, according to Campos, is 
overcome by this ‘universalizing discourse’ of Ottomanism, even if it was kept alive 
temporarily and for a short space of time after the revolution.149 
Campos views ‘the Ottoman nation, not simply as an “imagined” or discursive imperial 
community, but as a shared field of social and political interaction and contestation’.150 
De Bernières, too, sees ‘imperial multiethnicity’, to use Campos’s words, ‘not solely as 
a significant component of imperial collapse or a predictor of rising nationalisms’, but 
as a uniting aspect of communal fellowship and its own testing mechanism, which 
ascertain imperial ‘collective belonging, and identity’, and even ‘political 
membership’.151 A representative of this perspective, the Greek nationalist Leonidas’s 
father, incarnates the unionist perspective as an Ottoman gentleman.152 Unlike his son, 
he has faith in the future of the Ottoman Empire, and reminds his son of how Turkish 
rule no longer means, if it ever did, Turkish domination in the social hierarchy; social 
classes are permeable, and Turks labour as well as govern:  
‘We are all Ottomans now. Times have changed. Anyway, look at all my servants. 
What are they? They are all Turks. Look at Georgio’s servants. They are all Turks. 
Who digs the roads and carries away the night-soil? Turks. Who slaves in the fields 
to grow the produce that we sell on? Turks. Don’t tell me we are governed by 
Turks, when the evidence to the contrary is right in front of your eyes. What would 
we do without them? How can a son of mine be so stupid? That’s what I want to 
know! And you want to destroy everything we are!’153 
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It is a common phenomenon that, like Leonidas’s father, many of the local 
businessmen, the clergy and the ‘military chieftains’ remained loyal to the Empire 
during Greek nation-building, primarily because they enjoyed their powerful and 
privileged status within the empire. Özkırımlı and Sofos argue that these elite people 
were seen by Greek nation-builders as indifferent and sometimes hostile to the 
nationalist cause as they felt ‘threatened by the whole project of Neohellenic 
Enlightenment’.154 The need to modernise the Greek society was urged and acted upon 
‘by the mainly diasporic Greek intelligentsia and the emerging mercantile middle class’ 
who ‘supported and cultivated’ the promulgation of ‘a perception of Greekness’.155 
Despite being a politically non-governing member of the elite, Leonidas’s merchant 
father argues that he is in a position of authority and power, while the Turks, in this 
context, by not being part of the wealthy elite, do not possess any ruling power. The 
quotation above, therefore, presents a counter image to the idea that the non-Christians 
constituted a repressed section of the Ottoman society, and presents a response to the 
view that the Empire was ruled by the Islamic core. This conflicting opinion presents a 
good example of the changing understanding of what being an Ottoman meant, 
particularly after the sultanic decrees of 1839 and 1856. The 1856 Imperial Rescript was 
aimed at ‘promoting an equal discourse among subjects of the empire’ and acted as a 
harbinger of the process of turning non-Muslims from zimmi to teba.156 In any event, it 
was declared in the Ottoman Law of Nationality of 1869 that ‘all subjects of the empire 
are without distinction called Ottomans, irrespective of whatever religion they 
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profess’.157 Leonidas, on the other hand, despite these political and social changes, does 
not show any belief in having an Ottoman identity; he only adopts a Greek identity. 
Regardless, in the novel, both the teba status of the Greek and the idea that Asia Minor 
and Constantinople rightfully belonged to the Greeks are contested with the onset of the 
Great War. 
In his practical presentation of the role of ‘ethnic nationalisms in the breakup of the 
Ottoman Empire’, de Bernières demonstrates in his individual stories of what befalls the 
townspeople of Eskibahce the challenges to the concept of universal imperial 
citizenship. In this sense, de Bernières does not follow the genre of nationalist literature 
that celebrates Turkification or Hellenization, which at the same time anticipates the 
empire’s termination; rather, he embraces the Ottoman diversity and the subtle 
variations between the rulers and the ruled, as well as the winners and the losers. Ethnic 
nationalism like that of Leonidas is a determinant only so long as these groups are 
supported and instigated by forces that arise outside the individual communities. The 
characters are described as unsuspicious and unassuming of any threat when the 
sergeant of the Hamidiye troop informs the Armenian residents that they would be 
‘relocated in the interests of the Sultan Caliph and for their own protection’.158 Despite 
an earlier beating of Levon the apothecary in the meydan, the centre of the town, Gadar, 
Levon’s wife, lacking necessary cynicism, thinks that her local community would 
protect her: ‘Why should we go? We don’t need protecting. No one will hurt us here’.159 
However, when the news that the Hamidiye is sent to transport them comes out, Gadar 
realises the seriousness of the situation, and says: ‘Who would protect us now? 
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Everyone calls us traitors. No one wants us any more!’160 Gadar seeks Leyla Hanim’s 
help, although in vain as Rustem Bey is not in the town. In her plea, Gadar tells Leyla 
Hanim: ‘Our families came here all the way from Van thirty years ago, just to get away 
from people like them. They’re tribesmen, horsemen, Kurds. They’re savages, and they 
hate us’.161 This example suggests that, despite the commitment of many of the subjects 
in the imperial unity, ‘pan-Ottoman identification’, as Benjamin Fortna puts it, 
‘inevitably, failed to satisfy everyone’.162 
Özkirimli and Sofos mention that the use of ‘[e]thnic designations uch as “Serbs”, 
“Bulgarians”, “Greeks” or “Turks”’ during the rule of the Empire was frequently devoid 
of ‘ethnic connotations’ even if they carried ‘reference to linguistic groups or 
ethnicity’.163 The reason for this is that ‘[f]or many, locality remained a strong anchor of 
identity throughout the nineteenth century and even in the twentieth’.164 Accordingly, 
the Ottomans found their loyalty in their ‘immediate locality, be it a town or a village, 
or a religious community’; therefore, ‘the concept of a fatherland’ represented little to 
their identification.165 It was only as the concepts of ‘empire and nation’ gained 
increased prominence in the empire, the project of nation-building thrived.166 The 
famous example of the battleships that the British government failed to deliver to the 
Ottoman government can be regarded as a representation of this booming national 
identification and highlights the increased sense of awareness of membership of the 
Ottoman nation among common citizenry. This incident is usually described as the 
breaking point of the relationship between the English and the Ottomans, which welded 
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the relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire after Germany lent support to 
the latter, leading to the Ottoman involvement in the Great War.  
In both Birds and Dennis Wheatley’s The Eunuch of Stamboul (1935), it is mentioned 
that disappointment at national grassroots level can lead to catastrophic results.167 From 
the perspective of Reouf, a member of a secret organisation in modern Turkey, which 
Swithin Destime, the protagonist of Eunuch, is attempting to infiltrate, the incident of 
the battleships was to blame for the participation of Turkey in the war: 
‘In 1914,’ said Reouf, ‘Great Britain was building two big warships for Turkey. 
When the crisis came they were ready for delivery and they had been paid for – yet, 
at the urgent request of the Russian Foreign Office Britain detained them in her 
yards. On August 4th the British Navy was the stronger by two battle cruisers of the 
latest type but she had alienated the whole of the Turkish nation. Those ships had 
not been built and payed for by budget money but by patriotic subscription to which 
even the widow and the orphan had contributed their mite. Turkey might have been 
kept neutral but for that stupidity. As it was even the children felt they had been 
robbed by Britain and the nation stood behind Enver Pasha’s pact with Germany to 
a man’.168  
In this passage by an English author, attention is drawn to deteriorating English-
Ottoman relations and the Ottoman involvement in the Great War as a result. 
Wheatley’s character Reouf recommends not taking lightly the patriotic feelings of the 
common people, which were ignited and turned against the English by the battleship 
incident. In Birds, it is also mentioned along similar lines by the narrator that ‘the 
British are withholding them because Churchill has not been deceived about Enver’s 
intentions as war breaks out’.169 The narrator in Birds also adds that ‘two German 
battleships synchronicitously turn up, [...] and Germany becomes ever more popular 
with the Turkish people’.170 In Wheatley’s novel, Reouf links the inability of the 
Ottomans to avoid the war with the illiteracy and financial hardship of its people, and 
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establishes a connection between their conditions of poverty and their feeling of 
national disgrace: ‘in the low state of education in general in Turkey before the War, the 
people could not be expected to appreciate anything except that they had been deprived 
of those two glorious ships, paid for by self-denial and the nation’s pocket money’.171 
The display of loyalty to Ottomanness is revealed in relation to personal attachment to a 
central cause, which is seen as exposed by the overcircumspection of the English 
towards the Ottomans. In addition to Turkish-British diplomatic relations, Wheatley’s 
The Eunuch of Stamboul sheds light on Turkish nation-building and the preservation of 
the nation, foreshadowing some of the central concerns of de Bernières, including the 
failure of the Ottomans to prevail as a nation. 
3.8. The Politics of Nation-Building 
Ernest Renan classifies states as those which are ‘individual historical units’, like 
France, England, Germany and Russia172, and those which have not reached their 
national unities, like Turkey [that is, the Ottoman Empire], with subgroups such as the 
Turks, the Slavs, the Greeks, the Armenians, the Arabs, the Syrians, and the Kurds.173 
Agreeing with Renan’s definition, Ernest Gellner also adds that the Ottoman Empire, 
unlike its precedents in Anatolia, did not become ‘an ethnic melting-pot’.174 In recent 
studies, the Ottoman Empire has generally been praised for adopting policies that 
preserved the faith and culture of their subjects while their peers in Europe have been 
criticised for using assimilation policies further to expand their imperial influence on 
their colonised territories.175 With the rise of nationalism, empires such as the Ottoman 
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Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire, which contained diverse population groups, 
came under an intense pressure from ethnic political groups within their political 
borders. In order to prevent the collapse of the empire and the disintegration that would 
follow, the Ottomans attempted to appeal to the ‘ideology’ of Ottomanism, which 
‘aimed at promoting universal loyalty to the dynasty and equality under the law for non-
Muslims’ with the aim of ‘prevent[ing] the spread of new nationalist ideologies among 
non-Muslim subject populations as well as to neutralize European interventions on their 
behalf’.176 The formation of an Ottoman identity in the early twentieth century 
inevitably encompassed everyone from each of the ethnic groups, previously called 
millets. Today, this ideology of Ottomanism, which inevitably failed to sustain the 
adherence of the imperial subjects, is also seen as an attempt to form a genuine national 
identity; not only as a strategy to save the empire, but to turn its subjects into respected 
citizens. The research focus of Michelle Campos’s Ottoman Brothers has been whether 
the Ottoman identity, as a nation-state identity, even for a temporary period, could be 
established and embraced. Informed by Ernest Renan’s famous pioneering conclusion 
that nation is a group of people who agreed to live together, this is a valid question to be 
posed. 
In Birds without Wings, despite the celebration of shared traditions and habits across 
religions through the accounts and the stories of the main characters of Eskibahçe, this 
optimistic view on Ottoman nationalism and the formulation of Ottoman citizenship is 
at times challenged. The lack of a united Ottoman nation is also observed through de 
Bernières’s account of Mustafa Kemal’s biography. In the novel, ‘[t]he handsome 
Enver’ is reported to have ‘proclaim’ed from a hotel balcony ‘the new policy of 
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Ottomanism’, declaring ‘no more special privileges for particular ethnic and religious 
groups’ and ‘all obligations and rights are the same for everybody’.177 However, instead 
of fully celebrating such developments, the Revolution and the new government are 
criticised by the narrator from the perspective of Mustafa Kemal, who finds Enver 
Pasha ‘vain and punctilious’ and the ‘the hocus-pocus’ of the new Committee of Union 
and Progress (CUP) ‘very tedious’.178 The narrator also calls the revolution ‘a half-
baked affair’ as it is viewed to have ‘no real plan and no real ideology beyond the 
intention to restore the empire to its previous strength’.179 The narrator further 
demonstrates his reasons for why all the achievements of the CUP would come undone: 
The revolutionaries do not comprehend the power and seduction of the new 
nationalisms. The Christians are not necessarily pleased at having earned the right 
to do compulsory military service and become free Ottoman citizens, and very soon 
the Young Turks find that they have accelerated the disintegration of the empire 
instead of arresting it. Bulgaria declares independence. Crete declares union with 
Greece. Austria illegally and opportunistically annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
thereby setting in train the dismal events that will distort the entire course of 
European history for more than a hundred years.180 
The excerpt above taken from de Bernières’s novel evinces the narrator’s conviction 
that nationalism is an overriding and corrosive power, and after nation-building starts, it 
arrives at the expense of other peoples and nations.  
The destructive process of national ‘awakening’, which was what Ozkirimli and Sofos 
call a ‘belated but nonetheless inevitable’ development in the Ottoman Empire, ran in 
parallel to the processes of modernisation and democratisation that were officially 
initiated with the reform edicts and the 1908 Revolution, and presented additional 
challenges to Ottoman national consolidation.181 As the Young Turk movement tried to 
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prevent the culmination of the demise of the Empire by reinforcing and consolidating 
the centralisation efforts that were already in place in the nineteenth century, it created 
divides among the population it sought to bring together. As Benjamin Fortna suggests, 
such efforts were directed towards ‘remov[ing] what has been referred to as “empire of 
difference”’, organisation of the state in a way that offers legitimate rule over diverse 
populations and replacing it ‘with a linguistically, politically and in many cases 
ethnically homogeneous bureaucratic structure that would cement loyalty to the empire 
qua nation state led by a core group who were animated by Muslim (and later Turkish) 
nationalism’.182 The chosen path of Turkish Muslim nationalism not only tightened the 
physical boundaries of the Empire and alienated Muslim groups within the Empire such 
as the Albanians and the Arabs, but also accentuated complications ‘in eliminating 
distinctions made on religious, ethnic or linguistic grounds during what would later be 
seen as this period of imperial to national transition’.183  
Among contemporary theories that set out to interpret the phenomenon of nationalism, 
ethnosymbolism stands out because of the groundwork Anthony Smith provides for the 
definition of nationalism through his rendition of nucleus formations and affinities of 
nations called ethnies – ‘a named community of shared origin myths, memories and one 
or more element(s) of common culture, including an association with a specific 
territory’.184 Anthony Smith sees ethnie as the bedrock of a nation, which he defines, 
similarly to ethnie, as ‘a named community possessing an historic territory, shared 
myths and memories, a common public culture and [exclusive to the definition of 
nation] common laws and customs’.185 While Smith celebrates ethnies, nations and 
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nationalism, Louis de Bernières’s chapters on the biography of Mustafa Kemal portray a 
sceptical, and even a hostile, image of the true essence of nationalism:  
The child is born into a world where the seeds of Nazism have been long sewn, and 
are waiting only for the dark rain. Stirred up by Austria–Hungary and by Russia, 
the various peoples of the Balkans and the Near East are abrogating their long 
coexistence and codependence. Their hotheads and ideologues are propounding 
doctrines of separateness and superiority. The slogans are ‘Serbia for the Serbs, 
Bulgaria for the Bulgarians, Greece for the Greeks, Turks and Jews out!’ There has 
been interbreeding for centuries, but no one stops to ask what exactly a Serb or a 
Macedonian or a Bulgarian or a Greek actually is. It is enough that there are 
sufficient opportunists calling themselves freedom fighters and liberators, who will 
exploit these ideas in order to become bandits and local heroes in the war of all 
against all. Mustafa is born into a world where law and order are fast collapsing, 
where looting has become more profitable than working, where the arts of peace are 
becoming more and more unpracticable, and personal tolerance makes less and less 
difference.186  
The political climate in the above paragraph hints at the cataclysmic nature of 
nationalism, which is nurtured by the perennialist rhetoric. As the Serbian, Macedonian, 
Bulgarian or Greek identities are consolidated, freedoms are won by pursuing 
nationalist movements, and the empire is also stripped of its identity as the ‘empire of 
difference’.187  
The critique of ethnosymbolism adheres to the idea that ethnies are social constructs, 
and similar to nations, they are invented or conceived by ‘cultural practices established 
over time’ by politicians or other actors involved in nation-building practices.188 
According to Özkırımlı and Sofos, the problem with ethnosymbolism is that it promotes 
‘retrospective ethnicization’ by ‘ethniciz[ing] the past, a past that is much more 
complex, contradictory and ambiguous than we are led to believe’.189 They believe that 
the nationalists make use of the past through such expedients to the benefit of ‘their 
struggle to define the nation’ in order to make nationalist notions ‘intelligible to the 
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reader’ or ‘to the consumer of the ethnosymbolist discourse’.190 Furthermore, they also 
maintain that, ‘[n]ames such as “Hellenes” or “Turks” may exist for many centuries, but 
their meanings and the social realities behind them undergo rapid and sometimes quite 
radical transformations in time’.191  
The political desire to reaffirm the national character unavoidably leads to a 
retrospective search for certain identifications and attachments. This was common in the 
case of the French patriots who ‘harked back to Roman virtue and glory, as well as their 
“Gallic ancestors”’.192 Likewise, in their attempt to escape the claims of backwardness 
of their contemporary national identities, the Greeks were using models from Europe 
that looked back in time to their ancient history. When the Ottoman Empire failed to 
establish an Ottoman nation, the Turks followed the example of the Greeks and sought 
to have a direct lineage. The reasons for this were in direct relation to these nations’ 
image of themselves in the eyes of the world, especially the Western world. In the 
words of Özkırımlı and Sofos, ‘both Greek and Turkish nationalisms developed an 
ambivalent relationship with the past, as it constituted a resource […] for instilling 
national pride and establishing beyond doubt the diachronic existence of the nation, 
making it an acceptable me ber of the civilized world’.193 Anthony Smith maintains 
that in order to create emotional bondage and achieve a national unity, history has to be 
utilised: 
‘History’ becomes the focal point of nationalism and nation-formation. The 
‘rediscovery’ or ‘invention’ of history is no longer a scholarly pastime; it is a matter 
of national honour and collective endeavour. Through the tracing of our history, 
‘we’ discover (or ‘rediscover’) who we are, whence we came, when we emerged, 
who our ancestors were, when we were great and glorious, who our heroes are, why 
we declined [ … ] But the rediscovery of the ‘national self’ is not an academic 
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matter; it is a pressing practical issue, vexed and contentious, which spells life or 
death for the nationalist project of creating a nation.194  
As scholars of modern nationalism agree, ‘[n]ationalist projects always look back in 
time, seeking to demonstrate the “linear time of the nation”, its undisputed diachronic 
presence’.195 Anthony Smith investigates such linearity and asks whether there’s ‘a 
measure of continuity between medieval (or ancient) ethnic or regnal formations and 
modern nations in at least some cases’, and finds his answer in the formulation of 
‘longue duree’ of nations.196  
For ethnosymbolists like Anthony Smith, nationalism is explained through ‘the 
“recurrence of nations” throughout history’.197 In this approach, recurrence is ascribed a 
special purpose through the entity of ethnies since Smith sees ethnies as being subject to 
‘conflicts’ and ‘discontinuities’, rather than to evolutionary processes of ‘ascending [...] 
inclusiveness of the resident designated populations’.198 Since the longevity of nations 
and empires can be explained from this vantage point, the essence of the Ottoman 
Empire, which would merely depend on the evolutionary variation of land and peoples, 
would therefore act as a ‘prison of nations’.199 The continuity thesis of nationalism does 
not conform to inclusive population policies and oftentimes finds its footing in the gaps 
within the life cycle of states. The focus of ethnosymbolism is therefore directed at ‘the 
relationship between modern nations and premodern ethnies’ which is linked by the 
‘recurring nature of ethno-symbolic ties’.200 These national bonds are embedded in the 
(antecedent) ethnic symbols, memories, myths and values and the (sacred) traditions 
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that are acquired from earlier ages and peoples.201 According to Smith, one needs to 
look at these links in terms of la longue durée: ‘a time span which covers many 
centuries’ with ‘older layers [...] are not wholly erased’ and are tangible in the 
contemporary society.202 In this approach, ‘the history of large collective cultural 
identities’ is viewed as one belonging to a nation which ‘continually form[s] and 
dissolve[s] over different periods and continents’.203  
For this formulation of continuity to work, such national formations over a longue 
durée based on the assumption that nations rest on certain core units called ethnies 
unavoidably begets amnesia regarding certain historical periods that these ethnies may 
have undergone. The idea of ‘discontinuities’ that interrupt an otherwise seamless 
stream of ethnies requires such nationalist histories to disregard the very existence of 
certain historical periods, and by doing so, reject many of the characteristic changes 
these periods may have brought to the so-called ethnies. De Bernières explores this 
point by focusing on the character Leonidas, who disregards Ottomanism, considers the 
Ottomans as oppressors, and ignores any positive qualities worth considering, despite 
the fact that the Empire had for many years succeeded in maintaining the cultural 
heritage of various civilisations and traditions that it accommodated. Leonidas’s 
rejection of the Ottoman identity as part of his own character is seen as a matter of 
wholesale denial of Ottoman history as playing a big part of the nationalist Greek 
history. Leonidas’s approach not only illustrates the nationalist thesis of longue durée, 
but also shows how it disregards specific phases of history and the dynamic nature of 
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national character, embracing only certain facts and episodes and eliminating others in 
line with the nationalist discourse in question.  
In Birds without Wings, Leonidas’s self-identification with an extraneous motherland can 
be identified as a typical example of elitist nation-building based on the notion of a 
national homeland. In this type of national engagement, the commitment shown for the 
non-core groups by the co-ethnics abroad and their corresponding demands, in turn, are 
‘targeted with exclusionary policies by the state whose sovereignty they challenge’, 
which results in radicalising those who already feel excluded.204 A counter-argument to 
this approach, which reveals the ‘shortcomings’ of ‘the homeland argument’ supported 
by Leonidas, is exhibited by Leonidas’s father. He not only sets out to prove that he and 
his family are well-off and respected people within the Ottoman rule (‘Don’t tell me we 
are governed by Turks, when the evidence to the contrary is right in front of your eyes’), 
but also says that the historical figures Leonidas looks up to have many defects (‘How 
many weeping widows and raped virgins went and thanked [Alexander] for his culture, 
do you suppose?’).205 The emphasised ‘ethnic affinity between the external power and 
the non-core group’ is also deemed to be unreliable because of ‘the inability to account 
for the variation in the behavior of the “homeland” over time’.206 
The Greek past had been formulated to possess a predominance within the legacy of 
Renaissance classicism, but such a narrative presented an innate inconsistency and 
failed to meet the requirements of the project of national historiography, in which local 
elements proved to be difficult to incorporate into such a narrative. As Özkırımlı and 
Sofos declare, ‘the linear past of the nation was invariably disrupted’ not only by ‘the 
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often “unnational” conduct of the Church, the clergy and other elites that dominated the 
Rum millet of the Ottoman Empire’, but also by ‘the establishment of a Christian (not 
Hellenic) Byzantine empire’, a period known as ‘the “dark” centuries of the Middle 
Ages’.207 Because of these long and influential phases in history, ‘Korais and his 
disciples could not account for the severing of modern Greece’s link to classical 
antiquity’.208 Ozkirimli and Sofos describe the disappointment of the nation-builders of 
the early nineteenth century, given the social outlook at the time: 
And, despite the romantic faith of Greek nationalists and the European Philhellenes 
alike in the potential of the peasants and shepherds of the Ottoman Empire – 
identified as the heirs of Pericles, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle – to undergo an eye-
opening cultural regeneration experience, the situation on the ground remained 
disappointing for Korais and his like-minded nation-builders. Enthusiasm for the 
chosen privileged classical past was not forthcoming and probably not one of the 
priorities of a population that either had no sense of relationship to those who had 
produced a civilization in these lands almost two millennia ago – a civilization 
whose most tangible and material remnants were the ruins scattered throughout the 
Ottoman territories and, often unbeknown to their speakers, a host of vernaculars 
persevering elements of ancient Greek.209  
Following the suit of nation-builders like Korais, Leonidas, possessing romantic notions 
about the ancient Greece and, even the Byzantine Empire, and longing for the days 
everyone will speak Greek, tries to awaken nationalist feelings among townspeople. The 
narrator, on the other hand, gives the bitter taste of Greek actuality through the 
encounter of Leonidas with the townspeople. Leonidas is amazed by how much of the 
lives of the people of the town is dominated by superstitious beliefs as he ponders: 
‘these are the heirs of Alexander, and Constantine, and Socrates! And they’re no better 
than children!’210 The confusion created by giving a central place to distant past in 
nationalist imagination can also be traced in Captain Corelli’s Mandolin (1994). While 
Italian Captain Antonio Corelli is reflecting on his relationship with Pelagia, his Greek 
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lover, he utters some thoughts about the Roman Empire in a similar vein to how 
Leonidas talks of Byzantium: ‘She [Pelagia] has heard me talking of the new pax 
Romana, the reconstitution of the ancient sway that brought order and peace to all, the 
longest period of civilisation known to man, and she frowns’.211 Captain Corelli wants 
to apologise to Pelagia for the occupation of the island and says ‘it was not my idea, it 
was not me who stole Ionia’, but he is, regardless, overpowered by the nationalist idea 
of the pax Romana, however guiltless he may be of imperialist ambitions.212 I  de 
Bernières’s imagination, nationalism and irredentism can exist in every society and can 
assume many different forms.  
3.9. Enduring Pasts 
Among the factors used to establish the longstanding nature of nations, language is an 
important component to determine the longevity of ethnic groups. As opposed to 
perennial formulations, modern theories uphold the idea that even if languages in new 
nations are maintained, they unavoidably transform, so national languages have usually 
had to be fabricated. In other words, as Eric Hobsbawm suggests, ‘[n]ational languages 
are [...] almost always semi-artificial constructs’.213 According to Hobsbawm, 
constructing national languages not only involves the challenge of formulation of 
grammatical rules or deciding the range and scope of vocabulary in relation to the past 
and present of the language in question, but also entails choosing a dialect ‘as the base 
of the standardized and homogenized language’.214 In the case of Greece, while 
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Classical Greek was used officially, Attic became the chosen dialect that would have a 
national reach as the former was found to be impracticable.215  
Louis de Bernières also makes use of the confusion over the use of Greek language in 
his novel Captain Corelli’s Mandolin, in which Cephallonia is caught by the conflict 
brought by the Second World War, and it is occupied by Italian troops.216 As the British 
would like to understand and take control of the situation, they send an English agent to 
Cephallonia on a mission to provide intelligence on the island. The agent is apparently 
chosen for his good Greek language skills, with the exception that, when he arrives on 
the island, he is unable to communicate with the locals. When he introduces himself to 
the main characters in the novel, the locals, the doctor and his daughter Pelagia, fail to 
understand in which language the stranger speaks. Not recognising any of the most 
commonly spoken languages in his speech, they even consider other less likely 
possibilities, such as a mixture of Romaic, Turkish or Bulgarian, or Katharevousa, 
Adamantios Korais’s failed made-up language. After a great deal of confusion, 
appalled, they finally realise and decide that the stranger is trying to speak ancient 
Greek. This realisation startles Pelagia, who ‘step[s] back for fear of being in the 
company of a ghost’.217 For the English spy, however, ‘it had been an awful burden to 
be speaking the finest public-school Greek, and not be understood. He had been told 
that he was the nearest thing to a real Grecophone that could be found under the 
circumstances’.218 What de Bernières is accomplishing here is the exposition of a 
certain type of mythology via a humorous rehabilitation. As Hobsbawm explains, 
national languages ‘are the opposite of what nationalist mythology supposes them to be, 
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namely the primordial foundations of national culture and the matrices of the national 
mind’.219 National languages, including those recreated from ancient languages, such as 
modern Hebrew, are ‘almost always semi-artificial constructs and occasionally [...] 
virtually invented’.220  
In Birds without Wings, too, the admiration for the Greek language is criticised through 
the figure of Leonidas. When gendarmerie officers arrive in Eskibahce to transport the 
remainder of Rums to Greece during the population exchanges between Greece and the 
now newly established Republic of Turkey, Leonidas, an outcast in the town up till that 
point, comes to the realisation that he has to leave his homeland for the mainland 
Greece. He beseeches the group of Rum villagers to stay and fight for their ancestors’ 
land, yet he doesn’t receive any support because nobody in the crowd understands the 
purpose of his idealism.221 Not long after it leaves the town, the convoy welcomes Leyla 
Hanım, born in Ithaka, lives in disguise as Caucasian, and is finally primed to go to her 
homeland. When she speaks to the group in Greek, the priest and Leonidas try to 
interpret, but they don’t understand modern Greek, and their knowledge of ancient 
Greek won’t help them. Leyla Hanim finally remarks sardonically: ‘I am more Greek 
than any of you. I was born in Ithaca, and you are nothing but a pack of mongrel 
Turks’.222 This is a disconcerting sentence which makes one question what being Greek 
or Turk actually means. It shows that by inciting hatred between Greeks and Muslims, 
Leonidas and the irredentists actually experience the harsh consequences of their own 
demands. Through Leonidas’s and the town’s priest’s lack of Greek language skills, de 
Bernières not only shows the fact that the Ottoman Greeks are no longer like the Greeks 
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on the other side of the Aegean Sea, but they are not like the ancient Greeks either. Not 
only Leonidas’s inability to speak modern Greek properly shows this inadequacy, but 
also the fact that the Greeks’ inability in Captain Corelli to speak ancient Greek shows 
the rift between ancient and modern Greeks. By the end of Birds without Wings, having 
a particular national identity, in this case Greekness or Turkishness, becomes a 
disputable issue.  
The modern discourse of nationalism holds that enduring past traditions, memories and 
symbols are given political significance by nationalist politicians and intellectuals for 
nationalist projects. Such an arrangement also receives support from social and 
economic groups that benefit from such developments. For Hobsbawm, from a 
nationalist perspective, this construction process requires that the ‘nation’ is recognized 
‘prospectively’ by allowing the creation of nations based on a nationalist programme 
that ‘exists prior to the formation of the nation’.223 In the modern view of nationalism, it 
is maintained that ‘nationalism selects, reconfigures and sometimes recreates older 
traditions and identities in accordance with present concerns’.224 Such modern theories 
of nation are suggested in opposition to primordialist views that find ‘nations as 
objective, durable phenomena, the origins of which typically can be traced back to 
remote antiquity’.225 Their socially constructed character is the common denominator of 
modern currents of theories of nationalism. The advocates of the modern interpretation 
of nationalism uphold that ‘human actors’ are not only capable of nationalist thought, 
but they also have the ‘compulsion to turn even non-purposeful action into purposive 
action, that is, to reflect on and rationalize it’. In this way, nationalist actions are given 
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purpose, ‘a meaning and a direction within particular (and purposeful) hegemonic 
projects’.226 
It is common in the studies of modern nationalism to address the narratives of the past 
which are refashioned by the views and interests of nation builders. Anthony Smith 
takes a different approach from the modernists by assigning authority to certain cultural 
imprints and symbols and claims that the only way to ‘understand the power exerted by 
such pasts’ is to make ‘an analysis of collective cultural identities over la longue 
durée’.227 However, in this way of thinking, claim Özkırımlı and Sofos, when societies 
are seen as ‘collective cultural identities over la longue durée’ and, similarly, when 
‘ethnic pasts’ are allowed to ‘help to shape present concerns’, it becomes difficult to 
avoid presentism.228 In modern theories of nationalism, as Hobsbawm says, ‘the real 
"nation" can only be recognized a posteriori’, which means that nation cannot be before 
nation.229 In other words, in this way of thinking, it is accepted that in order to create 
some sense of continuity of a nation, there arises a need to omit or merge some 
histories, facts and findings. The ethnosymbolic approach, on the other hand, makes it 
possible to claim that a Greek nation ‘exist[ed] in the later Byzantine Empire, as well as 
in the subsequent Orthodox millet which was led by Greeks and a Greek-speaking 
clergy’.230 Such selectiveness of the past narratives and archives prohibits an Ottoman 
identity from being a part of this linearity; it is seen as disruptive, as having no 
consequence for Greek identity. The controversy between modernists, such as Ernest 
Gellner and John Breuilly, and ethnosymbolists is, then, about ‘dating the emergence of 
the nation’ and the relationship of the nation ‘to pre-modern ethnic communities’.231 On 
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the other hand, as Malešević puts it, these two approaches also ‘clash over the question 
of whether – as ethno-symbolists argue – common values, ideas and beliefs or – as 
modernists claim – political and economic interests had the upper hand in shaping the 
direction and intensity of nationalism’, which offers the presentist opposition to the 
primordial structure.232  
3.10. Accidental Histories 
The focus of Birds without Wings, the transition from community to nation, 
demonstrates the deliberateness of the act of construction of nationhood. As such, 
Leonidas’s nationalism that idolizes the Byzantine Empire can be ascribed to Smith’s 
discourse of longue durée. Tessa Morris-Suzuki notes that ‘[i]nterpretations of the past 
become a central feature’ of the strategies that form nationalist movements; in her 
example, the Japanese national movement was developed as a result of financial and 
social insecurities and in ‘an effort to ward off the forces of global change by shoring up 
imperilled imagined communities’.233 Louis de Bernières’s comment on history below 
extends over time and civilisation to explain the recurrent habit of use and abuse of 
history as a way of empowerment: 
Where does it all begin? History has no beginnings, for everything that happens 
becomes the cause or pretext for what occurs afterwards, and this chain of cause 
and pretext stretches back to the palaeolithic age, when the first Cain of one tribe 
murdered the first Abel of another. All war is fratricide, and there is therefore an 
infinite chain of blame that winds its circuitous route back and forth across the path 
and under the feet of every people and every nation, so that a people who are the 
victims of one time become the victimisers a generation later, and newly liberated 
nations resort immediately to the means of their former oppressors. The triple 
contagions of nationalism, utopianism and religious absolutism effervesce together 
into an acid that corrodes the moral metal of a race, and it shamelessly and even 
proudly performs deeds that it would deem vile if they were done by any other.234 
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Here, de Bernières draws attention to the timeworn habit of making poor judgements 
regarding one’s capacity to influence the course of history in a way that benefits the 
individual in question. The narrator’s criticism targets those who are called the ‘motor 
of history’, those who are uncompromising about their aspirations and ambitions, and 
those who do not learn from previous experiences, thus allowing unfavourable past 
incidents to repeat themselves.235 As Eric Hobsbawm puts it, ‘History is the raw 
material of nationalistic or ethnic or fundamentalist ideologies, as poppies are the raw 
material for heroin addiction’.236 
The narrator’s criticism in Birds without Wings is not merely about the radical 
application of belief systems, but also, in its core, about rationalism grounded in the 
Enlightenment. In de Bernières’s novel, this essentialism that lacks universalism is 
embedded in what is seen as the hypocrisy of the so-called idealists and moralists. 
Historical change is not attributed a noble character, and is deemed vile if it is imposed 
without any checks and balances. Therefore, change, for the most part, is seen by the 
narrator more as circumstantial and coincidental than noble. In this sense, the narrator’s 
stance can be viewed in juxtaposition with the hypothesis of Hegel, who believed in the 
circumstantial, inconclusive and dialectical nature of change.237  
For Hegel, such a change, driven by imperfect agencies who remained so even after the 
French Revolution because they possessed the knowledge of freedom in the abstract238, 
allowed for the next stage of change to happen until perfection is achieved. The 
traversing of a path to the next stage that culminates in the perfect state is not a valid 
notion in the novel, which sees history more in cyclical than in linear terms. Like 
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Giambatti Vico, the narrator establishes a pattern of human nature, which comes about 
as a result of human frailty as Hegel would put it, but at the same time, unlike the 
defenders of the Enlightenment teleology based on the idea of progress,239 the narrator 
leaves much to chance and decay. Therefore, the way the narrator in Birds without 
Wings sees historical process is neither linear nor incisively and uncontrollably random. 
He understands the motivations of people for progress, but as in Hegel’s dialectic, he 
sees imperfections in their plans, which, in the narrator’s world view, are not necessarily 
achieved. So even if Leonidas is considered to act as a ‘motor of history’, his aspirations 
are seen by the narrator as flawed.240 Historical change, for the narrator, does not 
necessarily happen in a progressive, successional and linear way, but instead, it happens 
both consciously and randomly, with contingencies and setbacks. Even if the flawed 
nature of such idealisms can be recognised, ultimately it is mankind that is flawed, 
according to the narrator, and regardless of the number of years that have passed since 
the French Revolution, such flaws will surface at every turn of history, perfecting 
nothing and freeing no one. In the final analysis, in the novel there is no ‘enlightened 
bureaucracy’ defending the higher values of humanity and perfecting the conditions of 
life as there is no end to history.241 
The way history is construed is to a great extent determined by the way the role of 
causality in the long term is perceived. When employing history in the service of 
politics or in other social disciplines, the precedence given to causality determines the 
narrative, establishing, in the meantime, an ethical standpoint. It therefore becomes 
possible to contemplate whether an over-analysis or use of history allows its 
exploitation and abuse in contemporary politics or whether a deficient reading of events 
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more often causes the corruption of history. According to this line of thought, when 
precedence is given an inordinate weight, interpretation of history becomes as salient as 
actively making history. Such debates about assigning history as the highest judge in 
making claims about the future find ample space in Louis de Bernières’s novels. 
Eskibahce presents an example for the maxim of Arnold Toynbee, who is famous for 
his determination to reject chaos and look for meaning in history, that ‘[t]he contact of 
civilisations has always been, and will always continue to be, a ruling factor in human 
progress and failure’.242 Eskibahce, or land in general, acts as a conduit for nationalists’, 
and in this case Leonidas’s, ambitions, acting as a site of convergence for history, rather 
than a meeting point of history. Eskibahce acts as an affirmation of the idea that 
becoming a community depends on the history of the land itself. The contact zone, for 
actors such as Leonidas, also encompasses an area of hostility, where relations are seen 
from the point of view of ‘asymmetrical relations of power’ – relations of ‘domination 
and subordination’.243 In the novel, not only is history viewed from a contemporary 
perspective, but also the contribution of history to the making of history and its 
representation in writing are studied in a critical, even antithetical manner: History can 
be a source of benevolent and respectful relations in a community, or rather, it can 
constrain the push for violent strife. 
De Bernières provides an alternative to the idealist stance that is informed by the 
perspectives of linear history. By doing so, the author also looks for answers to some of 
the questions of what or who makes and constitutes history. The chapter called ‘Fritz 
and Moritz Accidentally Change History’ forms a case in point, in which de Bernières 
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discusses the idea that history actually does not happen unequivocally (with precision) 
in view of the results of certain actions.244 In this chapter, on a nice day, King 
Alexander of the Kingdom of Greece goes out for a walk taking his dog, Fritz, with 
him. According to the narrator, the King, who is passionate about cars, decides to visit 
the palace vet at his house to see if the vet has any new foreign magazines about cars. 
The narrative, in the manner of story-telling rather than a historical account, continues 
in the present tense: ‘Suddenly King Alexander hears barking and screaming. He breaks 
into a run, and finds his dog in a frenzy, attempting to devour a Barbary ape that is tied 
to a chain near the house of the vet’. At this point, the narrator ponders the impossibility 
of having a certain knowledge of what actually happened at the time, leaving gaps in the 
real causes of certain incidents in history. He narrates one account, according to which 
the apes were given to the vet by a tavern owner, who had received them from Prince 
Christopher, the crown prince. Another account explains how Prince Christopher 
elucidates the facts by giving his own account, according to which, ‘the apes belonged 
to a vineyard keeper whose vineyard the King happened to be passing’. The narrator, 
then, after mentioning how this subjectivity causes ‘the impossibility of historical 
accuracy’, makes further sardonic remarks as to the extent of knowledge we actually 
may or may not have:  
one can only be certain that the grapes of the vineyard, if it was really a vineyard, 
and if it was really there, and if the King was really passing it, would have been 
producing grapes for Dekeleia wine, since in that area no other kind of grape was 
grown.245 
In all its finality, the course of the history changes when: 
Fritz bit Moritz and Moritz bit the King and the King died, and so there is a new 
king, who happens to be a previously deposed one who is detested vehemently by 
all the Allies. The loss of Allied support means the loss of the war. 
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Moritz, the Barbary ape, and Fritz, the German shepherd dog, will have 
successfully altered the entire course of Greek and Turkish history, but they 
themselves will retire modestly into oblivion and obscurity, they will leave neither 
simian nor canine memoirs explaining their side of the story. No one will know 
what happened to either of them in the end, or what would have happened if Moritz 
had not bitten the King.246  
While Leonidas clings to a totalitarian way of interpreting history, a way of interpreting 
history that takes certain instances as teleologic facts, de Bernières’s novel emphasises 
historical contingency. When establishing a historical narrative, gaps are filled by the 
writer, who uses verbs, situations, positions and even adjectives to describe feelings, 
attitudes, ideas, and events without having actually witnessed or listened to or read the 
eye-witness accounts, well aware that perceptions can be deceiving. The narrator’s 
story-like descriptions of how the King spent his morning, followed by such comments 
as seen above, which stress uncertainty in history, show the possibility of the myriad of 
ways that events may have actually occurred. Imperfections or the potential failure of 
explanations based on causality cause the writer to query contingencies. Such moments 
of bifurcation that arise from lack of knowledge, at the same time, offer a mirror for 
uncertainty that tends to be disregarded in teleological explanations.  
In a similar vein, in the postscript of his novel where he gives a glimpse of the town that 
hosted the fictional town Eskibahçe, de Bernières attempts to determine where the name 
Fethiye originates from. For this purpose, he gives different accounts of the story of the 
contemporary name of this town, reaching in the end the conclusion that history is 
impossible.247 The postscript gives depictions of Fethiye in the twenty-first century, 
teemed with people at the marketplace, local people, Western tourists, and Turks who 
have lived abroad, a mixture of modernity and tradition in a vivid recreation of lived 
experience. Despite this rich texture and social mixture de Bernières ends with a 
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significant absence: that of the Greeks who had formerly inhabited these shores. The 
question of minorities and the end of Ottoman multiculturalism still reverberates. 
In his writing, Louis de Bernières views civilisation from a conciliatory lens, and 
presents instances of both disruptions and complications created through past events in 
an effort to communicate a sense of harmony across numerous communities that came 
to exist throughout history. As such, by repeatedly overlaying his descriptions of the 
Lycian tombs and the ruins of the Roman theatre with the accounts of relatively more 
recent constructions in the town such as the Muslim graveyard or a fountain erected by 
a Rum philanthropist just before the First World War broke out, de Bernières is able to 
create a powerful sense of continuity, harmony and balance between the past and 
present inhabitants. Recurrent mention of the Lycian tombs and the artefacts of ancient 
Greece serves as an affirmation of the existence of the Greek heritage and gives a notion 
of intricate continuity between past and present, but at the same time acts as a reminder 
of the transient nature of civilizations. By debating the methods of historiography and 
the construction of nationalism, de Bernières criticises the abuses of history, and urges 
us to consider it as what it is – as history to learn from. He makes use of the town, to 
prove the civilisation at work, with its faults, but also with its strengths. As a 
representative of civilisation(s), de Bernières urges us to look for what Leyla Hanim 
recognises in Eskibahce: a sense of community and a host of diversity and harmony that 






The conclusions we draw from engaging with history are not only shaped by the events 
that take place in history, but also by the actors involved in the production of the 
narrative, by the instruments with which the actors create narratives, and by the 
consumers, whose perceptions depend on their own predispositions about their past, 
present and expectations for the future. The narratives of the last century of the Ottoman 
Empire, both fictional and scholarly, have generally undertaken the mission of 
understanding or explaining the causes of the decline of the empire through the 
exposition of specific symptoms such as the corruption of the Janissaries or Sultan 
Abdülhamid’s spies with a view to understanding or shaping the present post-Ottoman 
state. The narratives of so-called Ottoman decline have changed, evolved and varied in 
a number of ways as new data or political or scientific perspectives have emerged. One 
of the components of such changes is the shift in the focus of historiography in that 
historians, and historical novelists, have increasingly sought to understand social 
circumstances, beyond or independent of official histories based on imperial archives, 
by, for example, focusing on local conditions and histories from below. Another change 
has appeared as a result of the shift in the ways historians and the authors of historical 
novels reorganise the data and present it. The persistence of authoritative singularity or 
officialdom in the voice of academic historians began to lessen in the 1980s, as new 
nexuses of communication appeared, inspiring new narrational styles and assertions. As 
a result, another change has occurred in the world of readers and their ‘own position in 
the present’, as Tessa Morris-Suzuki puts it; ‘[s]uch a chain of relationships […] creates 
diversity: a multitude of differing accounts and images of the past.’1 These changing 
                                                          




notions of historiography have increasingly focused on social, in addition to 
institutional, approaches to history, and they have allowed the historical novel to 
develop its reach. As a result, today, we are obliged to speak of, in Olivier Bouquet’s 
coinage, homo-Ottomanicus, that is to say, the Ottoman person with his/her 
complications as a human being, defined outside politicised dichotomies.2 
In this thesis, I have aimed to structure an argument which focuses on the diversity of 
narratives in their description of what being an Ottoman meant in the last century of the 
Ottoman Empire. I have viewed a number of novels by Western writers as part of an 
ongoing attempt to understand, and to some extent contest, the ‘decline’ paradigm of the 
Ottoman Empire primarily within the context of its multicultural structure. This places 
this current thesis within an intriguing field of study since multiculturalism began to act 
as a double-edged sword within the Empire in the nineteenth century as a result of the 
changing dynamics of power relations around the world. As Deringil puts it: 
As the monarchies of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire included, came to 
find themselves increasingly hard pressed to legitimate their existence towards both 
their own subjects and the outside world, they felt ‘the need to provide a new, or at 
least a supplementary, ‘national’ foundation for this institution.’3 
This challenge was taken up by contemporaries when they provided a common 
nationalist basis for the Ottoman identity - Ottomanism. The Tanzimat reforms have 
been regarded by Ottoman historians as the point of emergence of this thought, even 
though ethnic nationalism, Islamism and Turanism also sprang up as alternative 
ideologies towards the end of the nineteenth century.  
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Today, the challenge to define the Ottoman man (or woman) has its own challenges. 
The tools the authors choose in their identification of points of contention, as I 
suggested in the Introduction, are, to a large extent, dependent on the novels’ pl ts 
being formulated in a teleological manner. Therefore, the strengths or weaknesses of an 
Ottoman character, through which the three authors studied here choose to represent a 
particular group or convey a particular message, become part of an aspect of the 
Ottoman identity that they would like to reassert or challenge. This diversity proves the 
impossibility of reaching a consensus on the definition and description of ideologies, 
religious affiliations, events, specifications of locations, in short, any one particular 
discourse related to Ottoman decline. This possibility of the multiplicity of 
contemporary representations of both historical change and the Ottoman identity in the 
last century of the empire is an important reason that Ottoman studies has attracted a 
host of attention with many participants eager to contribute their own representations 
and defend their own positions. The descriptions of the last century of the Ottomans 
tend to depend very much on the identified challenges the Ottomans encountered. 
Likewise, the period of choice very much depends on the story the authors would like to 
tell and the issues they wish to explore in the Ottoman historiography.  
In many ways, both Yashim’s and Kamil Pasha’s sleuthing, following up of leads and 
clues, and their investigation into the motives of criminals, are in large part carried out 
to redeem a central position for the detectives, whose characters are sketched as likeable 
– and even ideal – Ottoman figures. Crimes in these criminal fictions, murders or thefts 
alike, are not only unethical, but also unnational, stemming from the fact that the 
perpetrators are either not able to keep up with the changes in laws or in contempt with 




existence. Worthington argues that such crimes comprise evidence for social change and 
as such it is possible to read social changes through an investigation of crimes:  
[c]rime, criminals and criminality, then, are evidence of deviance from the cultural 
and social norm; as such, they offer a useful way into reading the changes in 
cultures and societies over time. But what such study demonstrates is that crime is 
temporally and culturally conditional; consequently, the definition of what 
constitutes crime is constantly shifting.4  
Crime fiction novels based on the nineteenth-century Ottoman history demonstrates 
precisely such ‘push and pull of larger social, political, and economic forces’ and tell 
the story of a struggling but aspiring empire.5 
In his unique interpretation of the impact of the Napoleonic scare on the Ottomans, in 
his first historical novel, The Janissary Tree, Goodwin creates an Ottoman version of 
the ‘counter-revolutionary response to the French Revolution’ based on Ottoman 
nationalism and loyalty to the Sultan.6 Jason Goodwin, by making use of the traditional 
device of oppositional forces of tradition and modernity, as well as the well-known 
historical character Napoleon Bonaparte, secures in his The Janissary Tree the 
traditional structure of the historical novel form in the long tradition of novels which 
have Napoleon’s expansionism as part of their plot, including War and Peace and The 
Count of Monte Cristo. The historical novel has come to be seen since George Lukacs’s 
The Historical Novel as ‘a product of romantic nationalism’, which, as Perry Anderson 
explains, emerged as ‘the European reaction against Napoleonic expansion’.7 In 
addition to the ‘popular roots’ of this reaction, Anderson holds that nationalism was 
‘also driven by the need of the continent’s different ancien regimes to mobilise local 
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enthusiasm for the defence of crown and altar’.8 The author of The Janissary Tree 
seems critical of the possibility of an Ottoman submission to the expansion of French 
influence, mainly referred to as ‘modernisation’; therefore, he portrays the possibility of 
a total modernisation from an unfavourable light, since it can endanger the integrity of 
the Ottoman monarchic system. Goodwin’s reservations regarding the need for reforms 
can be traced through Yashim’s defence of the Sultan as opposed to the Seraskier’s 
republican coup, as well as the tragic descriptions of the end of the traditional institution 
of the Janissaries and the head eunuch’s absorption in the symbolic power he takes from 
Napoleonic jewellery in his helpless attempt to protect the traditional institutions of the 
empire. Such a plot and character construction suggest the author’s conviction that a 
backlash would be bound to hap**pen, should the reforms take place expeditiously, 
since those reforms would unequivocally exclude certain elements of the society from 
social protection. 
As contrasted with the people Yashim surrounds himself with, who represent a world 
that has ended or is about to end, including the ambassador of a defunct empire and a 
valide sultan who had become a slave before becoming the mother of an Ottoman 
sultan, Kamil Pasha, having received some legal education at Cambridge, in contrast, is 
absorbed in a Europeanised modern elite world. As opposed to Yashim’s escapism from 
the ineluctable changes taking place in the empire as a result of the increased interaction 
with the Western countries, fifty years later, Kamil Pasha is presented at peace in his 
world of modern elites as a prosecutor in Pera, the European neighbourhood of Istanbul. 
Within this context, Goodwin and White, in their crime fiction series, re-enact two 
different settings of the bureaucratic world and daily life, half a century apart. The 
transformation of the Empire into a working bureaucratic machine with notable pashas 
                                                          




and working police force, who are also in contact with their counterparts abroad, 
embodies the backbone of the historical change between the two models of the empire, 
which has major significance for how White’s crime fiction is constructed. The 
operation of Ottoman law enforcement is particularly embodied through the differences 
between eunuch and magistrate protagonists, carrying archaic and modern markers of 
the same profession, respectively. The authors even demarcate such difference with the 
distinguishing zests of their detectives, similar to Sherlock Holmes’s eccentric and 
deranged opium addiction. Goodwin’s detective protagonist Yashim enjoys spending 
his free time cooking, a Romantic and bourgeois pastime, which gives the character a 
hint of exoticism, distinguished by the sensory characteristics of the taste and flavour of 
Ottoman cuisine. White’s Kamil Pasha, on the other hand, is engrossed in his private 
garden of orchids, his correspondence with orchid collectors around the world about the 
names of the species demonstrating his commitment to scientific method. 
This difference comes to the reader’s attention particularly because of the writers’ 
choice of genre. The nature of the crimes in the crime fiction discloses the daily 
struggles of the people in relation to the criminality in the society; therefore, crime 
fiction has been a powerful genre in the description of the nineteenth-century Ottoman 
Empire because of its ‘strong socio-political content’, which can effectively be used ‘as 
a weapon to criticize social, political, and gender inequalities’.9 Unlike many other 
types of character in fiction, in crime fiction, the detective has to tackle crimes and 
pursue criminals, giving hints to the reader about the extent of the degeneration in the 
society and about the difficulties ahead as the end of the empire is approaching. By 
looking beyond the question of ‘who is guilty?’, the novels examined in this thesis 
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attempt to answer the question of ‘what is to blame: what has caused this problem called 
“crime” in the first place?’ and also to identify issues related to both the Ottoman and 
international systems of justice.10 In other words, as Ed Christian puts it, by ‘mov[ing] 
from the interrogation of suspects to the interrogation of society, where crime stems 
from flaws in the political, social, and [legal] systems’, crime fiction has been 
functional in highlighting historical changes during the last century of the Ottoman 
Empire with a view to making asocial and historical analysis of the struggles of the 
Ottomans.11 
As to the choice of genre in the service of distinguishing historical conditions and 
change, Jon Thompson suggests that ‘[t]he capacity of crime fiction to evaluate 
different historical moments in the experience of modernity is not an accidental feature; 
rather, it is a dominant convention of the genre’.12 The period in which Goodwin has 
chosen to set his fiction saw the discussions about the initiation of increased ‘qualitative 
changes’ with the declaration of the Tanzimat (1839-76), which has been thought of as 
initiating Ottomanist ideology by assuring the implementation of ‘the legal equality of 
Muslim and non-Muslim, the rule of law, the state’s guarantee to safeguard the lives, 
property and honour of its subjects’.13 Selim Deringil distinguishes the Ottomanism of 
the Tanzimat period from that of the late nineteenth century by calling the former 
‘ostensibly supra-religious’ while he argues that the latter was the product of ‘a sort of 
“Imperial supranationalism”’.14 The major difference between the two periods is the 
emphasis placed on the role of Islam in the latter, while early reformers had intended to 
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smooth over such religious demarcations, a topic Jason Goodwin avoids even touching 
upon. I have criticised this avoidance as a limiting aspect of Goodwin’s fiction in terms 
of the way it oversimplifies the discussions of modernity and tradition, reducing them to 
their superficial and mostly material properties such as the transformation in outfits. 
This simplification leads to the author’s ignoring the legal implications of the millet 
system, which facilitates and reinforces the demands for equality and eventually 
European nationalism in the nineteenth century.  
In other words, the Tanzimat was an attempt at reforming the state structure and 
bonding believers across the Empire by establishing uniform codes of law in a wide 
range of areas. Jason Goodwin’s rightful concern regarding the homogenising aspect of 
the edict and the challenges regional differences across the empire may pose (‘would it 
work as well in the highlands of Bulgaria as in the deserts of Tripolitana?’) does not 
extend to legal differentiation of rule among religious denominations codified through 
the separate legal practices of the millets.15 By placing the edict at the centre of crimes 
in The Janissary Tree, Goodwin actually challenges the efforts of the palace to 
implement structural reforms which involve radical material changes, but by doing so, 
the author precludes an informed discussion on the advantages of an Ottomanist 
ideology that would reposition Ottoman identity, from a religion-centred to a nation-
centred foundation. By pitting conflicting ideas against each other, the author defends 
the untenable status quo during such momentous changes as the Tanzimat despite the 
worldwide developments linked with revolutionary nationalism. This view shows the 
desire to perpetuate the Ottoman system of millet administration, completely ignoring 
the destruction created by the existence of several different legal practices in the empire 
based on religious demarcations, which allowed these groups to enjoy privileges that 
                                                          




Ottomanist nationalism could not or could no longer provide without undermining a 
newly egalitarian ideology. 
In Jenny White’s novels, by contrast, religious discontent among the populace appears 
manifestly. Kamil Pasha’s commitment to the Ottoman rule of law is an indication of 
the terminus of the millet system, which was based on the premise of religion and was 
increasingly replaced by a single definition of Ottoman citizenship for all through all-
encompassing regulations, although still under the leadership of Muslim elites. Anthony 
Smith explains that among theories of nationalism ‘[t]he modernist paradigm 
emphasizes the novel economic and political features of modernity, and the role played 
by nationalism, the ideology, in disseminating the culture of modernity, and thereby 
creating nations’.16 Questions of modernity and nation-belonging have been addressed 
in both the second and third chapters in connection with the failure of the builders of 
Ottoman nationhood to provide a sufficiently substantial corpus of shared sense of 
belonging which could have achieved loyalty to the Sultan. Afterall, as Selim Deringil 
notes, towards the end of the nineteenth century, the efforts of the Sultan to maintain the 
loyalty of his people fell short as ‘[t]he Ottoman rulers faced the challenge of 
nationalism, not only from their Christian subjects and ex-subjects in the Balkans, but 
also from their own Islamic peoples’.17 In the literature on the nineteenth- and early-
twentieth-century Ottoman Empire, the relationship between modernity and nationhood 
has been an unavoidable part of the discourse that explains the road that leads to the 
collapse of the empire, and the works I have chosen to analyse in this thesis do not 
escape this tendency.  
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In this thesis, the strengths and weaknesses of both the millet system and Ottoman 
nationalism have been investigated in the light of the imaginative interventions by 
Goodwin, White and de Bernières of both of these systems. Particularly Jenny White’s 
and Louis de Bernières’s novels contain diverse views on conflicting nationalisms of 
the nineteenth century. In The Abyssinian Proof, Jenny White participates in the 
exploration of an interfaith dialogue through an emphasis on common values of the 
three Abrahamic religions, such as the Proof and syncretism. On the other hand, the 
author has also offered a criticism of the idea of the sustainability of an interfaith 
dialogue through the disappearance of the Proof, for the objects of power are open to 
abuses of power-seeking people and entities. My own criticism of the interfaith 
dialogue, in White’s fiction and in historical accounts, has also revealed the 
shortcoming of Ottomanism under the rule of a Muslim Sultan – or any other ruler with 
a strong religious affiliation, without any other measures or checks and balances on 
such power through, for example, institutionalised representation of communities. Jenny 
White’s contribution to the idea of Ottomanism, essentially, lies in her act of reminding 
her audience of the multitude, the heterogeneous complexity, which any blanket 
definition of identity or approach to identity contains. White demonstrates the 
possibility of multiple formulations of any given identity across her body of fiction: A 
Russian Armenian and an Ottoman Armenian may not have similar feelings about 
Ottoman rule; one does not have to be a socialist -- or Armenian -- to want to live 
altruistically (Vera overcomes her fear of Muslims when she receives help from a 
fisherman); not all socialists have the best interests of mankind at heart – some may 
prioritise creating nations to caring for humans. 
De Bernières achieves a similar goal through his depiction of the life of a community. 




Aga defends Polyxeni’s deceased mother’s innocence and saves the Armenian 
apothecary’s daughters from Kurdish irregulars); both Christians and Muslims want to 
serve their Sultan; a Muslim Ottoman boy can write in Greek letters; being born Greek 
doesn’t mean one is actually a Greek and can speak Greek. As Bouquet explains, this is 
what lies behind the modern notion of Ottoman identity: ‘I  is [the] ability to move 
within different worlds which, in my opinion, characterises the modernity of the 
Ottomans, both in the use they made of it and in the limits they encountered’.18 The 
concept of Ottomanism has been best described in these terms in de Bernières’s imagery 
of the Ottoman community representing a civilisational being – a simple, largely 
harmonious coexistence.  
All three authors’ works examined in this thesis have aimed at, and to a large extent 
achieved, a vision of and for the Ottoman Empire, in which ‘multiculturalism’ is viewed 
as being not only ‘about the rights of minority cultures’, but also ‘about the value of 
cultural diversity’.19 Through their works, Goodwin, White and de Bernières have 
portrayed the strengths and the flaws of both the millet system and the nationalist 
ideology of Ottomanism which aimed to eliminate the shortcomings of the millet system 
after the emergence of nationalist separatism. By doing so, the authors have challenged 
the devastating consequences of nationalism by upholding cultural diversity. The 
diversity of representations points towards the intricacy, fragility and even dissonance 
of the Ottoman past and post-Ottoman ideologies and identities. This diversity, 
however, more importantly indicates the possibility of gaining strength from this 
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multiplicity and of reconstructing amulti-dimensional Ottoman society with complex, 
fully-realised characters, at once diverse and unique.  
The historical moments of confrontation represented in these novels point towards the 
difficulties and problems the authors choose to foreground and the forgotten or hijacked 
histories they would like to rescue. Such historical investigation, when implemented 
within the capabilities of the historical novel form, helps us readers appreciate the past, 
‘define and redefine our position in the present’ and redeem the possibility of shared 
futures.20 The representations of all these spaces of heterogeneity u furl possibil t ies for 
empathy even though political boundaries may restrain further efforts or conversations. 
With literature’s reach in contemporary society, books keep such possibility alive. 
Fiction can reach audiences that academic history cannot. We might wish that more 
world leaders would become novel readers. 
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